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Abstract
New Labour came to power claiming it would usher in an era of progressive politics 
that would go beyond the old Left and New Right ideologies and deliver balanced 
communities through a modernised local government. These communities would see a 
move away from the dominance of economic policy with environmental and social 
issues given parity.
The planning system has historically accepted a socially driven argument for capturing 
some of the uplift in land value that results from the granting of planning permission, 
for community benefits. Local planning authorities seeking social benefits for a 
community normally secure these through planning obligations. However, obligations 
can be used for a wide range of purposes and this thesis investigates whether New 
Labour changed the emphasis of using obligations to be more socially cognisant, 
compared to the previous Government.
This is measured by conducting an in-depth analysis of obligations signed at one local 
authority over the period 1991 to 2003. This gives six years of obligations under the 
Conservative Government to provide a contrast with the obligations signed under the 
first six years of the New Labour Government. Every clause signed in every obligation 
over this period has been classified to see whether the use of obligations has undergone 
a paradigm shift under New Labour. The research at the authority came to an 
interesting and surprising conclusion that a smaller percentage of obligations had a 
social purpose under New Labour than the previous Conservative Government. The 
research results were investigated by conducting interviews with senior officers at the 
authority to consider why so little progress was made under New Labour. The thesis 
concludes by suggesting why problems arose, considers whether they are likely to 
transcend the case study authority, and suggests how changes are needed if social issues 
are to be progressed.
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1 INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH
“If they acquire private property in land, houses or money, they will become 
farmers and men of business instead of Guardians, and harsh tyrants instead 
of partners in their dealings with their fellow citizens, with whom they will 
live on terms of mutual hatred and suspicion; they will be more afraid of 
internal revolt than external attack, and be heading fast for destruction that 
will overwhelm themselves and the whole community” (Plato, from The 
Republic, translated by Lee, 1987: 125).
Plato warned of the dangers of the governing class1 owning property as he felt there was 
a risk that not only would they abuse their position but they would be distracted from 
the matters of state, instead becoming focused on their own business interests. Property 
and politics were seen as a dangerous mix that would undermine community cohesion 
from the earliest of days. However, history has shown that since the end of the ice age, 
humans have transformed themselves from being primarily hunter-gathers to having a 
desire for property that has proven irresistible (Cohen, 2001).
Cities have been central to civilisation for many centuries before the Greeks and 
Romans but the city was the agency through which the Graeco-Roman way of life was 
disseminated and it was an urban building programme that Agricola used to help pacify 
and civilise Britain (Owens, 1992). Within the context of this thesis, the Greek and 
Roman view of urban development is of particular interest and it should be remembered 
that the Greek polis3 was originally seen as a community of citizens where the buildings 
were of secondary importance. However, the physical interest increased as the cities 
grew under the Hellenistic kings and their Roman successors as cities had to serve 
political, economic, social, and religious functions. The orderly arrangement of these 
elements was the task of the town planner, with planning records stretching from around 
the fifth century BC. These early records demonstrate that doctors commented on the 
health implications of town planning and Hippocrates showed how to align streets for 
the occupants’ health. This was an early precursor of the foundations of the ‘modem’ 
planning system in Britain, over two thousand years later.
1 The Guardians were to carry out the functions of both the government and the army
2 The Phoenicians and Carthaginians were especially prolific city builders
3 A city state in ancient Greece
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The Classical town planning period under the Greeks therefore saw the city state as the 
dominant political form with new towns created for political ends but with town 
planners becoming increasingly aware of the social problems of expansion. However, it 
was the Hellenistic period that saw cities become an end in themselves, by showing the 
greatness and stability of the rulers through the monumentalisation of cities to reflect 
the strategic and military role they now fulfilled (Owens, 1992). Cities became an 
expression of the political ruler’s power to demonstrate their greatness, with town 
planning increasingly employed to ensure the economic and military power of the city 
was maximised. Town planning had become a tool of the political rulers of the day to 
try to physically demonstrate how great their nation was.
Politics and planning have been intertwined ever since and the ability of planners to 
address the concerns of citizens and ensure a community is developed in a way that 
balances economic, social, and physical concerns will largely be dependent on the 
desires of those in power. Planners would continue to struggle with this political 
dependence to varying degrees and this would influence their professional desire to 
create communities that provided what the people wanted, rather than what the 
politicians thought they wanted.
This research seeks to examine the planning system at the end of the twentieth century 
and into the new millennium to see the pressures it was under and whether communities 
were now being developed that balanced economic, social, and environmental aims. 
The signs were good with a strong economy, a public interested in the environment, and 
a Labour Government back in power with a landslide majority that should enable social 
issues to be high on the agenda. It was considered that research could be carried out by 
examining the use of planning obligations in detail at one local authority where all three 
desires would be found. This would give a good indication of whether the planning 
system was managing to give equal weight to each of the issues or whether any 
dominated.
Planning obligations were chosen as a suitable procedural tool where the aims could be 
measured and a case study authority was found that on paper balanced economic desires 
(it was in the economic powerhouse of the southeast), environmental concerns (it has 
significant international and national areas of protection), and social concerns (with high
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indices of deprivation). This would allow a modern day polis to be examined to see 
how conflicting desires were being weighted and whether after all these years, the 
planning system had managed to balance these aims.
1.1 Politics and planning before New Labour
Before the research can be set out in detail, it is important to have a brief understanding 
of how the planning system had developed over the centuries and the issues that had 
come to dominate before the Labour Government returned to power in 1997. It would 
be naive to assume that they inherited either a country or a planning system that were 
value free and that there were not circumstances that they would have to react to once in 
power.
Therefore, it is intended to provide a concise and abridged history of the ‘modem’ 
planning system and the issues that the outgoing Conservative Government had left the 
new Labour Government to contend with. This will also show how economic, 
environmental, and social concerns changed in importance relative to each other, as it is 
important to understand where social aims stood in relation to the others when Labour 
came to power.
‘Modem’ town planning before 1960
The ‘modem’ planning system in Britain, like the very first planners, also had an 
altruistic aim of trying to ensure development was well planned to address the concerns 
about public health and lack of housing. Growing fears over public health eventually 
led to the Public Health Act of 1875 which specified minimum housing standards in 
terms of street width, dwelling design, and construction. However, the squalid 
conditions inspired religious philanthropists, social reformers, political campaigners, 
entrepreneurs, and great landowners to go beyond the minimum requirements of the law 
and to develop model towns to improve the lives of their workers (Low, 1991). This 
culminated with Ebenezer Howard’s tract in 1898, Tomorrow -  A Peaceful Path to 
Social Reform, a key writing setting out how to create the ideal town that catered for all 
of the community’s needs and theorised the previous building experiments at Saltaire, 
Boumville, and Port Sunlight.
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Howard was also interested in trying to address the lack of wider social change and he 
saw land reform as critical to this process and wanted land to be owned by the people, 
not in the hands of the privileged ruling elite; the same concern Plato had raised. 
Howard believed that not only should the land be owned by the public but that it should 
be administered in the interests of the whole community and he placed an emphasis on 
the need for a strong local level of government to have a community spirit and be self- 
sufficient (Thomley, 1977).
However, the first piece of legislation to focus specifically on planning did not 
concentrate on these more ideological issues but instead looked at more practical 
matters. The first planning legislation was The Housing, Town Planning, Etc. Act of 
1909 and its title reflected the ongoing intertwined nature of planning and housing. 
These two issues were considered together to address the public health problems and the 
1909 Act was followed by The 1919 Housing and Town Planning Act. This emerging 
planning system was a response to the problems generated by the unregulated urban- 
industrial growth of the nineteenth century that had created slums and squalor. The new 
housing layouts were intended to improve social conditions for the public or at least to 
stabilise social relations (Cullingworth & Nadin, 2002; Ennis, 1997; Thomley, 1977).
The 1925 Town Planning Act separated housing from planning for the first time in 
legislation, although by the time of the 1932 Act it was the Minister of Health who 
oversaw the development of areas due to the health implications of housing layouts. 
Planning focused very much on physical design issues with the Town Planning Institute 
initially requiring a professional qualification in architecture, engineering, or surveying 
for admission (Rydin, 2003).
The nineteen twenties and thirties had also seen a growing interest in environmental 
issues, including a desire for better public access to the countryside, with the emergence 
of National Parks, the Council for the Preservation of Rural England in 1926, the Rights 
of Way Act, the Youth Hostels’ Association and the Ramblers’ Association. However, 
this environmental impetus was subsequently lost for over a decade due to economic 
concerns taking precedence after the 1929 Wall Street Crash and then the Second World 
War. The 1943 Cabinet Committee on Reconstruction eventually saw environmental 
issues return to the agenda (Cullingworth & Nadin, 2002; Rydin, 2003).
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The nineteen forties could be seen as a golden era for planning as the country prepared 
for the challenges of reconstruction after the Second World War and approached it with 
the same rigour of planning a military operation with a series of reports (Cullingworth 
& Nadin, 2002). There was new economic policy on industrial location with the 
requirement for industrial development certificates and the publication of the influential 
Barlow Report in 19404. There was also legislation for environmental aims to protect 
listed buildings, rural land, agricultural areas, national parks, wildlife conservation, 
nature conservation, and the publication of the Scott Report in 19425. Lastly, there was 
a renewed focus on social issues with Alcock (2003) noting how the welfare state in 
Britain emerged from the Beveridge Report of 19426 which sought to remove the ‘five 
giant evils’ of the pre-war years: disease, idleness, ignorance, squalor, and want.
“As developed in the 1940s, the UK planning system was intended to realise 
in spatial and physical terms the economic, social and environmental 
objectives of the new society ushered in with the post-war Labour 
government” (Healey, 1992: 421).
There are two other events of note in the forties. The first was the publication of the 
Uthwatt Report in 19427, which was the first serious consideration of how to develop 
land and retain the value for public benefit (this will be considered further later). The 
second was the publication of the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, which 
expanded the need for planning permission to cover nearly all development, and moved 
planning beyond its regulatory function by requiring development plans to proactively 
plan for the future. Consequently, planners in the forties and fifties saw themselves as 
being fundamental to building the welfare states that would provide a decent quality of 
life for people after the war. There was considerable focus on urban form and the ideas 
of Patrick Abercrombie with hierarchies of city, district, and sub centres on radial routes 
(Healey, 1997). In addition to the ongoing economic concerns, the fifties moved back 
to planning’s roots of ensuring a good supply of housing to improve physical conditions 
in the cities with the implementation of the much-heralded new towns programme.
4 Report of the Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population
5 Report of the Committee on Land Utilisation in Rural Areas
6 Social Insurance and Allied Services
7 Report of the Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment
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This era is also notable for the fact that the RTPI published a Report o f the Committee 
on the Qualifications o f Planners in 19508 and it recommended a widening of entrants 
to the profession to include economists, geographers, and sociologists (Rydin, 2003). 
This moved the Institute beyond the physical focus it previously had and was an 
important recognition by the profession that planning should legitimately be seeking to 
interact with economic and social issues as well as physical concerns.
The 1960s & 1970s
The sixties started with the designation of the second phase of new towns (in light of 
alarming population predictions) and with growing political tensions. The publication 
of The Robson Report in 1966 stated that local government had effectively lost power to 
central government, while The Maud Report of 1967 argued that what little power was 
left in local government was in the hands of the professional officers and not the elected 
local politicians (Leach & Percy-Smith, 2001). Power had effectively been centralised 
while decision-making was seen as an objective technical exercise to be carried out by 
the experts with the first major experiments in traffic management and computer 
modelling. However, there was a growing realisation that urban decay was spreading, 
poverty was increasing, and the public were increasingly worried about the effects of 
slum clearance, high-density redevelopment, urban motorways, and racial unrest in their 
communities (Cullingworth & Nadin, 2002). As the malaise spread, urban issues 
increasingly dominated the political agenda with politicians becoming more interested 
in planning to reach a technical solution (Leach & Percy-Smith, 2001).
The question was; what would happen when the elected politicians clashed with the 
technical expertise of the professional officers? The background to the Urban 
Programme (UP) of 1968 gives an answer and illustrates how the professionals were 
largely to blame for the removal of social issues from the political agenda. Atkinson 
(2000) argues that preparation for the UP had seen central government attempt to 
develop a more coordinated approach to social issues that would have had a radical 
impact. Unfortunately, the British political elite had been persuaded by the 
professionals that full employment and the welfare state had eradicated the social 
problems that were characteristic of the inter-war period. The belief that poverty as a
8 The Schuster Report
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mainstream problem had been defeated led to the view that social issues were only a 
problem in certain geographical areas. These were where communities had failed to 
take advantage of the opportunities afforded to them by full employment and the 
welfare state. The solution was typical of the dominant planning discourse that had 
existed since 1945 where problems were seen in physical terms with technical solutions 
proposed. The Government targeted the ‘problem’ areas along with their ‘deviant’ 
populations to ensure they ‘modified’ their behaviour (Atkinson, 2000).
The result was little serious consideration of wider societal forces and the UP was 
simply ‘tacked’ on to other policies with a relatively small budget and the opportunity 
for a coherent urban policy that would tackle social problems was lost. The 
professional experts, who thought they had a technical answer, had steered the 
politicians in central government away from a solution that would have placed social 
issues on the same level as economic and environmental concerns. Instead, they 
focused on spatial issues with only an aside given to social problems. The local 
politicians who may have questioned this by what they saw on the ground had lost the 
ability to influence the discussion as the professionals had the ear of central government 
(Atkinson, 2000).
Urban policy after 1968 was therefore characterised by a focus on these ‘deviant’ 
communities and one solution was to increase citizen involvement with the hope that if 
people were involved more in their communities they could be ‘helped’ to help 
themselves find a job or use the welfare state to escape poverty. This led to the growth 
of projects which operated alongside the main part of urban policy in areas of ‘special 
social need.’ Community involvement improved to a degree but was limited due to 
criticism that the process was top-down and run by the local authority and not by local 
people. The authorities argued that it was not easy to identify who the local community 
was, and when they did, it was often difficult to involve them in a meaningful way 
(Atkinson, 2000). This was not a new problem as trying to balance more participation 
with quicker decision-making had been a concern of the planning system for a decade 
before the 1968 Town and Country Planning Act eventually introduced the requirement 
for participation (Thomley, 1977).
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The Skeffington Report was published in 19699 and sought to work out how the 
requirements of the 1968 Act would be met but pointed out the educational benefits of 
participation. During the debate before publication of the report, the Government 
remained silent on its own opinion and even sought to keep the discussion vague, so as 
not to influence the outcome of the Report. However, it in turn was vague and 
contradictory and left the problem for the subsequent Circular 52/72 to resolve, which 
in turn left the problem for local authorities to consider (Thomley, 1977). People knew 
the planning system benefitted those who were best placed to ‘use’ the system for their 
own ends; business interests, the articulate middle classes, and affluent owner-occupiers 
living on the edge of cities but little changed (Davoudi & Atkinson, 1999). The 
participation required by the 1968 Act was in reality more a publication exercise, rather 
than genuine participation.
While there had been advances in the environmental agenda, particularly with the 
creation of the Countryside Commission (Cullingworth & Nadin, 2002), the seventies 
saw growing inner city problems. It was realised that planning was not actually capable 
of delivering level growth across the country with areas of severe deprivation adjacent 
to areas of massive development profit (Rydin, 2003). This led to research into the 
implications of welfare economics on land use planning, although with little practical 
purpose, as planners did not seem particularly interested (Evans, 2003). The seventies 
saw the peak and subsequent collapse of the post-war economic boom as the property 
explosion of the early seventies was swiftly followed by the oil price rises of 1973-74 as 
the Keynesian demand-stimulation strategies ran out of steam (Healey, 1997).
Research by Peter Hall and colleagues into The Containment o f Urban England in 1973 
proved that a major objective of the post-war planning system had been to restrict urban 
sprawl and development in the countryside and while this had successfully contained 
development, the success was at a price (Taylor, 1999). The restriction of land 
available for development led to inflation of land and property prices and the knock-on 
effect was an increase in social inequalities as fewer people could afford to buy land or 
property due to the increasing inflation and so post-war physical planning had been 
socially regressive.
9 People and Planning (Report of the Committee on Public Participation in Planning)
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The growing realisation that these problems were difficult to fix and that the planning 
system had wide ranging influence (for good or bad) was inherent to the 1977 White 
Paper10 which reflected on the experiences of the Urban Programme, the Educational 
Priority Areas programme, the Community Development Projects, and the analysis 
contained within the Inner Area Studies. It pointed out that progress had been made but 
that the problems of urban areas were only beginning to be understood by planners, 
politicians, and policy makers. The analysis is interesting as it recognises the interplay 
of economic decline, physical decay, and adverse social conditions (Burton, 1997).
The New Right
Margaret Thatcher came to power with the Conservative Government in 1979 and 
effectively ended aspirations of social progress as the 1978-79 winter of discontent 
started to bite and the harsh economic realities gave rise to the political ideologies of 
Reaganomics in the USA and Thatcherism in the UK. They undermined the collectivist 
entitlements of citizenship by taking on the unions (the air traffic controllers in the USA 
and the miners in the UK) and brought to an end full employment, which had given the 
industrial class its bargaining power. They sought to raise aspirations on an individual 
and competitive basis rather than on the previous collectivist basis (Low, 1991; Rustin, 
2001a).
The term New Right is broad and covers public choice theory, liberalism, neo­
liberalism, and conservatism and during this period every aspect of land-use planning 
was affected by New Right theory, although there was a gap between theory and 
practise, as what was meant to happen did not always occur (Allmendinger, 2002). The 
Thatcher Governments (1979-1990) and to a lesser extent the Major Governments 
(1990-1997) were influenced by New Right ideas. These were based on an economic 
and moral critique of the welfare state and state intervention with a resulting advocacy 
in support of market mechanisms in all areas of public policy. However, two New 
Right approaches resulted; firstly, the neo-liberal that stressed freedom, choice, and 
individualism, while expressing doubts and anxieties about government action, and 
favoured a minimal and enabling state. Secondly, the neo-conservative approach which
10 Policy for the Inner Cities
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emphasised the importance of hierarchy, authority, tradition and order, and advocated a 
strong interventionist state (Tiesdell & Allmendinger, 2001a). These different 
approaches would become highly visible within the planning system by the end of the 
era.
Thatcher came to power appearing to believe that local government was partly 
responsible for producing the run-down Council estates that dominated the post-war 
urban agenda. She was also aware that the seventies had culminated in a period of 
growing public mistrust that the government was not acting in the best interests of 
communities, as social problems had become prominent but with little visible action 
(Thomley, 1991). However, she believed that a strong central state was needed to 
ensure interest groups (including local authorities) did not frustrate the operation of the 
market and the neo-liberal argument for a minimal state with greater freedom and 
autonomy for local government was defeated by the neo-conservative argument for 
greater state direction (Tiesdell & Allmendinger, 2001b). Privatisation and deregulation 
were to free up market processes by removing the ‘blockages’ to supply-side activity, 
with the resulting loss of focus on social and environmental issues seen as a necessary 
cost of transition to a stronger economy (Healey, 1997). The ‘benefits culture’ was to 
be replaced by the ‘enterprise culture’ with many regeneration programmes bypassing 
the local authority as they sought to free up supply side conditions.
The Conservative Government was seeking to challenge the post-war consensus by 
drawing on the work of Friedman and Hayek to argue that the market should always be 
free to make decisions, as any decision it made would always be preferable to a political 
decision. The state would occasionally have to ‘interfere’ in society but only the market 
had the ability to objectively cope with the complexity of decision-making and 
satisfactorily weigh up all costs and benefits (Hayek, 1944). The important point for 
Hayek regarding the state was that the individual must be able to foresee the actions of 
the state. Although economic planning will involve deliberate discrimination between 
the needs of people, the rules applied by the state must be applied rigorously and 
without exception, even if occasionally it seems unfair (Hayek, 1944). One such 
example would be that the poor should accept they must live in bad housing and 
unpleasant locations, as that is all they can afford, and there should be no attempt by the 
Government to improve conditions beyond the minimum standard required to protect
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the rest of the population from disease. Any such attempt would be seen by Hayek as 
interfering with the just distribution of resources, as decided by market forces (Low, 
1991). Friedman and Hayek had both argued that terms such as ‘social justice’ were 
meaningless with no justification for intervening in the market to try to achieve social 
concerns and instead they advocated that market mechanisms should be used in all areas 
of public policy (Thomley, 1991; Tiesdell & Allmendinger, 2001b).
Therefore, the 1980s and early 1990s were characterised by the lure of an unrestrained 
market-led property-fuelled regeneration that had sprung from the belief that there was a 
need to overcome a shortfall of physical infrastructure to support global corporate 
investors. This approach was supported by the removal of supply-side constraints to 
investment in cities, including the minimisation of local government and public 
participation. The solution was for blighted areas to build their way out of poverty and 
to rely on some of the wealth created by the new development and investment to 
‘trickle-down’ into the local community (Imrie & Raco, 2003b; Thomley, 1991). 
Thatcher approached urban planning with an aim of introducing a ‘rule of law’ to 
minimise local discretion, centralise control and thereby provide the market with more 
certainty. The lobbying by the British Property Federation (BPF) and Royal Institute of 
Chartered Surveyors (RICS) to replace the planning system with restrictive covenants 
and nuisance laws is reflective of this attempt to simplify the planning process and the 
eighties saw a significant degree of centralisation in planning (Allmendinger & 
Tewdwr-Jones, 1997).
However, by the late 1980s there was much dissatisfaction about the exclusively 
economic approach being followed. The House of Commons Public Accounts 
Committee published a report in 1989 that criticised urban policy for its lack of social 
content. Evidence was produced that showed ‘trickle-down’ economics was not 
working, with the number of people living in poverty tripling between 1977 and the 
1990s, along with growing geographical inequalities between the rich and poor (Adair 
et al., 2003; Imrie & Raco, 2003b). Concern was also mounting that the Urban 
Development Corporations (UDC) took no account of local needs and had little interest 
in social issues with reports that they had received 61% of urban regeneration funding 
by 1990 but that they spent no more than 5% of their funding on social issues 
(Ginsburg, 1999). Nevertheless, there was little change in policy or practice with regard
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to public participation as community groups were still given a ‘presence’ rather than a 
proper voice (Imrie & Raco, 2003b).
Economic concerns were still seen as the panacea of society’s problems, although the 
environmental lobby had grown in strength as middle-England (the traditional 
heartlands of the Conservative Party) rallied against the massive house building 
programme that was considered to be destroying swathes of countryside. Conservative 
MPs were under increasing pressure from their constituents and Margaret Thatcher went 
from having little interest in the environment to suddenly declaring the party to be the 
guardians and trustees of the earth. She had realised the significant increase in support 
for the Green Party in the European elections of 1989 meant environmental issues could 
be a vote winner (Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 1997). This resulted in the 1990 
White Paper This Common Inheritance, which set out an environmental strategy 
(Cullingworth & Nadin, 2002), while The Environmental Protection Act of 1990 
bolstered the functions of local authorities as guardians of the environment. European 
integration led to the ‘greening’ of planning and politics in Britain as the EU had a 
strong environmental lobby and had moved beyond simply seeking market solutions to 
problems (Rydin, 2003).
Overall, the Thatcher Governments pursued an identifiable New Right market-led 
approach to regeneration, although by the end of her tenure as Prime Minister, there was 
mounting evidence that the plethora of initiatives and bodies responsible for 
regeneration was overly complex and bureaucratic (Tiesdell & Allmendinger, 2001b). 
Thatcher had moved Britain towards a freer and more competitive open economy but 
with a more repressive and authoritarian state. For example, planners were constantly 
reminded they were a ‘burden on business’ (Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 1997). 
However, the Audit Commission report Urban Regeneration and Economic 
Development was published in 1989 and concluded that the nineties needed to address 
the overly complex regeneration agenda and that local government should take a more 
active role in policy formulation and instigation. This set the scene for John Major who 
became Prime Minister in November 1990.
When Major came to power, policy inevitably continued as it was for the first few years 
as many initiatives had a long lifespan that could not be quickly changed, but there was
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a move to make policy more coherent and to include local authorities and local 
communities further (Tiesdell & Allmendinger, 2001b). After a decade of local 
government being practically sidelined from the regeneration programme, it was again 
seen as a key player, but now in partnership with the local community. There was an 
increase in ‘bottom-up’ involvement but it should not be forgotten that the top still 
controlled the process through the way it allocated resources via competitive funding 
regimes. This in turn led to the creation of the ‘audit culture’ that tried to monitor how 
the money was spent.
The New Right initially had little time for social aims but there had been a slow 
recognition of social issues on problem estates towards the end of Thatcher’s reign, 
although Major is still considered to have been more amenable to social issues than 
Thatcher (Tiesdell & Allmendinger, 2001b). Commentators do not agree about the 
difference between the approach of Thatcher and Major with Tiesdell & Allmendinger 
(2001a) arguing there was a significant difference with Major seeking to compel people 
to work together through the incentive of financial resources. They see this shift from 
the ‘agency-type’ model to a ‘partnership-type’ model as less confrontational and not to 
be dismissed but Rydin (2003) sees the Major Government as more of a change in style, 
rather than content, with Major more pragmatic and consensual than Thatcher. There is 
a further view that the Major government had a ‘hidden agenda’ that actually introduced 
some pro-planning changes via the plan-led system, although this was mainly to allow 
central government to dictate local policy through central policy guidance. However, 
the primacy of the development plan returned significant power to the local authority 
with the new S.54A under the Planning & Compensation Act (P&CA) 1991, which was 
introduced in Major’s first parliamentary session as Prime Minister (Allmendinger & 
Tewdwr-Jones, 1997).
There were contradictions within the Conservative Party as the influential house­
building lobby was eventually constrained by the ‘green’ lobby and this led to a dual 
planning system with environmental issues paramount in areas of protection11 but with 
the market dominant everywhere else (Thomley, 1991). Nevertheless, Thatcher did 
change the purpose of planning to become more market driven with only a selective
11 Such as the National Park, AONB, Conservation Area, Green Belt etc.
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application of environmental concerns and practically no room for social issues. The 
procedures also changed from community-based local democracy towards centralised 
government supervision.
“Central control has the effect of reducing the ability of local authorities to 
introduce their own criteria and allows central government to ensure that 
market criteria dominate, as expressed in their increasing involvement in 
planning gain. Again, the reduction of opportunities to participate is a 
thread running through the period, associated with the desire to speed up 
and streamline the system” (Thomley, 1991: 161).
The New Right had a profound impact on life within the United Kingdom and this 
included the planning system which had been significantly altered to practically remove 
social concerns as a legitimate consideration. The public was restless for a new 
approach and New Labour stepped into this vacuum.
1.2 New Labour
Tony Blair, the soon to be Prime Minister, stated in the introduction to the 1997 Labour 
Party manifesto that a new approach was needed in each policy area which was to differ 
from the ‘the old left and the Conservative right’ (Powell, 1999: 13). This was seen by 
many as the birth of a new political rationale that was different to the two traditional 
ideologies of the Labour Party and the Conservative Party. This was a ‘third way’ that 
heralded a new approach to politics and was befitting of a party that had branded itself 
as New Labour and fit for governing in the modem era. This new approach had 
emerged from the perceived collapse of Communism, the growing irritation with the 
New Right and its rejection of social concerns, and the growing dominance of 
globalisation that came to shape policies at the end of the millennium.
Blair wanted to be the peoples’ Prime Minister and he promised to give power back to 
them and to ensure people could work in partnership with each other towards a 
stakeholder democracy and economy. All people would have rights and responsibilities 
that would collectively allow the country to prosper as it embraced the free market to 
empower people. In Britain, Blair was personally the main proponent of the Third Way 
and he tried to explain what it was with assistance from Anthony Giddens who gave 
some intellectual credence to the idea. Giddens built on the ideas of Durkheim and
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placed community central to the New Labour message while Blair focused on a new 
buzz phrase -  social justice.
“The Third Way stands for a modernised social democracy, passionate in its 
commitment to social justice and the goals of the centre-left, but flexible, 
innovative and forward-looking in the means to achieve them... The Third 
Way is not an attempt to split the difference between Right and Left. It is 
about traditional values in a changed world. And it draws vitality from 
uniting the two great streams of left-of-centre thought - democratic 
socialism and liberalism” (Blair, 1998b: 1).
Ideas that would have been previously inconceivable were back on the agenda as 
progressive politics regained strength with a Labour Government that had a massive 
majority in the House of Commons that practically gave it carte blanche to do as it 
pleased. They moved quickly to set up new initiatives that would bring social issues 
back to the fore, such as the Social Exclusion Unit, and they spoke passionately of the 
need for social justice and for social issues to prevail.
Blair had come to power with a vision that local authorities needed to reassert and 
redefine their role as ‘community leaders’ by working in partnership with other groups 
and to bring together the various local stakeholders (Blair, 1998; Leach & Percy-Smith, 
2001). One of the areas where there was a need for this leadership was in the provision 
of social infrastructure as there was a demand for better health services (especially 
dentists), and more places, teachers, and facilities for schools that were in desperate 
need. News headlines were full of stories where people could not find an NHS dentist 
for hundreds of miles, hospitals were dirty and had waiting lists that ran into years, and 
schools could not afford new books and had to ask parents to buy them (Blair, 2002b; 
Coote, 2001; Crouch, 2003). The provision of social infrastructure had practically 
collapsed under the New Right and so it would be a ‘quick win’ area and a popular 
policy arena for the New Labour Government.
1 9In 1998, New Labour published a White Paper that “sets out a strategy for the reform 
and modernisation of local government in England. It is an agenda for change 
stretching for ten years or more” (ODPM, 1998a: 4). The scope of reform and 
modernisation was wide ranging but had very clear intentions with respect to the
12 Modern Local Government: In Touch with the People
22
relationship between economic, social, and environmental issues and the age old 
question of comparative importance. It is worth directly considering the purpose of this 
White Paper in detail, as it is central to this research.
“People everywhere deserve and rightly expect a pleasant and safe 
environment in which they can live and work... It is to give people this 
quality of life that we have embarked upon an ambitious programme to 
modernise Britain. We want to build a fairer more decent society 
underpinned by stable economic growth, environmental sustainability, and 
social justice for all... Central to this programme is our agenda to modernise 
local government. Among all our public institutions councils have a special 
status and authority as local, directly-elected bodies. They are uniquely 
placed to provide vision and leadership to their local communities. They are 
able to make things happen on the ground - where it really matters... But our 
modernising agenda is seeking nothing less than a radical refocusing of 
councils' traditional roles. A fundamental shift of culture throughout local 
government is essential so that councils become outward looking and 
responsive. Only in this way will local government fulfil its potential, and 
councils everywhere contribute to their communities' well-being - that is 
what people have a right to expect from local democratic institutions... 
Within this framework we will want councils to have a duty to promote the 
economic, social and environmental well-being of their areas” (ODPM, 
1998a: 2-3).
Simply put, the modernisation programme was to improve the quality of life for people 
by providing communities that balanced economic, social, and environmental desires 
and local government was charged with making sure this happened, as they worked on 
the front line. The role of local government was to fundamentally change and become 
more receptive to finding out what was in the interests of the community and seeking to 
provide for those needs by giving a vision and providing leadership. The White Paper 
went on to clearly state the role of local government.
“So, in taking decisions affecting their area or its people, councils will have 
to weigh up the likely effects of a decision against the three objectives -  
economic, social and environmental -  and if necessary strike a balance to 
ensure that the overall well-being of their area is achieved” (ODPM, 1998a:
63).
This requirement only became law in the enactment of the Local Government Act 2000 
(HMSO, 2000a: 2) but it sent a clear message that New Labour was placing the social 
needs of communities on an equal power as economic and environmental desires. 
However, it was clear that the New Labour Government was very different to the old
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Labour party and economic issues were much more central. Therefore, it is legitimate 
to consider whether things would actually change on the ground, when the local Council 
had tough choices to make when trying to balance the three aims. It is this question that 
this research seeks to answer.
The scene was set: New Labour had come to power and thrown down the challenge to 
local government to govern their people wisely and to ensure all decisions were made in 
the best interests of the area, with specific consideration to be given to social concerns, 
as well as to economic and environmental.
1.3 Measuring social aims within planning
Within local government, the local Council wears many hats and fulfils different 
functions. One of these is to operate as the Local Planning Authority (LPA), drawing 
together a development plan and then deciding planning applications primarily against 
the policies contained within the plan. As a result, the planning system operates in an 
almost unique environment as it plans where new communities should be located and 
then develops them over time. This requires decisions to be made between competing 
pressures (economic, social, and environmental) and people (the public, developers, 
lobby groups, and politicians etc.). The Town & Country Planning Association (TCPA) 
points out that the planning system has a central role in bringing all of these issues 
together for discussion and decision.
“Market forces increasingly shape priorities for development, and planning 
can help to ensure that any negative social, environmental or economic 
impacts, or conflicts with the priorities agreed by communities at all levels 
(local to national), can be minimised. Planning therefore needs to become 
much more fully integrated into the culture of governance in a mixed 
economy. It needs to provide a mechanism to enable a positive and 
productive dialogue between community visions and the market economy, 
between individual self interest and shared needs and demands, and between 
short-term opportunistic market-led initiatives and longer-term processes”
(TCP A, 1999: 12).
Therefore, the Council operating as the LPA is a good setting to assess whether New
Labour coming to power has actually made any difference in practice to delivering
balanced communities where social aims are given equal weight to economic and
environmental considerations. The detailed question is to assess which part of the
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planning system in particular best lends itself to allowing any changing emphasis to be 
measured.
By the time New Labour came to power, public pressure for improving the social 
conditions of communities was immense and the Conservative Government had allowed 
the practice known as planning gain to carry on in an attempt to fund these community 
resources.
“In essence, the planning system appears to have abandoned any pretensions 
of acting as a method of redistributing resources to improve the quality of 
life of the least privileged social and economic groups. At best the planning 
system sought to extract some marginal benefits for local people through the 
use of ‘planning gain’ whereby developers were able to ‘purchase’ consent 
for developments which previously would have been rejected by providing 
‘community facilities’ and/or putting in their own infrastructure (e.g. road 
links)” (Davoudi & Atkinson, 1999: 232).
The process of planning gain was controversial at the time but was achieving social 
infrastructure for local communities through the legal mechanism of granting planning 
permission subject to a planning obligation requiring the negotiated social aims to be 
provided in return for the permission. The process may have developed as a pragmatic 
response to cash-strapped local authorities, but it was also supported by the legal 
system. The 1990 Act (as amended) had set out the principle that decisions should be 
made in accordance with the development plan, unless material considerations dictated 
otherwise, and these material consideration have been defined very broadly.
“The broad scope of ‘material considerations’ is crucial to the evolution of 
development obligations, as the justification for such obligations often turns 
on the need to offset the impacts of development proposals. The more the 
social and economic impacts of development can be classified as being 
‘material considerations’, the wider the scope for negotiating development 
obligations” (Healey et al., 1995: 87).
The practice of planning gain was arguably the main way that limited social aims were 
being achieved for local communities through the planning system under the 
Conservative Government up to 1997 and developers were concerned that even then 
social aims were on the agenda too frequently.
“Some developers are worried that planning gain gives local authorities too 
much scope to introduce social criteria as they increasingly use planning
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gain to circumvent the restrictions on the use of conditions” (Thomley,
1991: 154).
Whatever the practice and reasoning, it is clear that planning gain is an area that would 
clearly illustrate any changing focus and potential increase in capturing social benefits 
for communities. If any evidence was to be found in practice that New Labour had 
changed the balance of aims, and social aims were now equal to economic and 
environmental issues, then this should be found by examining the practice of using 
planning obligations.
1.4 Aims of the research
This research is fundamentally concerned with considering whether the New Labour 
Government returned the planning system to one where decisions made regarding local 
communities were more balanced in terms of providing for their economic, social, and 
environmental needs. This will be assessed by considering whether the three aims are 
used equitably when planning for the needs of a local community, thereby returning 
social aims back to a comparable footing. This would be in contrast to under the 
previous Conservative Governments, as it was shown in section 1.1 that economic 
issues dominated planning at that time, with social issues practically dismissed as 
irrelevant to planning. The research will be carried out by examining one local 
authority in detail to contrast the clauses contained within planning obligations for the 
last six years of the Conservative Government (to set the benchmark) with those within 
the first six years of the New Labour Government.
The central research question is has New Labour’s promise of creating balanced 
communities that provide for the economic, social, and environmental needs of their 
people been translated from theory into practice by the planning system? Has this 
resulted in a paradigm shift in how planning gain is applied by showing an increase in 
obligations that have a social aim, compared to under the Conservatives? The Oxford 
Dictionary (2001) defines ‘paradigm shift’ as “a fundamental change in approach or 
underlying assumptions” and therefore the bar is set high, with a demonstrable 
difference in results or approach required to prove the point.
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It is accepted that some communities will need economic, social, or environmental aims 
to be progressed to the exclusion of one or both of the others if they have particular 
needs. Therefore, some consideration will be given to ensure that communities are 
actually interested in achieving social aims; otherwise any lack in finding social aims 
may not be conclusive in answering the key question. For example, one community 
may have high unemployment and seek economic goals almost exclusively while 
another may have considerable problems of deprivation and seek social aims to a 
greater extent. Particular consideration will be given to the case study authority to 
ensure it is an authority where social aims are capable of being given due consideration 
and that the local authority has not deliberately chosen economic or environmental 
needs to the exclusion of social aims.
Out of scope of the research
There are several underlying themes that run through this research in parallel to assist in 
trying to answer the central research question and to understand the answers found. The 
first is consideration of the thinking underpinning New Labour to better understand how 
and why the New Labour Government actually said they wanted to return social issues 
to an equal footing. This is necessary to place the claims in context to understand how 
deeply held their views were and what angle the thinking was being approached from. 
This requires consideration of the Third Way, as this is the only political rationale that 
has been advanced for New Labour thinking. It will be contrasted with the New Right 
that preceded it with particular focus on the implications for the planning system and 
the local government context it works within.
The second theme is to consider the role of planning gain, and planning obligations in 
particular, to understand how the planning system has sought to capture benefits for the 
local community. This will look at the theoretical and historical practice, which 
overlaps with the first theme in parts, to understand where planning obligations emerged 
from and what they were meant to be used for by the time New Labour came to power. 
This involves consideration of the problems associated with the use of obligations so a 
good understanding can be gained about the limitations of obligations, to what extent 
obligations can be used to achieve economic, social and environmental aims, and any 
issues that need to be resolved if New Labour is to achieve the promised paradigm shift.
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These two themes will be central to the research but it should be clarified that while 
other theories and issues will have significant influence on these two themes and on the 
overall thesis, they are not being considered systematically and are out of scope of this 
research as a direct issue. The main such issue is the whole debate around community 
involvement in the planning system and the extent to which the community is genuinely 
involved in defining what planning gain it actually wants. The extent that communities 
should be involved in the planning system is a massive topic in its own right and 
includes fundamental issues around how to identify the community and then how to 
effectively involve the whole community, not just the vocal minority. This will 
inevitably be referred to as the New Labour claims around economic, social, and 
environmental aims were clearly linked to communities being empowered to make these 
decisions but can only be considered in passing to make sure the research stays focused.
The other topic that people may think should feature more but will only be considered 
in passing (i.e. when relevant to the main focus of research) is the role of affordable 
housing as a social planning aim. So much has been written about affordable housing it 
would dominate the research to the exclusion of other social planning issues if 
considered in detail. Therefore, community involvement in the planning system and 
affordable housing are considered out-of-scope of this research, except where passing 
comment is needed when considering the main focus of research.
It should also be pointed out that the research will consider all of the information when 
concluding whether there was a paradigm shift and, irrespective of the result, some 
attention will be given to how social issues could be given more focus. This is because 
it is considered important to apply the knowledge gained from the research to make 
recommendations on how to progress the topic (Denscombe, 2010). This will be 
considered in passing throughout the research but will be drawn together for express 
recommendations in chapter eight.
1.5 Information requirements
It is important to set out at the start that I approached the research from a critical realist 
perspective, seeing the theories identified in the literature review as tentative 
propositions rather than complete explanations (Denscombe, 2010). My ontological
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assumptions are that social reality does not exist in a guaranteed and simple cause-effect 
relationship but that what can be seen on the surface must be interpreted and examined 
so theories can be created about what is going on beneath the surface. This means that 
some of the issues identified in the literature review were perhaps engaged with in more 
detail than others as I felt they perhaps were reflective of wider pressures at play. The 
theories identified needed to be tested and consideration needed to be given to the 
research methods as they will inevitably have in-built assumptions. Objectivity is 
needed to be sure that the facts are interpreted properly and theories produced from the 
facts.
Moving to practical issues, there is always some difficulty around access to information 
within planning as many local authorities do not have accurate historical information. 
The second problem area for research within the planning arena is that while planning 
has a high profile within local communities, the media and literature has not historically 
tended to focus directly on the planning system. Instead, they have been more 
interested in the broader but more esoteric issues revolving around ‘urban problems,’ 
property, and regeneration. These broader policy issues are sometimes intertwined with 
the planning system, but often they are of little direct relevance, which makes it difficult 
to assess the impact on the planning system itself. For example, Imrie & Raco (2003b) 
identify a list of one hundred and fifty one policy programmes that have ‘some 
relevance to urban policy’ but there are only four under the sub-heading of ‘land and 
planning’ and it isn’t clear why they are considered more relevant than some of the 
issues that are excluded from the list. The literature review will therefore have to look 
quite broadly first at planning issues before focusing in on the details.
The third area of difficulty regarding information within planning revolves around the 
whole area of social issues and the extent to which we can actually define which social 
issues are directly related to the planning system. The significance of this area to the 
research has necessitated significant consideration to be given to it in chapter three as 
social planning is not a well developed concept.
While detailed explanations regarding the choice of case study authority and more 
detailed explanations regarding the research have been considered in detail in chapter 
six, there needs to be some understanding regarding the timeframes considered within
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the research period from the outset. As has been stated, this research is interested in the 
changes promised by New Labour when they were in opposition and especially with the 
claims set out in the 1998 White Paper shortly after they came to power. Consideration 
was given to what length of time the research database should span with the starting 
position being the longer the better as trends could be followed that way. It was around 
2003 that I was looking to carry out my fieldwork and this lent itself to constructing a 
database of obligations under the first six years of the New Labour government (1997- 
2003).
One of the concerns was that any incoming government would take time to change 
practices as policy is formulated in opposition but only in broad terms and so it often 
takes some time for policy to be finalised, to pass through Parliament, and to become 
legislation that will actually change things. It was pointed out earlier (section 1.2) that 
the White Paper was only enacted in 2000 and so it is not unreasonable to accept change 
up until this stage would be limited. As a result, there was some logic in deciding to 
divide the database under New Labour into two three-year segments so comparisons 
could be made before and after legislation had taken effect.
The research was to compare whether New Labour had changed things and so a 
comparison was needed to benchmark against and it seemed astute to also compare six 
years of obligations under the previous Conservative government. This would allow a 
database to be constructed that tracked the use of obligations from 1991, shortly after 
the 1990 Act brought s. 106 obligations into creation, through to 2003; a significant 
period to compare trends.
It was considered that it was important to not just state the findings of the research but 
to try to better understand the case study authority and the reasons behind the findings 
and so interviews were carried out with officers that worked at the case study authority. 
This could have proven difficult as I worked at the authority at the time of the 
interviews and managed some of the staff I interviewed (and in turn was managed by 
two of those I interviewed) but while this issue will be considered in detail later, it is 
considered that the interviews were honest and very useful. My positionality as an 
‘insider’ both within local government and specifically working for the case study 
authority on two different occasions while this research was being conducted is
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important to clarify. This is to ensure there are no allegations of potential bias and 
perceived lack of objectivity, which researchers must avoid (Crang, 2002, 2003; 
Denscombe, 2010; Gold, 2002; Herod, 1999; Rose, 1997). This is considered in more 
detail in chapter six.
1.6 Structure of the thesis
The title of this research is “Planning Gain and Progressive Politics: New Labour as a 
Paradigm Shift” and the structure of the thesis is based around this framework question. 
Chapters 2 & 3 set out the analysis within the literature review around the ‘progressive 
politics’ part of the title. Chapters 4 and 5 then set out the issues around the ‘planning 
gain’ part before chapters 6-8 go on to answer the question of whether New Labour 
applied their progressive politics to the planning gain system to introduce a paradigm 
shift or not.
Therefore, after this introductory chapter, chapters 2 & 3 seek to clarify what 
progressive politics are (with particular reference to the planning system) and what New 
Labour promised to deliver in terms of furthering social aims at the heart of new 
communities. To place this in context, chapter 2 considers what social planning issues 
actually are as it is important to be clear from the start of this research what changes 
could realistically be made that would be measurable within the planning system. This 
will show that there are broader social policy issues that the planning system can only 
have minimal impact on and instead the focus within this thesis is only on the practical 
implementation of some social policy areas.
Chapter 3 sets out the case that New Labour made about how it was going to usher in a 
new era of enlightened politics that would deliver balanced communities. To place the 
thinking of New Labour in context, there is a need to contrast their vision within the 
preceding one under the New Right. Consequently, chapter 3 starts by looking at where 
the New Right, under John Major, had left the planning system before moving on to 
amplify how New Labour claimed it would build a progressive society. This would be 
one that espoused the ideas of the Third Way and would deliver an enlightened and 
modem planning system that in turn would develop more stable communities. This 
chapter covers a broad area but the focus throughout is to establish the New Labour
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principles that more socially responsive communities would result than under the 
Conservatives. The chapter examines the claims by focusing on the contrast with the 
New Right by setting out the background to the Third Way and how social aims would 
be progressed in a modem society. This gives the theoretical understanding behind the 
New Labour thinking for how balanced communities would be created. However, as 
this thesis is interested in answering the question from a planning gain perspective, the 
framework within which planning gain operates needs to be explored to show how the 
implications of changes that New Labour was proposing would affect them. These 
areas include the ideas around local government modernisation and a plethora of other 
reviews that were conducted as planning gain operates inextricably within this broader 
context. The Third Way, changes to local government, and any implications for the 
planning system all need to be understood before the research question can be 
considered in detail as all of these areas could have influenced the planning gain system 
under New Labour.
Chapter 3 also takes New Labour’s claims about how it was going to build a progressive 
society and critically examines these claims and the growing literature that challenges 
their assertions as empty rhetoric. It is important to this research that the arguments 
emanating from Third Way thinking are both understood and critically examined as 
they were fundamental to New Labour thinking for developing more socially cognisant 
communities. The political rationale behind any political party and how deep it has 
been established will come to have considerable influence on what can actually be 
achieved in practice. Therefore, understanding whether the ideas behind the Third Way 
were genuinely a new political rationale that was embedded in New Labour thinking 
would be critical to understanding the case study results. Once the arguments and 
counter-claims have been made in this chapter, then the case study analysis and 
interviews presented later will have more depth and appreciation of the issues at play. 
Consideration will specifically be given to the New Labour thinking in contrast to the 
New Right to establish the depth of difference between the approaches. There will also 
be some reflection on the framework that planning gain was operating within by looking 
at the arguments around the local government modernisation programme and any 
implications for pushing a progressive social agenda.
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Chapter 4 then moves to examine the broader topic of planning gain and the historic 
approach of capturing land value through betterment, before going on to consider the 
more ‘modem’ practice of using planning obligations and considering the differences. 
As this research is particularly interested in the role of obligations, this chapter 
considers the framework for obligations by looking at relevant case law and government 
guidance, assesses why obligations have increased in number, and seeks to clarify the 
rationale behind the use of obligations and what they should be used for.
Chapter 5 builds on the framework for obligations set out in the preceding chapter by 
considering the actual use of obligations in practice by assessing previous research 
findings and contemplates the areas of particular difficulty for obligations. This gives 
an understanding of problems that have historically been a concern in the use of 
obligations. This will be important when considering the research database, how 
obligations are used at the case study authority, and what it is realistic to expect 
obligations to achieve. It concludes by bringing the research up-to-date with the 
proposed Planning-gain Supplement and the latest ideas around the Community 
Infrastructure Levy.
Chapter 6 sets out the methodology for the research by explaining why the case study 
authority was chosen, how the research database was created, what it contains, and what 
the interviews will consider. This also examines my positionality in terms of my 
relationship with the case study authority and those I interviewed. Chapter 7 contains 
the analysis of the database with some broader findings of interest within the wider 
research field considered before more detailed analysis of the use of obligations within 
the case study authority. This chapter also contains an attempt to understand the 
quantitative findings by reporting some primary qualitative research through interviews 
carried out with officers working at the case study authority. This was to see if they 
could provide some further understanding of the results and raise any issues not 
apparent from the statistics.
The final chapter is the conclusions and it primarily seeks to answer the question of 
whether New Labour did introduce a paradigm shift to the system of planning gain by 
better balancing economic, social, and environmental aims. Some consideration is then 
given to why little progress was made by focussing on the three key themes that had
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stood out throughout the literature review and the interviews as likely areas to slow 
progress. There is then a short reflection, based on all that has preceded, considering 
whether obligations should still be used to seek social aims in the planning system and 
if a paradigm shift is ever likely to be possible.
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2 SOCIAL PLANNING
This thesis started by setting out how the planning system had begun with a desire to 
build cities that were healthy, with housing and public health fundamental pillars of 
early planning. The purpose of ancient town planning has been defined as the laying 
out of towns with due care for health, commercial efficiency, and beauty of buildings; 
which is basically the same three aims that the planning system has sought to achieve 
ever since (Cherry, 1969). These are now what are known as the social, economic, and 
environmental goals that the planning system aspires to. However, it has also been 
argued that the ‘founding fathers’ of the planning system were driven by their social 
concerns but sought to address these through a physically deterministic approach for the 
first half of the twentieth century (Davoudi, 2000; Davoudi & Atkinson, 1999). This 
tension between a philosophical desire to achieve social benefits and its delivery 
through physical means has epitomised the struggle over the purpose of the planning 
system ever since.
This chapter will start by looking at the social aims the planning system was seeking to 
achieve before going on to look at the problems that resulted from trying to translate the 
theory into practice. Therefore, the first section will amplify the statements made at the 
start of the thesis about how planning was developed to make society a better place. 
The second section will set out how the planning system ultimately lost focus in 
achieving this. The third section clarifies how the attempt by planners to deliver social 
change through physical and environmental policies led to this loss of social interest as 
theory and practice became further divorced. The fourth section sets out how this loss 
of focus was allowed to take place as social issues lack the same lobbying power as 
economic and environmental issues. This resulted in the planning system becoming 
diverted to focus on these concerns ahead of social ones. The last section clarifies that 
although the planning system still has a role to play in achieving social aims, this is in 
quite a specific and confined way. This section also gives the framework for exploring 
what type of social issues the planning system can realistically achieve. It also sets out 
the key social planning issues that needed to be considered as the research is progressed. 
This chapter will provide a broad understanding of social planning issues but the 
definitive list that will be used to assess change at the case study authority are presented 
in chapter 6.
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2.1 Social roots of the planning system
The planning system has had three distinct types of influence that have sought to 
develop an urban utopia; the first was the ethico-religious vision to establish a God- 
centred system; the second was the political utopia as idealised by Plato and Aristotle; 
and the third was the intellectual utopia of literary treatises, such as by More (Cherry, 
1969). These ideological ideas have tended to focus on the theory of what a good city 
should comprise of. This focuses more on how the city should function efficiently and 
fairly, as well as what it should look like. This constant switching between the theory 
of a good city in principle and the practice of achieving a city that was good to live in 
has been a difficult mix for those responsible for planning cities, as history has shown 
that most are better at one or the other. In more recent times, this has been illustrated by 
the change between the social reform movement and the ideas of the German 
Rationalisation which developed the science of managing the physical aspects of cities 
more efficiently (Webber, 1969).
“Town builders who were also social reformers were thus for the most part 
environmental determinists. They believed that their physical creations 
would lead directly to a vast improvement in the quality of life for the 
inhabitants” (Cherry, 1969: 50).
It was the philanthropists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that 
combined their social ideals with their substantial finances to achieve this mix and led 
to the garden city movement. They had been determined to improve the quality of life 
for city inhabitants due to fears resulting from late nineteenth century industrialisation 
and urbanisation and the associated problems with public health, housing, and fear of 
social unrest (Davoudi, 2000). The fact that the British planning system had strong 
social reformist roots meant that it was different from many European neighbours who 
developed from a more economic or architectural perspective (Cowan & MacDonald, 
1980).
The philosophic support for modem social town planning was developed by Lewis 
Mumford in his Culture o f Cities, published in 1938, and his subsequent influential 
wartime essay, The Social Foundations o f Post-War Building, published in 1943 by the 
Town and Country Planning Association (Foley, 1960). Mumford and Patrick Geddes 
both argued the city functioned as an organ of social transmission and should represent
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in microcosm, the world at large (Sarkissian, 1976). These ideas were influential in 
developing more rounded neighbourhoods by planners and were seized upon after 
World War II to develop communal life with socially balanced neighbourhoods. In 
particular, there was a focus on ensuring self-contained small or middle-sized 
communities of houses with gardens that were socially balanced (Foley, 1960). This 
focus on social mix, usually delivered through affordable housing in more recent years, 
is one area of social planning that has continued. Social reform within the field of 
housing resurfaced in the anti-slum crusades and pushed urban planners to take up the 
moral challenge of their profession with urban overcrowding seen as aggravating a host 
of social and physical evils (von Hoffman, 2009). Therefore, tackling the health and 
social ills that were due to overcrowding was a driving force within planning in the 
ancient planning days, it re-emerged at the start of the twentieth century, and again in 
the nineteen seventies. It has remained on the agenda ever since to a greater or lesser 
extent.
Looking beyond social housing, the planning profession had also tried to branch out 
from ‘pure’ planning and to apply its understanding of societal systems to areas of 
demand where people were trying to predict future changes and to engineer social 
change (Webber, 1969). Michael Foucault argued in the late nineteen seventies that 
changing ideas about the urban environment were critical to the emergence of the social 
sciences and social change during the early nineteenth century (Driver, 1988). 
However, the idea that planning could shape the growing field of social policy and have 
a significant influence did not last long and the planning system has often had only 
passing interest in social policy beyond physical issues and provision of affordable 
housing.
It is also worth noting that some of the interest shown by planners when they engaged 
with social issues in the late twentieth century was due to the concerns of the sixties 
slum clearances and destruction of neighbourhoods. They were keen to learn from these 
previous mistakes and the provision of affordable housing was a practical way to try to 
rebuild mixed communities (von Hoffman, 2009). The outcry from the public about the 
destruction done to their communities was a salutary lesson for the planning system in 
using theories about how to create a community while ignoring the fact there already 
was one. Social issues often reinforce the consequences of economic change and
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together they create an uneven distribution of prosperity and marginalise some groups 
(Parkinson, 1996). The planning system had misunderstood the link between social and 
economic issues and the fact that disadvantaged communities often had strong social 
links due to their economic struggles. Splitting existing communities by building new 
roads and new houses to try to attract in the better-off to create a mixed community was 
never going to work as the affluent usually did not assimilate with the existing 
communities.
The planning system is meant to be a flexible regulatory regime through which the 
tensions between economic and social issues can be managed while environmental 
quality is conserved and enhanced (Healey & Shaw, 1994). However, as we have seen, 
managing the tension between the economic and social has often proven elusive for 
planners, although this is not a new problem. Even the social reformers who developed 
the garden city movement struggled to translate theory into practice as they sought to 
prevent the separation of different classes of people. However, as the houses were 
usually sold privately, there was often little actual progress (von Hoffman, 2009).
Returning to the point made at the start of this section, it was stated that the planning 
system had social ideals but in practice had focused on physical environmental changes. 
It has been argued that the planning system has particularly struggled to reconcile these 
two aims since the Industrial Revolution (it developed a clear manufacturing and 
engineering focus that Great Britain was founded on) and so the engineering approach 
has dominated since (Webber, 1969). This resulted in an operational style that is 
focused on engineering and physical changes but with a rationale that is based on social 
ideology. This schizophrenic problem has underlain much of what the planning system 
has struggled with ever since as social theory is difficult to translate into physical 
reality. The social reform of overcrowding by the physical expression of improved 
housing and new towns was one of the few areas of success (Cherry, 1969).
There has been a renewed interest in some areas of social issues in the past two decades, 
particularly as the consequences and causes of global environmental change have been 
argued to be both social and economic in character, thereby requiring more social 
science research if sustainable economic development is to be achieved (Newby, 1990). 
However, it is important to now look at the reasons why social issues and aims were not
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realised within the planning system, despite both the initial interest and re-emergence in 
the sixties and seventies. Only if we understand why so little was actually achieved can 
we understand whether New Labour would be able to achieve a paradigm shift.
2.2 Loss of interest of social aims within planning
While the planning system in Britain was founded on social ideals, this tradition is 
being replaced with a professional, prescriptive, negative form of planning where social 
issues are no longer the purpose of planning but simply another factor to be considered 
(Cowan & MacDonald, 1980). Indeed, it has been stated that planning has failed to 
ever properly engage with social issues (Eisenschitz, 2008). However, it can be argued 
that it was not just the planning system that lost interest in social aims but that this was 
part of a broader loss of interest in social issues. Since the three decades after the 
Second World War, there was a strong view that central and local government were 
responsible for delivering welfare and championing greater equality and social justice, 
with the voluntary and private sectors only residual to this (Ellison & Pierson, 2003a). 
After this period, the subsequent loss of this role led to a reduction in interest in social 
policy within most of local government, which was the main context that planners 
worked in at the time. Indeed, Eisenschitz (2008) argues that planning will always 
struggle to promote social reform as the planning system is delivered by a rational 
profession working within a framework laid down by central government and this is not 
conducive to social progress.
Another problem has been that while the planning system has potential for furthering 
social aims in communities, it has often struggled to be clear about what social issues 
are that are legitimately within the planning remit and even when it is clear what they 
are, there are problems around how to achieve them. It has been argued that part of the 
problem stems from the fact that social policy analysts have shown little interest in the 
city as a concept and sociologists lost interest in the seventies after abortive attempts to 
revive community studies (Edwards, 1995). The resulting lack of literature on urban 
policy written by social policy analysts reflects the underdevelopment of the social 
elements of urban regeneration policies and reinforces the emphasis on physical and 
commercial development (Ginsburg, 1999). Some have argued that apart from some 
spatial concentrations, there is little intrinsically urban about most social policies with
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ideas that there is a clear link between social policy and the city dismissed as ‘tenuous’ 
(Edwards, 1995).
The lack of understanding of social issues within the planning system has been 
reinforced by some of the planning academia and the profession itself with many of the 
influential books within the profession giving little space to social concerns and 
sometimes even playing down the social aspects of development (Thomas, 1999). 
Thomas argues that the RTPI itself has shifted emphasis to include a consciousness of 
social and environmental impacts but that this has been with a qualified enthusiasm. He 
reports that research carried out in 1975 showed that social issues were marginal 
discussion points in branch meetings between 1947 and 1971. The more recent survey 
in 1997 by the RTPI to assess what issues members wanted to learn about in continuing 
professional development shows an increase in demand for planning law and 
development control but still very little interest in social concerns.
The result of the lack of interest in social issues within the planning system and the 
inability by anyone to be able to bring them coherently to the policy agenda has resulted 
in social issues being reduced to almost only of theoretical interest. More recently there 
has also been a growing interest in issues around inequality, race, and gender within the 
planning system but overall social theory is particularly influential in only four areas of 
indigenous planning theory: critical theory, rational choice theory, Foucault’s 
archaeology and genealogy theory, and structuration theory (Allmendinger, 2002). 
These are all issues of academic interest but of little relevance to the planning 
practitioner working in the hectic planning system and therefore the debates struggle to 
transfer from theory into practice. It is probably also true that many of these debates are 
engaged with more by planning policy teams considering the future of the development 
plan area than within development control. This suggests that there are problems on 
several levels of translating theory about social issues into practical examples that the 
planning system can act on.
“Town planning has lacked a full and sophisticated understanding of the 
social implications of improving the physical environment. This is so 
around the world, and is by no means a distinctive British problem. What 
seems so serious to an American observer is the seeming lack of awareness 
in Britain that here is an intellectual problem of significant proportions and
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that any fully developed rationale supporting town planning awaits 
successful assaults on this problem” (Foley, 1960: 228).
It appears that the main reason for the loss of interest in social issues within the 
planning system was the simple fact that economic pressures came to dominate. This 
change in focus happened at Government level and then influenced the planning system. 
Even the Labour party came to accept the importance of economic issues with the 
Commission on Social Justice calling for a ‘middle way’ where economic and social 
policy were combined as two sides of the same coin (Powell, 2000). These ideas, 
started under John Smith, were continued by New Labour who accepted that 
employment was its own reward and the best way to enhance social inclusion. This led 
to a loss of interest in social policies as social aims were to be progressed through 
employment, with the welfare state to get people back to work, rather than providing 
social protection from unemployment and other socio-economic problems (Ellison & 
Pierson, 2003a; Peters, 2003).
The rise in importance of economic issues was due to a general acceptance that the 
market is the dynamic wealth-creating mechanism, while the state is static and 
undermines market discipline and efficient exchange, so the state is seen as “at best a 
necessary evil, at worst inherently parasitic on the market” (Evans & Cerny, 2003). 
Social programmes now exist to underpin the market and create competitiveness, rather 
than to compensate for the social problems caused by the market (Peters, 2003). This 
has fundamentally changed the role and purpose of social issues so they are no longer 
seen as an end in themselves by many people and therefore have less focus and interest.
The dominance of economic issues resulted as capitalism had become more ruthless 
with its primary focus on maximising shareholder value and the rise of this ‘harder’ 
capitalism, termed ‘turbo-capitalism’ (Luttwak, 1999). The term was used to convey 
how capitalism had become ‘out of control’ and was no longer responsive to traditional 
attempts to restrict its excesses. Social problems were important to communities as they 
felt powerless against global pressures, experts no longer agreed on anything as research 
was increasingly ambiguous and disputed, and people trusted those in authority even 
less than before (Giddens, 1998b). However, the market showed little interest in these
41
social concerns and instead Governments focused on dealing with the concerns of the 
market rather than the concerns of the public.
This focus on economic issues by national Governments led to the postwar planning 
system seeing economic issues dominate environmental concerns but also saw 
environmental conservationism and economic issues in turn sideline social concerns 
(Healey & Shaw, 1994). From the nineteen-fifties onwards, the planning system 
changed from having social concerns to slowly capitulating to a process of facilitating 
private sector development and by the late nineties it has been complicit in intensifying 
the growth of poverty, social polarisation, and inequality (Davoudi & Atkinson, 1999). 
The property-led urban regeneration approach simply focused on investors making 
money with the hope that jobs would ‘trickle down’ to those in need (Atkinson, 2003; 
Healey, 1992).
The charge that the planning system itself was complicit in social aims being given less 
consideration is a particularly serious one in terms of this research but has been strongly 
made by several commentators with little evidence of anyone springing to its defence. 
Peter Hall is one of the more eminent planners but is said to have dismissed the ‘golden 
age of welfare’ after the Second World War as twenty five years of planning that simply 
managed to keep most of the poor, poor (stated by Peter Hall in Eisenschitz, 2008). 
Planners had set themselves up as the experts on protecting the public interest and social 
issues but then excluded the public from these debates so the slum clearance 
programmes dispersed communities with little public input. It was this failure by 
planners to promote social issues and by the planning system to allow public 
involvement that led to pressure for change and the birth of advocacy planning, which 
was promoted as a new type of social planning (Davoudi & Atkinson, 1999). The view 
was that if the public were more involved then more social progress would be made.
Perhaps of greatest disappointment is the fact that the problems of the planning system 
engaging with social issues had been predicted but still little preventative action was 
taken to improve things. It had been argued that the influence of planning would grow 
over the second half of the twentieth century and that as a result the planning system 
would increasingly help some groups within society but hurt others and that those that 
would be hurt would be the least able to help themselves (Webber, 1969). Despite this,
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planners failed to grasp the problems this would bring and to progress social issues and 
the concerns of the poorest communities.
While part of the reason for indifference towards social problems is due to the 
disproportionately strong emphasis within urban planning on physical and commercial 
development, there is also an argument that the planning system is largely ‘unable’ and 
‘ill-equipped’ to meet social needs as it focuses on physical issues such as land-use 
rather than land-users (Greed, 1999b). Successive Conservative governments focused 
on land-use aspects at the expense of wider social factors while the profession was more 
interested in technical aspects of the job (Higgins & Allmendinger, 1999).
However, there have been mixed improvements as even some of the more ‘modern’ 
areas of social policy that the planning system could have engaged with, it has failed to 
grasp. For example, there has been surprisingly little discussion about social exclusion 
within the planning field (Turok et al., 1999). It has been argued that much of this 
failure has been due to the fact that while New Labour talked about issues like social 
justice and returned social issues to national debate, any planning dimension to this was 
ignored because the planning system was initially seen as regulatory (Allmendinger & 
Tewdwr-Jones, 2000). However, as will be seen later, there has been some progress in 
social issues in parts of the planning system.
This section started by showing that the reason for the loss of interest in social issues 
was due to a host of other secondary influences and that the primary reason was the 
dominance of economic concerns. However, there is one other reason that needs to be 
specifically looked at which has been alluded to in passing and the next section will 
consider it in detail.
2.3 Planning more interested in physical environmental issues
Planners often focus on the technical outcomes and define themselves narrowly in 
physical terms rather than engage with the social purposes behind the policies and what 
a policy is aiming to achieve (Eisenschitz, 2008; Foley, 1960). This means that while 
the radical social side of planning is focused on ideology and the potential to change 
things, the reality is a very practical and focused planning system that is regulatory and
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simply tries to reconcile conflicts of interest (Davoudi, 2000). This leads to a 
schizophrenic approach to planning where the academics talk of social revolution and 
new communities, while most practitioners are simply trying to reduce any harm from 
granting planning permission.
This is not a recent phenomena and it was pointed out thirty years ago how the 
haphazard development of the planning system had led many planners to believe their 
job is simply a technical exercise to create the least harmful and more efficient use of 
land (Cowan & MacDonald, 1980). Part of the reason for this is that planning measures 
success by looking at the inputs (i.e. number of houses built, miles of roads constructed, 
size of parks landscaped etc.) rather than assessing the outputs of how well-off the 
people are who live in the houses or that use the roads or parks (Webber, 1969). This 
problem is exacerbated by the fact that planners are judged primarily by their 
professional peers who award success by pay-rises and promotions for hitting input 
targets rather than by measuring success from the public. More recent focus under New 
Labour has further exacerbated this problem as they measured planning authorities by 
the speed of making decisions on planning applications rather than on any quality of the 
decision.
This focus has resulted in housing reformers, who pushed the need for planners to deal 
with slums, largely being ignored as the planners instead focused on physical issues of 
poor transport and regeneration and ignored the social problems (Taylor, 1999; von 
Hoffman, 2009). This approach by the planning system of reducing big political and 
economic challenges into spatial issues that are given technical solutions means 
environmental determinism is used to try to achieve social change by physical means 
but with little social success (Eisenschitz, 2008).
The reason the planning system ended up in this position is because town planning in 
western Europe has in practice revolved around the builder and architect’s search for the 
ideal city, more than on the theoretical social concerns (Cherry, 1969). This is seen in 
the functional design of the bastides of England and France, the formal design of the 
Renaissance towns, and the high urban living of Georgian and Regency architecture. 
This architectural approach gave way to the more functional building approach since
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1945, with the physical reconstruction of cities by replacing slums with vibrant new city 
centres and road networks, up until more recent times (Atkinson, 2003).
The regeneration agenda is one area that could have developed social policy but instead 
it has also focused on physical issues, such as land reclamation, road building, and 
environmental improvements with only tentative social aspects relating to poverty 
(Ginsburg, 1999). New Labour has prioritised regeneration but there has been little 
joined-up thinking with social and economic regeneration having little integration 
(Atkinson, 2003). The planning system became focused on improving the physical 
environment and while caught up in these debates has managed to convince itself that 
this is merely physical and is not connected to the complexities of social planning 
(Foley, 1960). For example, if the focus is on preventing sprawl by protecting a green 
belt then that can be viewed in a physical way but if the reason for the approach is that it 
is considered more compact communities have greater social interaction and sense of 
community, this is a social argument that underlies the physical one. The focus by 
planners tends to be on the first issue.
“...town planning has tried to hedge as between physical planning and 
social planning, has developed something of an ideological basis for doing 
this, and has thus never more fully faced up to its responsibility for 
catalysing social goals and fully analysing what physical environmental 
improvements most realistically facilitated these social goals” (Foley, 1960:
228).
It was this lack of understanding of social issues by planners that was at the heart of 
Jane Jacobs’s famous attack on town planning in her book The Death and Life o f Great 
American Cities, published in 1961 (von Hoffman, 2009; Taylor, 1999). She attacked 
the principles that had guided the planning system of segregating land uses, population 
dispersal, destroying old buildings and she gave a voice to the public disillusionment at 
the social insensitivity of the massive housing redevelopments and urban motorways 
that cut through cities and local communities. Jacobs particularly criticised the fact that 
urban planners missed the point that communities were more than physical entities and 
she has been credited with launching the term ‘social capital’ (Roseland, 2000). 
However, it has taken almost another four decades for this term and social issues to 
return seriously to the planning agenda and many of her criticisms remain. Others have 
sought to remind planners that there are spatial dimensions of social exclusion that are
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still often neglected and that the hardship and isolation faced by people and places in 
Britain is a serious challenge for the planning system (Turok et al, 1999).
It is ironic that some landscape architects argued that only when planning was used to 
achieve social and economic ends would it produce genuinely beautiful cities but 
instead the physical has become an end in itself (von Hoffman, 2009). There is a need 
to retain this focus on physical environmental change but also to engage with the social 
concerns that are expressed in communities. If there is to be genuine progress on 
environmental issues then the social sciences need to be progressed further as the 
environmental debate has been conducted in a value-laden way that lacks the rigour of 
the social sciences (Newby, 1990). There is much that the social sciences can teach 
planning and much that the planning system can do to address the social concerns of 
society. However, before we move to consider what is realistic to be achieved, the last 
area that needs to be considered to explain why the planning system has lost interest in 
social aims is that social aims lack considerable lobbying power.
2.4 Social issues lack lobbying power
The environmental lobby has traditionally relied on the farming industry to use its 
contacts with the government due to the number of MPs with farming links and rural 
constituencies. However, the farming lobby has declined in power since the seventies 
and attention has now moved to a broader environmental lobby that has grown in 
influence as membership grew since the seventies with a corresponding increase in 
power as financial resources increased from membership fee receipts (Rydin, 2003).
Therefore, there are influential powers ensuring that environmental issues remain 
central to the role of the planning system. It will be shown later (see section 3.3) that 
economic issues have even more influential groups acting on its behalf with big 
business entirely focused on economic issues in practice (in reality only paying lip 
service to environmental and social issues). However, social issues do not have 
anything like the same organised lobby groups with campaigners often calling for one- 
off changes but lacking the large pressure groups that have influence with those in 
power. The likely candidates, such as the NHS and social services are traditionally seen 
by the Government as the problem rather than able to provide the solution. It is
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disheartening to reflect on the almost antagonistic approach to the NHS (and the public 
sector in general) in comparison with the New Labour Government’s insipid courting of 
business groups.
This lack of lobbying for social issues is just as problematic on the wider scale. Despite 
the fact that society is undergoing major economic and social changes which are 
creating a world that is more unequal, insecure, individualised, and fragmented, there 
has been surprisingly little comparative focus on social issues by the EU. Insofar as the 
EU has any type of social policy to try to deal with these huge issues, it is almost 
entirely in terms of supporting the European economy (Davoudi & Atkinson, 1999).
“Indeed, under the terms of the Treaties of Rome and Masstricht promoting 
social cohesion can only be legally justified if it is undertaken as a means to 
promoting economic cohesion” (Davoudi & Atkinson, 1999: 228).
This focus on achieving social aims through pursuing economic goals is an old problem 
that stems from the American ideal of self-sufficiency, which usually relies on getting a 
job, and in turn social issues have struggled to capture the interest of many researchers 
(Levin-Waldman, 2005). This has come to affect the planning system so that social 
issues have received little more than passing interest within the planning profession 
with the result that those with most influence have spent the past 150 years pushing the 
argument for ‘salvation by bricks’ and trying to physically build our way to more 
successful communities (Greed, 1999b).
The added problem for the planning system is that it is not ‘neutral’ but benefits groups 
that are dominant in society and any proposals to include overtly social issues within the 
planning system have been repeatedly rejected by the Government as being beyond 
planning as the strong pro-development lobby groups have held sway. They have the 
finance and knowledge to challenge planning decisions and influence strategic planning 
to ensure that economic aims do not slip down the agenda. They also have powerful 
umbrella organisations to represent and support them such as the House Builders 
Federation (HBF) and the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and ready supporters 
in both of the main political parties (Greed, 1999b).
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While social issues may lack the influential lobbies and interest that economic, and to a 
lesser extent environmental issues, enjoy, they do have some influence, particularly in 
more recent years. However, even within social policy itself, it has been found that in 
Britain the quality of research into welfare is very poor, with little long-term analysis 
and most of the research that does exist is reliant on the Government, rather than 
independent bodies (Evans & Cemy, 2003). Social policy in Britain has instead focused 
on defining what is acceptable behaviour and distinguishing between the genuine 
unemployed and the scrounger, the real asylum-seeker and the economic migrant, the 
respectable poor and the disreputable etc. (MacGregor, 2003). This focus has turned 
social issues into a very divisive and negative issue, particularly by the British Press.
It is ironic that British planners had originally worried about the Americanisation of 
British town planning as they saw American planning as “less mature in its social 
policy” and they were concerned that British planning may become more neutral (Foley, 
1960). However, the subsequent adoption by the British planning system of a technical 
approach to planning led to the view that planning professionals should interact with the 
technical problems but that social policy should be left to the elected officials. This 
resulted in a more neutral approach to social issues within the planning system than 
arguably happened in the American system.
Many social scientists argued that the purpose of social science was to remove politics 
and ideology from the policy process so that it only focused on methodology and not 
political ideology (Levin-Waldman, 2005). However, this arguably has reduced the 
influence of social policy as it attempts to be value free and to simply follow a research 
backed approach. This objective approach has had an impact on the planning profession 
with claims that this reluctance to engage with concerns means that the planning system 
has become complicit in steering debates away from social issues. This is illustrated by 
the fact that when planning applications are considered it is usually the environmental 
impacts that are assessed while many of the significant issues of social reform are 
avoided by the planners and dismissed as political issues and therefore beyond them 
(Eisenschitz, 2008). Social issues have been further held back by the planning system 
as the public have used planning tools to not only try to reduce the amount of affordable 
housing in their areas but have even tried to prevent any housing in existing
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neighbourhoods, thereby pushing development further away to urban extensions (von 
Hoffman, 2009).
The sad conclusion is that the social professions have served themselves better than 
their clients with most social policy supporting the middle classes and the rich more 
than the poor with middle class professionals often unable to empathise and understand 
the poorer classes they profess to help (Webber, 1969). While the planning system has 
had very important practical implications for everyday social problems, the discipline- 
specific training and professional identity often hold back opportunities to achieve 
anything innovative (Woolcock, 2004).
2.5 Some clarification of social planning issues
It has been shown that the planning system lost much of its interest in social issues and 
that progress of social planning has therefore been frustratingly slow over the years. 
However, it has also been shown that there have been some areas of growth 
(particularly affordable housing and creating mixed communities) but it is important to 
now set out in more detail other areas where there has been progress. It is also essential 
to this thesis that social planning issues are clarified as all that follows depends on this 
understanding, although it will be shown that it is not an issue with definitive clarity. 
Nevertheless, some typology of what social planning issues are is needed if progress of 
social issues under New Labour is to be quantified at the case study authority.
Taylor (1999) made a useful starting point by stating that planning uses the term ‘social’ 
in three different ways. The first is to describe the kind o f action that planning entails 
i.e. social action, and is seen in the actions of the state. The second is to describe the 
object of planning or what planning deals with and is arguable as planning does impact 
socially on people but not to the extent of education or medical services, as planning is 
primarily a physical process. The third is to refer to the purpose of planning to deliver 
social aims and one of the New Labour Government’s purposes for planning is to 
improve people’s lives and so the purposes of planning can be social even if the ends 
used to achieve this are primarily physical. In examining the extent of social issues 
within the planning system, therefore, it is important to always consider the reason 
behind the policy.
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This can be illustrated by the point that the term ‘environment’ can be considered in 
different contexts and can even refer to aesthetically opposite ends of the spectrum from 
the built environment to the countryside (Healey & Shaw, 1994). The term itself can be 
used in different ways as the environment can be considered as a functional resource 
(gravel, sand, agriculture, forestry etc.), as a recreational resource (as a ‘backcloth’ for 
economic and social enjoyment), as an aesthetic resource (providing an attractive 
landscape setting to contrast with urban form), or as a natural resource (for wildlife to 
live in). In planning terms, the different approaches create different planning responses, 
depending on how the term is being used and it is considered that the term ‘social’ 
within the planning framework is just as variable and can mean many different things 
depending on the purpose and context.
Greed (1999b) argues that social town planning refers to any policy proposal that seeks 
to meet the needs of any minority interest or community group or any attempt to take 
into account the needs of the diversity of people who live in society and so this also 
involves consideration of the purpose behind the action. Alcock (2003) likewise argues 
that local authorities can fund voluntary organisations through revenue streams as well 
as capital grants and the revenue stream is not always straightforward but can be 
through provision in kind, such as free use of premises, access to Council staff or 
facilities etc. Therefore, the resources can take different forms but it is the purpose of 
why the provisions are being made that is important i.e. for community benefit.
Putting these ideas together, it can be argued that in terms of defining social aims within 
the planning system, it is best to consider these broadly to include aims that are 
primarily for the community benefit of people rather than principally for the 
environment or the economy. It is recognised that there is considerable overlap as many 
environmental and economic aims are also beneficial to people. However, a distinction 
can be made from the motives and is similar to the third approach towards social used 
by Taylor above.
Within this context, it is also important to realise that the planning system is confined in 
the breadth of its impact on social issues as it now only has a passing influence on social 
policy and the wider social policy issues. It was shown in section 2.1 that planning had
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briefly had an opportunity to shape the wider social policy debate but did not grasp it. It 
has been argued that the planning system has (at least) three roles that are 
complementary but also competitive and this balance changes over time (Foley, 1960). 
The roles are to reconcile the competing claims for the use of limited land, to provide a 
good physical environment to promote a healthy and civilised lifestyle, and to provide 
the physical basis for better community life as part of a broader social programme. It is 
argued that this third role has the potential for planning to operate in parallel to public 
health or social service activities with a strong social role. However, as no theory has 
evolved that bridges the three ideological roles, the third role has failed to fully develop, 
and planning lacks a sophisticated understanding of the social implications of improving 
the physical environment. As a result, it is important to be clear that the planning 
system interacts with social issues but only in a very narrow and constrained way and 
has little impact on mainline social policy issues. It will be shown later (see chapters 4 
& 5) that planning obligations have been used to fund the delivery of many varied social 
policies, and while this is important, it must be remembered throughout that this is a 
small part of delivering huge social policy areas. For example, money may be taken to 
contribute towards a new classroom but this is only a fraction of the cost of running the 
school. It will also be shown later that as the planning system has very vague aims and 
objectives, these can quite easily be shaped and amended to allow the system to be 
changed without primary legislation (Allmendinger, 2001; Healey & Shaw, 1994) and 
so it is arguable to what extent even these social gains are legitimate.
“.. .social policy is taken to include both the discipline of social policy, with 
its concern with study, teaching, analysis and interpretation, and the practice 
of social policy—the political process of policy making and 
implementation” (Beresford, 2001: 495).
The discipline of social policy and the mainstream social policy areas are therefore 
broadly beyond the reach of the planning system with only a small involvement in 
ensuring these broader social issues are considered when communities are developed. 
This is more in an enabling role of ensuring the right agencies are involved than 
planning for them directly and this thesis is not investigating social issues from this 
perception but simply focusing on the ability of the planning system to deliver social 
benefits directly.
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The practice of implementing social policies can have direct influence and the topic of 
social exclusion is one that it was hoped planning could interact with, despite the fact 
that the meaning of social exclusion remains elusive (Davoudi & Atkinson, 1999; Turok 
et al., 1999). Social exclusion refers to both the processes of social exclusion and the 
consequent situations as it is manifest within the broad fields of housing, education, 
health, access to services etc. and is not just about income (Davoudi & Atkinson, 1999). 
Therefore, there is a broader aspect that remains relevant and while the planning system 
may not cause social exclusion, it can “reinforce and exacerbate” the problems and so 
does have a role in promoting social stability, balance, and cohesion (Turok et al., 
1999). Exclusion can be for reasons other than money, such as few educational 
opportunities, poor public transport to access facilities, or practices that deprive certain 
groups (i.e. women). The planning system could help to address these to an extent if it 
chose to, especially through the planning gain process of making sure that the needs of 
communities are catered for in new development by providing appropriate facilities, as 
just discussed.
There is an important point to consider at this stage though and that is how can the 
planning system actually deliver practical social change on the ground? This point is 
considered further later (see sections 3.5 & 6.1) but it is important to have a brief 
understanding at this stage also. It has just been mentioned that the planning system has 
very limited input into wider social policy changes but that it could interact with these 
issues more if it wanted to. It is also clear that if successful communities are to be built 
then the planning system needs to work better with the broader social policy agenda and 
the agencies that deliver it, to ensure a more coordinated approach.
“At one level this perspective supports the importance of a ‘joined-up’ 
approach to urban problems, but it also recognizes the need for mainstream 
policies (such as social security, health, education, employment and 
economic policy) to play the major role. The implications of this 
recognition are far-reaching and imply the need for all policies to be 
assessed in terms of their direct and indirect impact on urban areas” 
(Atkinson, 2003:168).
The problem is that the planning system is split into two arms. The policy side usually 
considers the wider context and how to create successful communities in the future, 
while the development control side is focused on determining applications for existing
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communities. The policy side has considerably more potential to interact with these 
broader social issues and to develop policies that have a social purpose through their 
policy documents and place shaping agenda. The development control system has 
limited ability currently to engage with these broader social issues as they are required 
to consider planning applications in accordance with the development plan (unless 
material considerations suggest otherwise). Very few development plans have these 
broader social policies in them, due to the dominance of economic and environmental 
concerns over the past few decades (as explained earlier in this chapter), and so it will 
take time to change. Unfortunately, the speed of producing new development plan 
documents takes an inordinately long time (close to a decade) and so any closer 
interaction between broader social policies and the planning system will take some time 
to manifest itself.
That is not to say that social issues are not being progressed or that more cannot be done 
in the more immediate future. The difference is that the broader social policy issues 
will have to wait to a large extent and the planning system will be only part of this 
bigger picture, but the smaller and more local social issues can be considered within the 
development control system. This will be explained in much more detail later (see 
chapters 4 & 5) but it needs to be clarified that the focus of this thesis is around these 
smaller local social achievements than the broader social policy issues. The next 
section (and later chapters) will clarify some of the issues that can be considered and 
show that the reality is that the main ability to achieve these types of smaller, more 
local, social benefits is through the planning gain system.
Towards a definition of social planning issues
We still need to endeavour to produce a list of issues that can be considered as social 
and a good place to start is to assess what issues other academics or policy makers have 
considered as social issues. It has already been stated that this research is not interested 
in investigating the ability of the planning system to deliver or develop social goals in 
the broader social policy field. Instead, the focus is on the ability of the planning 
system to facilitate the delivery of some existing social goals, often primarily by 
financing their delivery in the development of new communities through the payment of 
financial contributions or provision of a service via the planning gain system.
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Edwards (1995) argues that any such description of social policies in Britain that could 
be achieved would include delivery of some aspects of health, education, income- 
support, housing, and personal social services. Inner city policies are considered a 
minor addition and others, such as planning, transport, and environmental policies will 
have social components. Byford et al. (2003) report that social welfare was defined for 
research purposes by the London School of Economics and the Institute of Psychiatry as 
encompassing social care, early intervention schemes, housing, urban regeneration, 
community development, work with families, and welfare to work. Alcock (2003) uses 
the chapter headings of social security, education, health, housing, social services, and 
employment as the titles for chapters under welfare services. Turok et a l (1999) 
identify six of the key phenomena that lead to social exclusion and believes that the 
planning system could attempt to tackle most of these. These are unemployment, low 
income, low educational attainment (lack of skills), bad health, poor housing, and high 
crime.
ATLAS (the Advisory Team for Large Applications) has recently created a ‘social 
infrastructure matrix’ (ATLAS, undated) which identifies different elements of social 
infrastructure so development proposals can be assessed against this planning need. 
However, it is interesting that they cover health care (including primary, secondary, & 
social care), education (from pre-school up to secondary), childcare (nursery & creche), 
emergency services (police, ambulance, & fire), leisure, recreation, and open space 
(outdoor play areas of various sorts, sports pitches, and recreation facilities), as well as 
general community uses (such as community hall, libraries, cultural infrastructure, and 
religious infrastructure). While it is accepted that the planning system does not have to 
fund all of these completely, it is argued that there is a role for planning to ensure they 
are supplied, and so the fact it is such a broad list is relevant.
The British Property Federation (BPF) have also adopted a very wide interpretation of 
social infrastructure, which is surprising as they lobby on behalf of property companies, 
who would normally be wanting to reduce the amount required.
“Social infrastructure, therefore, can be said to include:
• health and social care: primary care, health centres, doctors/GP surgeries,
hospitals and tertiary care
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• education: nursery/pre-school, primary, secondary, further and higher 
education, adult training
• leisure and pleasure: parks, allotments, open space, play areas, sports 
centres
• commercial infrastructure such as shops, cinemas, pubs and cafes
• emergency services: police, fire, ambulance
• other community and cultural infrastructure: libraries, community 
halls, youth clubs, arts projects, community development.
However, social infrastructure is not just about physical infrastructure. It 
can also embrace the provision of training and employment opportunities 
both in the construction phase and in the businesses and services created by 
the development” (BPF, 2010: 7).
The more official position of the Government is listed in Circulars and it is interesting 
to note that Circular 1/97 lists community facilities (in passing) as “reasonable amounts 
of small areas of open space, social, educational, recreational or sporting facilities...” 
(paragraph BIO) but did not attempt to define social issues. Circular 05/05 had little to 
say on the subject in terms of either community or social issues.
It can only be concluded that the literature review found no definitive list of social 
issues within planning and the use of any list will be subject to considerable debate. 
Nevertheless, social issues clearly revolve around the ‘likely’ areas that most people 
would recognise, such as education, employment, health, housing, social services, and 
crime. At this stage, all that can be agreed in theoretical terms is that it is the primary 
reason behind the obligation that must be considered and assessed as to whether the 
purpose is for economic, social, or environmental purposes and that considerable 
overlap is likely. This point will be considered in more detail in chapter 6.
Conclusions
This chapter has set out how the planning system was founded back in the ancient days
on ideals that revolved around social concerns, particularly related to public health.
There was a return to social ideals in the period following the Second World War and
55
again since Margaret Thatcher’s reign as Prime Minister ended. However, it has been 
argued that not as much has been achieved in practice as should have resulted but it was 
noted that there was some progress in certain areas.
Listing exactly what social planning issues are is difficult as the planning system is 
preoccupied with the physical expression of economic and environmental issues but 
while there is a very broad potential for the planning system to interact with social 
issues, the reality is a little more conservative. It is also important to realise that most of 
the broader interpretations of what can be achieved have been made since the research 
period ended. The context of thinking relevant at the time will be clarified in later 
chapters. However, this chapter should have explained the issues that the planning 
system can interact with and show that there is considerable potential for both central 
and local government to develop social issues that the planning system can progress and 
the challenge is down to the decision makers. It should also be clear that this research is 
interested in the practical aspects of delivering planning benefits that have a social aim, 
rather than the broader ability to influence social policy and the more strategic issues.
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3 NEW LABOUR AND PROGRESSIVE POLITICS
“There was deep national impatience with our party... Labour did not win 
the election for themselves: they won because we started as losers. There 
was a feeling that the Conservatives had been in power too long, and that it 
was time to move on... But in one respect Labour did indeed create their 
victory. The party managed not to seem frightening any more. For the first 
time in two decades many voters felt it was safe to abandon the 
Conservatives” (Major, 2000: 692-693).
The former Prime Minister, John Major, who lost to the incoming Tony Blair, accepted 
that while the Conservative Party had practically self-destructed and made themselves 
unelectable, the Labour Party still had a job to do to convince people that after years in 
opposition, they could form a Government and be trusted to rule. This chapter will 
amplify the statements articulated by New Labour in section 1.2 that they would create 
balanced communities where economic, social, and environmental concerns were all to 
be given equal consideration. This will be done by presenting both the positive 
promises of New Labour and also the concerns that were raised by those who dismissed 
New Labour as lacking a progressive agenda.
It is important to be clear about what exactly New Labour promised, specifically in 
relation to town planning, and how they intended to usher in a progressive politics that 
would ensure balanced communities were created where social aims would be given the 
same consideration as economic and environmental. It is also essential to understand if 
these promises were accepted as legitimate and achievable or were they likely to be 
empty rhetoric, as the research should look for evidence to inform the debate while 
considering the case study authority. It is particularly relevant to consider whether these 
areas of concern would affect the ability of social issues to be progressed when 
developing communities.
The first section looks at where the Conservatives had left the planning system and how 
they were using it to try to achieve their aims. This sets the background to contrast the 
promises of New Labour and their electoral return from the political wilderness and the 
influences that were prominent within the Party at that time. It is important to 
understand the nineties had very different pressures and influences to consider and these 
must be remembered and understood to place New Labour’s thinking in context.
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In addition to the exciting ‘new’ label for the Labour Party, there was also a ‘new’ 
political rationale that was to provide a framework to understand these complicated 
times. It was called the Third Way and would articulate the vision for a country that 
was now ‘cool’ and ‘on the up’ with the British Prime Minister central to spreading the 
vision. Therefore, the second and third sections will set out the claims of the Third Way 
and the criticisms of it respectively. The Third Way was presented by New Labour as a 
coherent political rationale that would provide the framework for ideas that would 
actively achieve more policies with a social purpose. It was New Labour’s big idea but 
whether it would stand up to scrutiny as a modem left-of-centre strategy was debatable 
and this discussion needs to be understood as it will clarify whether progress was likely 
to result and define issues that the research can investigate further.
Attention will then move in section four to examine a key Third Way aim of relevance 
to this research; the local government modernisation agenda and the impact this had on 
achieving social aims. Local government is a key agency in delivering the balanced 
communities that New Labour talked about and so any changes in their role or aims 
would inevitably have some effect on the ability or desire to deliver social aims. As my 
research focuses on a local government case study, it is particularly pertinent. This 
section will not examine the role of public participation per se but will consider whether 
communities were empowered to develop themselves or not, as that was a key aim of 
the modernisation agenda and had a significant impact on the planning system.
The fifth and sixth sections set out the influence of New Labour on the planning system 
and the direction their policies were arguably taking it, including the impact of the 
modernisation agenda and the Barker Review. Section five primarily examines the 
direction of travel under New Labour and section six more critically examines the 
concerns that were arising from this.
3.1 The Influence of the New Right on the planning system
There are two quite distinct strands within the New Right which are quite dissimilar in 
approach and can lead to mixed messages. The first is a combination of a market- 
orientated competitive state (liberalism) and the second is based on a more authoritarian
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state (conservatism) (Allmendinger, 2002; Tiesdell & Allmendinger, 2001b) and these 
strands need to be borne in mind when considering the broader Conservative Party and 
its thinking.
The liberal New Right developed from the work of Smith, Burke, Mill, and especially 
Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek who rejected central planning13 as dangerous 
and inefficient as it interfered in the market and reduced personal liberty. This strand of 
the New Right stressed freedom, choice and individualism while expressing doubts and 
anxieties about government action, so it favoured a minimal and enabling state (Tiesdell 
& Allmendinger, 2001b). Hayek in particular felt that society was too complex for 
planners to work out and that the market uses the knowledge of all within society to 
make decisions. However, he accepted the role of town planning as a practical measure 
to correct an imperfect land market and only rejected the role of planning when it 
sought to displace the market altogether (Allmendinger, 2002). The Government was to 
ensure the market is kept in working order by applying the ‘rule of law’ which all 
companies have to obey, but individual firms should then be left alone to get on with 
production (Giddens, 1994; Low, 1991). The view often stated that Hayek was anti­
town planning is not correct, although he did criticise the 1947 Act for including a 
betterment tax (Allmendinger, 2002; Low, 1991).
The conservative New Right was less influential than the liberal strand but it was 
important in modifying the liberal market instincts. It was also more abstract than the 
economic based liberal theory, focused more on a mindset that preferred the familiar to 
the unknown, the tried to the untested, fact to mystery etc. Those within the 
conservative New Right disliked the fact that liberalism requires inequality and poverty 
and therefore undermines stability and authority. Conservatism focuses on the authority 
of the state and has contempt for any undermining forces, such as the welfare state 
which is seen as decreasing self-reliance and responsibility (Allmendinger, 2002). It 
was broadly neutral in its attitude towards capitalism, defending it on utilitarian grounds 
of efficiency, but also advocating a strong interventionist state (Tiesdell & 
Allmendinger, 2001b).
13 This was primarily about central planning of society by the state rather than specifically meaning town 
planning
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The purpose of planning under the New Right
The New Right generally tried to bypass the planning system by redirecting power away 
from planning and towards the use of land tribunals to decide on noise, pollution, etc. 
and with private covenants replacing conditional planning permission. Other proposals 
considered moving towards land zoning and away from public participation to place a 
greater reliance on the market. These ideas culminated with the Simplified Planning 
Zone (SPZ), introduced in the 1986 Planning and Housing Act, which was intended to 
significantly reduce the influence of planning within these areas. It is ironic that it was 
subsequently the business community who objected to them as they were unhappy that 
they would not be able to comment on other developers’ proposals and preferred the 
flexibility of the existing planning system (Allmendinger, 2002).
The philosophical argument against the planning system was that planners have to try to 
simplify very complex issues before making a decision and in reality only the market 
can ultimately make this sort of decision as any pursuit of rational planning destroys 
innovation as a result. The real question for the New Right was to what extent planning 
should be involved in being part of the framework that the state has a duty to enforce 
and how it should deal with any resulting externalities. There was almost a consensus 
view at the start of Thatcher’s reign that the legal framework should be sufficient to deal 
with these problems. The result would be a planning system that would be protectionist 
in certain areas (AONB) and buildings (those listed) but apart from that, it would just 
provide information to developers and ensure the necessary infrastructure to facilitate 
development was in place. Planning lacked any clear overall purpose and was stuck 
talking about meaningless phrases like neighbourhood and social equality as it had no 
power to achieve anything (Thomley, 1991).
As the purpose of planning had changed to a market driven agenda, it is not surprising 
that other changes followed that sought to remove perceived delays or distractions to the 
business of letting developers getting on with building. The main casualty was the 
public, who the Government advised (through Circular 2/87) were to be ignored unless 
they had valid concerns that could be supported by substantial evidence. It is difficult 
to provide evidence in advance of development of the negative effects and so the public 
were little match for developers. However, the Thatcher Government was not taking
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any risks and decided to virtually by-pass the planning system in many areas altogether 
through the use of architectural competitions, Special Development Orders, and Urban 
Development Corporations (UDCs) which had little public involvement or concern for 
social issues.
The New Right had carried out an onslaught on the planning system and practically 
reduced it to an economic tool subservient to the market.
“As a result of these changes it is argued that the scope and purpose of 
planning has undergone a major shift since 1979. During the post-war 
period planning was fulfilling three different purposes, though often in a 
confused or veiled fashion. These purposes covered the promotion of 
economic efficiency, the protection of the environment and the fulfilment of 
community needs. Since 1979 the first of these has become paramount, the 
second important only in specified geographical areas and the third is no 
longer seen as the remit of planning” (Thomley, 1991: 219).
The early and mid-1980s had seen social issues virtually sidelined with the focus on 
market-led development to generate wealth and the hope that economic prosperity 
would ‘trickle down’ to improve social conditions. The planning system was seen as a 
means to an end to achieving economic aims above all else with environmental 
concerns only allowed to hold sway in small geographical areas. However, by the end 
of the 1980s pressure was growing to properly balance economic, social, and 
environmental considerations and there was a ray of light that things may improve.
“The challenge for planning in the 1990s is to ‘adapt’ not only to new 
substantive agendas about the environment and how to manage it, but to 
address new ways of thinking about the relation of state and market and 
state and citizen, in the field of land use and environmental change” 
(Healey, 1992: 412).
Positive planning under the New Right
It would be wrong to write-off the New Right as a period that only concentrated on 
economic issues as there is evidence that towards the middle and end of the eighties 
there was a perceptible change. For example, it has been shown that between 1983- 
1985 economic considerations dominated articles in The Planner14 but by 1988 onwards
14 The professional magazine for Members of the Royal Town Planning Institute
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the ‘green tide’ had grown in prominence (Higgins & Allmendinger, 1999). This was 
mainly due to growing pressures from Europe, which was pushing environmental issues 
further up the political agenda and required more regulation of the free market 
(Tewdwr-Jones, 1998). As a result, the planning system was used to restrict out-of- 
centre retail locations, to decide where new housing estates should be located, and 
characterised a move away from the unrestricted private sector and from the free market 
as autonomous to a more consensual style of planning (Rydin, 2003).
In addition, despite the attempts of the Government to remove social issues from the 
planning agenda and to make planning focus on uses, rather than users, planning did 
target some social aims with ‘special-needs’ housing for elderly and single people, 
disabled access, better urban design for female safety, child-care provision, access to 
public transport, among other issues (Healey, 1992). However, there is no denying that 
this was tweaking at the edges rather than anything more fundamental.
One area that saw considerable change during this period was the status of the local plan 
which was nothing short of a complete policy u-tum from looking to abolish them to 
then requiring mandatory district-wide local plans for all authorities and proceeding to 
promote a plan-led system (Higgins & Allmendinger, 1999). The new plan-led 
approach meant decisions about where new development should go were taken by the 
local authority, thereby giving local people a greater say. However, it has been argued 
(Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2000) that this ‘local choice’ was not primarily to 
allow local authorities more autonomy but was a more cynical central government move 
to allow it to distance itself from the anti-development voters and let the local authority 
take the criticism for new development.
There were other u-turns under the New Right as they also had to accept they should not 
try to remove all externalities from the planning system and issues such as design, 
which had been declared beyond the planning system, were returned to try to restrain 
the largesse of architects. This recognition that the market was not always right and that 
planning and the public did have a positive role to play was a significant step for a New 
Right Government.
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The rising importance of environmental issues, the realisation that the market did have 
to be controlled to some extent, and the increasing involvement of the public in the 
planning system, all came together in a significant way. The 1989 European elections 
saw the Green Party win fifteen percent of the vote and the realisation that ‘the 
environment’ could win votes meant it rose back up the political agenda. The ‘green’ 
issue was really pushed by public concern about environmental damage, which in turn 
affected consumer demand and corporate image, so during the nineties there was an 
almost universal adoption among major firms of environmental programmes as no firm 
could afford to be seen to be ignoring environmental factors in its decision making 
(Jacobs, 2001b).
The principle of environmental taxation was first accepted by the Conservative 
Government with the introduction of the landfill tax and the petrol duty escalator and 
there was a growing realisation that if taxes are hypothecated, they are more likely to be 
popular, rather than just seen as a stealth tax (Jacobs, 2001b). An important point is that 
these factors came together to show that the public could influence the operation of the 
free market and require restrictions to be placed on how developers worked and to push 
environmental issues up the agenda.
The late nineties were characterised by massive new development and particularly 
regeneration schemes where the public became increasingly disillusioned with a 
planning system that permitted developers to bulldoze whole estates to make way for 
new development with scant regard for existing local communities (Monbiot, 2001). 
For the planning system, the situation could not have been much worse, as it had 
become complicit in ensuring developers walked away with huge profits at the expense 
of local communities, who had growing social needs. At best, all the local authority 
could do was to take some minor financial benefit towards community gain but it paled 
into insignificance compared to the developer’s profits. Meanwhile, there was growing 
concern that the infrastructure simply could not cope with the rising demand for school 
places, doctors, dentists, road capacity etc. The public were getting frustrated at the 
lack of progress on social issues and there was a mood for change that the Labour Party 
sought to deliver.
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3.2 The return of progressive politics by a Third Way
Not long after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Giddens (1994) published a book called 
Beyond Left and Right: the Future of Radical Politics that sought to tackle the 
dominance of neoconservative thought and to set out a coherent approach that would 
convince people the traditional left and right of politics was no longer meaningful. The 
sub-text to this was that policies that had ‘traditionally’ been considered the domain of 
the right could now be captured by the left, thereby allowing the Labour Party to gain 
the key centre ground votes needed for electoral success. The critique set out by 
Giddens was that neoconservative thought had an inherent contradiction at its very core 
as the free market seeks to change things, being no respecter of tradition or history; on 
the other hand, neoconservatives want to protect structures from change. Therefore, 
neoconservatives want the market to be free to act but they also want to restrain it from 
changing tradition.
In the same year as Giddens book was published, Blair took over the leadership of the 
Labour Party and sought to continue the modernisation of the Party begun under the 
leadership of Kinnock and the recently deceased Smith. He took to the ideas of 
Giddens and set out to develop his own approach to policy that would regain the historic 
and progressive side of socialism but build on the growing irritation with the 
Conservatives. Blair (1996) explained how socialism’s values and principles are 
definable for all time and included an economy based on partnership that makes the 
market dynamic and works in the public interest to provide opportunities for all. This 
partnership was to be between government and industry, employer and employee, and 
the public and private sector. Alongside this new partnership approach was a 
commitment to reject the desire of governments to centralise; New Labour would return 
power to the people and rebuild local democracy as a means to creating strong and 
balanced communities.
He continued by arguing that the Tories had centralised power and Britain had become 
one of the most centralised governments of any large state in the Western world. Blair 
suggested the country should adopt a stakeholder democracy as well as a stakeholder 
economy, stating that no society can progress unless all of its people prosper and the 
community works for the good of every individual and every individual works for the
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good of the community. This was to be a new social order, a genuine modem civic 
society based on merit, commitment and inclusion. The rationale to underpin the new 
ideas was termed the Third Way.
“Third way politics, as I conceive of it, is not an attempt to occupy a middle 
ground between top-down socialism and free-market philosophy. It is 
concerned with restructuring social democratic doctrines to respond to the 
twin revolutions of globalization and the knowledge economy” (Giddens, 
2000b: 163).
It is always difficult to decide who should define terms in wide usage as different 
people have different interpretations and opinions and the Third Way has been very 
controversial. It is also tme that the Third Way goes under different names across the 
globe, including New Democrat in America, New Labour in Great Britain, and the New 
Middle in Germany (From, 1999). However, within the context of this research, there is 
support for the view that it was Giddens, arguably the best known proponent of 
analysing and applying the theories of modernity to British politics, who formulated the 
theoretical notion of the Third Way and is seen as Blair’s Third Way gum (Driver & 
Martell, 1999; Jacobs, 2001b; Merkel, 2001). These two people have probably been 
more influential in deciding what the Third Way has been in relation to the development 
of a political rationale for New Labour policy, although they did have significant 
differences. For example, Blair is said to be more passive and adaptive to globalisation 
than Giddens (Driver & Martell, 1999).
When New Labour came to power, they immediately made the development of social 
policies a key aim with a considerable number of announcements. These included the 
reform of the welfare state, money for schools and hospitals, expansion of child-care, a 
White Paper on the NHS, a Green Paper on welfare reform and another one on public 
health to name a few in the first year alone (Powell, 2000). Blair (1998b) had stated 
that the Third Way stood for a modernised social democracy that was committed to 
social justice but was flexible about how to achieve this and so these new policies 
would be pursued in a pragmatic way. Social justice was founded on the equal worth of 
all people and the aim of the Labour Party was to spread wealth, power, and opportunity 
(Blair, 1998b).
65
The Prime Minister went on to state that Labour’s five key pledges were education, 
welfare to work, reducing crime, reducing NHS waiting lists, and a sound economy, 
with secondary targets of tackling social exclusion, improving public health, 
implementing Local Agenda 21, and modernising public transport. He also argued that 
communities need to deal with cross-cutting problems like youth justice, drug abuse, 
and social exclusion (Blair, 1998a). New Labour clearly saw social issues as on a par 
with economic and arguably ahead of environmental concerns with a clear purpose that 
espoused social aims.
The Government gave extra money to education, health, crime prevention, transport, 
housing, and social exclusion and so the finances had a clear social focus as well (HM 
Treasury, 1998). Blair also wrote a Fabian Pamphlet (Blair, 1998b) and stated that the 
underlying assumption of the Third Way was that the left of centre had to be 
transformed but stated the commitments to “social justice and to ideas of social 
community” held fast. Economic and environmental issues were given attention in the 
Pamphlet but social concerns were just as high on the agenda with youth justice, 
supporting families, education, and health all featured, along with a desire to distribute 
the benefits of progress. There was no doubt that the Government saw social issues as 
prominently as economic and environmental challenges.
Giddens (1998b) published his book The Third Way: The Renewal o f Social Democracy 
and in it he tried to place Tony Blair’s break with old Labour as similar to what had 
happened in nearly all Continental social democratic parties and therefore not unusual. 
He also argued that the origins of socialism were based on a philosophical and ethical 
idea that sought to oppose individualism and that the critique of capitalism only came 
later. This was an attempt to ‘allow’ New Labour to jettison its traditional opposition to 
capitalism but to still consider itself a socialist party. He looked back to the start of the 
century to try to anchor the Third Way, stating the phrase originated at the turn of the 
nineteenth century, originally used by right-wing groups in the 1920s, but was then used 
by social democrats on mainland Europe.
It is explained that the new mixed economy of the Third Way looks for synergy 
between public and private sectors with “a balance between the economic and the non­
economic in the life of the society” (Giddens, 1998b: 100). He proposed positive
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welfare as a solution and stated that it was no longer simply an economic concern but 
that social assistance may be more helpful i.e. counselling instead of economic support. 
This investment in human capital instead of economic tools and the focus on the ‘social 
investment state’ instead of the welfare state was a positive step that placed social issues 
high on the agenda. Giddens went on to explain that the Third Way motto becomes ‘no 
rights without responsibilities’ with the state having a right to protect its citizens, but 
they in turn have responsibilities to the state and each other.
The Third Way had a conflict between allowing individuals to act for themselves while 
reducing state interference but at the same time ensuring the state acted to protect these 
rights of individuals. The slogan ‘no rights without responsibilities’ was the attempt to 
marry the two ideas but with hindsight there was probably more tension between the 
two ideas than was first realised. Giddens brought out two books that set out to define 
the Third Way and to try to create this grand narrative and it is important to look at 
these in more detail as they encapsulate many of the problems within the Third Way.
Phase Two
In 2002, Giddens published Where Now for New Labour?, which appeared from the 
introduction to have been partly written in an attempt to defend Tony Blair, who had 
started to talk about the ‘third way, phase two’ but had effectively been dismissed by 
most social commentators. Giddens identified part of the problem as being a 
disinclination of the left to take the Third Way seriously and set about trying to place it 
within a wider European social democratic context by explaining that all social 
democratic governments have had to make compromises and trade-offs. He felt that 
those on the left should recognise this and be realistic, rather than sticking rigidly to 
historical ideological positions.
However, he recognised that the term, the Third Way, may be causing difficulties for 
people and instead preferred the phrases the ‘new social democracy’ or the ‘new centre- 
left’ and so he moved away from the term itself. He argued that the New Labour project 
needed to completely rethink leftist doctrines (in light of globalization, the knowledge 
economy, rising individualism and ‘postmaterialist’ concerns) and to concentrate on the 
conditions necessary for electoral success.
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The biggest concern regarding the Third Way at this stage, with reference to this 
research, is a lack of clarity regarding what it stood for and how much it revered social 
issues as the focus was more on processes than policies. The Third Way (now called 
the ‘new social democracy’) had a framework set out but it was so broad it simply 
became like sound-bites with little substance, so ‘reform of the state’ becomes a focus 
to ensure that it is not ‘too unwieldy, bureaucratic, driven by producer interests, or 
operate with soft budget constraints’ (Giddens, 2002: 15). What purpose the state is to 
achieve is not clear and whether it is to have an economic, social and/or environmental 
purpose is not clarified.
The following year, Giddens (2003a) had another book published; The Progressive 
Manifesto which the back cover said was written to develop a new agenda for the 
centre-left and to move beyond the formulae of the 1990s. He admits in the book that 
the Third Way had many weaknesses when it was devised but promised that things had 
progressed, only to perpetuate the problem by clarifying what it was not and failing to 
state what it was.
Giddens (2003b) argues that the recent electoral setbacks by the left were not because 
the Third Way failed but because it was not embraced strongly enough. He did admit 
that the Third Way was too focused on what it stood against but needed to focus on 
fresh ideas that almost amount to a fourth way, but where he prefers the term 
neoprogressivism. This new approach should be a strong public sphere, a thriving 
market economy, a plural and inclusive society, and a cosmopolitan wider world 
founded on principles of international law. The two ‘new’ concepts to achieve this are 
the ‘embedded market’ and the ‘ensuring state’, which are meant to combine to provide 
‘publicisation’ which will defend the core importance of the public sphere. Quite what 
this means in practice is not explained and again the focus is all on procedures of how to 
govern with little interaction of why to govern -  what sort of society is wanted?
The Third Way had a belief that a strong economy and a strong society are mutually 
reinforcing and sought to mix traditional principles with new ideas and policies, thereby 
trying to resolve the ideological tension between socialism and liberalism (Latham, 
2001). This approach was not unique to Britain with the global Third Way philosophy 
calling for equal opportunity for all and special privilege for none. There was also a
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public ethic of mutual responsibility, a core value of community, and a global outlook 
that fosters private sector economic growth with an empowering government that equips 
citizens with the tools they need to prosper (From, 1999). These core principles of 
combining a strong economy and community with a government that supports and 
enables rather than commands and organises were fundamental to the Third Way.
However, the Third Way evolved and one of the themes it came to adopt was social 
capital, which was developed during the nineties by mainly North American social 
scientists and revolved around the idea of mutually respecting relationships that will 
enable a group to pursue shared goals more effectively than on their own. It is 
measured in terms of the volume and intensity of cooperative social relationships within 
a community rather than focusing on the individual (Midgley, 2001). Szreter (2001) 
states that Putnam is the leading expert on social capital and that his research has shown 
that it is the ‘horizontal’ contacts of association between equals, rather than the 
‘vertical’ networks (that illustrate inequalities of authority) that produce true social 
capital and lend itself perfectly to the New Labour language of partnership.
It should be clear that the Third Way had a lot to say that could have been relevant to 
building local communities where economic, social, and environmental aims were even- 
handedly considered when decisions were made. Unfortunately, as the focus was often 
on the procedures of how to make decisions rather than clearly trying to articulate a 
vision for the country, the comments were often in passing. The ideas around working 
in partnership, building communities that respected rights and accepted they had 
responsibilities, social capital and so on all illustrated that there was a strong focus on 
social concerns but it was more often implicitly made. There had been clear statements 
soon after coming to power around the purpose of New Labour where the key topics 
had a strong social aim but these appear to have been diluted over time.
Moving now to examine the local government modernisation agenda, it will be seen 
again that the social focus is there but once more it is not as explicit as it could be. 
Therefore, some topics will have to be considered in passing that are not central to this 
research but they help to ‘paint a picture’ of the issues New Labour was seeking to 
achieve.
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“As part of its attempt to forge a new politics, Labour has drawn on, and 
amplified, a range of discourses that had been submerged or marginalised 
during the Thatcher and Major administrations. The languages of 
democracy, citizenship, society, community, social inclusion, partnership, 
public participation, central to new Labour’s discursive repertoire, can be 
understood as an attempt to reinstall ‘the social’ in public and social policy” 
(Newman, 2001: 6).
3.3 Critique of The Third Way
It is important to realise that there are strong arguments on both sides of the debate 
around the impact of New Labour as a modem left-of-centre party and it is impossible 
to engage with all the debates and sub-arguments. However, within the broader context 
of this research, it is imperative that the main theoretical criticisms are understood at 
this stage and then the issues of more relevance to this research can be probed further 
later. It is only when the perceived problems with the promises that New Labour made 
are understood that it can be clear what should be looked for at the case study authority 
to see if there is evidence for either side. We need to understand the aims of New 
Labour and the alleged problems to see if there are clues why social aims either were, or 
were not, being progressed at the case study authority.
It has been noted that in order to make space for the Third Way as a radical new idea 
that is different to the old left and right, there has been some re-writing of history that 
has misrepresented the traditional positions (Driver & Martell, 2002; Powell, 2000). 
Giddens has particularly been identified as guilty of presenting the New Right in an 
extreme form to make the Third Way appear more rational by comparison and of 
caricaturising any alternative models that differ from the Anglo-American one so he can 
more easily dismiss them (Allen, 2001; Newman, 2001; Prowse, 2000).
The idea of a Third Way was clearly attractive to Labour modernisers as it reinforced 
the ‘newness’ of New Labour and offered voters a bright new hope at the end of a torrid 
time under the Conservatives. However, it was just the latest in a string of attempts by 
politicians during the twentieth century to try to appear to break the political mould. 
Not only did it rely on the exaggerated interpretation of the Old Left and the New Right 
but it also was very vulnerable to the criticism that it was always defined with reference 
to what it was not, which is rather negative (Driver & Martell, 1999).
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The Third Way was also not new, as many other centre-left parties before Blair were 
pursuing similar policies with processes such as globalisation leading to the same sort of 
logical adaptations globally (Driver & Martell, 2002). While Bill Clinton was arguably 
the first real ‘populariser’ of the idea and policies of the Third Way, the 1980s and 
1990s saw the PSOE in Spain, the PvdA in the Netherlands, and the SAP in Sweden all 
reinvent themselves along similar lines. By the mid-1990s Europe’s social democrats 
had generally accepted the market economy while the independence of the central bank 
from government had been implemented in Germany for decades (Driver & Martell, 
2002).
In the early days, the Third Way in Britain had a cult figure that promised all things to 
all people to get elected. While this brought the votes and gave ideas like the Third 
Way a very British feeling, this desire to win the business vote in particular and to say 
whatever it took to upset no-one was the beginning of the end for the Third Way. It 
suffered from a misunderstanding of the role of the state, believing it had a duty towards 
big business to create and sustain market institutions by reforming the state but leaving 
the markets alone (Allen, 2001; Skidelsky, 2002). This misunderstanding was central to 
all that the Third Way did and was ultimately responsible for the loss of focus on social 
issues that resulted.
Big business
When New Labour came to power it was caught up in trying to please ‘all of the people 
all of the time’ with the result that little radical change resulted. Blair’s personal lack of 
ideological commitment and reliance on the practical rather than the theoretical was part 
of the problem (Tiesdell & Allmendinger, 2001a). Giddens (2002) had to acknowledge 
that Labour consciously changed little of the Conservative policy in the first two years 
in power to assure corporate Britain that they could handle the economy. While this 
reassured big business, it exposed New Labour as fundamentally lacking a clear vision 
that differed from the previous government -  a serious charge for any political party.
Unfortunately, the result of using years before the election and two years after it wooing
the private sector and convincing them New Labour was their friend, they ended up
believing what big business said and came to accept privatisation and the neo-liberal
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macroeconomic arguments (Lloyd, 1999). Soon the ideas of the New Right could be 
heard in faint disguise from New Labour strategists and no longer seemed anathema 
(Alcock, 2003). The irony of this change in approach has been pointed out so that while 
many on the left embraced market values with a naive and wide-eyed admiration, neo­
liberal economists like Jeffrey Sachs were voicing concerns about market failings 
(Allen, 2001). New Labour had caught the big business bug and fallen under the spell.
The SEU document Bringing Britain Together: A National Strategy for Neighbourhood 
Renewal was held as a central plank to the New Labour focus on promoting social aims. 
However, it has been argued that it lacks an overall ideology, shifting between 
promoting social justice and then echoing Thatcher’s unwillingness to intervene in the 
distributional outcomes of the market (Atkinson, 2000). New Labour appeared to agree 
with Thatcher that the market should regulate and limit the actions of government as the 
market was seen as the most effective and efficient means of allocating resources and 
facilitating freedom and choice (Atkinson, 2000). This underlying support for big 
business and the market was often in conflict with the social aims that New Labour was 
stating it was seeking to achieve.
A decisive moment in the evolution of the Third Way was the rejection of Will Hutton’s 
proposed Germanic stakeholder capitalism, which New Labour had courted briefly, but 
rejected for the more exciting and risky liberal American ideal that proposed fewer 
burdens on companies (Skidelsky, 2002). Many of the policy ideas that followed 
emerged from this market orientated approach with the result that it has been argued 
that for New Labour, employment became its own reward, as it enhances social 
inclusion and creates a trained and disciplined citizenry able to respond to the changing 
demands of the labour market (Ellison & Pierson, 2003a). They also developed public 
policy according to the maxims of market liberals with privatisation ruling supreme and 
the Third Way seen as no more than a rhetorical device for making market liberal 
policies palatable to the Left (Prowse, 2000).
These ideas would have been unthinkable for any previous Labour Government and the 
courting of the business sector was seen as repugnant to many ‘traditional’ Labour Party 
supporters. The fact that by 2000, Britain had more accountants than in the rest of the 
European Union put together (companies wanted accountants on their board to manage
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the share price) illustrates what Britain had become (Cohen, 2003). Suspicion about 
Tony Blair grew and his infatuation with big business led to claims that he was
“...the most prominent among today’s nominally left-wing party leaders in 
revealing his disdain for the poor and other losers, his desire to sup at the 
table of financial success, and his contempt for the broad masses of working 
people with small houses, big mortgages and ugly little cars” (Luttwak,
1999: 195).
New Labour wanted to show that it did not mess up the economy, it did not tax and 
spend anymore, it did not attack business interests, it was not soft on crime, and so on 
(Wright, 2001) but there was no clear focus on what it did do. The first part of this 
section has shown how in practice, New Labour was not dissimilar to the Conservatives 
and the main focus of their drive was on economic issues, to the detriment of social and 
environmental concerns. Some consideration now needs to be given to just how deeply 
held New Labour’s social policies and convictions were to see if the lack of practical 
evidence espousing social aims is somehow connected to a lack of commitment to the 
issue by New Labour.
Style over substance
“.. .the central question is whether the third way represents a new dimension 
for social democratic politics in the post-cold war era or merely a deftly 
crafted slogan designed to make the capitulation to a conservative agenda 
intellectually and morally respectable” (Faux, 1999: 67-68).
The Institute of Economic Affairs was set up in 1955 and was the first of several right- 
wing think-tanks to provide Thatcher with an intellectual framework for her mission. It 
has been argued that these neo-liberal ideas passed so deeply into the consciousness of 
the British political classes that socialism was pushed further underground than in any 
other country (Lloyd, 1999). Therefore, the fear of being seen as overtly socialist was 
still seen as risky by many on the left and could explain the fear New Labour had. 
However, at the time there were at least four different countries following a social 
democratic route within Europe and Blair’s New Labour had enormous resources and 
few constraints in implementing policy due to its massive electoral majority (Merkel, 
2001).
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The criticism of the Third Way in the early days mainly focused around the point that it 
was a marketing slogan, rather than anything new of any substance and amounted to 
‘shallow rhetoric’ lacking ideological conviction (Marquand, 2004). New Labour was 
quickly labelled as being focused on ‘spin’ and trying to repackage bad news as good. 
As a result, questions were soon asked whether the Third Way was anything more than 
‘spin’ to cover the fact that it had abandoned traditional Labour policies in an attempt to 
reassure middle-England voters that it had a plan and noble aims (Ryan, 1999). 
Likewise, it was suggested that it was taken and used as New Labour’s ideological 
position before anyone had actually worked out what it was and what it stood for, so it 
became “a brand in search of a product” (Rustin, 2001b: 73). The fact that Giddens 
(2000a) had conceded in an interview that the Third Way was ‘just a label’ for what the 
philosophy might involve, added weight to the concerns.
Many of the ideas it drew upon had been ‘borrowed’ and reworked into new discourses 
with a re-packaging of the public sphere in the light of ‘communities’ and ‘citizens’ 
rather than the Thatcher image of the consumer (Newman, 2001).
“The language of partnership was also adopted in place of the language of 
competition to re-label contractual or outsourcing arrangements between the 
public and private sectors. These constructions, together with those of 
‘community’, ‘responsibility’ and ‘inclusion’, formed part of the ideological 
glue through which disparate elements of the Third Way were seemingly 
held together” (Newman, 2001: 166).
The allegation that the Third Way lacked an accessible and popular narrative that ‘tells a 
story’ to the public about how life will be and what the limits of neo-liberalism will be 
grew (Allen, 2001). Any previous Government that had sought radical changes in 
direction, such as the governments of 1906, 1945 and 1979, had a philosophical 
cohesion that the Third Way could not match (Seldon, 2001b). Attlee had Beveridge 
and Keynes informing his policy while Thatcher built on the ideas of Friedman and 
Hayek but Blair had no-one of this stature underlining his policies, occasionally calling 
on Giddens to support him but he seemed to struggle to develop the thinking. As a 
result, Blair ended up frustrated and resorted to complaining about the ‘forces of 
conservatism’ that impeded the radical change he allegedly desired (Seldon, 2001b).
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In an attempt to reinvigorate New Labour thinking, Giddens (2002) published Where 
Now for New Labour? but it had little impact with trite statements, such as the state 
should be efficient and work for the public - who would disagree? The book lacked any 
comprehensive ideological position and Giddens even refers to one of Blair’s main 
advisers as admitting that when he was elected leader he had no coherent set of political 
ideas and ‘appropriated’ ideas and policies from the New Democrats -  hardly a ringing 
endorsement of a sitting Prime Minister or likely to give substance to the Third Way.
Giddens (2003a) next book, The Progressive Manifesto again added little to the debate 
in reality, agreeing that it needed to move the Third Way forward and to develop from 
the weak position it was in, but he then returned to arguing what the Third Way was not 
about, rather than stating what it stood for. New concepts were proposed around the 
‘embedded market,’ the ‘ensuring state,’ and ‘publicisation’ but there was no clear 
message about where the Third Way was heading, just concepts and ideas made in 
passing.
The loss of radical idealism, the backbone of the Party historically, led to disenchanted 
politics as New Labour politicians became too embarrassed to talk about socialism or 
how to transform the social order; the goal now was the better administration of society 
(Jacobs, 2001a; 2002). The other concern was that the philosophical ambiguity, which 
was important to not offend anyone and lose votes, came at a high price as the breadth 
was in conflict with depth and the lack of ideological clarity meant although many were 
on board, they had little conviction.
“It is the loss of ideology which creates the sense of alienation. It is the 
abandonment of the party’s historic commitments to equality and to radical 
social change... Membership figures tell a tale: down by 130,000, nearly one 
third, in five years... it is a dull sense that there is no longer much point.
When Labour wanted to change society, it was at heart, a campaign: it 
needed members. But if it just wants to manage things better, why bother?” 
(Jacobs, 2002).
Party membership fell as people lost interest. They were not clear what they were 
trying to achieve and people want to know they are fighting for a valuable aim and 
outcome (Kay, 2003). With no clear vision of what this outcome is, how can progress 
towards it be measured? A strong ideological narrative is essential as it sets out what
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the government is trying to do, even when problems arise, so people can visualise the 
better future to come. Thatcher mastered this as she was judged by what she stood for 
as much as what she achieved throughout the eighties (Jacobs, 2001a; 2002). If  centre- 
left parties are to survive, they must define themselves positively by clarifying what 
they stand for, not what they stand against (Schuppert, 2003).
It is not enough to just list some values and say ‘this is what we stand for’ as values 
often have to be traded against each other and Blair came unstuck in trying to combine 
what turned out to be contrary principles with no way deciding which should take 
precedence when they competed (Driver & Martell, 2002). The reality is that although 
it sounds good to say you can have social justice and economic efficiency, for example, 
in reality one side often has to be supported at the expense of the other. Also, to argue 
that all that matters is ‘what works’ and the means to achieving this are irrelevant is 
naive; the means of achieving something contains values, as different policies create 
different kinds of society i.e. using the public sector or private sector is not value free 
and requires a choice between non-market values and profit (Jacobs, 2001a).
The scale of the problem with the Third Way and New Labour is best summed up by a 
quote from Stephen Byers MP, who was a key Blairite and therefore not one quick to 
criticise the Government. He said that the Government
“...needs to recognise that a constant stream of useful but relatively minor 
initiatives are no substitute for a well-thought-out programme that is deeply 
rooted in Labour’s values and principles. It needs an approach that has the 
objective of transforming society as opposed to simply being a competent 
administration... increasingly the electorate sees Labour as being on the 
right. The task now must be to move it leftwards... We can no longer define 
ourselves by what we are against -  that is the politics of opposition. 
Instead, we should articulate a clear vision of what we believe a Labour 
government should be for” (Byers, 2003: 23).
The Third Way as an ideology fell apart when it came under scrutiny and by the end of 
this research it was hardly mentioned anymore and had been practically dismissed as 
vacuous even by the turn of the millennium (Allen, 2001; Faux, 1999; Newman, 2001; 
Plant, 2001; Prowse, 2000; Rustin, 2001b). Many concluded that it had been little more 
than a modification of Thatcherism to make it more palatable to the left but that its true 
identity was it “seems happier on the side of the private sector and at war with public
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service ethos and public sector workers” (New Statesman, 2003). Another simply 
stated New Labour was Thatcher’s “stepchild” who had grown up to take Thatcherism 
more seriously than even the Thatcherites but with a bolted-on social dimension 
(Skidelsky, 2002). Others argued that New Labour actually stole much of the 
Conservative’s policy ground and threw in the towel to Thatcherite neo-liberalism 
within the first four years in power, with little difference from eighteen years of radical 
Conservative Government (Driver & Martell, 2002; Norman, 2006).
“Despite Blair’s conviction, the rhetoric of New Labour is almost 
indistinguishable from that of the Conservatives on public spending and the 
role of the private sector in welfare” (Burchardt & Hills, 1999: 48).
The dual problem of New Labour becoming influenced by big business and lacking a 
clear narrative suggests that when difficult decisions are needed or when economic, 
social, and environmental issues are in competition, then the economic would prevail. 
The literature review suggests that there was evidence that this did happen and that 
social issues did not progress as well as might have been expected under New Labour. 
Ellison & Pierson (2003a) carried out a comprehensive review of social policy and 
concluded that the overall verdict was at best mixed. While there had been progress in 
some areas (which should not be dismissed) the overall finding was there was no sign of 
a ‘new social politics’ (Ellison & Pierson, 2003a). The fundamental problem they 
identified was that New Labour regarded social policy as a means to achieving 
economic stability rather than an end in itself. This resulted in New Labour 
transforming Britain from a welfare state into ‘a competition state’ where issues such as 
unemployment were to be dealt with through the marketplace and not by government 
intervention (Evans & Cerny, 2003).
It is accepted that Tony Blair’s time as Prime Minister means that every modern 
political party now has to espouse social policies, at least in theory (Toynbee, 2006). It 
is also true that social exclusion did not figure in the official discourse of the British 
Government before and these are significant steps forward. For example, the 
Conservatives, under David Cameron, are now calling for a ‘compassionate 
conservatism’ that points out social ties are weakening, resulting in unprecedented 
social problems (Norman & Ganesh, 2006). It is hard to imagine previous Conservative 
parties considering such ideas so strongly.
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New Labour did make many changes that had a social aspect and did break many of the 
taboos of talking about social issues but there is strength in the argument that this was 
not part of any coherent ideological strategy that put social issues on a comparable 
footing with economic and environmental concerns.
“The great themes of our age -  the rise of inequality, the over-riding priority 
of business and the decline of the public realm -  have not been intellectually 
and politically challenged, nor has any popular narrative been developed 
that might do the job. Conservatism’s grip may be weakening at the 
margins, but it remains ascendant” (Hutton, 2002b: 274-275).
3.4 Modernising local government
The White Paper Modem Local Government -  In Touch with the People of 1998 set the 
modernisation process into motion and paved the way for all that was to follow with the 
Local Government Act of 1999 introducing Best Value and the Local Government Act 
of 2000 introducing the governance changes and increased community involvement 
(Cirrell, 2003). To ensure that the process did not lose impetus the Cabinet Office took 
on much of the policy work and published a report on Modernising Government in 1999 
(Cabinet Office, 1999).
The first wave of ideas focused on New Public Management theory where best practice 
from business was to be applied to public services, with flatter hierarchies, local 
responsibility for budgets, assessing outcomes rather than processes, and seeing the 
citizen as a consumer (Giddens, 2003b; Schuppert, 2003; Smith, 2000). This moved on 
to the ‘enabling state’ of empowering citizens and this in turn moved on to the ‘ensuring 
state’ which focuses on taking responsibility for the delivery of policy outcomes, for 
coordinating services and guaranteeing standards of delivery, even when many of these 
services are beyond its control. The ensuring state has been explained by Giddens 
(2003b) as ‘regulated self-regulation’ where the state lets go of power but regulates the 
conditions under which local autonomy is exercised, thus allowing people freedom to 
use their initiative and leaving them alone when it is going well, but checking up when 
things go wrong.
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New Labour was also seeking to tackle the bureaucracy that was holding up 
regeneration and to identify the barriers that were frustrating progress. The Social 
Exclusion Unit (SEU) produced Bringing Britain Together: A National Strategy for  
Neighbourhood Renewal in 1998 (SEU, 1998) to develop a new approach to urban 
regeneration that would build upon the Single Regeneration Budget. The SEU was 
partly charged with trying to deal with what had become known as ‘wicked issues,’ a 
term first used in 1997 to refer to policy problems that had proven to be persistent and 
not amenable to simple solutions, such as urban regeneration, social exclusion, 
sustainable development etc.
“All of these critiques of traditional approaches to policy making in relation 
to cross-cutting issues reiterate common themes: lack of an integrated 
approach both within and across organisations and across different levels of 
government; failure to learn the lessons of what works; lack of community 
involvement in policy making; failure to think through possible side-effects 
of policy interventions; and short termism” (Leach & Percy-Smith, 2001:
194).
The SEU (1998) report contained a foreword by Tony Blair that set out how the ‘worst 
estates’ were falling further behind and a targeted programme would focus on 
improvement. The problems were seen as having a significant social aspect with 
programmes such as Sure Start, Education and Health Action Zones set up to target 
specific areas. It was recognised that problems were complex and resulted from major 
economic and social changes with traditional jobs and social structures collapsing. The 
target was to create a ‘virtuous circle of regeneration’ that would focus on 
improvements to economic and social problems which in turn would create attractive 
communities to live in. Economic, social, and environmental issues would all be 
tackled to lift these communities out of deprivation with programmes specifically to 
target social issues, such as poor education, high teenage pregnancy rates, drug 
problems, and high levels of crime.
It has been argued (Atkinson, 2000) that Bringing Britain Together by the SEU was 
only meant to be the first step in a wider process of trying to develop a more coherent 
and effective urban policy. It was different from previous attempts due to the range of 
issues covered, its apparent determination to link urban policy into a range of 
mainstream social and economic policies, and the way it attempted to engage local
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communities by focusing on opportunities for local people rather than physical renewal. 
It also tried to tackle the causes of problems rather than the symptoms. It has been 
stated that as a result, urban policy had started to resemble an anti-poverty strategy with 
SRB guidance under New Labour stressing the importance of policy coherence between 
economic objectives and social policy initiatives (Lawless & Robinson, 2000). The 
modernisation programme was to make sure these complex problems and cross-sectoral 
solutions were developed and that change would actually take place. The approach was 
to use new structures that went beyond the local authority and where the focus was on 
making quicker decisions and tackling problems from a community perspective and by 
involving them.
New Labour continued the push towards self autonomy for local communities in its first 
few years of Government with the Urban White Paper (ODPM, 2000) promising Local 
Strategic Partnerships (LSP). These would be set up to bring together the local 
authority, service providers (schools, police, health and social services), local 
businesses, community groups and the voluntary sector to produce a Community 
Strategy (CS)15 to set out a long-term vision for the area. There was a legal requirement 
to produce the CS but considerable latitude for local authorities to decide how the 
connected well-being power could be used to achieve the improvements identified in the 
CS and the power was wide-ranging and offered an ability to tackle social problems 
(ODPM, 2001b). However, the fear within local government that this was actually an 
attempt to bypass them should not be glossed over as it was recognised that local 
government has few friends but influential enemies, including some in Whitehall 
(Elcock, 2000).
As with the Third Way, there were some clear over-arching statements about the 
purpose of the modernisation agenda being for achieving social aims, but most of the 
detailed attention was on procedures of how to make decisions rather than on providing 
guidance on how to translate the bigger picture concerns into local issues with a social 
aspect. However, the fact that there was a focus on ‘wicked issues’ (which tended to 
have strong social challenges) meant that social aims were still high on the New Labour 
agenda and social issues infused New Labour speech. Attention will now turn to the
15 This is now known as the Sustainable Community Strategy
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problems with the modernisation agenda and the focus on using the private sector to 
deliver public services, the target culture, and whether the community was genuinely 
involved in making policy.
Problems with the modernisation programme
The Conservatives set out in 1988, through the pamphlet by Nicholas Ridley The Local 
Right: Enabling not Providing, how local government should withdraw from ‘service 
provision’ and Michael Heseltine tried to encourage local authorities to take on this 
enabling role (Rydin, 1998). Therefore, many of Blair’s ideas for local government 
were copied from Heseltine and this naturally worried many within the Labour Party 
right from the start (Newman, 2001; Travers, 2001). While Blair and his policy unit set 
out to drive the modernisation process, the more ‘traditional’ Labour ministers were less 
keen on these radical ideas and a conflict arose between devolving power and having 
centrally-driven targets (Swann, 2000).
“Downing Street and the Treasury were strongly in favour of changing the 
culture of local councils and councillors, whereas the Department of the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions (local government’s sponsoring 
department) was more modest in its aspirations. Many Labour supporters in 
local authorities and constituency parties were amongst modernisation’s 
most bitter opponents” (Travers, 2001: 122).
Despite this serious crack within the modernisation agenda from the start, the 
Government pressed ahead with reform regardless and argued that more people from the 
private sector were needed to make the civil service fit for the new millennium (Cabinet 
Office, 1999). Blair felt the public sector was simply inefficient and he swerved 
towards ‘marketising’ public services and bringing in the more expensive private sector, 
which was not originally part of the New Labour approach (Toynbee, 2006). 
Meanwhile, he openly questioned whether the private sector really should be expected 
to pay towards things like training, environmental concerns, social costs that damage 
enterprise, and towards infrastructure (Blair, 2003). The private sector seemed to have 
wide ranging ‘rights’ to make money but few ‘responsibilities’ and the denigration of 
the public sector and deification of the private sector was remorseless.
“Some of the inadequacies of Britain’s public services are more to do with 
inertia, poor management, overmanning and bureaucratic sloth than lack of 
resources. Given the rapid pace of innovation in business, and the advance
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of technology, a great deal of change is necessary for the state sector to 
catch up” (Giddens, 2002: 56).
“Moreover, firms working in the commercial sector are likely on average to 
be better managed than state agencies -  not merely because they are 
commercial, but because they have been exposed to competition. In a 
market, unlike in the sphere of the state, poorly managed companies will be 
driven out of business” (Giddens, 2002: 61).
The approach towards the two sectors was clear cut and while the Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI)16 had been introduced under the 1992 Finance Act by the Conservatives, 
New Labour quickly adopted it as a means to involve the private sector in public 
services. In fact, they moved from a position of saying the NHS could ‘consider’ the 
role of private finance to saying that it was ‘PFI or bust’ (Monbiot, 2000: 63). Other 
public sector functions were passed over to the private sector despite growing concern 
that the figures did not stack up. For example, the campaign group, Transport 2000, 
illustrated that privately financed roads are around two and a half times more expensive 
than state built roads (Monbiot, 2000). Others have concluded there just is no evidence 
that public-private partnerships are actually efficient (Keating, 1998: 170). These 
concerns about using the private sector to deliver public services grew over the years 
and evidence soon started to emerge that a significant percentage of the huge amounts 
of money the Government was investing in transforming public services was simply 
ending up paying for private sector consultants (Cohen, 2006; Toynbee & Walker
2005).
Even before the rescue of the private sector banks in 2008/09 (Kirkup, 2008), Roy 
Hattersley, then a Labour MP, was pointing out the growing collapse of private 
companies in the provision of public sector services and the subsequent ‘bail out’ of 
private sector profits by the taxpayer (Hattersley, 2002b). He showed how in just one 
month private sector companies failed in their contracts involving schools, the NHS, the 
criminal record bureau, the Ashfield Young Offenders Institution, and the National Air 
Traffic Service. Cohen (2003) added the failings at the Immigration service, the Child 
Support Agency, the Passport Office, the National Insurance Office, London
16 See Domberger & Jensen, 1997; Grout, 1997; Monbiot, 2000, 2002; Shaoul, 2002; Torres & Pina, 2001 
for a further discussion on the PFI
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Underground, Railtrack, and the Millennium Dome to the list. The private sector was 
clearly struggling to deliver public services efficiently.
The Government’s own Public Administration Select Committee issued a report stating 
that public services were also different to private sector companies and had intrinsic 
assumptions about equity, access, and accountability that the private sector lacked 
(House of Commons, 2002b). Subsequent research backed this up with evidence of a 
continuing public sector ethos (Allmendinger et al, 2003b). The growing realisation 
within New Labour that the private sector was not the panacea to the problems of 
delivering services was too late to stop increasing cynicism and frustration within the 
public sector (Barlow et al., 2002).
The target culture
The second fundamental problem with the modernisation agenda, with reference to this 
research, was the impact of the target culture that resulted from the focus on making 
quicker decisions. Targets were set by Central Government and local public services 
were then monitored on whether they were achieving the targets but this approach was 
resented in local councils as yet another technocratic, top-down, incursion into local 
democracy (Fenwick et al, 2003). The targets and audits were ‘trust-corroding’ and 
showed the same disdain for public service professionals as Thatcher (Marquand, 2004). 
The need to provide detailed service performance plans with dozens of targets and key 
indicators became a bureaucratic nightmare and Public Service Agreements were added 
in 2000 with a further control on spending. New Labour retained the Audit 
Commission and Ofsted, which had been set up under the Conservatives, but expanded 
their roles and added the Best Value Inspectors. Blair took the challenge personally and 
constantly complained of the slow rate of progress and threatened to send in the ‘hit 
squads’ to failing authorities (Newman, 2001).
All of this was despite one of the Government’s own Policy Action Teams noting that 
while targets can be a powerful incentive for local authorities, they can also end up 
hindering action, and care needs to be taken when producing targets (DETR, 2000). 
The heavy audit culture slowed down the pace of change with central micro­
management breeding an atmosphere of distrust which leads to risk aversion and
83
encourages uniformity in programme design, thereby inhibiting innovation and any 
distinctive contribution from local community groups (Demos, 2003; Newman, 2001).
New Labour gained a reputation as talking about devolving power and resources to the 
local level but in practice they became one of the most heavily centralised governments 
with little movement away from their centralising tendency (Butler, 2001; Golding,
2006). Even Giddens (2002) criticised New Labour for sticking to old habits by 
dictating what councils and agencies may or may not do. It appeared that New Labour 
simply did not trust local authorities or other public sector bodies to manage themselves 
and instead imposed constant targets and checks that twisted results.
However, despite the pressures on them, local authorities still managed to work with 
their local communities and much of the progress in communities was due to local 
authority commitment as it was generally accepted as the community leader by local 
stakeholders (Harding, 1998; Rydin & Pennington, 2000; Sullivan, 2008). The local 
authority culture was consistently seen as key to influencing stakeholder engagement 
with a ‘can-do’ attitude amongst officers (although Members were not seen as good 
advocates of community leadership) (Sullivan, 2008). Therefore, the Government 
sponsored research found the public sector ethos was alive and well (the caveat that the 
findings of the report do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government is 
somewhat ironic). Other Government sponsored reports found that there has been a 
steady increase in public trust in local government between 2001 and 2007 and they 
were more trusted than central government and ‘politicians’ in general (Cardiff 
Business School & INLOGOV, 2008).
Did New Labour empower local communities?
The evidence from the literature review suggests that New Labour did not genuinely
empower communities to be involved in determining their own future. Soon after
coming to power they ended up telling the public to trust their policies as they were
based on objective science. However, the public were sceptical about ‘objective’ truth
and many never accepted the ‘evidence’ presented regarding the BSE crisis, GM food
debate, and the MMR vaccine, which rocked public confidence in ‘objective’ science
(Newman, 2001). New Labour also contributed towards the climate of public cynicism
by overstating what they were achieving with the constant ‘spin’ synonymous with
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Alastair Campbell and the Iraq War (Toynbee & Walker, 2005). The Government were 
not seen as providing objective information but as twisting information to suit their aims 
and the cynicism resulted in the lowest election turnout since universal suffrage 
(Toynbee & Walker, 2005). The fuel protests and subsequent Government use of the 
police against the public to enforce their view on the public left a deep scar on the idea 
that the Government genuinely wanted to work with the public (Newman, 2001).
“There is much talk of giving power to the people, moving power away 
from the centre, empowering and consulting the people; but its instinct is to 
centralise... At the heart of the New Labour machine, democracy is 
regarded as inefficient and outcomes are considered better served through 
the iron will of the people” (Giddy, 2001: 67-68).
There was also a direct link between the target culture (considered in the previous point) 
and this problem. The focus had been on speeding up public services and quicker 
decision making but this will inevitably result in less community consultation as 
involving a large number of people will almost inevitably slow the decision-making 
process if it is undertaken properly. There is only space here to consider the point in 
passing and it is best served with reference to the planning system itself (see Atkinson, 
2003; Jones, 2003; Newman, 2001; ODPM, 1998b; Rydin & Pennington, 2000; Willis 
& Wilsdon, 2003 for further discussion on this issue).
New Labour went from stating, while in opposition, that they would introduce an 
automatic right of appeal for third parties where there was a departure from the local 
plan to quickly dropping the idea and even reducing the number of ‘called-in’ 
applications that departed from local plans (Monbiot, 2000). Speed was at the price of 
involving the public and New Labour went further by trying to impose their ideas for 
development without proper public debate. The editorial in Planning (Morris, 2007a) 
highlighted the anger that the coalition of lobbyists and interest groups against the 
Planning White Paper had generated and pointed out that the public were fed up with 
being consulted and then ignored by a dictatorial Government. This culminated in the 
shambolic consultation on nuclear energy, where the Government had to carry out the 
consultation again after a judge found the process had been misleading and flawed 
(Morris, 2007a).
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The allegations from Greenpeace (reported in Planning, 2007b) that Gordon Brown, 
after becoming Prime Minister, said in the Commons that the Government had made the 
decision to continue with nuclear power before the consultation process had finished, 
suggested the new Prime Minister has the same distain for listening to the public as the 
previous one. Only months later, the public was promised a consultation on a third 
runway at Heathrow before any decision would be taken but both the Transport 
Secretary and Gordon Brown were supporting the expansion of Heathrow before any 
consultation had even started (Morris, 2007c). Lastly, the High Court decided in 2008 
that a judicial review of the whole eco-towns process should be considered on the 
grounds that proper and full consultation had not taken place and that the promotion of 
eco-towns outside the plan-led system was simply to avoid proper scrutiny, which takes 
time (BARD, 2009; LG A, 2008).
The target culture was used to direct local government to follow the ideas pushed by 
central Government and it has just been shown how the centre also did not value the 
opinion of the public but wanted to impose their views on them. This had an impact on 
the progress of the ‘Well Being power,’ with the Government’s own research (ODPM, 
2005b) into how the power was being used with reference to the wider modernisation 
agenda being somewhat dismissive of progress. It concluded that much of the lack of 
progress was due to Central Government mistrusting local government and confusion 
within Central Government about the purpose of the power itself. The trio of 
independent reports commissioned to assess different aspects of the local government 
modernisation agenda also found evidence of problems with the Central Government 
approach (Cardiff Business School & INLOGOV, 2008; Martin, 2008; Sullivan, 2008). 
The barriers to improvement listed a catalogue of central government negative 
influences: initiative overload, constantly changing policies, too much central 
prescription and regulation, insufficient joined-up thinking within central government, 
and ring fencing on how resources were spent. New Labour had set out to bypass local 
government in their desire for efficient and quick decision making processes that would 
genuinely involve communities but instead the evidence found that while local 
government was making progress, Central Government was responsible for many of the 
problems.
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The public were also growing increasingly suspicious of private sector companies 
running public services (ESRC, 2008) and over sixty percent of those asked agreed that 
large companies do not really care about the long-term environmental and social impact 
of their actions (Giddens, 2007). This leads to the question of why New Labour 
promised to work with the public and to empower them but their actions were to ignore 
them and to try to bypass local government and use a private sector that appeared ill- 
equipped to provide public services and not trusted by the public? It appears there are 
several answers that reflect some of the problems found earlier and associated with the 
Third Way and therefore suggest they were underlying problems with New Labour 
itself.
“Here New Labour has made an important if hesitant beginning.. .But still it 
lacks confidence, allowing itself to worry about the condemnation of the 
financial markets, the Conservative party and business rather than 
vigorously arguing for what it knows the public wants” (Hutton, 2002b: 
455-456).
The argument that New Labour was worried about being seen by big business to be 
interested in the concerns of the public (which tend to not focus on the economy 
exclusively) is very relevant. New Labour did drive many positive changes forward but 
a significant part of the problem was that they were almost embarrassed to point out the 
social progress they were making. There was a fear that big business would sneer at the 
ideas as irrelevant and argue they were being achieved at the cost of deflecting attention 
away from what mattered -  the economy.
While the modernisation agenda did bring improvements to the public sector, the money 
did not stretch far enough, there are serious capacity issues with understaffing and lack 
of recruits, target fatigue with a myriad of conflicting targets, and all while trying to 
cope with increasing workloads (Butler, 2001). Blair’s focus on the modernisation 
agenda and forcing change on local government has been a failed attempt to solve a 
problem that did not really exist. Local government did have many problems that 
needed to be resolved and there is no doubt that more efficient work was required (as in 
most large businesses) but the distrust of the public sector and the constant threats 
proved very costly to relations and the modernisation agenda arguably held back 
genuine improvements.
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3.5 Evolution of the planning system under New Labour
The Deputy Prime Minister set out a vision for the future where new communities 
would be built on the principles of sustainable development, which in turn would 
require balanced communities that met all their citizens’ needs.
“The Government has begun a historic programme to build a modem and 
fair Britain, a strong economy and a healthy environment to pass on to our 
children. This means creating an economy that is innovative and efficient, 
with a highly skilled and well-rewarded workforce, with firms that can 
compete against the best in the world. It means sustainable economic 
growth that does not come at the expense of our environment, whether that 
is the places where we live and work, or where our children play or go to 
school, or the natural environment which we all value and enjoy. And we 
believe in social justice a society where everyone has the chance to play 
their full part. Where a decent quality of life - health and housing, work and 
leisure - is there for us all, in every part of the country” (DETR, 1998; 
foreword).
It was stated that this approach of balancing economic, social, and environmental aims 
went right back to the heart of their election campaign and that the three did not have to 
be at the expense of each other but were in equilibrium.
“The Government's Election Manifesto stressed the importance of policies 
which combine environmental, economic and social objectives. Achieving 
all these objectives at the same time is what sustainable development is 
about. It brings together policies such as those to support businesses and job 
opportunities, to improve education and training, to improve the health of 
our people, and to safeguard the environment” (DETR, 1998; para. 2).
One of the four key aims of sustainable development was the need for social progress 
and a feature of building sustainable communities was to promote social cohesion 
(DETR, 1998). New Labour also continued to push the well-being power and stated 
that it was introduced to “improve communities’ quality of life” and suggested that 
issues such as tackling social exclusion, reducing health inequalities, promoting 
neighbourhood renewal and improving environmental quality were likely to be suitable 
(ODPM, 2001b). Again, social issues were high on the agenda for new communities 
and the power was clearly identified as being targeted at the promotion or improvement 
of the economic, social, or environmental well-being of the area (ODPM, 2001b).
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The planning system itself was to be overhauled with the focus to be on creating 
balanced communities with regional planning guidance (RPG) to be more important but 
also with a broader focus.
“RPG will now include a wider range of policies than in the past. The aim is 
to produce a more comprehensive and integrated "spatial” strategy designed 
to balance demands for development with the need to protect the 
environment and achieve social and economic objectives” (ODPM, 1999: 
para. 28).
This was a clear requirement for all three aims to be considered in spatial terms and 
decisions within the planning system were given the same aim of being required to be in 
balance with each other and where all three were central when decisions were made. 
There can be no doubt that social aims were important.
“We should never forget that decisions on matters like planning, or 
transport, or housing are ultimately about the quality of life of communities 
and individuals. Past mistakes happened when decision-makers lost sight of 
that... Planning has a key role to play in achieving a more sustainable 
pattern of development. It seeks to integrate economic, environmental and 
social factors in decisions about where to put homes, jobs, shops and leisure 
facilities... But more still needs to be done at all levels of the planning 
system as people's thinking about sustainable development moves on, 
especially to reflect the increased emphasis on combating social exclusion 
(DETR, 1998; para. 33, 35 & 36).
The production of the CS brought together these two important issues of making sure 
the community was actively involved in producing the strategy (it would shape the 
future activity of local organisations to meet community needs and aspirations) while 
also requiring the CS to promote the economic, social, and environmental well-being of 
the area (ODPM, 2001c). The CS was required to integrate the three areas and not to 
look at them in isolation, thereby taking a more holistic approach to problems. It is also 
important to note that while local authorities were given the power to promote the 
economic, social, and environmental well-being of their area they ‘must have regard’ to 
the strategy when using this power (HMSO, 2000a). Therefore, New Labour had 
clearly set out the need for communities to be involved in determining their own 
destinies, albeit in partnership, and to balance their economic, social, and environmental 
needs. The CS would also raise the profile of the planning system as the CS and 
development plan were to be complementary with the development plan to be seen as a
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means to take forward the physical development in the area necessary to meet the aims 
of the CS (ODPM, 2001c). New Labour was seeking to create communities that could 
work with others to build a community that proactively considered economic, social, 
and environmental issues up-front and where the planning system would be a key means 
to achieving this end.
There was a growing concern within Government that the planning system needed to 
modernise to match the proposed changes in local authorities, and this led to the Green 
Paper Planning: Delivering a Fundamental Change, published in December 2001 
(DTLR, 2001) along with a consultation paper. The Green Paper set out a vision of a 
planning system that was to be a positive and proactive tool, rather than a negative 
brake on development, and as such was to fully engage people in shaping the future of 
their community. The whole community was to be able to have a say -  individuals, 
organisations and businesses, with environmental and community concerns respected by 
a system that could accommodate change rather than just resist and stifle it (DTLR, 
2001). It was also noted that the planning system had previously been ‘consultative’ but 
did not actually engage communities as the local plan process was seen as protracted, so 
only those with considerable finances and stamina would endure. The Green Paper 
stated LSPs were to work with the local authority to ensure effective mechanisms for 
community involvement. The Local Development Framework (LDF) would then be 
required to contain a Statement of Community Involvement (SCI) setting out how the 
community would be involved in reviewing the LDF and having their say on 
‘significant’ planning applications.
Of more direct relevance to this research, the Government noted that the use of planning 
obligations had grown considerably in recent years, that there were strong differences of 
opinion on how they should be used, and that a consultation paper would be provided in 
due course (ODPM, 1999). This moved on by the time of the Green Paper, which stated 
there was a “strong case for allowing local communities to share in the benefits of 
development and growth” using obligations, although a separate document was to be 
published (DTLR, 2001: 5.28).
The planning system under New Labour had a clear mandate to ensure social concerns 
were considered when decisions were made. This was further clarified when the
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Government started in late 2004 to replace the Planning Policy Guidance Notes (PPGs) 
with Planning Policy Statements (PPSs) which were subtitled:
“Planning shapes the places where people live and work and the country we 
live in. It plays a key role in supporting the Government’s wider economic, 
social and environmental objectives and for sustainable communities.”
The 2004 version of PPS12 went on to state that the LDF:
“...should contain within its documents, an integrated set of policies which 
are based on a clear understanding of the economic, social and 
environmental needs of the area and any constraints on meeting those 
needs.” (ODPM, 2004a: para. 2.1)
Therefore, New Labour gave the planning system a clear purpose to create sustainable 
communities where economic, social, and environmental objectives were all to be 
considered when decisions were taken. However, it is surprising that it took New 
Labour so long to get to grips with the planning system and to replace previous 
Conservative PPGs, not least PPG1 which was only replaced in January 2005, despite it 
setting out the principles for the planning system; almost eight years after they had 
come to power.
The Government produced a dizzying number of consultations, guidance notes, and 
papers about the planning system during the research period and they are impossible to 
summarise here but there is little direct suggestion within any of them about how local 
authorities were to achieve social aims through the planning system. The overarching 
vision of sustainable communities that balanced decisions in the interests of economic, 
social, and environmental concerns was clear but there was little to clarify how that 
translated into daily decisions in the planning system. However, the policy framework 
was in place so that local authorities could develop policies that had a social aim. In 
particular, the concept of the ‘social investment state’ had advanced ideas such as 
providing child minding for single parents so they could go to work and counselling for 
those in difficulty rather than just giving economic benefits (Giddens, 1998b). 
Therefore, negotiations on planning applications could consider the provision of more 
nurseries and medical centres on large developments to provide for the community in 
these ways, although there was no direct PPS stating this.
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There was also potential for the planning system to influence other social issues. For 
example, there was concern about a new phenomenon known as ‘food poverty’ that the 
planning system had inadvertently created where out-of-town shopping centres led to 
the closure of many local shops, especially small food stores (Jacobs, 2001b). This 
meant that people living on deprived housing estates, who often had no car to access the 
shopping centre, would only have a small convenience store to do their shopping in but 
it would be less likely to have fresh fruit and vegetables and would be more expensive. 
This was exacerbated by increasing the amount of other facilities that were only 
realistically accessible by car, such as community facilities, cinemas, leisure centres, 
hospitals, and employment opportunities etc. with the rise of multiplexes and industrial 
estates on the edge of town centres. This also took place in parallel to significant 
declines in bus services with unprofitable routes closing while fares have risen. Again, 
these are issues with clear spatial dimensions that the planning system could, in some 
cases, influence but there was little in the way of changes to government policy at the 
time to require changes.
“...social elements... have never been a major element in urban regeneration 
policy. Nevertheless, under popular pressure they have certainly crept onto 
the agenda at various junctures, only to slip off again once the pressure has 
been absorbed or accommodated in a particular instance... The new Labour 
government has once again raised hopes that a more social approach to 
urban regeneration can be developed” (Ginsburg, 1999: 56-57).
In closing, it should also be noted that New Labour did make a significant number of 
quick changes, particularly to the procedures for planning. These included the setting 
up of the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) as a 
‘super-ministry’ to co-ordinate planning and the wider urban agenda, the Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs), strategic authority, and the Mayor for London. It must 
be recognised there were also come changes in approach to planning policy with the 
modernisation agenda, refocusing of attention on brownfield land, issuing some 
regional planning guidance, and they founded the Urban Task Force (UTF) (see 
Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2000).
A Summary of New Labour’s aims
New Labour had come to power on the crest of a euphoric wave of public support for a 
new approach to politics where social issues would be firmly on the agenda and the
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public would be central to all that the new government did. This was an exciting idea 
that promised a Third Way, with a Prime Minister who was courted around the world at 
the helm promising to deliver a new social order where everyone would work for the 
good of their local community. The focus would be to ensure that the economic, social, 
and environmental concerns were all considered when decisions were made. The power 
of the market would be harnessed to deliver social benefits to the community within a 
suitable environmental setting.
The Third Way had a clear focus on delivering a fairer society with better places to live 
and a desire to improve social conditions with improved schools and hospitals, a fairer 
welfare state, reducing crime, tackling social exclusion, promoting social justice and 
building citizens who accepted they had responsibilities as well as rights. All their 
statements and high level aims oozed with concern for improving the social conditions 
of life for citizens, at least on a power with economic and environmental issues, if not 
higher.
Communities were to be involved in producing new Community Strategies and these 
would be required to promote economic, social, and environmental issues so a ‘virtuous 
circle of regeneration’ would develop. Within the planning system itself, the statements 
were far reaching with demands that economic, social, and environmental issues were to 
be balanced if sustainable development was to be achieved. The spatial strategy, the 
LDF, and the CS were to focus on giving a physical interpretation of how these three 
demands were to be considered holistically to improve the quality of life for 
communities. The CS would raise the profile of planning, while planning obligations 
would be allowed to be used to ensure communities shared in the benefits of growth. 
Meanwhile, each new PPS carried a strap line about how the planning system was 
important to achieving the Government’s economic, social, and environmental 
objectives.
New structures and processes to refocus the planning system were created but during 
the first few years under New Labour there was little practical change in the work of the 
local authority development control team17. Part of the data analysis to be carried out as
17 Often now renamed as development management to give a more positive feel
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part of this research will examine this issue to assess the extent of change under New 
Labour, but it is important to accept from the start that there was little explicit change in 
planning policy that would push for change within the system in practice for the first 
few years. It will be interesting to see if the second three-year segment of data analysis 
under New Labour shows a greater change in approach.
Lastly, it must be recognised that New Labour made it clear before they came to power, 
that certain services, especially education and health, would be the major areas of focus, 
while others, notably defence, housing and transport, would not be so well served 
(Ellison & Pierson, 2003a). Also, once they were in power they become sidetracked 
quite quickly, especially with the rural backlash against what was perceived as a 
weakening of the environmental agenda as more greenfield housing was proposed, 
increases on fuel duty were introduced, the fox hunting debate erupted, and the BSE 
crisis broke out. It resulted in an umbrella group Countryside Alliance marching on 
London in 1997 and 1998 and led to the Government refocusing attention on developing 
brownfield sites before greenfield sites. The public pushed the countryside high onto 
the government agenda and it is arguable that subsequent changes to the planning 
system have been shaped by this recognition that the environmental agenda and public 
opinion cannot be ignored. However, while this should be borne in mind, it should not 
detract from the clear statements that need to be assessed.
3.6 The purpose of the planning system under New Labour
The fact the Government’s own Policy Action Teams struggled to articulate what 
exactly social exclusion was or how it should be tackled was a worrying omen for the 
progress of social issues. They simply managed to state it would require a joined-up 
approach, focusing on better public services, a strong economy, improvements in wider 
areas, and to empower residents (DETR, 2000). New Labour had promised in the report 
Bringing Britain Together that they were committed to social regeneration that 
empowers local communities but the early evidence was they were very reluctant to 
actually do this (Ginsburg, 1999). While ‘even’ the Conservative Government had 
accepted that ‘trickle down’ economics was not working, creating City Challenge in 
1992 and then SRB two years later, New Labour were reluctant to move away from 
using the market to tackle urban problems.
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“Accordingly, Labour’s approach to urban regeneration is based, first and 
foremost, on policies designed to provide people with the skills and 
capacities to reduce (their) poverty and dependence on welfare” (Imrie &
Raco, 2003b: 13).
This reliance on employment and working your way out of poverty was to result in the 
Urban White Paper of 2000 that was the first White Paper on urban policy since 1977 
with a ‘new vision of urban living’ (Lees, 2003). This placed the planning system in a 
key position as the regeneration bug turned into an unrelenting property bubble that 
drove development and high density living that returned fortunes for developers. At 
last, there appeared to be a substantive link between urban issues and planning as 
eminent architects and speakers developed this new vision with planning as a central 
component. Meanwhile, planning theorists had returned to debates about how best to 
interpose the planning process between urban development and the market to create a 
fairer society and while the communicative theorists, new urbanists, and just-city 
theorists may have disagreed, they shared optimism (Fainstein, 2000).
However, it did not last as the attention of the New Labour government to urban issues 
was subject to ongoing change and uncertainty with debates on urbanism, quality-of-life 
issues, economic, and environmental issues going back and forth. Social issues had a 
lack of focus and the problems facing urban communities resulted in little concrete 
action with limited resources devoted to regeneration, despite all the talk (Raco, 2003). 
The Urban White Paper was also dismissed as “a relatively toothless piece of legislation 
-  long on rhetoric, but short on substance” (Raco, 2003: 247), that it contained little that 
was new, and “all the evidence suggests that action has been anything but joined-up” 
(Atkinson, 2003: 168). The various Area Based Initiatives reflected the priorities of the 
parent department in Whitehall, with little coordination at central, regional, or local 
level among the various programmes. At least three reports by the Government in 2000 
alone cited this as a problem but to little effect with other reviews raising the same 
problem in 2002 and 2003 (Atkinson, 2003; NRU, 2003; The Quest Network, 2003).
Ginsburg (1999) shows how New Labour’s thinking was flawed from the start with the 
1998 SEU Report Bringing Britain Together stating the most deprived areas had failed 
due to structural economic change, social change, and fragmentation and gaps in 
previous urban programmes. However, the Government basically forgot the first two as
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too difficult to tackle and instead focused on the third with a complex blend of 
neoliberal fiscal and monetary policy, economic globalisation, and a flexible labour 
market. Policy almost turned back to the 1970s with the underlying claim being that 
new economic machinery will solve the problem this time round.
Likewise, the RDAs were one of New Labour’s big achievements within the planning 
arena but they effectively also relied on economic success to ‘trickle-down’ social 
benefits with ‘bricks and mortar’ regeneration the key focus (Atkinson, 2003; Lloyd, 
1999). They have shown little effort to actively engage with issues of poverty, 
inequality, or the social and environmental downsides of economic development in a 
globalised economy. Instead, they have relied on education and training, reflecting the 
view that the route to social inclusion is via a job in the mainstream labour market 
(Lloyd, 1999).
A report that the government has admitted that nobody knows how many community 
buildings exist or whether the numbers are rising or falling each year (Simms, 2003) 
will do little to build confidence that the government is taking social infrastructure 
seriously. The Government’s own select committee scrutinised the Communities Plan 
and was clearly concerned about the approach being taken which focused on supporting 
the construction industry in building thousands of new houses but with little thought 
about creating balanced communities.
“It will be an expensive and complex task to build so many homes. The 
Government has recognised this, but has yet to estimate the costs of 
providing the transport links, health care, education and all the other 
facilities which new neighbourhoods require... Local authorities need to be 
confident that the infrastructure will be available when the housing is 
occupied” (House of Commons, 2003b: 5).
The fear that New Labour sees social policy as a subdivision of economics has also 
been seen in the planning system where social impact statements are rarely given the 
same priority or funding as economic or environmental statements and are often only an 
afterthought when the process has begun (Ziller & Phibbs, 2003). Taking the evidence 
found from the literature review earlier in this chapter, it is likely that the reason for the 
lack of progress is the dominance of economic issues. It is not surprising then that the 
House of Commons own Select Committee scrutinised the Planning Green Paper and
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concluded that there was a ‘business’ agenda running through it. They even went on to 
state that the planning system “should not be subservient to the requirements of 
business” and although the Government response rejected this was the case, the 
accusation was clear that it was the business lobby that was influencing the Government 
(ODPM, 2002b: paragraph 47). There was a considerable body of evidence that 
suggested the Government appeared to have little appetite in the first term in office to 
use the planning system to deliver balanced communities where social and 
environmental aims would be able to be given equal consideration to economic desires.
“The conservative creed we have been asked to accept barely needs 
rehearsing... The message is merciless. The object of companies is to 
maximise profits for their shareholders, so that all obstacles to that end -  
from trade unions to planning laws -  should be as minimal as possible. 
Taxation is seen as a distortion of business-making and a confiscation of 
what belongs to individuals by right... The rich and business have only the 
obligation to the poor or to society as a whole that their own conscience and 
philanthropic instincts dictate” (Hutton, 2002b: 15).
There was even fear amongst the professional planning body that the purpose of the 
planning system was becoming lost and needed to be radically rethought as the values 
from the ‘golden era’ of planning (the post-war reconstruction) no longer applied 
(RTPI, 2001). Some planning academics were arguing that the reason the planning 
system was failing to deal with social issues was that it now had a different purpose.
“Planning exists to help the market and support capitalism, not challenge 
and supplant it” (Allmendinger, 2001: 1).
Modernising the planning system & the Barker review
Local government had been marginalised by the property industry during the 1980s but 
by the start of the 1990s, there had been a gradual reorientation of policy to involve 
local government more (Atkinson, 2003). The Conservatives had seen local authorities 
as part of the solution to involving local people more but while New Labour shifted the 
focus of policies back to the local level, this did not mean to local authorities. Instead, a 
plethora of supra-local organisations based on partnerships, such as LSP and RDA, 
were to operate under central government control and guidance. For example, the 
Treasury saw the RDA as the driver of economic development, rather than the local
97
authority and the local authority is only one of the partners on the NDC scheme (Imrie 
& Raco, 2003b).
The modernisation agenda and target culture also came to have a significant impact on 
the planning system as targets were enforced for the speed of processing applications 
with money given to reward good performance through the Planning Delivery Grant 
(PDG). However, evidence was emerging that as performance management in the 
planning system only focused on speed, this was damaging the quality of decisions with 
poor quality of design resulting as it was not incentivised and therefore authorities were 
not putting resources into it (Carmona, 2007).
There is one final topic that needs to be mentioned in relation to planning under New 
Labour in the early years as it arguably distracted them from focusing more positively 
on the planning system and caused considerable resentment amongst many planning 
professionals. While the planning system has periodically been accused of impeding 
business, which in turn has been identified as contributing to economic slowdown, this 
has traditionally been at the hands of the Conservatives. New Labour soon warmed to 
the topic though as they too were unsure about the planning system and were easily 
persuaded by large private sector companies like McKinsey (a favourite of The 
Treasury) who produced a report to convince the Government. Many saw through the 
report though.
“It adopts the unconventional view that the core of the British problem, far 
from lack of investment, is land use planning... the ‘pervasive explanation’ 
for lower British productivity... At first sight this seems an innovative idea 
-  until the evidence is examined closely, when it plainly becomes batty” 
(Hutton, 2002b: 278).
Hutton (2002b) showed that the OECD had already demonstrated firm entry is
relatively trivial as a cause of productivity growth and is already easier in Britain than in
the US, while a leading business school thinker in Europe accepted that planning
restrictions are not a serious problem. Despite this, the CBI advised the inquiry into the
Planning Green Paper that every survey and conversation they conducted with
businesses resulted in the complaint that planning was the main fetter on productivity.
This was a serious allegation with massive implications for the entire purpose of the
planning system but it was dismissed by the inquiry as being based on ‘anecdote and
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prejudice’ (reported in House of Commons, 2003a). A subsequent select committee 
(House of Commons, 2003a) reported that a review of the documentary evidence found 
no evidence that planning was a significant factor for the UK’s low productivity. In 
fact, the evidence they heard actually supported the planning system, with many of 
those who had previously criticised the planning system reversing their opinion when 
having to give evidence. The select committee concluded that the planning system was 
not a significant factor in determining productivity and other issues were much more 
important and even went on to comment that the planning system had a positive role to 
play in the economy.
The next major consideration of the purpose of the planning system was announced in 
the 2005 Pre-Budget Report when it was stated that Kate Barker would lead an 
independent review of land use planning, with particular reference to the link with 
economic growth. The report was published in 2006 (Barker, 2006) but the purpose and 
independence of the review was questioned from the start. Many believed the Treasury 
was on a mission to reform the planning system until it became marginalised and could 
no longer interfere with business decisions, even at the cost of local democracy being 
traded for speed (Ellis, 2006; Morris, 2006). The fact the ODPM even agreed to such a 
narrow and biased Treasury inquiry was seen as “an extraordinary indictment of the 
poor standing of the planning system inside government” (Ellis, 2006). The business 
journal, Management Today (not a predictable ally of the planning system) ran an article 
on changes to the planning system stating that Barker had been sent by The Treasury to 
find the evidence that the planning system was bad for business (see Loney, 2006). 
However, the article noted that she failed to find any such evidence and that any attempt 
to streamline the planning system would require dismantling local democracy.
Barker’s final report made thirty-two recommendations for improving the planning 
system and many were controversial and did not go down well within the planning 
profession (Ellis, 2007; Wilson, 2006b). Of direct relevance, was the explicit support 
for social policy simply to rely on economic development, as she stated national 
economic policy needed to be updated and it should emphasise
“...the critical role economic development often plays in support of wider
social and environmental goals, such as regeneration; strengthening the
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consideration given to economic factors in planning policy” (Barker, 2006: 
recommendation 3)
Given the considerable evidence stated earlier in this chapter, it should be clear that one 
thing the planning system did not need was clarity that economic factors were important 
as that message had been unmistakably embedded to the cost of social aims. Economic 
goals were seen as the primary purpose for the planning system with the argument 
apparently that economic aims would deliver social and environmental benefits. While 
there were many other suggestions that did have some merit18 there were also other 
reckless suggestions that supported the business agenda. For example, support for 
setting up the Infrastructure Planning Commission so strategic decisions could be made 
quicker sent a worrying message about the value of public involvement.
The Government’s response was in the Planning for a Sustainable Future White Paper 
that contained a foreword which was focused on economic, and to a lesser extent, 
environmental aims with no direct reference to social issues. Progress of the planning 
system was summarised (see box 1.1 of White Paper) as quicker decision-making, 
customer involvement through e-planning, planning bursaries to increase planners, 
focus on brownfield redevelopment, increased housing supply, focus on town centres 
first, and better urban design. These achievements are significant and there has been a 
step-change in sustainable planning, but it is not a ringing endorsement for a Labour 
government that has been in power for a decade in terms of social progress. Lastly, six 
future challenges for the planning system are introduced but only one, that calling for 
more housing, has a social aim with two explicitly economic and two environmental 
and the sixth, to maintain energy supplies, is arguably economic but could have a social 
slant. No wonder that an editorial in Planning (Morris, 2007b) argued that many within 
the planning profession felt that economic issues were moving even more to the 
forefront under Gordon Brown as Prime Minister.
18 Such as streamlining the permitted development rights system (although its introduction was 
subsequently shambolic), reducing complexity over historic environment applications (the idea has since 
been dropped), increasing fees, maintaining PDG etc.
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Conclusions
This chapter has set out how New Labour came to power with a political rationale that 
they promised would deliver greater social benefits for local communities. They argued 
that modernising local government would help to deliver these sustainable communities, 
and that the planning system would be central to this. The chapter has also set out the 
considerable apprehension raised by many people and groups who were concerned that 
the Third Way was nothing more than spin to enable a supposed left-of-centre 
Government to capitulate to a neo-conservative agenda.
The first section set out that New Labour had taken over the role of Government from a 
Conservative Government that was pushing a largely dismissive view of the planning 
system. The message was that planning was an impediment to business and was best to 
be bypassed through various schemes and initiatives that both took the power away 
from the local authority but also minimised the input from the public. While the 
environmental programme was practically forced onto the agenda by the public, there 
were only minor improvements in the importance of social issues.
Section 2 explained how New Labour took over and promised to decentralise power, 
promote social justice, tackle social exclusion, and place social issues back at the centre 
of Government through the social investment state. This was a clear change in 
approach in theory but section 3 set out a growing voice of concern that the theories 
spoken about were simply empty rhetoric and little would change in practice. One of 
the main areas of unease amongst commentators was that the Third Way was a 
meaningless idea that would provide little guidance when tough decisions were 
required. Other concerns revolved around New Labour’s courting of business where 
businesses were pushing a relentless form of turbo-capitalism that had little time for 
social issues. This led to New Labour’s supporters quickly became disillusioned with 
any idea of a progressive politics. It is important for this thesis to engage with these 
more political debates as the ideas that lay behind the New Labour thinking would come 
to have a critical impact on the thinking that shaped the planning system. The same 
concerns that were outlined by many commentators would also be found within the 
planning arena. Therefore, an understanding of the Third Way and the more theoretical
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debates and whether the ideas could be turned into practice would become very relevant 
to understanding what happened within the planning system.
This almost schizophrenic approach of promoting social issues and a Government that 
wanted to work with the people in theory but achieving little in practice was borne out 
in section 4. The modernisation agenda was driven by a desire to achieve a ‘virtuous 
circle of regeneration’ with the well-being power of balancing economic, social, and 
environmental goals central to this. The community was to be involved with a 
Community Strategy and Councils were to enable their public to work together for the 
good of all. However, it was shown that in practice, economic goals were prioritised 
with the private sector trusted to bypass Councils, while the Councils were given a 
target culture that took away their ability to work with their communities.
These issues were the backdrop to sections 5 and 6 which showed how these wider 
pressures that were being promised in theory but not delivered in practice, were also 
evident within the planning system. Section 5 set out how New Labour promised that 
the planning system was to build sustainable communities which would balance the 
economic, social, and environmental pressures they were under. Issues such as social 
exclusion were to be tackled with the Community Strategy to give the community and 
stakeholders a voice and a Statement of Community Involvement would ensure the 
public were enabled to be involved in the planning process. Expectations were high that 
social gains would be made. However, section 6 showed that much of New Labour’s 
focus within the planning agenda was also economic-led with the lack of depth to the 
Third Way meaning the focus on social issues did not last. Despite the growing concern 
over infrastructure provision, there was a business agenda evident throughout the 
Planning Green Paper and concerns were raised that the planning system was being 
supplanted as a capitalist tool.
The concerns set out in section 3 regarding how the progressive ideas behind the Third 
Way capitulated to the business agenda and that the modernisation programme actually 
returned power back to central government were all evident within the planning system. 
Section 6 illustrated this by showing that the target culture was damaging to the 
planning system as it effectively centralised power and controlled local government 
through setting targets, heavy auditing, and constant threats for those that did not meet
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New Labour targets. This meant that in reality, decisions would be made that reflected 
central Government policy with restricted ability for the local community or local 
government to influence the agenda. Pressure from big business was also brought to 
bear with focus returned to trying to dismiss the planning system as damaging to 
productivity and the relentless desire of the Treasury to make the planning system more 
subservient to these business interests.
This chapter set out the promise that New Labour would be a progressive Government 
and it is this assurance that this thesis is seeking to investigate. The difference between 
the previous Government and the New Labour one was clear in theory but the intention 
was to assess whether this translated into practice. Therefore, understanding the 
promises that were made is critical to providing an understanding to what exactly was 
stated would change. Being clear about the areas of concern is just as important, as this 
could provide the clues as to why little progress was made. Understanding the 
theoretical issues at play and the wider pressures and desires of New Labour is also 
fundamental as these broader issues would be bome out within the planning system.
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4 PLANNING GAIN
This thesis is interested in investigating New Labour’s claims that they would deliver 
balanced communities in terms of economic, social, and environmental needs with 
specific reference to planning obligations. Chapter two set out a clearer understanding 
of the sorts of issues that could be considered as social planning issues while chapter 
three expanded and assessed New Labour’s claims about how they would usher in a 
new era in progressive politics with social issues now firmly on the agenda. This 
chapter now needs to start developing an understanding of planning obligations, 
clarifying what they are, where they have come from, the pressures that have influenced 
their use, and their theoretical justification. This is because they are the vehicle that is 
mostly used to achieve social aims within the planning system and so is the focus of 
attention for this research. Particular attention is needed to ensure that there is a clear 
understanding throughout, as obligations have been misunderstood and discredited for 
years.
“Planning obligation (more commonly and comprehensibly called planning 
gain) is the most intractable aspect of the planning system with which we 
have had to deal” (Nolan, 1997: 77).
This statement by the Nolan Commission into standards within local government built 
on widely held opinions that planning gain is shrouded in corruption, legal arguments, 
misinterpretation, and confusion that leaves anyone trying to grasp the subject matter 
struggling to decide what is anecdote and what is fact. It is said to be a subject of 
extraordinary complexity and great political importance where technical issues give rise 
to political difficulties, and political objectives lead to technical problems 
(Cullingworth, 1980). In an effort to better understand these complexities, it is 
proposed to start by looking at some definitions of the terms used, as we need to be 
clear about what we are discussing from the start, before any of these 
misunderstandings take hold.
Attention will then move to consider the topic of betterment as it is a significant policy 
area of importance to the foundations and justification of modern day planning 
obligations. The second half of the chapter will then start to consider obligations
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themselves to give a better understanding of how they operated during the research 
period. This will be considered from three aspects and will start by looking at the 
history of obligations and emerging conflicts between Government advice and legal 
precedent. The second point will consider why there has been an increase in the use of 
obligations and then move to clarify what the justifiable rationale is for seeking 
obligations as this will give the framework for assessing how far the case study 
authority has achieved an efficient use of obligations.
4.1 Definitions
Planning permission will normally be required when someone wants to build new 
buildings, beyond small ancillary residential extensions and structures. When this 
involves a considerable number of new dwellings in particular, this can increase the 
value of land by vast amounts due to the demand for housing in comparison to other 
uses. For example, change in use of land in the south of England to residential from 
agricultural use was estimated to increase the land value by 170 times in 2000 (Evans & 
Bate, 2000: 18). However, even by the end of the first five years of the millennium this 
difference had increased further with the Government estimating the increase in land 
value in England in 2005 from £9,287 per hectare of mixed agricultural land to £2.46 
million for residential use: an increase o f264 times (HM Treasury, 2005b).
John Stuart Mill is reported (see Evans & Bate, 2000) to have described this added 
value as an ‘unearned increment’ as the landowner had not carried out any work to 
improve the land and the increase in land value had resulted purely from a decision of 
the state to allocate land for a higher value use. Planning gain, in the philosophical 
sense, is an attempt to try to ‘capture’ some of this increase in land value that the 
landowner has made, and pass it back to the community as a ‘gain’ of some type. It is 
argued that land is allocated for housing purposes in the interests of meeting the needs 
of a growing local community and so while a landowner has a right to a fair price for 
the loss of land, they do not have a ‘right’ to benefit from something that is in the 
community interest by making considerable personal profit.
The topic has been so controversial and bedevilled by problems that the Government 
asked The Property Advisory Group (PAG) to produce a report on the issue and their
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subsequent report Planning Gain was published in 1981. One of the first issues they 
had to deal with was the definition of the term ‘planning gain’ itself as it was often used 
interchangeably with other terms, including ‘community gain’ and ‘planning 
bargaining.’ The idea of planning gain crossed many different boundaries and meant 
different things to different people and the PAG concluded that no satisfactory 
definition of the term existed. The covering letter accompanying the report stated that 
planning gain involved
“...the arrangements whereby local authorities, in granting planning 
permission, achieve planning or other community gains at the expense of 
developers” (PAG, 1981: iii).
This is the definition often used by people quoting the PAG and both Crow (1998) and 
the RTPI itself (2000) refer to this as the PAG definition. However, this is a little 
disingenuous as this was only the definition given in passing in the covering letter and 
the PAG actually went to some length to define the term in their report. The full 
definition was
“...a planning gain accrues when, in connection with the obtaining of a 
planning permission, a developer offers, agrees or is obliged to incur some 
expenditure, surrender some right or concede some other benefit which 
could not, or arguably could not, be embodied in a valid planning condition” 
(PAG, 1981: 4).
This definition is more detailed and picks up on the key point that planning gain is 
technically about securing a benefit to someone, other than the developer, who 
otherwise would arguably have no right to it (as it could not be required to be provided 
within a planning condition) and that it will be provided at the developers’ expense. 
The definition is suitably broad allowing the gain to be financial, the loss of a right, or 
the gain of a benefit, and accepts that the gain is not always at the local authority’s 
insistence.
The definition by the PAG is fairly vague but it has been argued that it is important to 
keep the definition ‘loose’ as any attempt to be more explicit runs the risk of excluding 
some potential gains (Crow, 1998). Some developers even argue that there is an 
intrinsic benefit to the public from all new development and therefore the whole 
development process could be considered a planning gain (Punter, 1999). However, for
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the purposes of this research, this argument is rejected and planning gain is specifically 
looking at something additional to the development proposal that is brought about in 
connection with the granting of planning permission and that the developer would not 
otherwise be required to provide. As will be illustrated later, this is not always clear 
cut.
The other definition discovered in the literature review that has some value is:
“.. .planning gain exists when a developer obtains planning permission by 
providing, at their own expense, an asset or service to the community which 
would not have been provided but for the need to obtain planning 
permission. By a developer, we mean no more than a person or organisation 
seeking planning permission” (Bowers, 1992: 1329).
The salient difference between this definition and that used by the PAG is that it 
removes the focus on whether the gain could be secured through a planning condition 
and instead focuses on the fact that the gain could be an asset or a service and that the 
‘developer’ could be anyone. However, at this stage, the definition by the PAG is 
considered to be better overall, as the focus on whether the gain could be included in a 
condition adds value, as will be discussed later.
It is also considered that ‘true’ planning gain requires some consideration to be given to 
the developer’s motives in the process, and more importantly, the impact on their 
profits. If the developer derives some financial benefit from the so-called planning 
gain, then is it not technically a gain for the community at the developer’s expense. 
There are two areas to consider in relation to this point. The first is that many ‘gains’ to 
the community are little more than window-dressing of something of little value. For 
example, landscaping areas on a scheme are often the land left over after the 
development has been designed on the prime part of the site and is the piece of land that 
the developer has little use for and doesn’t know what to do with (Ennis, 1996a; Healey 
et al., 1995). This is hardly therefore a significant ‘gain’ to the wider community in 
planning terms as it adds value to the development (house purchasers like landscaping 
and will pay higher prices) but at minimum cost (nothing else the land could be used 
for). This is contrasted with a development where a ‘true’ planning gain would be a 
requirement for a landscape buffer across a large part of the site that otherwise could
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have been used for houses as the community is benefiting from something that is 
affecting the developer’s profits.
The second area to consider is where the developer actively agrees to provide a benefit 
for the local community but the ‘gain’ offered will also benefit the development. As in 
the first case, the developer can pass the ‘cost’ onto the house purchaser in higher prices 
and so there is no actual ‘cost’ to the developer. This is well illustrated by a case in 
Harlow, reported by Healey et al. (1995), where the local authority’s Parks Manager 
wanted a new playground to be provided as part of the new housing scheme. He 
pointed out to the developer that providing a playground next to the new houses would 
be ‘an additional saleable item in terms of that house’ and the developer jumped at the 
idea as a result, being able to pay for the playground from the increased house values. It 
is not implausible to consider that the increase in house values because of the 
playground could be more than the cost of the playground itself and therefore the 
‘community gain’ of a new playground actually increased the developer’s profit.
The first area seems fairly clear that it should not be considered to be a ‘pure’ planning 
gain as it only secures the provision of something that in effect is minimising the impact 
of the development itself and is of little intrinsic value to the local community. The 
second area however is much more difficult to conclude upon as in the illustration 
given, the community has benefited with the provision of a new playground that 
existing local children should be able to use, but it was not provided at the developer’s 
expense as they passed the cost onto the house purchasers. The comment by the then 
Minister for Planning, Sir George Young MP, in the House of Commons in 1991, shows 
planning gain was expected to go further.
“A planning gain would do more than merely provide facilities that would 
normally have been provided at public expense. It would provide facilities 
that the public purse could never have afforded...Conservative members 
believe that there is no reason why the public sector should provide all the 
schools, community centres and infrastructure” (reported in The Local 
Government Library, 2001: 2-3422).
However, for the purposes of definitions at this stage, it is considered sufficient to 
accept that the second area considered is still a planning gain to the local community, 
although it is not a ‘pure’ planning gain, as that would have achieved something
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primarily for the existing local community and at the developer’s expense, as per the 
Minister’s comments above. This illustrates why it is accepted that the definition of 
planning gain remains broad, as there are so many examples where there is a benefit to 
the local community and to the developer.
It is noted that the phrase ‘planning gain’ fell out of favour in the 1990s as people came 
to connect it with stories of misuse and local authorities trying to blackmail developers 
into providing infrastructure in return for granting planning permission. Circular 1/97, 
Planning Obligations abandoned the term and instead focused on the term ‘planning 
obligation’, although this has been criticised as confusing (Punter, 1999). This research 
retains the use of planning gain to refer to the overarching topic of achieving a benefit 
for the local community at the developer’s expense and in accordance with the 
definition given by the PAG at the start.
There is a myriad of different ways to obtain planning gain and the ability to distinguish 
between them is required before further consideration can be made of the topic. 
However, this section will only focus on the terms betterment, planning obligations, and 
planning agreements. These are the topics central to the thesis that need to be 
understood before the methodology chapter of this research can be considered. Other 
terms will be considered when required.
The first term to be uncovered in historical use is that of ‘betterment’ (and the rather 
awkward flip-side of ‘worsenment’ which for grammatical reasons is not often used). It 
has been reported that the first attempt at betterment was in 1427, during the reign of 
Henry VI, when landowners had a levy imposed on them for the increase in value of 
their land from the sea defences that had been erected at the cost of the state (Healey et 
al., 1995). The argument is that the sea defences were paid for by all subjects from 
taxes in the national interest and so an individual landowner should not personally profit 
at the expense of the public and there should be some recompense. It is argued that the 
local community has a ‘right’ to receive this ‘compensation’ for the additional value 
that has been put into the pockets of those whose rights have been retained (Kekwick & 
Hughes, 1955).
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“Betterment is usually defined as an increase in site value caused by 
improvements carried out at public expense, and in the context of the 
development process, this is mainly interpreted as the increase in the value 
of land consequent upon the granting of planning consent” (Evans & Bate,
2000: 18).
It is important to realise that officially betterment is not a tax, but a levy.
“A tax is a means of raising money for payment to the Crown. A levy on 
the other hand is a means, sanctioned by law, of raising money for the 
purposes of some other authority or organisation than the state” (Harris & 
Nutley, 1967: 5).
The difference between planning gain and betterment focuses on the point above as 
betterment is historically used to describe the attempts by government to legislate for a 
levy to be placed upon the grant of planning permission. This was a fixed amount, 
collected nationally, although as will be shown later, a very complex system with all 
sorts of caveats and disclaimers that did allow site specifics to be taken into account. 
Planning gain, by contrast, is a more ‘modern’ phrase and starts with the premise of 
negotiating on a site specific basis, although more recent attempts have sought to 
establish a formula approach to fix the amount. This results in the two systems 
overlapping to a considerable extent and they are arguably different sides of the same 
coin but the main point is that the betterment levy required primary legislation 
specifically for that purpose, while planning gain has ‘used’ other legislation to achieve 
its aims (as will be illustrated later).
Section 12(1) of the 1991 P&CA substituted s. 106 into the 1990 Act and came into 
force on 25th October 1991 through Statutory Instrument 1991 No. 2272 and introduced 
the term ‘planning obligations’ officially to the planning lexicon. The new s. 106A and 
S.106B were substituted in by the same legislation but only enacted on 9 th November 
1992 by Statutory Instrument 1992 No. 2831 to allow obligations to be discharged and 
modified and to give the right of appeal against refusal to modify an obligation (or non­
determination of such an application). Obligations could now be entered into by ‘any 
person’ and this did not have to be ‘in agreement’ with the LPA. Circular 28/92 
Modification and Discharge o f Planning Obligations followed to explain how the 
process would work.
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However, the main point at this stage is that the term planning obligations is more 
generic and includes all obligations entered into under s. 106. In the author’s 
experience, practitioners tend to speak about agreements (reached bilaterally between 
two parties) and unilateral undertakings (by one party) but there is considerable misuse 
of these terms which causes confusion and many people refer to any obligation entered 
into under s. 106 as a ‘legal agreement’ or a ‘section 106 agreement’ even when 
referring to a unilateral undertaking, which is not an agreement as such. A unilateral 
undertaking has not been ‘agreed’ by the LPA but it has been imposed on the authority 
as an undertaking that the developer will do something to overcome the concerns of the 
LPA. This can be imposed by a developer who decides not to negotiate with the LPA, 
or by the Planning Inspectorate following a successful appeal.
The term planning agreement, or legal agreement, should only technically be used to 
refer to agreements entered into under the old s. 106 (before the changes under the 1991 
Act), agreements entered into before the 1990 Act or bilateral agreements under the new 
s. 106. They should not be used to refer to unilateral undertakings under the new s. 106 
or as a generic term to cover both parts of the new s. 106 as the phrase planning 
obligation is the correct one.
There are many examples of poor use of the terminology but it is interesting to note 
two; the first defining planning gain while the second tries to explain the difference 
between agreements and obligations. They are interesting as they were written by 
researchers who have written extensively on the topic of planning obligations.
[Planning gain is] “...the provision in cash or kind of some benefit or 
advantage which makes a scheme acceptable which could not otherwise be 
permitted on planning grounds” (Healey, 1992: 420).
“A planning agreement is a legal mechanism through which a developer 
agrees either to accept a restriction on the use of the land or the operation of 
the development or to make contributions to a local authority. Each 
contribution can be termed a planning obligation... Agreements contain at 
least one planning obligation though they may contain more. Obligations 
contained in planning agreements may be negative or positive or both” 
(Ennis, 1996a: 350-351).
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The first definition only focuses on schemes that are unacceptable in planning terms, 
but the ‘offer’ of some planning gain has made the scheme acceptable. There are 
considerable ethical problems with this approach (which will be explored later) but it is 
not a suitable definition as planning gain is, by contrast, something that is usually 
achieved from development that is acceptable in planning terms. The second definition 
only talks about agreements but then states the clauses contained within the agreement 
are called obligations, thereby causing complete confusion in terminology as an 
agreement is technically part of an obligation (unilateral undertaking being the other) 
rather than an obligation being part of an agreement.
This research seeks to be clear about exactly how we are using these terms but also to 
be mindful that other researchers have used terms in other ways. This research refers to 
planning gain as the overarching topic of achieving a benefit for someone, other than 
the developer, but at the developer’s expense and is a broad and imprecise issue. There 
are many ways to achieve planning gain; the method of primary interest to this research 
is that of planning obligations entered into under s. 106 of the T&CPA (as amended). 
These obligations can be either bilateral agreements between the LPA and the developer 
or unilateral undertakings imposed on the LPA by the developer or the Planning 
Inspectorate. These obligations all contain clauses that set out the requirements to be 
satisfied by the obligation. This research will seek to use the term ‘agreement’ when 
referring to legal agreements entered into under other legislation, agreements entered 
into before the 1990 Act (or the 1991 Act changes) or specifically when referring to 
unilateral agreements within the new obligations procedure, but not to generically refer 
to s. 106 obligations. Betterment is not technically a planning gain as it requires primary 
legislation to be collected and is a levy, whereas a planning gain tends to relate to a 
specific site and uses existing legislation.
4.2 Betterment
The concept of betterment19 was arguably begun with the 1909 Act, as it introduced a 
process of collecting a 50% levy on any increase in value of a development site (later 
increased to 75% in the 1932 Act). However, very little money was actually collected
19 This section relies extensively on Cullingworth (1980), Harris & Nutley (1967) and Healey et al. (1993, 
1995).
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from this scheme and to make matters worse the few schemes that did go ahead resulted 
in expensive compensation payments from local authorities to adjoining landowners 
where their land had been blighted (known as worsenment) (Healey et al. 1993,1995).
The Government had asked the Uthwatt Committee20 to consider the issues around 
betterment and they reported that the main problem with the previous legislation was 
the size of the compensation payments. Landowners were compensated for the most 
valuable use their land could be put to rather than what it was actually used for and this 
‘development value’ was speculative and often over-valued land by two or three times. 
One solution was that betterment should be considered on a national basis, as money 
from development in one area may be needed to compensate those blighted in another 
area and the ‘logical solution’ was land nationalisation but Uthwatt rejected it as 
impractical for political, financial, and administrative reasons and instead considered 
that land required for development should be bought by the state and leased to the 
developer. Many of the detailed recommendations of the Uthwatt Committee were 
rejected but other ideas did make it into the 1947 Act.21
The 1947 Act introduced a 100% development charge on the difference between the 
existing value of land and the increase from the grant of planning permission. This 
made development of little attraction to landowners who held out for the chance to 
make profit under a future Conservative Government who were making pledges in 
opposition that they would repeal the charge. In practice, this almost stopped new 
development overnight and the situation was made worse as the charge was intended to 
be flexible with reductions available where necessary but this flexibility was not 
included in the legislation and so the system never really worked.
The Conservative Government of 1951 set out to overhaul the system but ended up 
deciding to abolish the development charge completely, just as evidence was starting to 
emerge that the scheme was becoming more effective. However, it was too little too 
late as the development charge had been discredited for holding up new housing, even 
though many suspect the real reason for a lack of housing was a shortage of building 
materials and labour (Cullingworth, 1980).
20 Report of the Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment
21 See Cullingworth (1980) for further information on the Uthwatt Committee
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In 1965, a White Paper set out the intention to introduce a flat-rate charge where land 
was realised but was delayed by the General Election of 1966 and was enacted in the 
Land Commission Act, 1967 (Hughes et al., 1968). The Act introduced a betterment 
levy, established the Land Commission, and sought to return some of the development 
value back to the local community.
The levy would apply whenever development value was realised by a ‘chargeable act or 
event’ that included the granting of a lease on land or a tenancy over seven years. The 
levy was not in the Act itself but prescribed by the Betterment Levy (Prescribed Rate) 
Order, 1967 and was originally set at 40% with an intention to rise to 45% and then 
50% (Harris & Nutley, 1967). In addition, the Land Commission was to buy land at 
existing use value plus some extra to cover losses and a little more to encourage a 
willing sale. They had the power of compulsory purchase if necessary. Again, like the 
development charge some twenty years earlier, the proposals were plagued by the large 
number of exemptions under the transitional period and the significant number of 
hardship cases. It also became apparent that while the system had been set up to tackle 
land-hoarding by developers, the problem was actually found to be a lack of land 
allocated for development by the local authority.
“In short, the main shortcomings of the 1947 and 1967 schemes were that 
they attempted too much, and did not adequately slot in to the local 
machinery of planning” (Cullingworth, 1980: 418).
The Conservative Government that came to power quickly scrapped the levy but in 
1974 proposed a specific charge on increase in land value, known as the development 
land tax. Their main target was the land-hoarder who kept land with planning 
permission as its value continued to rise, as local authorities were paying twice for 
providing infrastructure by purchasing the land to build the infrastructure on and then 
paying to provide it. The Government produced two White Papers to require 
developers to contribute to the costs of services provided in relation to new 
development. The White Paper Land, published in 1974, was concerned that 
communities were not satisfactorily receiving the public facilities they needed because 
of the inflated price that resulted from private developers providing them. It was also 
concerned that the market did not consider the stressful impact on the individual from
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traffic jams and crowded conditions and that this was a suitable issue for the local 
authority to consider.
“This concern with the impacts of development and the way the private 
market tended to externalise the costs of such impacts, was to provide much 
of the impetus and justification for the negotiation of development 
obligations” (Healey et al., 1995: 32).
Labour ousted the Conservative Government and so the proposals were never turned 
into legislation. However, of particular relevance is the fact that the principle of 
developers paying for infrastructure to their sites had been accepted and the introduction 
of Section 52 of the 1971 T&CPA had given authorities the legal mechanism to achieve 
it, taking the introduction of planning agreements by the 1932 Act to a different level 
(Ashworth & Demetrius, 2008). In addition, it had been accepted that local authorities 
could legitimately consider concerns that are more general in nature and argue that 
developers had to address these problems and this led to the start of the modem attempt 
to extract planning gain by using legal agreements (Rydin, 2003).
The Labour Government produced the Development Land Tax in 1976, which built 
upon the previous Conservative inspired tax. It received cross-party support as a result 
and so lasted much longer than previous attempts at recovering betterment. The 
Development Land Tax, like the betterment levy before it, was charged at the point of 
sale of the land and was a tax on the actual profit22 or the deemed realised development 
value when the owner was deemed to have disposed of the site by carrying out 
development. The initial levy was 80% but with a reduced rate for the first £150,000 
worth of development. It was only seen as an interim solution as it was intended, 
through the Community Land Act of 1975, that all major development would be 
channelled through the ownership of the local authority. The authority would purchase 
the site at normal land value but sell it at development land value and so recoup the 
development value by selling or leasing the land for development. This way, authorities 
could become positive planning authorities with the finance to carry out the necessary 
works.
22 Where planning permission was granted this would be the realised development value
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However, the 1979 Conservative Government repealed the proposals, which had in fact 
not been working particularly well as many authorities did not have the financial 
backing to assemble sites or the incentive to even attempt to as the local authorities 
were only allowed to keep 30% of the profits, with the whole system tightly monitored 
by central government accountants. The Development Land Tax lasted until 1985 but is 
said to have had little effect as exceptions to the tax meant there were many ways 
around payment so it became almost a voluntary tax and when it was finally abandoned 
it was costing the Treasury more to administer than it was bringing in (Minton, 2004). 
However, it had further set the scene for successful negotiation of planning gain for 
both on and off-site costs.
It can be concluded that betterment struggled on two simple practical issues (Grant, 
1999). The first is the attribution of value as it is not straightforward to categorically 
state what proportion of land value results from the public benefit and so the term 
betterment tends to be used in a looser way to reflect the difference between the historic 
value of the land (or the existing use) from the current market value for development. 
The difference is known as ‘development value’ but it may reflect the benefit of 
development and improvements carried out by the landowner or other landowners on 
adjoining land. The second problem is that of liability where the preference is to pass 
the liability on when the land transfers as that normally coincides with the release of 
funds.
4.3 History of obligations
The use of the term ‘obligation’ by the 1990 Act appears to have been an adoption of 
the term used by the Law Commission in its 1984 Report Transfer o f Land: the Law o f 
Positive and Restrictive Covenants and adds planning obligations to the reports 
‘neighbour obligations’ and ‘development obligations’ (The Local Government Library,
2001). As was outlined above (section 4.1), planning obligations were introduced into 
the amended s. 106 of the 1990 Act by the 1991 Act amendments, with agreements 
previously having been ‘tacked’ onto s.52 of the T&CPA, 1971 and then transferred 
through to s. 106 of the T&CPA, 1990. The 1991 amendments were part of an attempt 
to reorganise the use of planning agreements and to resolve some of the problems 
associated with their use is practice. The introduction of the term planning obligation
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was an attempt by the Government to project a more serious image as they sought to 
move planning gain away from an image of “consort with dubious characters” 
(Lichfield, 1992) towards a more positive image.
The term, planning obligation, is the generic term for any obligation entered into under 
the amended s. 106 and includes bilateral agreements and unilateral undertakings. The 
obligations are legally binding between anyone involved in the obligation and anyone 
deriving title from them (signatories are usually the local planning authority, the 
developer, and the landowner). Usually the planning permission is only issued upon 
completion of the obligation and the term ‘resolution to grant planning permission 
subject to a planning obligation’ describes when those applications that are decided by 
the Committee have been agreed in principle but the obligation has not yet been signed. 
The obligation only takes effect once the planning permission it is connected to has 
been implemented by the commencement of development.
The obligation is a land charge and runs with the land rather than the applicant and is 
enforceable against any subsequent owner of the land. The obligation is enforced by an 
injunction, which makes any breach very serious and one that can be swiftly enforced 
by the LPA without the service of any further notices. This is a significant benefit over 
conditions that have been attached to a planning permission, as they tend to result in 
much smaller fines, require the service of further notices, and gives the opportunity for 
time delaying appeals. However, an application can be made to modify or discharge the 
obligation five years after it is entered into, whereas agreements under the T&CPA, 
1971 can only be discharged by application under s. 84 of the Law of Property Act, 1925 
or by a deed between the parties (White, 1998). The new process is much easier.
Now that planning obligations are better understood, it is important to this research that 
there is awareness of the history of obligations and how they have changed over the 
years and the various factors that have influenced their use, particularly during the 
research period (1991-2003).
It is appropriate to go back to the incoming Conservative Party of 1979 who were 
seeking to restrict the use of agreements due to growing concern from legal 
commentators that they were being abused. They set up the PAG in 1980 to investigate
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the practice of planning gain and condemned it outright as unsuitable for planning 
control. Circular 22/83, entitled Planning Gain, was produced as a result and only 
supported the use of agreements when infrastructure was required to allow the 
development to go ahead, or where the agreement was so directly related to the 
development that the scheme should not be allowed to go ahead without it. The tone of 
Circular 22/83, and the subsequent Circular 16/91, was greatly influenced by the PAG 
report and their concern to rein back the practise (Crow, 1998).
It was Circular 22/83 that led to the use of the phrase that agreements had to be ‘directly 
related in scale and kind’ to the benefit that the development would receive from the 
facilities. This meant that there was to be no additional ‘gain’ as such to the community 
as the developer only had to cover the actual cost and impact of the development 
(Healey et al., 1995). The case of Richmond-upon-Thames, 1984 held that if there was 
no legitimate planning objection to an application, apart from the lack of planning gain, 
then the application should not be refused.
Circular 16/91 tried to be more specific and set out five tests for when it was considered 
reasonable to seek a planning obligation:
(i) When there is a requirement to provide something to enable the development to 
go ahead in practical terms i.e. the provision of car parking for future users.
(ii) When there is a need to ensure the development meets the cost of providing for 
facilities for occupiers of the development in the near future through payments.
(iii) Where there is a direct need resulting from the development and subsequent use 
of the land that the development should not be permitted without it i.e. a new 
classroom for the children in a new housing scheme.
(iv) To ensure a local plan policy is implemented as part of the development and 
retained thereafter for that use i.e. provision and retention of affordable housing.
(v) Where it is required to offset the loss of an amenity or resource present before 
development i.e. nature conservation benefits.
The first, second and fourth tests were similar to the tests within Circular 22/83, but the 
third test was expanded under Circular 16/91 by adding to the car parking and open 
space envisaged within the previous advice by including “social, education,
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recreational, sporting or other community provision” that arises from the need of the 
development. Circular 16/91 also added the fifth test but dropped the previous 
Circular’s call to distinguish between a reasonable charge on the developer and local 
taxation. Social needs could therefore be catered for and provided by the obligation.
In addition to the direct tests within the Circular, there was further guidance in the 
appendices to the Circular and these included the previous test (established under 22/83) 
that what is required must fairly and reasonably be related in scale and kind to the 
proposed development (B9). The 1991 Circular also stated that the LPA should not 
impose commuted maintenance payments on developers (BIO). However, this resulted 
in highway engineers simply relying on highway legislation instead of the planning 
system as s.278 agreements under the Highways Act, 1980 can be specific about the 
costs that can be charged by the highway authority (Healey et al., 1995). These costs 
can include any cost in making the agreement, related administrative expenses, and any 
subsequent maintenance charges.
Circular 16/91 went further than Circular 22/83 by increasing the range of community 
facilities that could be directly related to new development and accepting that a need for 
them could arise from the development. However, the tests in the Circular concerned 
alleviation of impacts rather than compensation for the impact of development within a 
wider environment. There was immediate concern that the ‘new approach’ was not 
going to change much in practice and that s. 106 would keep the ‘common’ touch and 
still be known as planning gain while the proposals had failed to keep up with changes 
that were happening in practice (Lichfield, 1992).
The new legislation led to a plethora of appeals to the courts about the legality of 
planning obligations and many of the judgements were contrary to the guidance 
contained within the Circular. The case of R. v. Plymouth City Council, ex parte 
Plymouth and South Devon Co-operative Society Ltd,23 established that community 
benefits offered as part of a planning application were material considerations, even if 
they were not necessary to overcome any planning problems with the site. Therefore, a 
local authority could be offered ‘incentives’ that were not directly related to the
23 [1993] 67 P.&C.R. 78
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application and the authority could consider them as a material consideration (Healey et 
al, 1995).
The Plymouth case accepted in policy terms that obligations should only be sought 
where they are necessary to make a proposal acceptable in land-use planning terms but 
rejected the argument that this was a test of the validity of an obligation as an obligation 
might lawfully provide something that was not necessary to the proposal (The Local 
Government Library, 2000). This ‘test of necessity’ had been fundamental to the use of 
planning obligations (and agreements before that as it was brought in by Circular 22/83) 
as it stated that obligations should only be used where it would otherwise not be 
reasonable to grant permission on the terms sought. In other words, the obligation had 
to be directly resolving an issue, without which, planning permission would have been 
refused. The case rejected this strict approach and concluded that an obligation legally 
only had to have a planning purpose, fairly and reasonably relate to the development, 
and that signing the obligation (or not) must not be unreasonable (to the extent of being 
irrational or breaching a fundamental legal principle such as fairness or human rights) 
(Healey et al, 1995). This wider use was then approved by the Court of Appeal in R v. 
South Northamptonshire D.C., ex p. Crest Homes pic24 (Comford, 1998).
In determining whether an obligation should be material, Healey et al. (1995) believe 
that the courts have held that physical proximity is important with the Plymouth case 
accepting that although the proposed on-site benefits (art features and sculptures) were 
not necessary, they were in the public interest, and therefore acceptable. That was held 
to be different to the developer who offered a public swimming pool at the other end of 
town that was also in the public interest but was not related to the site. The exception 
appears to be where an obvious detrimental impact will result that has to be resolved 
off-site but where there is a practical link between the two schemes, even if not a 
physical one. They give the example of a park-and-ride scheme that was found to be 
acceptable even though it was off-site as it was a reasonable solution to the expected 
traffic congestion.
24 [1995] J.P.L. 200
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However, Tesco Stores Ltd. v. Secretary o f State for the Environment25 stated that there 
still was a distinction to be made between a material consideration and the weight that 
consideration should be given; the first is a question of law, the latter a question of 
professional planning judgement, which is entirely for the LPA to decide. The planning 
judgement is not a matter for the courts to consider. The Tesco case was one of the 
most important in relation to obligations as it went all the way to the House of Lords 
and considered the scope of planning obligations and their role as material 
considerations. The Lords stated in their judgement that a planning obligation could be 
valid, even if it did not fairly or reasonably relate to the proposed development. They 
even went on to suggest that the only tests on validity were that it must be within the 
scope of s. 106, be used for a planning purpose, and not be unreasonable. The deciding 
authority can either give an obligation a lot of weight or no weight at all and that 
decision is up to the person deciding the application.
Another case of relevance was that of Pickavance v Secretary o f State for the 
Environment26 which established that if a new road was required for a development then 
subsequent developers could ‘freeload’ on the back of it as the improvements were 
necessary to make the development acceptable in the first place (Healey et al, 1995). 
This had been a problem with obligations for a long time as it was deemed unfair that 
the first developer had to pay for the cost of the infrastructure and the subsequent 
developers could access their sites without having to pay anything.
Other ‘difficult’ cases for local authorities include where the cost of turning an 
overloaded road into a dual carriageway was acceptable for contributions as the new 
development would only increase traffic flows at peak times by 3%. The Inspector 
concluded that this was insignificant and the cost to the developer of 9% of the cost of 
the work was unfair for a 3% increase. A similar proposal was ruled unfair for 
providing contributions towards education where new developments of over 30 children 
would have to contribute once a 200-place trigger had been reached. The Inspector 
concluded that it was wrong to charge developers after the 200-place trigger had been 
reached and not those before. Two identical schemes could end up with one developer
25 [1995] 1 W.L.R. 759
26 [1994] J.P.L. 465
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having to pay and a developer a month earlier not being required to pay. The Inspector 
also criticised the payments going into the authority’s capital budget and that no specific 
school had been identified (see Healey et al., 1995 for further details).
Circular 1/97
In January 1997, the Government introduced Circular 1/9727 (DOE, 1997), thereby 
superseding 16/91 but the new Circular rather unusually stated that it repeats and 
clarifies existing guidance (paragraph 10). Part of this clarification was to list five tests 
for planning obligations to meet before they should be sought:
(i) necessary;
(ii) relevant to planning;
(iii) directly related to the proposed development;
(iv) fairly and reasonably related in scale and kind to the proposed development;
(v) reasonable in all other respects.
The tests are expanded upon within the Annexes to the Circular and paragraph B2 sets 
out the general policy, advising that obligations may relate to matters beyond a planning 
permission but reasserts that there must be a direct relationship between the obligation 
and the permission. The Circular stated that this connection must exist and not be too 
remote but accepted that if this does happen it will not necessarily be unlawful, but 
advises that it should be given very little weight when deciding the application.
The Circular reaffirms (B9) that obligations should only be sought or offered in two 
instances. The first is where they are needed to enable the development to go ahead (or 
where a financial contribution will meet or contribute towards the cost of providing 
facilities in the future). The second case is where the obligation is necessary in planning 
terms and is so directly related to the proposed development and the use of land 
afterwards that the development should not be permitted without it.
It is relevant to note that the Circular advises the provision of community facilities may 
be acceptable provided they are directly related to the proposal with the need for them
27 Also titled ‘Planning Obligations’
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arising from the development and that what is required is ‘related in scale and kind’ 
(BIO). It specifically states that developers should not be expected to pay for facilities 
in order to resolve existing deficiencies or to attempt to extract ‘excessive’ contributions 
to infrastructure costs (B12). However, it then accepts that this is difficult as there will 
be occasions where existing facilities are lacking but the new development will 
exacerbate this and permission should not be granted until the problem is addressed.
The Government was so concerned that authorities were trying to achieve money for 
their local communities that they specifically rejected the use of blanket formulation 
within local plan policies as they stated this approach may not fairly and reasonably 
relate to the development proposed (B17). They also specifically ruled out betterment.
“Planning obligations should never be used as a means of securing for the 
local community a share in the profits of development, i.e. as a means of 
securing a “betterment levy” (DOE, 1997: B13).
Part of the problem with the Circular was that although it sought to be comprehensive, it 
was competing with case law that was at odds with much of the advice and there were at 
least eleven other PPGs with advice and comments on obligations at the time, some 
with a slightly different emphasis (Walker & Smith, 2002). For example, the Circular 
advises that commuted maintenance sums and other recurring costs should not be borne 
by the developer but then goes on to give considerable exceptions to the policy (Punter, 
1999) and so there was still confusion.
The other important document to be published at this time was The Nolan Report 
(mentioned at the start of this chapter). It commented that the committee received more 
letters from the public about planning than on any other subject, although they did 
recognise that planning excited strong passions as it was a system that inevitably 
produced winners and losers with enormous consequences, usually financial. 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the Nolan report did accept that the community 
should be entitled to seek contributions from developers to offset costs, even when they 
were ‘quite distant’ from the site (Nolan, 1997).
The main concerns of the committee involved the perception that planning permission 
was being bought and sold, that developers were being held to ransom and that the use
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of commercial confidentiality was excluding the public and elected Members from the 
debate on any planning gain achieved. By the time the benefits were disclosed, the 
public and Members were presented with the obligation on a ‘take it or leave it’ 
approach. The Committee made it clear that it had evidence to support all of the claims. 
However, it is interesting that there were only two recommendations made with 
reference to planning gain. The first was that the Government should consider whether 
current legislation was sufficient to stop planning permission being bought and sold 
with a recommendation that reducing delays in the appeal process would aid this. The 
second was that authorities should adopt rules on openness that allow obligations to be 
discussed by members of the public with commercial confidentiality narrowed.
The history of obligations has been bewildering to the onlooker with case law and 
policy following divergent paths. Considering the lack of a coherent policy framework 
for obligations to operate within and the complicated practice of actually negotiating 
them it may be surprising that the use of obligations is on the increase. Therefore, it is 
important to understand why obligations are being used more before we can move on to 
consider in detail the rationale for using them.
4.4 Reasons for the rise in use of obligations
The statistics show that the use of obligations increased steadily during the nineties, 
with a forty percent increase in permissions with an attached obligation between 1993 
and 1998 (Campbell et al., 1999b) but obligations were still only involved on a very low 
percentage of planning applications (see chapter 6 for details). Previous research 
(Healey et al., 1993) concluded that the result of the lack of clear Government guidance 
had led to the development of the use of obligations in a very ad hoc manner and that 
their use had greatly expanded in the 1960s with the expansion of peripheral areas for 
development that had inadequate infrastructure and Circular 107/72 actively encouraged 
the use of agreements for such purposes. The 1960s saw the start of almost two decades 
of growth in the use of legal agreements to assist the carrying out of development. 
While research at the start of the nineties found that obligations were used legitimately 
for planning purposes, by the end of the decade there was some concern that a growing 
plethora of strategies and priorities were now looking to obligations to deliver some of 
their objectives (Walker & Smith, 2002).
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The start of the nineties had seen the traditional roles of financing the urban fabric for 
socio-economic activity and its infrastructure result in greater reliance on developers 
(Lichfield, 1992). This manifested itself in several ways with a reduction in local 
government finance resulting in opportunism by local authorities to fill the funding gap 
with private sector money. Developers were left with little choice -  either pay to 
provide the services or have planning permission refused as the development would not 
have the necessary facilities as the local authority could not afford to provide them. 
This approach was facilitated by the privatisation of utility services which introduced 
private finance into the provision of public services and an increasing acceptance of the 
‘polluter pays’ principle that saw responsibility for the natural environment move from 
the public sector to the private sector. These reasons will be briefly examined in turn.
Reducing local government finance
“Because of financial restraint, local government has sought to find
partnerships or alternative ways of providing local infrastructure” (Punter,
1999: 8).
The property industry within the UK had been transformed over the last twenty years of 
the twentieth century, but land use planning had changed to a much lesser extent with 
the financial implications of planning intervention in the development process never 
having been suitably addressed (Campbell et al, 2001). As a result, it was the rising 
cost of infrastructure that led to the shift away from the public provision of services 
funded by general taxation towards private-sector provision (Ennis, 1997). Historically, 
developers have paid for on-site physical infrastructure (such as sewerage, drainage, 
water and highways) but in the 1970s and early 1980s, cities increasingly required 
private-sector provision of off-site infrastructure because of increases in construction 
costs and interest rates and reductions in funding. The Sheaf report was published by 
the DOE in 1972 and encouraged local authorities to enter into partnerships with the 
private sector.
Local authority expenditure is financed by income from three sources: local taxation 
raised by councils (council tax), charging for services (planning application fees etc.), 
and grants from central government (Alcock, 2003). Originally the local development
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of services had been primarily financed by local taxation but the range and scale of 
charges began to grow and central government grants replaced local taxation as the 
major source of income in the 1950s. This resulted in the need to require users of 
services to pay a contribution towards the provision of the service, such as an admission 
charge to a swimming pool or adult education classes etc. and followed on from 
charging for prescriptions, which was introduced in 1951, only three years after the 
founding of the NHS.
Previous research (Campbell et al, 1999a, 1999c) found evidence of an increase in 
obligations as a result of reducing local authority budgets with a shift from provision of 
‘hard’ to ‘soft’ infrastructure via obligations, such as service provision and revenue- 
funded activities. This is beyond the normal use of obligations and illustrates a shift 
away from direct site specific requirements and looking to wider community benefits. 
Interviews also found that officers were concerned that they were coming under 
increasing pressure from other departments to fund Council policies, with housing and 
economic development particularly cited as they sought funding for affordable housing 
and town centre improvements. Faced with shrinking budgets, departments had to find 
alternative revenue streams or face stopping provision of some services.
It is lamentable that the Government has created much of the inherent tension with the 
process of planning obligations. On one hand, they realised the problem of what was 
perceived to be a dubious practice and tried to pull back the role of obligations, but then 
were happy to rely on the money from obligations to provide new infrastructure and 
community facilities (Brock, 2002). Healey et al (1995) argue that this took place with 
relatively little complaint from the private sector for two reasons and these two issues 
will be examined in turn.
Changing roles
Research (Campbell et al., 1999c) found that most officers interviewed from a variety 
of LPAs, stated that if it was left to the local authority, the provision of transport and 
social infrastructure would not occur in tandem with the development but would lag 
behind by some years. The resulting lack of facilities would detract from the 
development and result in lower prices for the developer and so the developer would
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choose to provide facilities rather than wait for the local authority to work out how to 
provide them.
In addition, in many cases, unless a road junction was upgraded to cope with the 
additional traffic then the scheme would be unable to go ahead. Therefore, the 
developer faced a simple choice; they either forgot about the development and profits 
that would result or they accepted that for the development to proceed they would have 
to sign an obligation to provide the necessary infrastructure. They usually chose the 
latter and this was the reason behind the introduction of The Water Act, 1989 (now the 
Water Industry Act, 1991), which required developers to pay for connecting with the 
sewerage and water system (Healey et al, 1993).
The change in approach from public to private provision made the search for private 
sector contributions a legitimate objective as they were seen to be taking on the role of 
the public sector. The rise in the use of obligations is part of this trend towards the use 
of private finance initiatives that has resulted in the boundary between the public and 
private sectors becoming ‘blurred to the point of obscurity’ (Edwards & Martin, 2002). 
Many local authority employees agree that central Government is no longer seen to 
support the public sector as a provider and as a result, although central Government 
does not openly encourage the growing and widening use of obligations in theory, it 
purposely does not condone it.
“The stimulus for the growth in use and scope of planning obligations is the 
current strictures on local government finance. This is translated through 
corporate pressures into a demand for planning to maximise the gains to be 
realised through planning obligations associated with development which is 
granted planning permission. It is by chance that planning obligations, 
originally designed as a procedural device to deal with specific 
circumstances, have been employed more generally for this task which 
emphasises their role as a financial instrument...This evidence suggests that 
the broadening of the scope of planning obligations is being driven by 
corporate and external pressures, rather than strictly planning 
considerations. It might even be said that the findings of this work indicate 
that planning concerns are increasingly becoming subservient to corporate 
objectives” (Campbell et al., 2001: 11).
Up until this point, the approach had always been that public bodies should deliver 
public services and the change in approach in thirty years could hardly be more
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pronounced. The concern of the commentators is that it is not happening as a result of 
well thought-out policy and good planning but as an opportunistic response to fiscal 
constraints.
Power to the people
The seventies saw a rise in the use of planning gain, partly as a result of attempts by 
local authorities to achieve some ‘community benefits’ that would otherwise gain little 
from the new developments being built. Part of the justification was that development 
control was a regulatory function that otherwise had little time for working with
communities (Ennis, 1997; Heap & Ward, 1980). Some did not support this role.
“Bargaining in the field of statutory controls is inherently objectionable. 
Development control is a regulatory function -  and it is no more than that -  
the powers available to a local planning authority being, like it or not, 
negative in nature. The system was not designed, nor is it suitable, for 
achieving the ulterior object of sharing out development profits in land”
(Heap & Ward, 1980: 637).
However, there was a backlash to this dogmatic approach with other authors concerned 
that the public must become more involved and that the planning system had to change, 
as it had been only interested in land uses, rather than land users and this was 
detrimental to the profession (Healey, 1992). Local communities had little relevance on 
paper and so they mobilised themselves and found a voice to seek to influence the 
planning system (Bowers, 1992). The public had become increasingly angry and
articulate in expressing concerns that many areas could not cope with added
development pressures and relied on the use of developer contributions as a minimum 
expectation for developers to cover the impact of their development (Grant, 1999).
“It might be argued that planning gain has grown in importance because the 
local interest is in general not adequately accounted for in the planning 
process” (Bowers, 1992: 1338).
At the same time, the environmental movement was gathering pace and pressure was 
mounting on developers to pay to alleviate the detrimental environmental impacts of 
their developments. This gave the Government an ideological justification to support 
the financial impact of planning gain on developers as not so much paying a 
development tax or paying for community facilities but paying to offset the damage
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from their development. They published This Common Inheritance in 1990, which set 
out the idea that developers were alleviating the impacts of development and led to the 
new approach in the 1990 Act and the new Circular 16/91. Unfortunately, this 
opportunism to offset the reduction in Government spending mixed the principles of a 
development levy with the practise of using obligations to ensure development 
mitigated its impact. This mix of the more acceptable practice of ‘the polluter pays,’ 
where they have a moral duty to cover their costs, got somewhat lost in the more 
dubious fiscal solution of moving funding for infrastructure to the private sector.
However, public pressure was growing and a report by the Countryside Agency called 
for the planning system to require developers to compensate society for the demands on 
the environment and community as new development creates a ‘loss’ in countryside 
assets such as landscape quality, local distinctiveness and tranquillity (Elson et al., 
1999). The Labour Party built on the growing public dissatisfaction and published the 
report An Earthly Chance in 1991, setting out how environmental issues had been taken 
on-board and explained how they proposed using the tax system to encourage change 
through the market rather than intervention (Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2000).
The bullish attempts by the development lobby to ignore the public arguably backfired 
as they ended up having to pay more through the relatively unregulated process than 
they might otherwise have done. Either way, it is reasonable to agree with Healey’s 
conclusion (1992) that there is ‘a great deal of confusion’ about the practise of planning 
gain as the Government spent the eighties trying to contain the practice only to 
rediscover its value at the end of the decade, partly due to public pressure in addition to 
fiscal constraints, and actively pursue it. This opportunistic approach has resulted in 
policy guidance trying to catch up with practice and underlines that the guidance 
focuses on the process of how to seek obligations at the cost of answering the question 
of why it should be sought. This inability to clarify the actual end purpose of planning 
obligations has left considerable argument over the rationale for why obligations should 
be sought which then has the knock-on effect of opening the debate on what scale of 
obligation is reasonable which in turn has moved discussion to the Courts.
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Practical reasons
It is worth noting that there are two other practical reasons for the increase in the use of 
obligations that need to be mentioned in passing. The first is the procedural benefits of 
obligations in relation to conditions and the second is the increasing delays in the appeal 
process that allowed local authorities to seek obligations when they otherwise may not. 
Each will be mentioned only briefly, as they are considered in more detail later (sections
5.4 and 5.1 respectively).
There is evidence, via previous interviews with planning officers that there was 
considerable support for using obligations instead of conditions as officers were of the 
opinion that an applicant would be more likely to honour an obligation that had been 
negotiated, rather than a condition, which had been imposed on them (Healey et al., 
1995). Obligations are also seen by officers as easier to enforce through an injunction 
than the service of Breach of Condition Notices or Enforcement Notices and Stop 
Notices, which also have time delaying appeals. Added to this, the fact that conditions 
can be appealed once the permission is granted but an obligation can only be sought to 
be revoked after five years (time is usually of the essence to developers and so they are 
unlikely to wait that long to challenge it).
Suffice to say at this stage, the late 1980s development boom saw a massive rise in the 
use of agreements as developers were prepared to sign almost anything as long as they 
received their planning permission quickly. The profits from development were huge 
and the biggest factor affecting the profit was delay in getting the scheme to market and 
the local authority could ‘use’ the threat of delay by prevaricating on whether to grant 
planning permission without any significant planning gain or even to threaten to refuse 
the application. The developer would readily sign the agreement, as the delay would 
normally cost much more than the benefits requested by the LPA. This was even more 
the case if the authority refused planning permission with the Planning Inspectorate 
facing backlogs at the time in excess of a year. One Chief Planning Officer confirmed 
that the length of time for appeals was instrumental to their success in achieving good 
obligations (Ennis, 1996b). This renders the arguments over the legitimacy of seeking 
planning gain as irrelevant as once an obligation is signed between the two parties and 
they are happy to continue with it then it is practically beyond the remit of the courts or
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Government advice to question it (although there is a technical right for judicial review 
by a third party). However, this is not a proper justification for why obligations should 
be used and focus now turns to this issue.
4.5 Rationale for obligations
It has been argued that the failure of the last attempt to introduce a development tax in 
1976 led to an acceptance that there is no longer a right for communities to expect to 
benefit from development and therefore obligations should only be entered into subject 
to the ‘necessity’ test to make a proposal acceptable (Comford, 1998; Heap & Ward, 
1980). However, we have seen that this is difficult to apply in practice and that other 
justifications have been forwarded.
Crow (1998) has attempted to identify six strands of thought to justify the use of 
obligations. These are the necessity test (where an obligation can be used to remove an 
obstacle to development to make a proposal that would otherwise be acceptable 
happen); to ensure the developer pays for the provision of infrastructure and services; 
paying into a ‘pot’ towards the provision of communal infrastructure and other public 
services where the obstacle affects more than one developer; as a legal mechanism to 
ensure that where a development results in the loss of a community benefit on the site, 
that it is replaced elsewhere; the compensation for development by offsetting the impact 
of the development indirectly by providing unrelated benefits; and to facilitate the 
collection of some increase in land value for the benefit of the community (otherwise 
known as betterment).28
The RTPI (2000) endorsed these six points as the main aim obligations are being used 
for, although they rejected the last one as unacceptable as they did not support the use of 
taxation or any form of betterment. However, the six aims overlap and are not 
particularly clear about what they intend to achieve and they do not provide a 
satisfactory framework to analyse the use of obligations. A previous attempt was made 
to break the use of obligations down by Healey et al. (1993) and Punter (1999)
28 It should be noted that Crow (1998) argues that collecting taxation without the authority of Parliament 
breaches the Bill of Rights, 1688 and is therefore unlawful.
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subsequently used this broader framework instead of Crow’s more recent attempt. It 
would appear to be more robust and easier to use.
(i) Rationale 1 is to support the implementation of planned development where the 
local plan provides a clear framework that justifies the development and the 
obligation addresses management problems with the development or contributes 
towards the costs of infrastructure. It is primarily a functional test about removing 
the obstacles to development identified in the local plan.
(ii) Rationale 2 focuses on the adverse impacts of development and the need to alleviate 
or compensate for the social costs of that impact. In contrast to the first rationale, it 
is more concerned with accommodating the development over a wider area than 
making the development work in its own terms. This rationale concentrates on the 
impact of the development and lends itself to negotiation on a case by case basis.
(iii) Rationale 3 sees the developer having a duty to return some of the profit from the 
development to the community and so is more of a local development charge or 
betterment. This rationale is different from the first two, which would be 
unacceptable development without the obligation as it seeks to remove the adverse 
impacts, while this rationale is a tax on the developer’s profits.
Healey et al. expanded on this earlier work in their subsequent book Negotiating 
Development: Rationales and Practice for Development Obligations and Planning Gain 
(Healey et al., 1995) which was the most thorough assessment of obligations 
undertaken at the time. They also wrote an article based on this research a year later 
and in this article they confirmed that they supported the use of obligations for 
rationales 1 and 2 as the most appropriate for contemporary conditions in Britain with 
the LPA identifying and negotiating ways of alleviating or mitigating adverse impacts 
which projects may generate (Healey et al., 1996). They stated that mixing rationales 2 
and 3 causes confusion and could lead to failure to mitigate adverse impacts due to the 
attraction of financial gain and that taxation of profit is a different issue and should be 
treated separately.
This point of failing to mitigate against impacts is important and has been raised by 
environmentalists that communities will be ‘bought off to stop objecting to bad 
developments due to the community benefits they will receive. For example, a
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community may like the idea of having woods nearby, but if a developer offers a new 
sports hall, community centre, and open space that the children of the area badly need, 
some local people may no longer object to the loss of the woods. The Countryside 
Agency commissioned research into the whole area of compensation for the loss of 
countryside benefits, such was the concern about the issue (Elson et al., 1999).
It was noted that Punter (1999) used the three rationales in her analysis of the use of 
planning obligations and she was of the opinion that rationale one is well accepted 
within the planning process and falls within the scope of Circular advice. She considers 
that rationale two is more contentious and where the debate is focused on whether the 
use of obligations for this purpose falls within the legal aims of what planning 
obligations were designed for. Rationale three moves the debate into development 
taxation and is accepted to be beyond the scope of the current planning system, although 
still occurring.
Conclusions
This chapter started by setting out clear definitions of the terms used within the 
planning gain field to try to bring clarity to an area that can be confusing. Consideration 
was given to the philosophical ideas underlying the betterment levy and how this has 
transformed into a hybrid process built up around the debatable practices of planning 
agreements during the eighties when local authority planners sought to get some 
benefits for local communities and used delays in the appeal process as a bargaining 
tool.
Consideration was given as to how Government advice at the time affected the system 
and it was shown that the process of using obligations ran ahead of the guidance due to 
opportunism on the part of local authorities facing financial cutbacks, the changing role 
of the private sector providing public services, and public pressure for developers to 
cover the impact of their development.
The chapter concluded by setting out three rationales that could conceivably be used for
the collection of planning gain through the use of obligations, although it accepted that
the planning profession is generally only comfortable with the first two. Now that the
framework for why obligations should be negotiated has been clarified, further analysis
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is needed of the actual practice of negotiating these obligations and the issues that arise 
so these can be understood before the case study authority is analysed. It is important to 
understand the processes and issues before any judgements can be made as to whether 
the obligation process is suitable for achieving social aims and if New Labour 
progressed it significantly.
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5 PRACTICE OF USING OBLIGATIONS
It was explained in chapter two how social issues have been a philosophical concern for 
the planning system since it began but there has been difficulty in translating this 
theoretical desire into anything tangible in recent decades. However, interest has grown 
in social planning and chapter three set out how New Labour came to power with a 
stated desire to ensure local authorities would make decisions in the best interests of the 
economic, social, and environmental interests of their communities. Chapter three also 
set out the arguments of why some felt this was empty rhetoric and chapter four moved 
on to show how there is limited scope for social benefits to be gained for local 
communities within the planning system. However, the process of planning gain, in the 
broadest sense, was the most likely way to achieve this and the obligation system has 
been used to secure these social gains whenever possible.
This chapter now moves to examine how planning obligations (and their predecessors) 
were used in practice, the issues this raised, the claims made about using obligations, 
and then concludes by bringing the debate on planning obligations up-to-date by 
considering the proposed new procedures for obligations. Taking chapters four and five 
together will give a clear understanding of planning obligations, what they should be 
used for, what they are used for, the problematic areas, what previous research has 
found, the likely direction of travel etc. before moving to on to the research itself in the 
following chapters. Therefore, the first five sections of this chapter examine the areas 
identified as of most importance in the practice of using obligations and revolve around 
whether obligations facilitate corrupt practices, are they open and transparent, how they 
are negotiated, the role of the development plan, and delays and inconsistency that can 
result. The sixth section sets out New Labour’s proposals for reforming the obligations 
system that emerged during this research.
The five areas of concern regarding the practice of using obligations were based on
concerns common to several key publications (Punter, 1999; RTPI, 2000; Walker &
Smith, 2002). The RTPI (2000) was also uneasy that planning permission was being
effectively bought and sold; that the negotiation of planning gain through obligations
was a ‘potent source of delay’; it was unfair and capricious; commercial confidentiality
warps confidence in the system through a lack of openness; and it was effectively the
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taxation of betterment. However, they pointed out that apart from the complaint about 
betterment, the criticisms relate to the process by which gain is secured, rather than the 
objectives of planning gain. This echoes similar allegations made by Punter (1999).
Walker & Smith (2002) suggested obligations had irreconcilable differences. The first 
was between flexibility and consistency, where flexibility in the system is needed to be 
able to respond to site-specific issues, but this flexibility makes consistency very 
difficult to achieve. The next problem was that developers argue they need a consistent 
approach to be able to work out profit margins for schemes in advance which lends 
itself to a national taxation approach to remove local variation but local obligations 
connect the development to the community benefit and gives it a legitimacy that a 
national taxation system will not. The third incompatibility of obligations was around 
the lack of transparency and the need for speed as any attempt to make the system more 
transparent and accountable will normally result in delays as involving the public 
properly will inevitably take time. The fourth and fifth areas of concern revolved 
around concerns over fairness and speed, where obligations should have an area-wide 
focus to take account of cumulative impacts so all developers are contributing towards 
facilities and not just the major developers. Again, this would result in a slowing down 
of the planning system and increased costs as more obligations would need to be signed 
if the threshold is lowered. The last area of conflict is how to widen the scope of 
obligations to ensure local communities receive more facilities they want but making 
sure the process is accountable.
However, before we start to look at these areas of concern, it must be pointed out that 
planning agreements and then obligations suffer from inadequacy of primary research 
data on the topic. Although planning agreements have been negotiated since the 
thirties, central government has not been required to approve agreements since 1968 and 
so records were no longer kept on a systematic basis. In addition, there was little 
monitoring with the first recorded survey of agreements undertaken in 1975 and 
published two years later. The lack of information has been noted as a problem by 
previous researchers and it was also pointed out that where authorities did monitor 
agreements, they have tended to focus on positive clauses that provide things, leaving 
breaches of negative clauses to be reported by the public or parish councils (Healey et 
al, 1993). Where statistics have been kept by authorities they are often not comparable
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as some authorities include sewerage agreements signed under s. 18 of the Public Health 
Act, 1936 while others do not (Healey et al, 1995).
5.1 Institutionalised corruption?
John Gummer, a former Secretary of State for the Environment, has called the treatment 
of planning gain as the nearest thing we have to ‘institutionalised corruption’ (Gummer, 
2002). This was not the first time the charge had been made as the PAG had been 
similarly scathing about the practice over two decades before, with the covering letter of 
their report stating that they could not accept that planning gain had any place in the 
system of planning control.
“Our main objection to the general idea of planning gain is that, as soon as a 
system of accepting public benefits is established which goes beyond the 
strict consideration of the planning merits of a proposed development, the 
entire system of development control becomes subtly distorted, and may fall 
into disrepute” (PAG, 1981: 7).
This view and the related underlying concerns about the operation of the planning gain 
system has led to many researchers continuing to condemn the process (Comford, 1998; 
Grant, 1999; Heap & Ward, 1980). There is no denying that obligations are still one of 
the greatest sources of discontent in relation to the planning system (Lambert, 2000) but 
the stories about developers who have had to step outside the committee room to ‘up 
their offer’ for services and facilities that are only ‘tenuously’ related to the proposed 
development before planning permission is granted (Evans & Bate, 2000; Jameson,
1999) are more serious.
However, it is important to realise that although the rhetoric may claim corruption is 
widespread, things have moved on considerably since the research carried out by the 
PAG and there is a considerable body of research that contests that corruption is still 
widespread. Most of those making the claims have not carried out in-depth primary 
research and are contributing to the ‘urban legend’. Crow (1998) illustrates the problem 
when he advises that Healey et al (1993) found evidence of abuse of obligations. 
However, what they actually say in their research is that there was ‘little evidence’ of 
obligations that were not well related to the development in question. They did find a 
few obligations that ran outside the strict parameters of Circular 22/83 but they were
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still relevant to the proposal. A developer offering a little more than what is required, 
but within the scope of the planning permission, is not the same as buying a planning 
permission that would otherwise be unacceptable. This is a much more serious charge 
and Healey et al (1993) state they found no such evidence of this taking place or of 
developers being blackmailed to provide benefits or risk being refused planning 
permission. The authors making the claims do not refer to any cases in particular and 
offer no evidence to support their allegations.
It is considered that there are four more subtle areas that have the potential, perhaps not 
for abuse, but for the community to perceive there has been an abuse of the system.29 
The first arises as a result of it being difficult to judge when a community facility is 
either an added bonus (bribe?) offered by the developer or something legitimately 
required by the LPA to meet the needs of the new occupants. Healey et al. (1995) refer 
to a case in Shoreham-by-Sea where an obligation was used to transfer a site for a 
public swimming pool to the local authority and where the developer would pay a 
substantial part of the construction costs. Was this a bribe or was the need for a 
swimming pool and lack of suitable sites a material consideration? They also refer to 
the expansion of the Merry Hill Shopping Centre in 1994 where £6.75 million was 
given towards infrastructure and other capital projects. Was this a bribe or a genuine 
attempt to provide adequate infrastructure for the new development? Without knowing 
the thought process of the LPA officers involved it is impossible to clarify but it is 
worth noting that other research found that all of the planning officers interviewed 
agreed that obligations should not be a material consideration if the development is 
otherwise unacceptable (Campbell et al, 2001). Planning officers appear to be aware of 
the issue but it is not difficult to see how the local community may think the developer 
has ‘bought’ the planning permission.
The second area of concern is the more subtle approach of paying-off development 
impacts that will encourage a compensation culture rather than one of alleviation. If 
paying off environmental losses becomes a standard cost to developers where they 
simply throw money at the problem, rather than working with the LPA or statutory body 
to try to design a scheme that minimises the impact in the first place, then the
29 Also see section 4.3 which has commented on these issues
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environment will be much worse off. This is very short-sighted as many environmental 
features are finite and their loss cannot simply be compensated for by money. This is 
not so much corruption though as poor and lazy planning but it has the potential for the 
community to think that developers will always get their way as barriers to development 
are always moveable. A local community wanting to protect their local historic woods 
from development will find little comfort in being told new woods will be planted 
several miles away to replace those lost.
The third area is the claim that planning gain allows developers to ‘buy off objections 
to their proposals (Wenban-Smith & Pearce, 1998). Taking the example just given, the 
local community may want to protect the trees but if the developer offers a new 
children’s play park and creche facilities, many of those objecting that have children 
may no longer object as they choose to value the children’s facilities more than the 
woods. This is hardly a good example of an exemplary planning system at work but in 
an era where private developers are expected to provide community facilities, is it 
corrupt?
Research at the end of the nineties found growing concern that many sectors had a 
growing range of strategies and priorities that were now looking to obligations to 
deliver some of their objectives, especially funding, and this is the fourth area of 
concern. Departments within the LPA produced a ‘shopping list’ of what they wanted 
and told the planners to deliver their requests and this created considerable potential for 
the abuse of obligations as obligations were not designed for this purpose (Walker & 
Smith, 2002). Although the LPA tends to take the lead on negotiating the planning 
obligation, it is estimated that only ten percent of the money negotiated stays with the 
local authority due to the requirements of the highway authority, the education 
authority, and the waste authority among others (Evans & Bate, 2000).
The problem is one of both breadth and depth, as requests are not only made for 
developers to fund a plethora of facilities, they were also being asked to provide on­
going revenue costs towards the maintenance. The issue is a difficult one as the 
Department for Education and Skills requires a single capital payment to be contributed 
for new school places but the extra maintenance and management costs are borne by the 
local education authority, irrespective of whether they have the budget to do so. If
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enough new places are required so new classrooms are built, is it not reasonable to ask 
once the classrooms are built, who is going to pay for their maintenance if the 
Government does not? A similar problem exists for The Wildlife Trust when new 
coppices and woodlands are proposed as part of a development scheme as they will only 
accept the management of a new woodland or coppice with the equivalent of forty years 
worth of maintenance and management costs included (Walker & Smith, 2002). This 
inconsistency between some proposals attracting revenue costs while others do not is an 
obvious problem but there is little doubt that if forty year maintenance costs were 
required for every impact mitigated against, the cost would be immense and probably 
render most schemes financially unviable.
It is interesting to note that despite the righteous indignation of several authors that have 
claimed all sorts of abuse and corruption, they rely almost exclusively on anecdotal 
evidence. There is no evidence offered and it is important to note that despite all the 
rhetoric, there are very few documented cases of corruption and little evidence to 
support the claims that planning permission is routinely bought and sold. The Nolan 
Commission found the whole process of planning gain as highly undesirable but they 
did not actually state they found any evidence of abuse either. More recent research 
also failed to find any evidence to show obligations were abused, that planning 
permissions were being bought and sold, or developers blackmailed (Walker & Smith,
2002). The idea that the developer was a passive victim at the mercy of the LPA has 
been rightly rejected for some time (Ennis, 1996b).
Developers were generally found to accept the use of obligations and preferred local 
authorities to have a clear view of the role of obligations and to give clarity from the 
start. The main concern for developers revolved around whether they were paying 
obligations similar in scale to their competitors as they were unhappy when it was felt 
they were paying in excess of other developers (Elson et al, 1999). This point will be 
considered in more detail in section 5.5.
5.2 Openness and transparency
Despite the allegations about corruption within the planning obligation system, the 
problem is not so much one of substance as one of perception, as the process used to
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arrive at the decision is not seen to be open or transparent. The lack of public 
accountability and lucidity in the process is a concern and there is arguably also a 
democratic deficit as Members have little involvement in obligations (Campbell et al, 
1999a). People are concerned that there is the potential for abuse and that not all 
applicants’ are treated fairly or equally. Within this part of the topic there are primarily 
two areas of difficulty. The first area revolves around the conflict between being open 
with the public while developers are trying to keep details secret (usually on the 
pretence of commercial confidentiality), and the second area is transparency of decision 
making where the obligation sought should be clearly linked with the identified need.
If we take the issue of openness first, we can see that most of the problems are a direct 
result of the Government having conflicting aims that it has failed to reconcile. On one 
hand, it is calling for a system that delivers quick decisions, while on the other hand 
other parts of the Government are calling for more community involvement and 
discussion on planning applications. There is usually a conflict between authorities 
issuing planning permission as quickly as possible and trying to genuinely involve the 
public, which invariably takes time if it is done properly.
Access to information regarding obligations has improved which is a benefit to the 
public as now they can at least see what is being sought by the obligation. This follows 
from the guidance contained in Annex B14 of Circular 16/91 which advised that 
planning obligations and related correspondence should be listed as background papers 
to committee reports, that discussions at the committee regarding the obligations should 
be in public, and the obligations should be available for public view. The importance of 
following this advice has been underlined by the courts with Healey et al. (1995) citing 
a case (Daniel Davies) where the validity of a planning permission was questioned, as 
the terms of the obligation were not known when the committee made its decision. The 
Court of Appeal held that where the obligation was restrictive, there was no need to 
know its contents but they did comment in passing that there might be a case where the 
obligation fundamentally changed the nature of the permission so that the contents of 
the obligation needed to be known before the committee could make a decision. As a 
result, most authorities now refer to obligations within their committee reports by 
setting out the ‘heads of terms’ of what is being sought in general terms (leaving the 
details to be resolved later).
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This approach normally involves the LPA simply stating what information was taken on 
board when making the decision and the next level up of involving the public would be 
to actually advise them of what obligations are being offered when the planning 
application is being advertised so they can comment on the actual obligation within the 
context of the application. This approach is supported by Crow (1998) and the RTPI 
(2000). A further step on in community involvement would be to involve the public in 
discussing what obligations should be sought, rather than just asking for views on what 
has been submitted, as these discussions tend to take place before the application has 
even been submitted. The case studies researched by Claydon & Smith (1997) found 
that the pre-application meetings were often key in the negotiation process and involved 
many of the senior developers’ representatives to agree what would, and would not, be 
offered.
However, involving the public at this stage of the negotiations would be very difficult, 
as discussions need to be frank between officers and the developer to see if the 
application will even be supported. Research has found that most developers do not 
want any non-statutory representatives at these meetings due to concerns over 
commercial confidentiality (Ennis, 1996b). Developers often want to try to keep their 
interest in a site quiet at the outset to stop competitors finding out about the availability 
of the site. There also is the potential for considerable wasted effort, as many pre­
application proposals never progress and community representatives could be frustrated 
by the time wasted.
“Unless there is a fundamental review of the whole planning system, there is
no simple way to make planning obligations streamlined and certain.
Furthermore, because of the tension between certainty and flexibility no one
solution will meet both needs” (Punter, 1999: 17).
As managing the planning application process is so complex, it is perhaps not surprising 
that ‘very few’ authorities have been found to have a code o f practice to guide the 
negotiation process and to offer officers and Members advice (Campbell et al, 2001). 
Whether Members should be involved in such negotiations is a large and controversial 
topic in its own right, but Campbell et al (2001) found evidence that Members were 
getting involved and even negotiating with developers directly on some schemes. They
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report the case involving Vodafone Airtouch PLC where the applicant was concerned 
that any third party judicial review on the grounds of ‘buying’ the permission, undue 
influence of financial matters contained within the obligations, or Members making 
decisions based on anything other than the full picture would lead to years of delay as 
the case went through the courts. As a result, the applicant ensured that estimated costs 
of each clause of the obligation were included in the officer’s report, that all details 
were public, and that each part of the obligation was specifically linked to the 
development. A clear audit trail was the key concern.
The audit trail
In terms of the transparency of the obligations process, the key thing is to be able to 
ensure there is a clear and justifiable link between everything being sought within the 
obligation and the development proposed and a clear trail of what the money was taken 
for and how it was then spent. Probably the biggest criticism within this area has been 
where authorities have taken financial contributions for some specific purpose but then 
simply placed the money in their central account, rather than actually provide whatever 
the money was taken for. Some evidence of this was found in previous research, 
although it was also found that in many cases the local authority accountant would be 
able to trace the payment and that it was still earmarked for the specific purpose, it just 
had not been spent yet (Ennis, 1996a; Healey et al., 1993).
Again, research almost a decade later found that the situation had improved with most 
money obtained by obligations being placed in a ring-fenced account and spent on the 
intended gain (Walker & Smith, 2002). However, even when the budget is ring-fenced, 
it is important that the project the funds are saved for goes ahead or some agreement is 
made with the developers beforehand about what happens to the money if it does not. 
Cases such as the Leeds super-tram have been a source of discontent within the 
development industry as large contributions were paid but several years later there was 
no sign of the tram system (Jameson, 1999; Lambert, 2000). The money should be paid 
back to the developers or an alternative use of the money agreed i.e. to improve other 
public transport. The RTPI (2000) suggests that the money should be returned to the 
developer if it has not been spent after five years.
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It is perhaps surprising to note that despite the problems associated with obligations less 
than ten percent of authorities had scrutinised their obligations (Walker & Smith, 2002). 
In addition, the modernisation programme focused on speed of determining applications 
which resulted in many obligations being determined under delegated powers, thereby 
reducing public scrutiny (Punter, 1999).
In conclusion, it must be noted that despite all of the problems and concerns raised, 
research by Ennis (1996b) found that out of the 204 obligations he investigated, there 
was only one case that potentially had led to a developer abandoning development due 
to the cost of the obligation, and even that was based on anecdotal evidence. More 
recent research found that in nearly all of the cases investigated, authorities were found 
to be open and transparent in their dealings (Walker & Smith, 2002). However, many 
of these issues would be useful to investigate in passing at the case study authority to 
see if progress has been made and to see how the case study authority handles them.
5.3 Negotiating obligations
The development control process is one that revolves around negotiations, from giving 
pre-application advice, seeking changes to schemes once submitted, negotiating 
amendments post-decision, right through to agreeing the discharge of conditions once 
the permission has been issued. However, the role of negotiating obligations has 
attracted almost mythical status with claims of how much the officer ‘got’ from the 
developer. Again, there is probably more hype than substance to the claims but it is 
intended to see what the issues are before considering the claims against the results 
from previous research and then assessing what should be investigated at the case study 
authority.
It is argued that a lack of knowledge on how to negotiate planning gain was one of the 
reasons for rural authorities ‘missing out’ on benefits (Richards & Bentley, 2001) as 
many local authorities lack the in-house expertise for such negotiations (Evans & Bate,
2000). Research has also stated that evidence was found that planners from local 
authorities were inadequately prepared for negotiations due to the hectic routine of the 
development control section that was not conducive to good preparation (Claydon & 
Smith, 1997). As a result, there has been some evidence that planners can be reluctant
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to become involved in negotiations as the amount of gain an authority achieves makes 
many officers concerned that they will be criticised for not ‘getting’ more and having 
been seen as ‘letting the developer off lightly’ (Bunnell, 1995).
Conversely, it has also been found that most of the concern is over the detailed financial 
aspects of developments, with over three-quarters of authorities surveyed admitting that 
they had difficulties dealing with cumulative impacts of small-scale developments 
(Walker & Smith, 2002). Over half the authorities had problems calibrating 
development impacts and almost three fifths admitted their systems were inadequate for 
calculating the costs. When the authority itself admits it has difficulty working out the 
cost of the impact of the development it is somewhat unfair to then expect an individual 
officer to be able to satisfactorily negotiate a reasonable solution. In addition, the 
developer usually has a team of experts to deal with each specific issue while the local 
authority officer often has to negotiate across all of the issues, and development 
economics is not an area that many local authority staff are skilled in (Smith, 2002).
The position is made worse by other departments or bodies trying to ‘muscle in’ on the 
negotiations late in the process. For example, Campbell et al (2001) give an example 
of a County Council demanding £200,000 late in the negotiations towards a new fire 
station. The planning officer carrying out the negotiations was unsure how to deal with 
the situation and thankfully the problem resolved itself.
Other research found evidence of conflict between a LPA negotiating obligations while 
the Parish Council was also speaking directly to the developers (Healey et al, 1995). 
This placed the officers and elected Members in a difficult position trying to ensure the 
local authority achieved what it wanted while the Parish Council was taking some of the 
money available towards its aims. It also placed the developer in a position of not 
knowing whom they were meant to deal with and who took precedent. The situation 
was often complicated further with both the highway engineers and housing officers 
also negotiating directly with the developer. In an attempt to resolve the problems, the 
Council produced a planning gain policy to try to recover control of the process.
There is often conflict within the local authority itself, with other departments from 
outside development control stating that they had been involved too late in the process
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to be able to achieve their desires and most housing associations felt they would have 
secured a better scheme if they had been involved earlier (Smith, 2002). However, in 
return, the planners often felt that staff from other departments were intransigent in their 
position with little concept of wider issues outside their specialised area. It is also 
difficult to compare schemes as the LPA may be faced with competition between 
different schemes from rival developers offering different packages of obligations with 
some departments supporting one scheme while others support another (see Healey et 
al, 1993).
Given the complexities and problems involved, it could be asked if the LPA has people 
with the correct skills to be the chief negotiator. Research into countryside benefits in 
particular found that most planners were not fully aware of the range and scale of 
benefits they could seek and as they considered them difficult to quantify, they did not 
achieve good results (Elson et al., 1999). The research also found that there was a wide 
disparity between authorities in the level of knowledge about obligations with a low 
level of appreciation of the changes favouring countryside benefits under Circular 1/97 
and a reluctance to seek full compensation for lost assets, allowed under the Circular.
The Negotiator
The negotiation of planning gain
“...demands knowledge, skill and judgement from the participating parties; 
knowledge of the law of the planning context and of the development 
industry; skill to negotiate and manage the process of negotiating and 
development control; and judgement of the value each party attributes to its 
tradable commodities and its constraints” (Claydon & Smith, 1997: 2021).
Some believe this is beyond the local authority planner, with calls for the officers who 
negotiate obligations to be different from those who determine the application to stop 
abuse or even for mediators to become involved (Crow, 1998). However, it is not clear 
how this would stop abuse, even if it was accepted that such exploitation takes place, as 
a different person would be just as capable of carrying out the abuse. Involving 
mediators would be a costly process and again would offer little; apart from further 
delay as yet another party becomes involved in the process. In fact, most developers 
were accustomed to negotiating obligations and expected them as part of the necessary
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costs of obtaining planning permission and had little desire for a wholesale change in 
approach (Healey et al., 1995). It was also found that in all but one of the cases 
researched by Ennis (1996b) the developer was aware of the need for the planning 
obligation at an early stage and could calculate the likely financial outlay in advance.
Authorities have been found to be ‘reasonably accommodating’ in negotiating with 
developers once obligations had been signed but the developer was in difficulty i.e. the 
financial climate had taken a downturn (Healey et al, 1995). It is also relatively 
common for applications to be made for the modification or discharge of obligations, 
especially when the scheme did not go ahead and a new application was received 
(Healey et al., 1993). Authorities appear to be flexible in their use of obligations and to 
ensure they do not stifle development.
It is considered that there is little direct evidence that makes a case for removing the 
power of negotiating obligations away from the planning officers dealing with the 
planning application. There is more scope for further consideration of whether the 
Members should be involved in ratifying the obligations negotiated by the officers, 
which takes place in some authorities (see Claydon & Smith, 1997). This could add 
some transparency and legitimacy to the process but realising that only one third of 
Members have benefited from any training on planning obligations may question 
whether this would add value (Walker & Smith, 2002).
The vast majority of obligations are routine and research has found that very few 
authorities saw the need for, or were able to afford, specialist expertise in valuation and 
when it was sought it was usually only for particularly complicated sites (Campbell et 
al., 2001). However, it can be important to have that advice available as a case was 
reported where a developer insisted they couldn’t afford any more than £150,000 of 
contributions or it would make the scheme financially unviable, but they subsequently 
agreed to over ten times as much (Campbell et al., 2001).
Some obligations are difficult to negotiate even if specialist advice is available as it 
involves judgement calls on what is of most value to the local community, and 
environmental and amenity benefits are difficult to quantify. Research confirms that the 
LPA finds it particularly difficult to negotiate obligations that involve a trade-off
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between losing one type of benefit and replacing it with something else i.e. requiring 
new woodland to be planted to replace the proposed loss of some open space (Walker & 
Smith, 2002). Research has found clear evidence that more can be achieved through 
obligations when there is clarity in the process and that a policy in the development plan 
sets out the basic principles for discussion (Elson et al., 1999). This issue will be 
explored in the next section.
Although there is little evidence for fundamental changes to the process of how 
obligations are negotiated, the matter can be explored as a secondary issue during the 
interviews at the case study authority.
5.4 The role of the development plan
There is considerable evidence that authorities need to consider obligations in a more 
holistic way, with guidance available on what contributions will be sought and an 
approach agreed in advance on how they will negotiate. Many authorities had made 
little attempt to prioritise their claims for obligations in advance of discussions with 
developers or how they would carry out the negotiations (Healey et al, 1995). There 
appears to be a general acceptance that highway issues and the water utilities got ‘first 
cut’ but there was no guidance on who came next or how the amounts were calculated.
“A local authority’s negotiating position was greatly strengthened firstly by 
long-standing and well-established strategies and policies towards 
obligations; secondly by a clear view on the relative priority of different 
claims; and thirdly by strong market conditions” (Healey et al., 1995: 198).
This claim has been backed up more recently with evidence that authorities with good 
obligation practices attracted more benefits for their communities (Richards & Bentley,
2001). There was no evidence of the claim that rural authorities missed out or were less 
well organised in attracting gain and the key issue was being organised and clear in 
what you wanted. On the developers’ side, it was found that if they had good 
consultants on board from the start, they were able to incorporate obligations into the 
scheme and still achieve good financial returns, primarily by saving time as they did not
30 At the time of the research, the development plan comprised of the County Structure Plan and the local 
plan but these have both been superseded as part of the transition to the LDF so only the ‘saved’ policies 
of both documents are relevant at HBC
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have to battle with the authority as a result (Elson et al, 1999). This is where 
developers want the development plan to give them certainty about what requirements a 
site will have, along with approximate costing of the obligations but in doing this they 
must accept this restricts the flexibility for negotiating the requirements (Campbell et 
al, 1999a).
It is important to ensure that the amount sought is clearly justified and applied on a 
consistent basis as developers often see the obligations set out in the development plan 
as the upper limit and that ‘everything is up for grabs’ with negotiations expected to 
reduce the level of contribution (Ennis, 1996b). Again, the area is fraught with 
difficulties as the PAG (1981) condemned many policies contained in local plans on 
planning gain issues for being too broad and in their opinion appeared to be ultra vires 
and needing review. However, Healey et al (1993) found that developers were 
generally supportive of development briefs and local plan policies that clearly indicated 
the requirements in advance. Developers were found to be more concerned that local 
authority briefs were often out of date or misunderstood the market implications of 
many of their requirements.
Campbell et al (2001) reported that at the time of their research, 85% of local 
authorities had a policy relating to obligations in their development plan, with most 
(76%) having subject-specific policies, and some (38%) had site-specific policies. Of 
the authorities they surveyed, 43% had supplementary planning guidance (SPG)31 
relating to obligations to ‘flesh out’ the general development plan policies. The 
existence of a policy was seen more as a legitimising tool for appeals and a starting 
point for negotiations, rather than being seen as an end in itself.
The case study mentioned earlier (section 5.2) regarding the new Vodafone Airtouch 
PLC headquarters in Newbury illustrates how the lack of a local plan policy resulted in 
a severely limited scope for the use of obligations, as the developers were insistent on 
clearly linking each part of the obligation to policy to avoid any legal challenge. The 
lack of any policy to help link wider issues ruled them out as being too risky for the 
developer to consider, even if they had wanted to pay them. In the end, over £12
31 There is a process underway where SPGs are being updated and as the new versions are published they 
have been renamed as Supplementary Planning Documents (SPD)
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million of obligations were agreed with 84% of the cost going towards the Green Travel 
Plan, highway improvements, and environmental works. The obligation achieved 
around 10% of the development cost but it was accepted that more could have been 
gained (Campbell et al., 2001). The more recent announcement (BBC, 2002) that 
Arsenal Football Club was required to pay £100 million of planning obligations, 
amounting to a third of the total development cost, gives credence to this claim that 
considerably more than 10% of the cost could have been gained.
Most authorities now have policies in their development plan to ensure they do not miss 
out on the money, but Walker & Smith (2002) found that over half of the policies they 
reviewed are not considered to reflect the guidance contained in Circular 1/97. They 
found little evidence of any pattern explaining why some authorities were better 
organised in the use of obligations than others with no link between economic growth 
and better organisation and no relationship between the status or age of the local plan 
and policies on obligations. Only 12% of authorities they investigated that had 
reviewed their local plan since 1997 felt their local plan had a comprehensive approach 
to obligations. Over 60% described their obligation system as partial or non-existent. It 
would appear that authorities were relying on SPG and site-specific development briefs 
to review their obligations and most authorities had an approach to obligations that pre­
dates Circular 1/97.
The RTPI (2000) has argued that the local plan could have a wider role than simply 
listing a policy on obligations and that it should go on to explain the likely tariff 
required by the policy. They also argued that the local plan could set out a spatial basis 
for the requirements on an ‘area by area’ approach which could then be further 
interpreted by SPG. Benefits of this approach include the early notification of the fee so 
the financing of the obligation is more likely to come out of the land value itself (i.e. the 
landowner) rather than the developer and the consumer (i.e. increase in house prices).
Obligation or condition
Consideration needs to be given as to whether planning gain should be secured by a 
planning condition attached to the decision notice or by an obligation. It would be 
useful for authorities to make their requirements clear, although it is accepted this is
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unlikely to be set out in a Development Plan Document, but it should be clarified in an 
SPD.
Most developers will try to argue for any requirements to be secured by a condition and 
this can often be a difficult part of the negotiation process, explaining why it should be 
an obligation instead, especially when this adds time and cost to the process. 
Conditions are quite flexible and quicker to use but most authorities will want any 
significant gain to be secured through a contractual agreement as conditions can 
immediately be appealed and the requirement lost. Secondly, legal judgements have 
inhibited the use of conditions as a means of securing public infrastructure, although 
Lord Hoffman, when commenting on the Tesco case, admitted that these judgements 
may have been ‘self-defeating’ (reported in Crow, 1998).
However, the case of Hall & Co (1964f 2 determined that legally a condition could be 
used to require planning gain as long as it did not require the transfer of property rights. 
This is similar to the case of Grampian Regional Council v City o f Aberdeen that 
allowed land to be transferred, but in a negative way rather than a positive way. One of 
the main problems that researchers found is that the courts have held (in Bradford, 
1986)34 that a condition could still be invalid, even if the applicant agreed to it. As 
such, if a planning gain was secured by a condition it could still be appealed after the 
implementation of the planning permission and if the condition was quashed, there 
would be no requirement to provide the gain. If the gain was secured with an 
obligation, authorities are more confident that the obligation will not be appealed (it is a 
longer and more expensive process) and that there is less chance of a successful appeal 
(obligations are subject to stricter legal requirements than conditions).
Nevertheless, despite the legitimate concerns of planning officers about the benefits of 
obligations over conditions, the official view of the RTPI (2000) is that conditions 
should be used in preference to obligations due to transparency, equity, and speed.
32 R v Shoreham by Sea UDC, ex parte Hall & Co (1994) 1 ALL ER 1
33 (1984) 47 P&CR 633
34 Bradford MDC v Secretary of State for the Environment (1986) 53 P&CR 55
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5.5 Delays & inconsistency
The process of negotiating the planning obligation is said to be the single greatest cause 
of delay in the planning system (Campbell et al., 1999a; Evans & Bate, 2000; Lambert, 
2000). It should be noted that the delays caused by these protracted negotiations are 
also frustrating to the LPA as it affects performance targets, which at the start of the 
millennium was the only way the LPA was effectively rated (Punter, 1999).
It has been found that it took over twelve months for eighty percent of applications that 
were subject to obligations to finally be resolved (Grimley J.R. Eve et al. (1992). Even 
eighteen months after submission of the application, almost twelve percent were still to 
be determined. Obviously, some of these applications will have been subject to delay 
because of other factors but it appears clear that delay from negotiating obligations was 
a considerable problem. Previous research found that obligations involving occupancy 
conditions and financial contributions generated the longest delays as they could affect 
the overall viability of the scheme and often involved third parties in the negotiations 
(Grimley J.R. Eve et al., 1992).
Consideration naturally turns to why it takes so long to negotiate obligations and there 
appears to be several answers. The first relates back to the lack of negotiating skills 
within authorities (see section 5.3) with research showing that some authorities do not 
have officers with sufficient ability so negotiating a similar agreement can take several 
months in one authority to two and a half years in another (Chatterjee, 2002). A related 
factor is the delay and frustration for developers in authorities that have high staff 
turnover as they end up dealing with several case officers, often with different 
approaches, different ideas on what can and cannot be compromised on, and all taking 
time to familiarise themselves with the case.
It has also been found that many developers specifically blamed the local authority 
delays on the slowness at producing the first draft of the obligation, which appears to be 
a result of bad communication between the planning department and the legal 
department (Healey et al., 1995). An additional problem was that the local authority 
would rarely allow the developer to draft the agreement and so the developer’s legal 
team would go through it in minute detail, changing anything they could as a
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professional critique towards the public sector solicitor. This back and forth between 
solicitors often went on for months as they argued about every clause. A final issue in 
relation to this point is that the local authority solicitor usually does not sit in on the 
negotiations and so often did not understand what was trying to be achieved through the 
obligation. Healey et al. (1995) felt this often led to solicitors seeing their role as 
seeking compromise between the developer and the local authority.
While developers often saw the LPA as being the source of delay, it has also been noted 
by a local authority solicitor that the developer often loses interest in a scheme once the 
resolution to grant permission was made and so there is no interest in finalising the 
obligation (Healey et al, 1993). This is because the developer often usually only needs 
a resolution to grant permission to secure the funding to progress the development and 
so their attention moves from the planning permission to resolving the logistical issues 
of bringing the site into the development process. Planning permission is also only 
valid for three years and the developer will often have an option to purchase land, 
subject to planning permission, and so if they are not ready to build that site yet they 
will not want the clock to start running on the three years. This is an incentive for them 
to not sign the obligation as the permission will normally be issued shortly afterwards 
which they may not want if they are stalling for time. Only when they are preparing to 
start work on site does attention return to the planning permission and the realisation 
dawns that the lack of progress on the obligation means the permission has not yet been 
issued.
Inconsistency
Developers are very critical of the fact that on one scheme a local authority can require
few contributions and yet a similar scheme several miles away but in a neighbouring
authority could require thousands of pounds worth of contributions. Differences in
approach between authorities are commonplace and can greatly affect the profitability
of a scheme with those authorities that have more explicit local plan policies and a
stronger political will to pursue contributions seeking more. Differences will also be
more pronounced when the economic prosperity of the area is varied (Punter, 1999).
There are clear regional differences in the use of obligations with a divide between the
north and south with almost fifty percent more of major developments in the south
having obligations attached compared to the north and with an average cost to the
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developer of five times more in the south (Campbell et al., 2001). However, even 
within the southeast of England there are considerable differences, as illustrated by the 
two examples of obligations mentioned in the previous section, where one authority 
achieved a tenth of the overall development cost in contributions while a second 
developer paid around a third.
Another area of inconsistency is that obligations tend not to be required for schemes 
that fall under certain thresholds, known as ‘triggers’. When an application is submitted 
for just two or three houses at a time, it is often considered too difficult, or too costly, to 
seek contributions. However, the cumulative impact on most types of infrastructure for 
five schemes of three houses each will be similar to one scheme for fifteen houses. This 
is unfair to the larger developers and a source of discontent (Evans & Bate, 2000; 
Walker & Smith, 2002).
The Government is seeking to increase the amount of affordable housing available and 
to ensure the price of such housing is as affordable as possible. Therefore, it is essential 
that the cost of any obligations are known to the developer early in the process so the 
cost can be subsumed by the landowner, via a slightly smaller profit margin, rather than 
borne by the future occupiers of the site through higher house prices. Officers were 
mostly aware of the need to raise the need for obligations at an early stage of the 
application process, with many officers being of the view that they should be raised at 
the pre-application discussion stage (Campbell et al, 2001). Ensuring a consistent 
approach to raising the need for obligations at the outset would be a major step forward.
5.6 Planning obligations for a new millennium
There has been some progress on dealing with many of the concerns that the literature 
review uncovered as being problematic areas. For example, as of 1st July 2002 details 
of obligations were required to be recorded in both Parts I and II of the LPA planning 
register and would also be registered as a local land charge (see paragraphs B42 & 45 of 
DCLG, 2006b). This overcame one of the concerns that the public were not clear what 
deals were being done with developers when planning permission was granted as the 
information would now be published. There has also been progress made in many 
authorities in speeding up the process of dealing with obligations, including if the
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authority has staffing shortages in the legal department, then the authority contracts out 
the drafting of the obligation either to outside solicitors (which the developer pays for) 
or the developer drafts the obligation themselves so the LPA solicitor only has to check 
it (Brock, 2002).
Progress on the role of obligations has been mixed since the start of the new millennium 
with a huge volume of documents produced and consultations undertaken as the 
Government pushed for a solution, only to decide it did not work and lose interest for a 
while. It is not possible to review all the documents and consultations produced as there 
were so many but the key ones will be considered to bring the literature review up-to- 
date and to pick out salient points that may be relevant to progressing social issues via 
obligations.
A good starting point is the Government’s 2001 consultation Planning Obligations: 
Delivering a Fundamental Change (ODPM, 2001a) which set out a clear vision for 
obligations.
‘An effective planning obligation system should enhance the quality of 
development and the wider environment, and ensure that it makes a positive 
contribution to sustainable development, providing social, economic and 
environmental benefits to the community as a whole. It should help to 
provide an increased supply of affordable housing, the provision of public 
spaces, and the facilities and infrastructure needed to accommodate 
growth... A good obligation system will promote economic prosperity” 
(ODPM, 2001a: para 1.3 & 1.5).
This was a positive statement with a clear requirement for obligations to balance all
three aims, although economic issues were clearly emphasised. It was also an unusual
selection of aims for obligations to achieve but clearly supported the provision of
facilities and infrastructure, which is useful, and provided clear support for obligations
to be used to achieve social aims and within the research period of the case study. It
went on to say the obligation system should be transparent and provide ‘greater
certainty’ to those contemplating development and should not impose unacceptable
burdens on developers, concluding the existing system was inconsistent, unfair, lacked
transparency, and took an unacceptably long time to negotiate. The consultation stated
that any new approach should be more positive, with obligations used for a wider range
of objectives than permitted under Circular 1/97 so that communities did not suffer from
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new development. It was even suggested that commercial development should also 
contribute towards providing affordable housing, thereby breaking the direct link of 
development mitigating its actual impact.
Taking on board all the requirements, the Government suggested that tariffs set through 
the local plan were the best way to progress, with obligations only to be used to 
substitute the tariff for site-specific requirements. A subsequent consultation document 
in November 2003, Contributing to Sustainable Communities: a New Approach to 
Planning Obligations slightly amended this approach by introducing an Optional 
Planning Charge (OPC). Developers could either pay a standard charge with a limited 
negotiated obligation or they could enter into a full negotiated obligation without the 
charge.
The 2001 consultation had already argued that obligations no longer had to be strictly 
related to the impact of the scheme due to concern that would restrict the scope of 
obligations from the more positive contribution they could make to communities. This 
approach was continued in the 2003 consultation when it asserted that obligations 
should ensure that development “provides social, economic and environmental benefits 
to the community as a whole” and that policy should be widened to reflect case law. 
This raised suggestions that money raised in an area of high demand within an authority 
could be used to deliver benefits to areas in need of regeneration (Henneberry, 2004). 
Likewise, there was potential to use gain from one site to solve problems with other 
sites to bring them to the market i.e. remove contamination or congestion.
The OPC approach should not be underestimated as a radical approach by the 
Government to finally start to get to grips with the planning gain process and showed 
that they were prepared to explore ideas that were new and innovative. While their 
approach may have been naive and underestimated the complexities of the procedural 
side, the introduction of the OPC marked a fundamental shift in the debate. Developers 
appeared to accept that they could no longer stop the momentum to make them pay 
more towards mitigating the impact of their developments and to contribute towards the 
new communities they were creating.
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Planning-gain Supplement
However, in March 2004, Kate Barker produced a review of housing supply35 which 
recommended the ‘scaling back’ of s. 106 to only cover direct impact mitigation while in 
tandem she introduced a Planning-gain Supplement (PGS) to capture a proportion of the 
development gain, where local authorities should receive a direct share of this gain to 
compensate for the reduced s. 106. The local authorities were to be free to spend the 
money however they chose and it was to be worth a similar amount to that previously 
captured under s. 106. This was a radical suggestion, unthinkable a decade previous and 
built on the confidence that the principle of the OPC had been accepted.
In July 2005, the Government produced new guidance on planning obligations (Circular 
5/05) and Planning Obligations: Practice Guidance and accompanying model s. 106 
agreement (DCLG, 2006b). The practice guide brought together various case studies to 
improve the use of obligations until the proposed PGS could be introduced, at that stage 
expected in 2008 at the earliest. It was also attuned to the need to keep hitting targets 
and thus recommended that authorities should carry out a skills audit of gaps in 
negotiating skills so consultants could be identified to provide advice at short notice and 
it recommended having a dedicated obligations officer to ensure speed and consistency. 
It supported the use of formulae and standard charges ‘where appropriate’ as part of the 
framework on obligations as they were said to speed up negotiations, provide 
predictability, promote transparency, and assist in accountability. It was clear that the 
good practice guide was bringing together examples of what authorities were already 
doing and did not really progress the use of obligations much, but countenanced many 
innovative ideas already in use by LPAs. This would give some of the more risk-averse 
authorities the confidence to use obligations more creatively.
In December 2005, the Government responded36 to the Barker Review and again it was 
the Treasury who took the lead with the ODPM relegated to playing second fiddle. 
They explained that the Government wanted to build sustainable communities 
supported by infrastructure to include health, education, transport, economic 
development, leisure, and recreational facilities. The PGS had an accompanying
35 Delivering Stability: Securing our Future Housing Needs
36 HM Treasury (2005a) The Government’s Response to Kate Barker’s Review of Housing Supply
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consultation paper37 which was also published by the Treasury with the support of HM 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC) in addition to the ODPM. It explained that the 
Government agreed with Barker that PGS was likely to be more effective than other 
means of capturing land value uplift, including the current obligations system. It 
proposed that PGS would be dedicated to local communities to manage the impact of 
growth. However, it would not be implemented before 2008, it would capture a modest 
portion of the value uplift, and would be payable under a self-assessment regime 
administered by HMRC once development had commenced but only after a 
Development Start Notice had identified the chargeable person. The PGS would be 
calculated by the formula:
Uplift = PV-CUV
This is based on the difference between the land value with planning 
permission (planning value or PV) and the value of the land as currently 
permitted (current use value or CUV).
PGS liability = PGS rate x uplift
Obligations would only be allowed for those matters that needed to be addressed in 
order for the environment of the development site to be sustainable, safe, of high quality 
and accessible, and for the provision of affordable housing. This became known as the 
development-site environment approach and excluded the provision of education and 
health, community centres, leisure facilities (amongst others) from obligations, as they 
would be covered by the PGS. It was also suggested that highway agreements (under 
s.278 of the Highways Act 1980) could also be replaced.
There seemed to be considerable support for the proposal at first, with concerns 
focusing more on practical matters and especially on the amount of PGS revenue that 
would be returned to the local authority with a figure of seventy percent mooted (Butt, 
2007; Wilson, 2007). The focus certainly appeared to be on making the PGS work and 
it had resolved the Government’s own uncertainty as they had been supporting the PGS 
at the same time as the Planning Act was recommending a tariff system (Minton, 2004).
37 HM Treasury (2005b) Planning-gain Supplement: a consultation
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The next step was to publish a report in May 2006, Valuing Planning Obligations in 
England: Final Report (DCLG, 2006a) which reported the results of extensive research 
carried out by the University of Sheffield and The Halcrow Group on over a hundred 
English local authorities with detailed case studies in over forty. The research found 
that the proportion of planning permissions with an obligation attached had risen to 
6.9% in 2003/04 and that obligations were attached to 40% of major residential 
permissions and 20% of major permissions for offices, R&D, and light industry (the 
corresponding figures for minor permissions was 9.2% and 2.6% respectively).
Across all sectors, commuted sums secured using a standard charge (i.e. a fixed amount 
per residential unit or amount of floorspace) was found to be almost three times higher 
than those without but there was considerable variation across categories with standard 
charges making little difference to transport contributions for example. However, it is 
interesting to note the findings for community and leisure obligations. Only 28% of 
authorities surveyed had a standard charging approach for community and leisure 
facilities and while they achieved around eight times as many obligations than those 
without a formula, they were valued, on average, at almost £42,000 each compared to 
over £114,000 for those without a standard approach. Therefore, standard charging 
achieved considerably less per obligation but the cumulative impact achieved more.
In the Pre-Budget Report of 2006, the Government announced it would move forward 
with implementing the PGS if further consultation deemed it workable and effective. It 
was confirmed that it would not be introduced earlier than 2009, it would be levied at a 
modest rate across the UK, would not only apply to residential land, the majority of the 
revenue would be hypothecated for local infrastructure, and there would be transitional 
arrangements. In December 2006, the Government introduced another series of 
consultation papers with the DCLG publishing Changes to Planning Obligations: A 
Planning-gain Supplement Consultation (DCLG, 2006d), while HMRC published two 
consultations Paying PGS: A Planning-gain Supplement Technical Consultation 
(HMRC, 2006a) and Valuing Planning Gain: A Planning-gain Supplement Consultation 
(HMRC, 2006b).
The DCLG consultation sought views on the more detailed aspects of the proposed 
PGS, clarifying that the Government’s proposed scope for obligations remained that of
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the ‘development site environment approach’. Obligations would be subject to a 
criteria-based test to define their scope and social and community infrastructure 
contributions would no longer be possible by an obligation, although views were sought 
on whether the land transfer for such facilities would need to remain ‘within scope’ of 
the obligation; potentially a confusing split. It is interesting to note that the document 
listed ‘community works and leisure’ as collected under current obligations and did not 
suggest this was not acceptable. The list included community centres, public art, town 
centre improvements, funding for public services such as libraries and museums, 
creches, public toilets, health services, CCTV, waste and recycling facilities, religious 
facilities, and regeneration initiatives. This was a broad interpretation of community 
infrastructure that appears to have been acceptable to achieve.
The HMRC (2006a) consultation sought views on the practical issues regarding how the 
process would work and it was clear the process was complicated, requiring developers 
to apply for their PGS Start Notice and file their self-assessed return after they had 
received planning permission but before work was allowed to start on site. Once they 
received their PGS Start Notice, development could commence, but the PGS had to then 
be paid within sixty days38 from the date the PGS Start Notice was issued. The 
document sought views on an array of issues around the practicalities of paying the 
PGS, timings involved, administrative concerns and costs, debt management, 
enforcement of payment, and many other issues.
The other HMRC (2006b) document tried to find answers to the complex process of 
coming up with the PGS which was not as easy as may seem. Where outline permission 
was granted, sometimes the development would be built in phases and therefore each 
reserved matters application would need a separate PV and CUV. Calculations would 
be made on an assumption of freehold interest with vacant possession and free from 
encumbrances and there was considerable guidance around the exact definitions of PV 
and CUV. There was also agreement that the CUV should reflect the value where there 
are rights to rebuild or reuse certain buildings on the site currently demolished or 
underused and that the CUV should reflect remediation costs on contaminated land.
38 Sixty days is stated in paragraphs 2.11 and 6.1 but it is noted that paragraph 2.8 states it is thirty days
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The head of policy at the RICS supported the principle of the PGS in 2004 (see Minton, 
2004) but did have concerns about the practicality of implementing it. The RTPI stated 
the PGS would encourage land banking, create inflexibility and would not support 
infrastructure funding (reported by Dewar, 2005). However, the British Property 
Foundation (BPF), who had originally opposed the idea started to come round to it,
probably because the Government was suggesting the rate would be relatively low at
<10
around twenty per cent of land value gain (Dewar, 2006).
By 2006, the RICS (2006) had changed their mind and stated they would prefer a levy 
or tariff-based system as they felt it was more workable and effective, they were 
worried about the lack of cross-party support for PGS, and appear to have accepted the 
work by Johnson & Hart (2005) that rejected the PGS as unworkable. It was also 
reported that only twenty percent of planning lawyers believed that PGS ‘can be made 
workable and effective’ (Johnston & Early, 2007). Many of those within the property 
industry who had opposed the tariffs in 2001 now advocated them as an antidote to PGS 
(Ashworth & Demetrius, 2008; Blackman, 2005). There was also scepticism that as the 
PGS would not replace s. 106, but would be in addition; this would result in the worst of 
both worlds with an increased tax burden from the PGS and delays still occurring from 
the s. 106 (Iliffe, 2006). Even the former planning minister, Nick Raynsford, supported 
retaining the current system of s. 106 as the PGS was seen as too ‘risky’ and will only 
create ‘an army of consultants’ to advise people how to avoid paying it (Planning, 
2007a). The fact it had been admitted the computerised system to administer the PGS 
would cost forty million pounds probably did not help (Planning, 2007a).
The Chancellor’s Pre-Budget Report of October 2007 scrapped plans for the PGS in 
favour of a tariff-based system, similar to the Milton Keynes roof tax, as concern grew 
that the PGS was unworkable. The decision was reportedly welcomed by the RTPI and 
developers alike as they argued the system was impossible to make work and money 
could be diverted to fund central government projects (Baber, 2007; Hayman, 2007).
39 In comparison, the Milton Keynes tariff was around thirty to thirty five per cent of uplift in land value
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The future for obligations after PGS
There was a risk that after the Government had wasted so much on the PGS they would 
give up on reforming planning gain and move onto other ‘easier’ reforms. However, 
one thing the focus on PGS had resulted in was an increased awareness of the money 
involved that the Government could tap into to facilitate development and much needed 
regeneration (whether that was a legitimate aim or not). For example, one local 
authority reportedly received over one hundred and fifty million pounds from one 
scheme alone (Campbell et al., 2001). The Government’s own research (DCLG, 2006a) 
found that London authorities achieved over £107,000 in value per obligation, on 
average. The research noted that authorities with a standard charging mechanism 
secured more obligations than those without and the value of obligations achieved on 
average was highest for affordable housing (£250,000), then education (£118,000), 
transport and travel (£83,000), community and leisure (£59,000), and lastly open space 
(£25,000).
The Government could see that it was estimated that the value of obligations secured in 
England in 2003/04 was around £1.89 billion with £1.2 billion of this towards 
affordable housing and £0.11 billion towards community and leisure facilities (see table 
1 below).
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Open Space £115,518,981
Transport and Travel £279,522,108
Community and Leisure £111,325,259
Education £118,828,835
Other £64,618,282
County Council £6,660,384
Total
£696,473,84940
Affordable Housing £1,200,000,000
Grand total
£1,896,473,84941
Table 1: Estimated value of obligations agreed in England 2003/04 (DCLG, 2006a: 42)
It was clear that considering the amounts of money involved, the Government could not 
afford to walk away when obligations were being used to provide so much that 
otherwise would have to come out of Government taxes. However, one point will 
remain of concern to the Government and that is the north/south divide with almost 
23% of major developments in the South having obligations attached and at an average 
cost to the developer of just over three quarters of a million pounds compared to under 
15% in the North and at an average cost of just over one hundred and forty-eight 
thousand pounds (Campbell et al., 2001; Henneberry, 2004). Other research 
commissioned by the Government found the average value of obligations secured in the 
South East was almost double that in the North (DCLG, 2006a) which is less of a gap, 
but significant nonetheless. However, 40% of major planning permissions in the South 
East had an accompanying obligation, compared to only 7.5% in the North; a much 
more significant gap. Although the results are different, they show a clear gap between 
what is being achieved and it would appear that communities in the North are probably 
losing out on planning gain, despite some of those communities having the greatest 
need.
40 The total figure is corrected from the figure printed in the document which appears to be incorrect as it 
gives a figure of £696,473,847
1 The total figure is corrected from the figure printed in the document which appears to be incorrect as it 
gives a figure of £1,887,649,938
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The reason for such vast sums of money being attracted by obligations has already been 
discussed but it is clear that local authorities were riding on the back of the development 
boom and public expectation grew to use obligations much more widely than 
Government advice had previously expected. Examples include West Quay in 
Southampton, where obligations for a large retail scheme required the developer to pay 
the Council three hundred and fifty thousand pounds for the . .provision of vocational 
training facilities” (Macfarlane, 2000: 17). This idea has also been adopted in the 
RENEW Northwest employment study, which calls for obligations to be used to help 
local people access jobs on local developments (Planning, 2007d). Other ideas include 
the South East Museums, Libraries and Archives Council (SEMLAC, 2006), which is 
now calling for a minimum contribution of ninety pounds per person in new housing 
across the region to be collected from obligations. MPs have even supported the use of 
obligations to generate money for British Waterways to spend on waterside 
developments (Planning, 2007c).
It has been reported that another Council has consulted on a tariff-based policy for 
contributions towards education, transport, libraries, community and recreation 
facilities, health care, and recycling services (Planning, 2008a). This is an increasing 
list but perhaps the one that is most surprising is that developers in Essex could have to 
pay £410 pounds per dwelling towards the cost of policing, as they are the first police 
force in England to apply for s. 106 funding (reported in Regeneration & Renewal, 
2006). Other ideas include one London Borough that uses money from obligations to 
finance air quality management measures (Planning, 2008b), while the Healthy Urban 
Development Unit has published a tool kit to calculate the health provision implications 
of development to inform discussions on planning obligations and includes a three-year 
revenue stream funding in addition to the capital costs (Kochan, 2006a). The 
Environment Agency (2007) announced they will need an average of £20,000 per 
dwelling in the south east of England and recommended a wide range of funding 
options, including obligations, the PGS (as then proposed), and the next 2009 Water 
Price Review. Other more imaginative ideas have authorities requiring contributions 
towards car clubs on sustainability grounds with one authority adopting SPD in 
November 2007 requiring £540 per dwelling (Kochan, 2008). However, the article
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notes that developers are happy to pay the contribution as it means they can increase 
residential density by twenty per cent due to reduced parking on the site.
Lastly, Birmingham City Council is apparently considering using obligations to 
subsidise rents for independent retailers in an effort to promote entrepreneurialism and 
increase the diversity of shops in the city (Thorp, 2007). The Council argued that this 
was simply an extension of affordable housing policy that they already take 
contributions for and so affordable retail space was a logical step and would seek to stop 
the ‘clone town’ syndrome. Ken Livingstone also looked at applying the policy to 
London to secure independent retailers in regeneration projects by subsidising rents 
(Planning, 2007e).
There is no doubt that these examples illustrate obligations are being used more 
creatively and to fund things that traditionally would not have been accepted. The 
reasons for this have been mixed and include opportunism by the Government, poor 
drafting of legislation and guidance that allowed broader legal interpretations, but 
mainly public pressure demanding better services and infrastructure which local 
authorities saw a funding opportunity to meet. However, there is fear that financial 
issues are now becoming a consideration when determining applications with the 
biggest concern being that the planning system is changing by stealth and without due 
consideration to the issues and implications (Campbell et al, 2001).
There is a need to sort out the obligations system as the South East region alone has a 
significant gap in the availability of funding, particularly for transport, and potentially 
for affordable housing and local community facilities (Roger Tym & Partners, 2005). 
The gap is conservatively estimated to be around eight billion pounds and is based on an 
assumption that the average dwelling will contribute twenty thousand pounds, which is 
probably over-estimating what is achievable.
More recent evidence has shown that developers are still concerned the process is not 
transparent and they are not informed early enough, while a quarter of local authorities 
surveyed are concerned they lack the necessary skills for negotiations, with lack of staff 
the main apprehension (Lee, 2008).
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The demise of the PGS did not see the issue disappear for long as The Planning Reform 
Bill proposed a Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) and will allow Councils to charge 
developers for infrastructure that is not directly related to specific schemes. The 
payments will need to be outlined in the LDF and will apply to all new development, 
thereby addressing the cumulative impact issue (Planning, 2007f). It was noted that the 
Government purposely left a clause in the Bill that would leave the option of 
introducing a revised PGS open as a ‘stick’ to wave if the development industry tried to 
back away from their preferred CIL approach (Hayman, 2007). However, it was not 
needed as the CIL has now been accepted and published with the Conservative Party 
initially agreeing to support it in principle (Donantonio, 2008) although as the 2010 
general election gets closer they appear to be moving away from that view.
The introduction of CIL is not mandatory on authorities but it would allow funding for 
local and sub-regional infrastructure and would sit alongside obligations to be used for 
site-specific requirements. It would cover all types of development, including 
commercial (but not householder) and a de minimis threshold would be set, and of 
interest to this research, the definition of infrastructure was broad.
“Development can be unlocked and made sustainable by the provision of 
very different types of infrastructure, such as transport, schools and health 
centres, flood defences, play areas, parks and other green spaces, many of 
which are already funded in part by the existing system of developer 
contributions. However, affordable housing provision should continue to be 
provided through the existing system of negotiated planning obligations, not 
through CIL” (DCLG, 2008c: 3).
Planning obligations would only be used to negotiate site specific issues with social 
infrastructure and any other ‘standard’ tariffs (such as education, creches, libraries, 
green travel contributions etc.) calculated by the local authority in an SPD and only 
collected through CIL. The provision of CIL is welcomed as it has opened up the 
debate on wider planning gain but as it is not mandatory, it will not provide a standard 
solution that many developers wanted as some local authorities will probably choose to 
stick with their own approaches. The loss of consistency has to be balanced against 
allowing local authorities to decide with their local communities which approach they 
should take and so, on balance, it is considered it should be left as discretionary rather 
than imposed.
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Conclusions
It has been shown that the practice of using obligations is for many people a 
controversial and unacceptable part of the planning system, although there is no clearly 
documented evidence that corruption is rife in the planning system due to obligations. 
As in many areas of life, the fear of the crime is larger than the crime itself and the myth 
is perpetuated by many who do not practice within the field and by those who have a 
position to promote. It is certainly accepted that the process has many problems and 
there is considerable room for improvement in most parts of the obligation process but 
it is not considered that the evidence from previous research shows that the system of 
using obligations is corrupt in itself.
It was shown that authorities need to ensure there is a clear audit trail between the 
obligation and what it is seeking to resolve. It is also usually beneficial to have a policy 
in the development plan setting out the scope of obligations. The negotiation process 
was explained to be one that is often routine as it relies on formulas but that detailed 
negotiations can be time-consuming, expensive, and specialised. Given the lack of 
understanding of social issues within the planning system, this is likely to be 
problematic for achieving more social obligations. Lastly, it was shown that New 
Labour had presented some quite radical ideas through consideration of the OPC, PGS, 
and then CIL and given support for a wide interpretation of things that the planning 
system could achieve for their communities.
The primary aim of this research is to investigate how much obligations are used to 
achieve social aims within the planning system and whether New Labour changed this 
emphasis. However, there are many related issues that would be good to address in 
passing when conducting research at the case study authority as the results would 
contribute to the wider debate on obligations. This, in turn, can assist in trying to find 
solutions to the problem of how obligations can be better used for social aims.
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6 METHODOLOGY & INTRODUCTION TO CASE STUDY
The main aim of this research is to investigate whether the advent of the New Labour 
Government coming to power in May 1997 resulted in a change to the planning system 
where communities would see social aims returned to the agenda on an equal footing to 
economic and environmental concerns. The claims by the Labour Party while in 
opposition and in the early few years of Government enthused with references to the 
return to progressive politics and the ability to move social issues up the policy agenda. 
Blair (1998b) had boasted that his Government would usher in a modernised social 
democracy, committed to social justice and strong government.
The second chapter explained more about what social planning issues could be, 
although it was pointed out that there was no definitive list, and consideration of 
whether something should be classified as social was more around the aim of what the 
person was hoping to achieve. Chapter three set out the aims and counter-claims 
regarding New Labour and then chapters four and five illustrated the purpose and 
practice of using planning obligations (within the wider planning gain debate) to attract 
some benefits from development for local communities. It was shown that social aims 
were usually achieved through planning obligations and this was arguably the main way 
the planning system captured social benefits for local communities. This chapter now 
looks to move beyond the literature review and scene setting to explain the 
methodology for the research and how it will examine the claims that New Labour 
sought a left-of-centre policy change that would manifest itself in achieving more social 
aims in building communities than under the Conservatives.
The purpose of the research was to clarify if New Labour had delivered on their promise
to create more balanced communities in terms of ensuring economic, social, and
environmental needs were all catered for when decisions were taken in the planning
system. This is of considerable importance to all communities as it was shown in the
literature review that over the years social issues have become the almost forgotten part
of the trinity, despite growing public concern. New Labour was voted in because they
were different to the Conservatives and so the public had a right to expect a left-of-
centre Government to deliver on their social pledges. The research therefore needs to
examine if there is any evidence at the case study authority that those promises were
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delivered or broken. A secondary issue is to consider how social issues could be 
ushered even further up the planning agenda, given the experiences of those at the 
authority.
This chapter starts by setting out why the case study authority was chosen, and then 
gives some background to the authority itself, stating why it is believed to be a good 
choice. The second section then looks at how the research database was constructed to 
carry out the assessment of how obligations were used over the twelve year period of 
analysis. The third section then moves to look at the database in detail, setting out 
exactly what would be considered and included within the database and some of the 
more practical issues regarding it. The fourth section will then consider the qualitative 
analysis and why it was considered interviews would be useful to advancing the 
research and the issues they hoped to progress.
6.1 Background to case study
The starting point in how to evaluate whether New Labour did bring in a paradigm shift 
to the planning gain system was to consider where within the planning system any 
change in direction would manifest itself. The planning system has practically been 
split into two areas: planning policy and development control, although there are other 
less mainstream areas including regeneration but in terms of making decisions, these are 
the two key areas. Considering planning policy first, it might have been possible to 
examine national policy statements and/or several development plans to see if policies 
were taking on a more ‘social’ aspect. However, given the slow speed of publishing 
local plans and the increased delays since LDFs were introduced, it was decided that it 
was unlikely that much would have changed of significance when I was doing my 
fieldwork. There was also the issue that even if policies changed, it did not follow that 
anything would change in practice and I was especially interested in whether New 
Labour was actually bringing in tangible changes for communities.
This left the decision-making part of the planning system, which in reality means the 
development control section of the LPA. Again, there were options around what area 
could be chosen and planning applications could be investigated to see if they contained 
social infrastructure as part of the development. Such an analysis would have involved
169
looking at decision notices to see what was being built but this was considered a risky 
approach as many descriptions on planning permissions are vague about exactly what is 
proposed. Usually the description lists the main focus of the development, such as the 
number of new houses, but then states ‘and associated facilities’ and so may not actually 
refer to any social gain. This is especially difficult if the proposal was not clarified 
when the application was submitted and would also miss many of the smaller gains that 
were being made. This is because new social infrastructure is often not built as part of 
the planning application but money is taken to contribute towards an existing project or 
some other benefit bestowed that would not appear on a decision notice.
The reality is that if something is going to be achieved for social purposes within 
development control then to ensure it would happen it would normally need to be 
agreed within the planning obligation. Obligations were already being used to achieve 
community gains (albeit not fully endorsed by the users of the planning system) and this 
meant that if local authorities were wanting to push New Labour’s agenda of achieving 
more social aims then it was most likely to be visible through the use of planning 
obligations.
There is always an argument that local authorities smooth out national policy and tend 
to continue with a ‘business as usual’ approach but as local authorities were keen to use 
obligations to achieve planning gain, it is not as likely to be a problem, and the purpose 
of this research is to see if changes did happen. If they did not then, as was pointed out 
at the start, part of a research project must be to try to find reasons why changes 
expected did not happen and this will be considered after the results have been set out.
The fact that the literature review had shown that the obligation process was clearly 
operating outside of the guidelines set out in the formal policy framework by central 
Government meant that it was more susceptible to any changing emphasis and therefore 
the most likely place for changes to be seen. The introduction of the requirement to 
promote economic, social, and environmental well-being went a step further and 
subsequently gave legal legitimacy to much of the practice. The combination of 
planning gain already being used towards this end and the statements now openly 
supporting this use meant changes were possible. The intention therefore, was to assess 
whether there had been any change in emphasis in the aims of obligations under New
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Labour and specifically if this reflected a move towards a more open use of obligations 
to achieve social aims.
The focus would be to look at the obligations entered into under the previous 
Conservative Government and then under New Labour to see what aim the obligations 
had. Were they trying to achieve economic, social, or environmental benefits and did 
this change under the different types of government? It is only by assessing the 
amounts for each that an understanding can be made as to whether New Labour had 
actually managed to bring in a new era of progressive politics at the research authority 
which delivered more social aims for communities. By using obligations, it meant that 
the research question could be clearly measured, thereby ensuring that one of the pitfalls 
of unsuccessful research was avoided (Denscombe, 2010).
Finding the research gap and issues of positionality
My interest in planning obligations arose when I was working at a previous authority as 
I was concerned that many of the obligations sought were probably correct to seek in 
principle but that the approach to asking for them and what amount to ask for was 
disorganised. As I researched the topic further, I soon realised that despite the 
significance of the issue and the serious claims being made about planning gain, there 
was not actually much research that examined the use of obligations in detail at that 
time. There also appeared to be anecdotal evidence that most local authorities did not 
have detailed or clear guidance on how to deal with planning obligations or what they 
should be used for.
My position of being on the ‘inside’ of a LPA meant it was a good candidate to consider
for researching but clearly this in itself brings advantages and risks (Crang, 2003).
Some of the advantages include better access to information and people as you know
what to look for and where, and if you conduct interviews then you already should have
the confidence of the interviewees (Gold, 2002). However, you need to bear in mind
that you will often have a similar worldview as those interviewed and the choice of
topic is not impartial but connected to your interest and so ensuring objectivity can be a
challenge (Gold, 2002). It needs to be remembered though that the idea of being an
‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ is moveable and researchers can open and close ‘the gap’ of how
close they are to an organisation or person and positionality can change over time and
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circumstance (Herod, 1999). These were all issues to consider while I decided how I 
was going to conduct the research.
I looked at previous research and knew that the work by Grimley J.R. Eve et a l (1992) 
had looked at twenty-eight authorities from April 1987 to March 1990 to give a broad 
overview of what agreements were being used for over this period. The Healey et al 
(1995) research looked at five authorities in detail over a longer period (1984 to 1991) 
and was carried out before Circular 16/91 was published and so was a good empirical 
base for assessing how policy had translated into practice at the end of the eighties. 
These were the two main bodies of research into the use of obligations at that stage but 
neither had analysed how, or if, obligations had changed across different Governments 
as they were too early for the arrival of New Labour in 1997. Other more recent 
research has focused on the negotiation aspects of the planning obligation process 
(Claydon & Smith, 1997; Wenban-Smith & Pearce, 1998) or more specialised uses of 
obligations, such as seeking to achieve countryside benefits (Elson et al, 1999) or to 
secure the use of local employment by obligations (Macfarlane, 2000). These pieces of 
research have focused on narrow policy areas while most of the other recent research 
has focused on trying to quantify the scale and scope of the use of obligations from 
slightly different angles.
Campbell et al (2001) carried out a survey of all English and Welsh planning 
authorities to assess the scale and scope of obligations, the existence of formal policy 
frameworks, and attitudes of officers and Members towards Government policy. They 
then looked in more detail at twelve case studies. Walker & Smith (2002) also sent 
questionnaires to local authorities to assess the policy framework, the authority’s 
current practice (survey was October 2000 to March 2001) and their opinion of 
Government policy but there was no notable research that examined in detail and 
contrasted how obligations had been used across significant periods under the 
Conservatives and New Labour. My research would fill a gap in the existing research 
in terms of being more in-depth than most research by considering the purpose of every 
clause, drawing comparisons across different Governments, and also giving a longer 
timeline than most research by using twelve years of analysis. This should add to the 
body of knowledge on planning gain. Obviously the biggest weakness was that it only 
considered one authority and therefore it is not possible to draw wide ranging
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conclusions and to pass judgement but it should draw out issues that other researchers 
can use to consider the matter further.
I wanted to make use of the fact that I worked in local government and so was in an 
unusual position of being ‘on the inside’ of negotiating obligations and therefore had 
unrestricted access to information. More importantly, I knew what information existed, 
where to look for it, and the reasons why processes were used the way they were. This 
‘inside knowledge’ is, I believe, invaluable for ensuring as in-depth an analysis as 
possible could be carried out and genuine reasons given for the way processes were 
used and decisions taken that other researchers may have struggled to explain as 
authorities may not have wanted to ‘offer up’ the problems they had. This led to the 
obvious conclusion that I should consider using my current employer as the case study 
authority if possible.
There was an obvious risk of using the authority I worked at as people may think I had a 
vested interest or would not be keen to criticise my employer or simply that I may have 
an allegiance to them as a public sector body that I wanted to protect from allegations 
(Denscombe, 2010). However, positionality in research has long been an issue to be 
considered and the important point is to be clear about the angle you are approaching 
the research from and any influences you could be under. I can clarify that Havant 
Borough Council (HBC), the case study authority, did not sponsor my research in any 
way, only allowing some study leave in the first years of study. In fact, there was little 
interest in the research while it was being carried out which even resulted in a separate 
project being run in 2008 that this research arguably could have been used to achieve if 
it had been identified earlier as a requirement. Perhaps the biggest risk I felt I faced was 
that I had some pre-conceived ideas of what the problems were and I might use my 
ideas to interpret the research results rather than having an open mind (Crang, 2002; 
Rose, 1997). However, I do not consider that I have any particular loyalty to HBC that 
would pressure me to reflect them in a better light than any research finds and it is true 
that HBC knew the obligation system needed to be improved (several publicly available 
reports reflect this). As long as comments and criticisms I make are constructive then 
they can be used as a means to improvement. It is also true that it is not HBC itself that 
is being examined but the purpose of obligations and so while there may be some 
criticism in passing, it is unlikely to be of a fundamental nature of the authority itself
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but more of the obligation process. There is also a risk though that we focus so much 
on our positionality that we become self-centred and miss the bigger influences and 
powers that are at work so we need to reflect on it, but not be consumed by it (Cloke, 
2005; Cloke etal., 2004).
However, it is important to recognise our positionality in research and to reflectively 
examine it, being clear about who and what we are researching, being open about this 
and the relationships we have, as we cannot remain completely detached (Rose, 1997). 
This does not invalidate our research as no social research is truly ‘value free’ as we all 
inevitably bring some personal influences and values to our research (see Gold, 2002). 
Instead, the challenge is to think not only about what we are researching, but especially 
how and why we are doing it, who we are and the values and ethics we hold and any 
influence or bias this will bring (Cloke et al., 2004; Hopkins, 2007). I have considered 
these issues throughout the methodology and believe I have been careful to keep my 
research as objective as possible.
I had worked at East Hampshire District Council (EHDC) since August 1998, and was a 
Senior Planning Officer in Development Control at the time of my move to HBC in 
June 2002, where I worked in Economic Development. In November 2003 I moved to 
become a Development Control Team Leader at HBC until June 2006 when I left to 
become Development Control Manager at Test Valley Borough Council. I 
subsequently returned to HBC in September 2007 as Development Services Manager 
(managing development control, building control, land charges, conservation and 
address management). The main part of my fieldwork was carried out during the 
middle of 2003 and throughout 2004, which meant that HBC was an obvious choice as 
a case study authority (as long as it was otherwise suitable) and I carried out subsequent 
interviews with officers at HBC in summer 2008. Researchers often work in a dynamic 
environment where situations and positionality change over time and my position of 
moving from being an ‘insider’ at HBC to an ‘outsider’ when at TVBC only to become 
an ‘insider’ again when returning to HBC bears this out (Crang, 2003; Gold, 2002; 
Herod, 1999).
I had originally considered using both HBC and EHDC as case studies to draw a 
contrast between the two authorities, as EHDC was a more affluent area and so HBC
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would arguably show more social obligations, but I decided that as my intention was to 
look in as much detail as possible it would be better to focus on one authority. I felt that 
considering two authorities would not add much and was more a choice of convenience 
but could distract from the depth as I would inevitably end up looking across a wider 
but shallower base as I had to keep the research manageable. As I considered the issue I 
also realised that the attempt to ‘control’ for various factors between the two authorities 
would take up considerable time and arguably make the research more open to question 
as the two authorities had very different structures, political parties, and aims. Trying to 
clarify if the findings were found due to changes in national government and not 
because of local issues and influences would be complex. The deciding factor was that 
realistically I would only have been able to consider half as long under each 
Government if I had considered two authorities to keep it manageable. It was 
fundamental to my research that I remained focused on achieving as in-depth a case 
study as possible. Instead, I decided to stick with just one authority but to assess every 
single clause included within the obligations (not just the general aim of the obligations) 
and to try to quantify the financial amounts obtained within obligations, wherever 
possible. It is accepted that a single case study had limitations when seeking to apply 
the findings to any overall theory and draw any generalisations as only one example 
will not prove a theory. However, an additional case study would not have changed this 
much and the other option of looking at many authorities on a shallow basis had been 
done by previous researchers and lacked the depth I wanted to achieve. The key point 
was to be sure that it was a good example and one where social issues were likely to be 
prevalent.
The case study authority and social aims
It was also fairly clear that HBC was going to be a better choice for the case study as it
has a relatively high number of electoral wards that are classified as deprived. The
Indices of Deprivation for 2004 (ODPM, 2004b) show that out of the 32,482 Super
Output Area (SOA) lower layers, the most deprived area in EHDC was the 13,384th
most deprived SO A. In contrast, HBC had 26 SO As included within the 10,000 most
deprived SOA and had the 2,443rd most deprived SOA. As my research is seeking to
assess the extent of usage of obligations for social benefits within the planning system,
researching an area of higher deprivation would be more likely to show understanding
and consideration of social needs than a more affluent area. If New Labour had brought
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in changes in emphasis, HBC should be more likely to have embraced the changes and 
made use of them than EHDC.
The political pressures were also more conducive to expecting social aims to be 
progressed at HBC as it had Labour Councillors and had no overall political control 
between 1990 and 2002, with the Conservatives only taking control in 2002 with 23 
Councillors to Labour’s 9 and the Liberal Democrats 6 (BBC, 2003). It is unusual to 
find an authority with as many Labour Councillors in the southeast of England, outside 
of large metropolitan areas.
Looking at HBC in more detail, it was shown in chapter two that New Labour had 
championed the use of Community Strategies (CS) to give power back to local 
communities and to ensure social aims could have significant weight in setting policy 
aims for an area. Given the social concerns at Havant, it is not surprising that the HBC 
Community Strategy (HBC, 2001) set out eight aims to seek to achieve noticeable 
change in the next three years from the date of the strategy (and therefore some 
evidence should be found by the end of the research period). The focus areas were 
based around safer communities, strengthening the economy, improving education, 
enhancing the environment, promoting a healthier community, enabling better housing, 
promoting social wellbeing, and engaging young people. It is clear that there was a 
good mix of aims for economic, social, and environmental issues.
Within the CS, the eight aims identified ‘key actions’ and some of these clearly had 
social aspects that could have been considered for achievement through planning gain. 
In particular, the proposals to extend the CCTV system, providing playcourts and 
teenage shelters, funding for better education in schools around drugs and health, 
improving training for local employees, increasing the quality and range of community 
based learning opportunities, Leigh Park Education Action Zone and Sure Start funding, 
funding needed to tackle deprivation and social exclusion, developing the community 
centres, and developing better sporting, cultural and leisure facilities for young people. 
There was potential for a considerable number of social based policies and initiatives 
that could be promoted through the use of planning obligations and HBC appears to be a 
good case study authority to use for the research intended.
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To place HBC in context, it is worth considering some more facts and also to compare it 
to other authorities. It is on the south coast of England, in south Hampshire, and forms 
part of the Greater Portsmouth area, lying to the east and northeast of the city (see map 
1 below). It has a population of over 114,000 people and covers an area of 7,783 
hectares, giving an average density of over 20 persons per hectare (HBC, 2007). It had 
an unemployment rate of 2.3% in July 2007, which may be low by national standards, 
but is the highest within the County, (excluding the unitary authorities of Southampton 
and Portsmouth), which averages only 1.2% (HCC, 2007).
If we look at the official statistics for Havant (Nomis, 2010) we can place the authority 
within context of both the South East (SE) and Great Britain (GB) as a whole for 
comparison. This shows that Havant has a lower percentage of people of working age 
(57.8%) than within the SE (61.1%) and GB as a whole (62.0%). This is the 52nd out of 
the 67 local authorities in the SE. Havant also has less economically active people 
(81.5%) than the SE average (82.3%), although it is ahead of the GB average (78.9%). 
This is 38th out of the 67 local authorities in the SE. Of those who are economically 
inactive, those wanting a job (4.2%) was lower than both the SE (5.4%) and GB (5.6%) 
percentages. This figure is 33rd out of the 37 authorities in the SE that figures are 
available for. Havant has a higher percentage of jobseekers within the 18-24 age 
bracket (30.5%) than the SE (26.9%) and GB (28.4%) averages and of those claiming 
benefits the percentage of lone parents (2.2%) and carers (1.3%) is higher than the SE 
(1.4% & 0.8% respectively) and GB (1.9% and 1.1% respectively) averages.
Looking at the figures for employment, although Havant has more ‘managers and senior 
officials’ (14.5%) than any other occupational grouping, this is lower than the SE 
(17.6%) and GB (15.7%) average. The areas of greatest disparity are that Havant has 
considerably less people employed in the ‘associate professional & technical’ 
occupations (9.6%) compared to the SE (15.8%) and GB (14.8%) averages. This is 
made up by a much higher percentage of people employed within the ‘process plant & 
machine operatives’ occupation in Havant (11.4%) than the SE (5.0%) and GB (6.8%) 
average, reflecting a stronger emphasis on manufacturing jobs. This probably explains 
why the gross weekly pay for full-time workers in Havant (£464.0) is less than the SE 
(£536.6) and GB (£491.0) averages. In relation to this, Havant also suffers from lower 
educational qualifications with only 26.5% of the population being qualified to NVQ4
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level and above, compared to the SE (31.5%) and GB (29.0%) averages. This is the 47th 
lowest out of the 67 local authorities in the SE.
The health indicators do not show a good picture with 8.5% of people within Havant 
defined as being in the “not good health” category, compared to an average of 7.1% for 
the SE (although the figure for England is higher at 9.0%) (ONS, 2004a). The 
comparative figures for having a limiting long-term illness are more marked for HBC 
with 18.3% of people described as within this category, compared to 15.5% in the SE 
and 17.9% within England (ONS, 2004c). Therefore, there are clear health issues 
within the Borough.
Turning to some social issues, 7.2% of households are defined as lone parent 
households with dependent children, which is higher than both the SE average (5.8%), 
and the average for England (7.1%) (ONS, 2004b). The divorce rate is also 
considerably higher in HBC (7.6%) than both the SE (6.6%) and England (6.6%) as a 
percentage of all people (ONS, 2004d). These figures suggest home life that is not as 
stable.
Looking more specifically at the planning context, the development plan at the time of 
the research consisted of a strategic plan and a series of documents comprising the local 
plan. The strategic plan was the South Hampshire Structure Plan: First Alteration, 1987 
which was replaced by the Hampshire County Structure Plan, 1993, which in turn was 
replaced by the Hampshire County Structure Plan Review (1996-2011). The local plan 
started with the Havant Borough Local Plan, which was adopted in June 1994, but had 
begun with a Consultation Draft Plan in 1988. The Plan covered the Borough except 
for the town centres of Havant, Waterlooville, and Emsworth, which had separate local 
plans. These were the Waterlooville Town Centre Action Area Local Plan, adopted in 
January 1995; the Emsworth Town Centre District Plan, adopted in June 1983; and the 
Havant Town Centre Action Area Plan, adopted in November 1980. These have all 
since been superseded by the new Havant Borough District-Wide Local Plan, which 
was adopted in September 2005 and covered the whole Borough.
To better understand the types of planning applications HBC was dealing with, we can 
look at some comparative figures to place HBC within the context of the other 11
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Hampshire local authorities (excluding the 2 unitary authorities of Portsmouth and 
Southampton as they would skew the comparison). The statistics (DCLG, 2005) show 
that HBC decided 35 major planning applications in 2004/05 (this year was chosen as it 
related best to when most of the field work was carried out), 238 minor applications, 
and 970 ‘other’ decisions. Within the 11 local authorities of Hampshire, this was the 2nd 
lowest number of major applications, the 3rd lowest number of minor applications, and 
the 3rd lowest number of ‘other’ decisions. This is in-keeping with HBC being a 
relatively small Borough Council. In terms of speed of making decision, 49% of majors 
were decided within 13 weeks, 61% of minors within 8 weeks, and 80% of ‘others’ 
within the 8 week statutory target. This was the 3 rd slowest for major applications, the 
3rd slowest for minor applications, and joint last for ‘others’. In terms of types of 
applications submitted, HBC had the highest percentage of all applications that were 
classified as ‘householder’ within the 11 Hampshire authorities. It had the 4th highest 
percentage of all applications classified as ‘general industry, storage, warehousing’ 
(information was only available for 10 of the Hampshire authorities), it ranked 8th for 
the percentage of all applications classified as ‘offices, research and devt., light 
industry’ and 9th of the 11 authorities for applications categorised as ‘dwellings’ 
compared to the overall percentage. This shows that HBC had more householder and 
general industrial applications than average but less offices and new housing schemes.
Taking all the factors together shows that there are clear socio-economic issues within 
Havant that the Council could be dealing with and while it may be comparable in many 
statistical categories to the averages for GB or England it also is worse in some 
categories and has clear challenges as an authority within the relatively prosperous SE. 
In particular, many of the problems are spatially concentrated within Leigh Park, a large 
post war housing estate that has a considerable number of wards with social deprivation 
(Leigh Park is largely covered by the wards of Bamcroft, Battins, Bondfields, and 
Warren Park in map 2 below).
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6.2 Creating the research database
As I had decided that researching in as much detail as possible would add most to the 
existing field of research, it was clear that the database needed to cover as long a period 
as possible since New Labour had been in Government to give the best chance for any 
changes to be found. I had started my field work around the middle of 2003 and so it 
was possible to collect six full years of data from when New Labour came to power on 
2nd May 1997 up to 1st May 2003. This six-year period of New Labour also worked 
well by allowing a good comparison to be made with the last six years of the 
Conservative Government (2nd May 1991 to 1st May 1997). It is accepted that as the 
new s. 106 (introduced by the 1991 Act) did not take effect until 25 th October 1991, the 
first six months of the statistics for the Conservatives are not on a strictly comparable 
basis. However, the only way to nullify this would be to delete the year and reduce it to 
a five year comparison for each but it was considered ‘losing’ a year of statistics under 
New Labour would be a greater loss.
With this in mind, it was considered that it was best to create the database using the 
dates that applications were registered within these annual dates of 2nd May to 1st May 
for each year. The other option would have been to use the decision date of the 
planning permission but it was considered that this would be less useful as many 
applications, especially in the early 1990s, took months (sometimes even years) to 
negotiate. This time lag would distort the results, as applications being negotiated under 
the Conservative Government would show up in the New Labour results. In reality, an 
application and any associated obligation would be negotiated under the position that 
was current at the time of submission and would better reflect the position in place at 
that time.
Healey et al. (1995) point out that the data they recorded was incomplete as systematic 
records were rarely kept and the data should therefore be treated with caution. 
Likewise, much of this research originally relied on the use of a database that the 
Council had paid a student to develop and work on over the holidays. There was a risk 
that relying on this information may result in inaccurate findings, although the benefit 
of being able to use it meant the task of compiling the data over twelve years to the level 
required, was possible. There were two main areas where inaccuracy could have
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resulted. The first revolved around whether entire obligations were missing from the 
spreadsheet as obligations may have been signed but not recorded and the second area 
was the accuracy of what was recorded itself, as understanding clauses within an 
obligation is not straightforward. It was decided to assess these issues in reverse order 
as if the spreadsheet had not recorded the information accurately in the first place then 
there was little point in worrying about whether whole obligations were missing as the 
spreadsheet could not be relied on.
The Council had a ledger listing all legal agreements that the Council had signed (not 
just planning obligations under s. 106) in the ‘strong room’ and due to the legal status it 
had it was considered it would be the most accurate source. By cross-referencing the 
ledger with the spreadsheet would check one against the other.
There were two hundred and twenty seven obligations signed in the legal ledger under 
s. 106 of the T&CPA. It was decided to ensure a sample of no less than ten percent was 
checked, which would have involved twenty-three obligations. However, there was a 
risk that some of the obligations may not have been available when I visited the strong 
room (e.g. being used by other officers) and so I considered it would be prudent to 
check several additional obligations. In addition, there was also the risk that as I was 
choosing the obligations randomly, I may happen to pick twenty-three straightforward 
obligations (i.e. single clause obligations) which were not as likely to be recorded 
inaccurately as they would be fairly simple for the student to understand. Therefore, I 
decided to pick two obligations that I knew from personal experience had multiple 
clauses plus an additional random obligation.
This gave twenty-six obligations and of this, twenty-two were recorded completely 
accurately (eight five percent accuracy rate). The twenty-six obligations contained sixty 
clauses between them, and of these, seven clauses had been missed off the spreadsheet 
(giving an eighty eight percent accuracy rate). Looking at the missing clauses, it 
appears most of these had some overlap with other clauses so the distinction may not 
have been clear i.e. two clauses related to different highway requirements were only 
recorded as one. However, it was considered that an almost ninety percent accuracy 
rate meant the spreadsheet was suitable for using as the basis for the database. Further 
checking of the database would be ongoing, as I would have to look up many
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obligations during my fieldwork to clarify clauses or to examine cases that are more 
interesting.
This meant that as the obligations recorded were sufficiently accurate, it was worth 
continuing to check whether whole obligations were missing from the spreadsheet. By 
comparing the ledger with the spreadsheet, I was able to find that there were one 
hundred and sixty five obligations in the ledger of relevance within my research period 
and of these, only four were missing from the spreadsheet, which meant it was almost 
ninety eight percent accurate. It was very surprising to note that conversely there was 
one obligation missing from the ledger that was on the spreadsheet. Nevertheless, I was 
able to add the obligations from the spreadsheet and the ledger to my database to give 
confidence that the database now contained all obligations signed by HBC in this period 
(one hundred and sixty six at this stage).
Attention now turned to focusing on construction of the research database itself by 
using the spreadsheet for the base information. It will have been noted from above that 
the number of obligations reduced from two hundred and twenty seven to one hundred 
and sixty six by removing those not contained within the research period, those 
superseded, where applications had been withdrawn or not preceded with, and several 
cases where unilateral undertakings had been served on the Council (so they would have 
been registered and legally engrossed) but the accompanying planning applications were 
refused and any appeal dismissed. Further refinement of the number of obligations was 
required before the database could be finished.
Working on the spreadsheet to check the number of obligations recorded from the 
ledger had quickly brought up an issue of what exactly the spreadsheet was recording. 
It was apparent that some of the applications did not have a signed bilateral or unilateral 
agreement number recorded against them but instead had a payment recorded towards 
the Council’s green transport scheme. These payments are called Green Transport 
Contributions (GTC) and as they were relatively small amounts of money, it had been 
decided by the Council that it was not cost-effective to ask an applicant to sign an 
obligation (the cost of instructing a solicitor was often more than the contribution) and 
so they often paid money instead. It was considered that these payments should be 
included in the analysis as an applicant was offered the choice of paying cash (in reality
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usually a cheque but occasionally actual money) or signing a unilateral agreement when 
there was only a GTC required. While some paid cash, others still chose to use the 
unilateral undertaking, (usually because the cash was required up-front whereas the 
obligation was ‘triggered’ at the commencement of development stage which could be 
several years away). In addition, where the application involved more than a GTC, the 
applicant was not offered the option of paying cash, as an obligation would be required 
anyway. Excluding the cash alternative GTC would skew the results as it would not 
give a complete picture with some GTC requirements being included and others 
excluded. There was sufficient confidence that all GTC payments were included as the 
cheques were receipted when received on one system and logged onto another before 
being cashed and the two systems cross-referenced by the Finance Department in the 
annual audit.
Taking the one hundred and sixty six obligations previously mentioned, we can add on a 
further six obligations that had been signed since the spreadsheet had last been updated, 
the eighteen GTC cash alternative payments, plus eight obligations in the ledger had 
been entered onto the spreadsheet twice because the obligation had been signed in 
relation to two different planning applications. This was usually either because the sites 
were adjacent to each other and so were replicating the obligation but subject to two 
separate planning applications as they were separate planning units, or because the same 
developer put in two similar applications (to appeal one if the other was taking too long) 
or for alternative schemes. Therefore, although there was only one obligation, it had to 
be counted twice as in some cases both permissions could be implemented or if only 
one could be implemented, it was not known which one would be, so both were counted 
to cover both eventualities. There were a further six applications where the 
Development Control Committee had resolved to grant planning permission, subject to 
an obligation but the decision notice had not yet been issued. In each of these cases 
negotiations were ongoing and the decision notice was considered likely to be issued, 
and so it was decided to include these in the database as well, as they had been 
submitted within the research timeframe. Lastly, there was one unilateral undertaking 
served on the Council where the application was still under discussion (but likely to get 
permission) and so had not been entered into the ledger yet and it was included. This 
gives two hundred and five obligations on the research database (although it is accepted
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it is technically two hundred and five applications with attached obligations due to the 
duplication of some obligations).
6.3 Content and purpose of the database
The spreadsheet compiled by the student had listed the following details for each 
obligation:
a) Application number
b) Address of the site
c) Number of the obligation in the legal ledger
d) Date the obligation was signed
e) Description of proposed development
f) Whether work had commenced to implement the permission
g) A basic coding of the type of clause (8 codes)
b) A more detailed description of the clause (over 100 descriptions)
0 Notes on the clause
j) A list of financial contributions
k) A comments box stating progress on the discharge of the obligation
1) Whether the obligation had been met or was still outstanding
m) Date it was complied with
Some of this information was useful for the research, but other parts were not and so I 
set about designing a database that used the relevant information but also looked to see 
what else was needed. It was considered that columns (a)-(e) and (j) would be useful 
but that the other columns were either not particularly relevant and should be deleted (f, 
k, 1, and m) or they would be useful, but needed to be re-evaluated first (g, h, and i).
The reason for assessing these last three columns again was that the description for 
column (g) was too general while column (h) was too complex and recorded the aim of 
the obligation, while column (i) stated exactly what the clause was seeking to achieve. I 
was seeking to ensure that my research recorded the aim of the obligation with 
particular ability to draw out any obligations that were used for social aims. This was a 
difficult area as previous researchers had struggled to classify the purpose behind
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obligations. Healey et al. (1995) wrote one of the most comprehensive accounts about 
the practice of using obligations and they noted that other researchers had tried different 
ways to classify obligations with some simply classifying whether they were positive or 
negative in tone, what the relationship was between the obligation and the development 
site i.e. on-site or off-site, by the policy objective, or the form of the obligation. 
However, they rejected these as too difficult to allow comparison across authorities as 
they would vary too much depending on local policies and conditions.
Instead, they chose to first divide the obligations into either negative obligations that 
restricted the rights of the developer or positive obligations that require further action to 
be taken. They also categorised each clause contained in the obligation which gave 
much more information than most research of the time. They further divided the 
negative and positive obligations into four and eight categories respectively. The 
negative categories were:
(i) Development control administration
(ii) Controlling development
(iii) Control after development
(iv) Modification
The categories for the positive clauses contained within the obligations were:
(i) Highways obligations
(ii) Sewerage and drainage
(iii) Landscaping, open space, footpaths
(iv) Parking
(v) Community facilities
(vi) Conservation
(vii) Social policy
(viii) Other
The categories will be explored in more detail later but for present purposes the main 
issue is to assess the categories of interest to helping define social purposes within the 
planning system. The only overtly clear categories of relevance are the fifth and
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seventh categories of the positive classification and so we need to explore further the 
clauses that Healey et al (1995) included within these two categories.
The fifth category (community facilities) included community services, sport and 
recreational facilities and some examples were given where the developer had to 
provide sites for the facilities at nominal cost and contribute a quarter of the 
construction costs of the facilities themselves. This included new community buildings, 
schools, and playing fields.
The seventh category (social policy) included child-care, employment training and 
housing obligations with a social policy intention. Cases were given where attempts 
had been made to achieve child-care facilities on a retail development scheme and 
contributions towards a child-care trust. These had been rejected by the developers, and 
not insisted on by the local authority, illustrating the consideration that these were 
‘grey’ areas of policy. However, other cases were given where child-care facilities were 
provided and one case in Harlow set out how the local authority also managed to secure 
a small shop, management training centre and a cash point to provide services for staff 
on an industrial estate. It was argued that the industrial estate was relying on untrained 
staff that needed access to basic services to attract them to work there in the first place 
so although the obligations have a social aspect, they also had a considerable benefit to 
the employer as well. Another problem highlighted by Healey et al (1995) was that 
Harlow also managed to get developers to make financial payments towards out-of­
school child-care, provide creches, to use local subcontractors, and to hire labourers 
from the Harlow Job Centre but all by voluntary agreement and not by a planning 
obligation. Therefore, more was achieved in terms of social provision than showed up 
in the statistics analysing obligations but there is no clear and systematic way of 
recording this.
It was argued earlier (see chapter 2) that there has been little academic debate about 
what should, and should not, be the remit of social issues within the planning system 
and that the only guiding maxim was the aim of the obligation and whether it was 
primarily seeking a social aim, rather than an economic or environmental one. The 
approach and categorisation used by Healey et al. (1995) is sympathetic to this 
approach and so this research chose to adopt the framework developed by them for the
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basis of this thesis. It was accepted that this contained a slight drawback as I believed 
that the provision of play equipment within positive category 3 (P3) would have been 
better located in positive category 5 (P5) as it arguably has a social benefit for the 
community in tackling health issues, but this could not be changed. Using the 
categories to allow the comparisons to be made outweighed the slight disadvantage as 
comparisons could then be made with other research to see how trends had changed 
over the years. Therefore, I adopted the categories developed by Healey et al (1995) 
with the four negative categories and eight positive categories.
However, I wanted more information than the twelve categories they had used as the 
whole focus of my research was to provide as much in-depth information as possible. 
Therefore, I decided to subdivide the categories down further so there was a total of 
thirty-seven categories, rather than twelve, but the original twelve categories remained 
so the narrower categories could be collapsed back to the twelve for any comparative 
purposes, where relevant.
I also wanted to contrast each year of the research periods with other years, so it was 
important to ensure that each obligation could be assigned to the correct year and so I 
added a column for the date every application had been registered. In addition, I wanted 
to be able to compare and contrast how the use of obligations was changing and whether 
they were being used more for one type of development in comparison to others. This 
meant adding a column to register the class of development type, using the then 
eighteen Government classes of development.42
This gave the following list of categories on my database for every application (where 
appropriate, an explanation has been provided in brackets and for columns H-AR 
clarification has been given as to which of the positive and negative categories used by 
Healey et al, 1995 applied):
A) Registration date
B) App. Number (reference number of planning application)
C) Site address
42 In 2008 the DCLG added more classes as they split major applications into large-scale majors and 
small-scale majors
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D) Obligation Number (to compare with legal ledger)
E) Obligation signed date
F) Development (description of proposed development)
G) Cls (Class of development using Government classification)
H) REV (N1 -  revocation/ limitation of previous planning permission)
I) RET (N1 -  retain/ demolish/ cease use of existing building or access)
J) DWE (N1 -  limit number of dwellings)
K) Rout (N2 -  lorry routing during construction and after)
L) SIG (N2 -  signage to be agreed for traffic)
M) Phas (N2 -  phasing of development & timing of occupation)
N) RoU (N3 -  restriction of use i.e. by use class or occupancy, including age
and/or seasonal restrictions)
O) RoA (N3 -  restriction of activity i.e. opening times, number of visitors,
removal of p.d. rights, no development in specified area etc.)
P) NC (N3 -  nature conservation i.e. protection of existing)
Q) Sere (N3 -  screening to hide development, including fences, hoardings,
sound attenuation i.e. resolving negative impact of development)
R) Main (N3 -  maintenance of public open space and/or landscaping once)
S) MOD (N4 -  modification of previous obligation or agreement)
T) GTC (PI -  payment of Green Transport Contribution)
U) HGpr (PI -  provision of highways infrastructure, including on-site and off-
site works, granting public right of way etc.)
V) HG£ (PI -  financial contribution towards highways infrastructure)
W) Sewr (P2 -  provision of any sewerage and/or drainage facilities)
X) OSpr (P3 -  provision of public open space)
Y) OS£ (P3 -  financial contribution towards public open space)
Z) PEpr (P3 -  provision of play equipment)
AA) PE£ (P3 -  financial contribution towards play equipment)
AB) LNpr (P3-provision of landscaping)
AC) LN£ (P3 -  financial contribution towards landscaping)
AD) F/Cpr (P3 -  provision of a public footpath or cycleway)
AE) F/C£ (P3 -  financial contribution towards a public footpath or cycleway)
AF) Park (P4 -  provision of car, lorry or cycle parking)
AG) CMpr (P5 -  provision of community, sport and/or recreational facilities)
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AH) CM£ (P5 -  financial contribution towards community, sport and/or
recreational facilities)
AI) PApr (P5 -  provision of public art)
AJ) PA£ (P5 -  financial contribution towards public art)
AK) LT (P6 -  transfer of land for nature conservation)
AL) Cons (P6 -  works to repair or improve land and/or buildings for
conservation purposes)
AM) AHpr (P7 -  provision of affordable housing)
AN) AH£ (P7 -  financial contribution towards affordable housing)
AO) cctv£ (P7 -  financial contribution towards provision of CCTV)
AP) BE£ (P7 -  financial contribution for business, enterprise, or training)
AQ) Crc£ (P7 -  financial contribution towards provision of a creche)
AR) Oth (P8 -  any other positive obligation)
AS) financial benefit (sum achieved where listed in obligation)
AT) other (any other comments on the obligation)
AU) notes (anything of interest regarding the case in general)
The columns (H)-(AR) fall within the four negative and eight positive classifications 
used by Healey et a l (1995) and are denoted N1 for negative category 1, PI for positive 
category 1 and so on. The categories they used are (see pages 124 -  146 of their book 
for further explanation):
Negative obligations:
1. Development control administration - seeking to adjust or limit existing 
permissions.
2. Controlling development - especially to restrict impact during the construction 
phase and when or how things will be built.
3. Control after development - to control the use of land or development after 
completion by restricting use and users, ensuring adequate management and 
maintenance of the site and to ensure things promised materialised and remained 
(i.e. low cost housing remained as such)
4. Modification -  changes to previous obligations (or agreements preceding s. 106).
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Positive obligations:
1. Highways obligations -  to cover vehicular and pedestrian access to the site, on-site 
highway works, access and off-site works.
2. Sewerage and drainage -  decreasing as most developers now negotiate directly with 
the water company but still used, primarily on greenfield sites.
3. Landscaping, open space, footpaths -  includes cycleways, play areas, riverside 
walks and other areas of recreational and environmental amenities.
4. Parking -  can cover on-site, off-site provision or a financial payment in lieu of 
provision.
5. Community facilities -  includes community services, sport and recreational 
facilities.
6. Conservation -  includes building and nature conservation and archaeological 
matters.
7. Social policy -  includes child care, employment training and housing obligations 
with a social policy intention
8. Other -  any other obligation that could not be placed in the other categories.
It is easy to see that there is considerable scope for confusion, even within these wider 
categories. For example, recreational facilities could easily fall within P3 or P5 and 
care needs to be taken to look at the aim of the category i.e. P3 is primarily interested in 
recreational facilities for their amenity value while P5 is interested in recreational 
facilities as something for people to physically do in terms of provision of equipment. 
P7 is also easy to misinterpret as N3 seeks to ensure retention of low cost housing while 
P7 seeks to ensure provision of affordable housing. One is the negative side of 
retaining what has been positively required. There is no way round the fact that there is 
scope for miscategorising clauses but within this research considerable care was taken 
to consider the aim of the clause and many obligations were checked when clarity was 
required.
It is considered that the research database is sufficient to clearly show how trends have, 
or have not, changed across the last six years of the Conservative Government and the 
first six years of New Labour. It will also allow in-depth analysis of exactly what 
obligations are trying to achieve by looking at the aims behind the obligation. The fact 
that the categories can be collapsed back down means that it is possible to compare
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results with that found in the research carried out by Healey et al (1995) which is 
arguably the most comprehensive research into the use of obligations in the second half 
of the nineteen eighties. This research will allow direct contrasts to be made to see if 
there are any trends or changes, although it must be remembered that it is very difficult 
to contrast databases constructed by different researchers as they will inevitably 
categorise differently but it is still considered that there will be some value to this.
6.4 Proposed qualitative analysis
It was explained (see section 1.4) that once the quantitative results have been found, it is 
important for a researcher to then investigate why the results were found and in so doing 
to draw the conclusions from this regarding the theories that underlined the hypotheses 
being investigated in the first instance. This hypothetico-deductivist approach takes the 
‘hypothesis-relevant facts’ and prior theory generated by the literature review and 
quantitative analysis and seeks to ‘test’ the theoretical facts by qualitative interviews to 
see if the hypothesis can objectively be supported or refuted (Wengraf, 2001). As a 
result, it was decided to carry out a series of interviews with the planning officers 
responsible for negotiating the obligations across the research period.
Interviewing is ‘a conversation with a purpose’ to give an authentic insight into 
someone’s experiences and is useful for explaining processes, changing conditions, 
understanding organisations, circumstances, meanings and identities (Cloke et al, 
(2004). Therefore, the interviews were seeking to clarify some of the theoretical ideas 
around the purpose of obligations and to also better understand the pressures the case 
study authority was under to see if that could influence the findings.
There were many practical issues to be considered in the first instance around the 
interview setting, any possible impact of using tape recorders, who else would be 
present and any implications that may have, whether others can interrupt etc. It is also 
important to ensure interviews have informed consent, ensure privacy, safety, that they 
do not exploit, and are sensitive to the interviewee’s cultural difference and gender 
(Cloke et al, 2004). Much has also been written about how it is important to think 
about the level of involvement, consultation and participation given to those we 
interview (see Hopkins, 2007) and we need to especially think about questions of
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authority, communication and representation as our own position can influence 
knowledge production (Cloke, 2005; Rose, 1997).
Informed consent was gained from those interviewed by explaining how the interview 
would take place, what the purpose of the research was (broadly speaking), that the 
interviews would be anonymous (although it was pointed out that as only a small 
number were being interviewed, people may be able to guess who said what). The 
interviews were conducted in an office where interruptions were unlikely (a sign was on 
the door asking for no interruptions) and a small tape recorder was used. The exception 
was that the officer who had since left the Council had their interview carried out at 
their house. All interviewees seemed happy with the process (apart from passing jokes 
that they were worried they may not look knowledgeable about obligations) and were 
interested to know the findings and what others said. There was no coercion in 
involving them and all seemed pleased to be asked for their views.
Problems around positionality were mentioned earlier (section 6.1) and while 
interviewing seeks to qualitatively tease out the deeper meaning of attributes, attitudes, 
and behaviour, issues of positionality can contextualise our role in co-constructing and 
then interpreting interview data (Cloke et al, 2004). Any researcher carrying out 
interviews brings their personal reflection to the process (Flick, 2002) but as was 
mentioned earlier, it is important to ensure the researcher remains as unbiased as 
possible and is aware of not asking ‘loaded’ questions. I was particularly conscious that 
I had my own views on what was found in the research considering I worked at the case 
study authority, although it must be admitted that I was also considerably surprised by 
some of the findings and unsure of why that was (this will be explained further in 
chapter seven). It was important that I had to be clear that my personal opinions were 
minimised in interpreting my findings and so I set out to seek as independent a view as 
possible. As a result, the interviews were conducted by using a type of semi-structured 
interview technique that sought to clarify the interviewee’s knowledge in a format that 
is accessible for interpretation (Flick, 2002). The purpose of the interviews was to draw 
out not just the explicit knowledge but also the implicit assumptions that the person has, 
and to do this several topic areas were chosen for discussion (the purpose of the 
planning system, the purpose and use of obligations, and the application of these at 
HBC). A mixture of open questions, theory-driven questions and some more
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confrontational questions were used to test the interviewee’s assumptions and 
throughout the interviews I kept my contribution to a minimum to induce narrative and 
to minimise my influence (Flick, 2002; Wengraf, 2001). It should be clarified that 
although I worked at the case study authority during the research period (I worked in 
Economic Development from June 2002 and only moved to become a Development 
Control Team Leader over a year later and therefore after the end of the research period) 
I was not directly involved in negotiating the obligations investigated. My concern 
about influencing the interviews was more due to my position within the authority at the 
time of the interviews.
As with most local authorities, HBC has faced several restructures over the research 
period, but broadly speaking the Council’s management structure had remained a 
Managing Director, Corporate Directors, Heads of Service, Managers, Team Leaders, 
and then case officers. From within this, there were six qualified planners who had 
worked at HBC for significant periods while both the Conservatives and New Labour 
were in power. Therefore, I decided to interview these six people. Three of the six 
were case officers (although one had left HBC several years ago), one was a Team 
Leader (who had been the Interim Development Control Manager for a short period) 
and the other two had worked their way up through the development control team, one 
now a Corporate Director and the other the Head of Service. Therefore, there were two 
with a more managerial view of the process and four with a practitioner viewpoint as 
they were still negotiating obligations on an on-going basis.
At the time of the interviews I had returned to the authority as the Development 
Services Manager and there was a risk that as four of those being interviewed were 
answerable to me they may be somehow restricted in what they said. I do not believe 
this was the case and in fact believe that the familiarity actually led to more candid 
responses than an external interviewer would have received. However, the approach to 
the interviews described above where I kept my questions to the minimum to induce as 
much narrative as possible should also restrict any influence on the interviews, although 
it must be accepted that there is some risk of influence. A copy of the template used is 
attached in appendix 3 but it should be remembered that it was only a template.
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Conclusions
It should be apparent that the research has a clear purpose of assessing whether New 
Labour coming to power delivered an increase in social aims being achieved for 
communities through analysis of clauses contained within planning obligations. The 
literature review in chapters two and three set out what social planning issues were, the 
aims of New Labour, and the concerns raised by the objectors. Chapters four and five 
articulated that planning obligations were the most suitable medium to use for assessing 
any progress on social issues within the planning system. This methodology should 
also have made it clear exactly how the research will be conducted and that the 
positionality of the researcher on the ‘inside’ of the case study authority has been fully 
considered.
It is hoped that the quantitative research will produce some clear results as to whether 
more social aims were achieved through obligations under New Labour as they claim, 
or if the detractors were correct to suggest that little had changed since the 
Conservatives were in power. The interviews will hopefully be able to uncover some 
reasons as to why the results found were as they were and it is hoped that the research 
will also contribute to clarifying issues still to be resolved around the use of obligations 
and how to achieve more social aims.
The quantitative data will therefore provide the statistics around the use of obligations 
and what they are being used to achieve at the case study authority and any changes in 
trend will be considered both between the different governments over time by looking at 
three year segments. The interviews will then try to explain the reasons for the findings 
and to clarify if some of the issues identified in the literature review are evident at the 
case study authority. The research findings will then be considered to see what can be 
extrapolated, although it must be remembered that having only one case study will 
restrict how much these issues can be applied in a wider context.
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7 RESULTS AND COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS RESEARCH
This chapter will start by setting out some preliminary comparisons between my 
research findings and previous research on background issues, such as numbers of 
obligations and what they are used for. This should be of wider interest for comparative 
purposes and also indicate whether the case study authority had similar findings to other 
authorities or if there were any unique circumstances at the authority.
Sections 2-4 contain an analysis of the detailed findings to understand what the 
obligations investigated were used for and whether they were successful in seeking 
social aims within the planning system. This includes comparative analysis across the 
six years under the last Conservative Government with the first six years under New 
Labour. Once the findings have been clarified, the research is keen to understand if 
there are any local circumstances that could explain these results and to investigate any 
reasons for what has been found and this will be informed by the interviews that were 
undertaken with some of the senior staff at the case study authority. This will lead to 
some final conclusions about what was found with a considered explanation of why that 
was found.
7.1 Preliminary quantitative findings
Obligations have not actually been as prevalent in the planning system as many would 
expect but quantifying this is not straightforward. Using previous research for a 
comparison to assess the percentage of applications with an obligation is fraught with 
difficulties as some research considers the percentage of all planning applications 
submitted that end up with an obligation while others consider the percentage in relation 
to all planning permissions (thereby removing all refused applications and those not yet 
determined). Others exclude applications for Listed Building Consent (LBC), 
advertisement consent, Certificates for Lawful Use and Proposed Use, and minor 
applications, as these applications were considered less likely to attract obligations. 
Therefore, considerable care needs to be taken over exactly what the figures being used 
are comparing.
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Grimley J.R. Eve et al. (1992) reported that just over 0.5% of all decisions had an 
agreement attached while Healey et al. (1993) reported a slightly lower figure at 0.3% 
o f all decisions with an obligation. They also considered what the figure would be if 
only considering the percentage of major, minor, and minerals permissions but found 
this still only raised the figure to 1.07% (this excludes LBC, applications for 
advertisement consent, CLUEs, and minor application refusals). Campbell et al. (2001) 
carried out research in 1998 and found that obligations were attached to 1.5% of 
planning permissions. Evans & Bate (2000) uncovered less than 1% of planning 
permissions with an obligation attached, while the more recent research by Walker & 
Smith (2002) found the figure had risen to 2% of decisions with an obligation attached.
At the case study authority, the number o f planning applications received increased 
consistently over the research period, reflecting the ongoing prosperity in the south east 
at the time (see figure 1 below).
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Figure 1: Applications received during research period
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Therefore, it was more important to look at the number o f obligations entered into as a 
percentage o f applications received to see whether there was a trend o f an increasing use 
o f obligations as suggested by the previous research, as any numerical increase could 
simply reflect the increase in applications. The database (see table 1 in appendix 2) 
listed obligations against the year the planning application was registered as valid and 
so it was relatively easy to assess the percentage of applications that ended up with an 
obligation attached.
It was found (see figure 2 below) that an average of 1.4% of all applications registered 
as valid across the research period ended up with an obligation attached. Considering 
this was for all applications, and not just decisions, this is a relatively high figure, and 
consistent with the argument that obligations are increasing in use, but still only 
attached to a small percentage of applications. There is a clear gradual increase over the 
research period, as illustrated by the trend line in figure 2.
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Figure 2: Percentage of applications with an obligation
The data for this average figure can be broken down further to give percentages o f 
applications with an obligation, by development type, o f 14.6%, 3.5% and 0.4% for
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major, minor and other applications respectively43. The comparative figures reported by 
Campbell et al. (2001) were 17.6%, 1.7% and 0.7% for major, minor and other 
developments respectively. The case study findings at HBC would be expected to be 
slightly lower in comparison as they are reporting a percentage of applications with an 
obligation, not decisions, so it is surprising that the figure for minor applications is over 
twice the size and this will be explored further. However, before doing that it should be 
noted that while the number o f obligations is increasing over time, despite considerable 
fluctuation over the research period, there is a considerable spike at the end o f the 
nineties that will also need to be investigated further and this is considered later.
Looking at figure 3 (below), it is clear an increase has taken place across all types o f 
development both in terms o f number of obligations and number o f clauses but it is 
particularly interesting to note how much the minor category has grown since New 
Labour came to power, in comparison to the other two.
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Figure 3: Number of obligations & clauses by party & type of development
43 The m ajor category covers applications coded 01-05, m inor applications are coded 06-10, and others 
are those coded in categories 11-18. Table 2 in appendix 2 sets out the codes as classified by the 
Governm ent.
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It is evident that in addition to the increase in volume o f obligations for development 
falling within the minor category there is a significant increase in the number of clauses 
being used in the major and minor categories, which would suggest an increasing use 
and complexity in obligations and not just an increase in volume. The only way to be 
clear whether these increases are just a reflection of the increase in quantity of planning 
applications is to look at the number o f obligations as a percentage o f applications 
within each development type, as this will nullify the increase in volume of 
applications. This is set out in figure 4 below.
■  Cons H New Labour £3 % increase
40
35
30
25
20
a>
gp 15
I  10
a3
* *  5
0
-5
6 7 8 9 10
M inor
Summary of 18 classes of development:
I Residential; 2 Office; 3 Industry; 4 Retail; 5 Other;
6 Residential; 7 Office; 8 Industry; 9 Retail; 10 Other;
I I  Minerals; 12 Change o f  use; 13 Householder; 14 
Adverts; 15&16 listed buildings; 17 Conservation 
A rea; 18 Other
(see table 2 in appendix 2 for detailed list).
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Figure 4: Percentage of applications with an obligation by class44 and party
It is clear that a considerable percentage of major applications have an obligation 
attached to them and minor applications to a lesser extent. However, the percentage 
with an obligation is steadily increasing under New Labour in eight out o f the ten major 
and minor categories, suggesting the figures will continue to rise in the future. It is 
perhaps a little surprising that the office, R&D, and light industry categories have
44 Table 2 in appendix 2 defines the 18 classes or categories o f  developm ent w ith the sum m ary box only 
to  be used as a quick reference guide
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increased by as much (class 2 and 7) in comparison to class 6 (minor residential) as 
residential development is normally the focus of attention when considering the whole 
topic of planning gain. This will be examined further later.
To put the research in context, we can look at the results found by Grimley J.R. Eve et 
al. (1992) which examined the obligations attached to major and minor applications to 
see what type of development was being proposed in the related planning application. It 
is interesting, and perhaps a little surprising, that the results are broadly similar, 
considering what appears to be a recent increase at HBC for obligations attached to 
residential applications (as illustrated by the increase in class 1 in figure 4 above).
Type o f development HBC Grimley
Residential 64 61
Retail 8 8
Offices/ light industry 7 8
Industry/ warehousing 4 5
Other 18 18
Table 2: Comparative figures for percentage of all obligations attached to major and 
minor applications45 only and the type of development46 the application is related to, 
using my research and Grimley J.R. Eve et al. (1992).47
The vast majority of obligations are therefore used for residential purposes and it is 
interesting to note just how similar the percentages are for each category. However, it is 
useful to now ‘control’ for the number of applications within each development type to 
see what percentage of applications for each type of development has attracted an 
obligation, as this considers the numbers of applications falling within each category.
45 ‘Other’ applications are excluded, as the data contained within the Government BVPI codes is not 
classified by type of development as it is for the major and minor categories.
46 The comparative data assumes that the figures used by Grimley J.R. Eve et al. (1992) uses ‘offices’ to 
include light industry and ‘industrial’ includes warehousing, as classified in the BVPI codes.
47 Data is extracted from Appendix F of their research.
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Type o f  development HBC Campbell
Residential 8.1 7.1
Retail 3.7 2.7
Offices/ light industry 6.8 2.6
Industry/ warehousing 3.1 1.4
Other 2.0 0.7
Table 3: Comparative figures for percentage of major and minor applications, by type of 
development, with an obligation using my research and Campbell et al (2001). 8
Again, the figures are comparable, apart from the much higher percentage of 
applications relating to offices and light industrial development that have an obligation 
at HBC (and industry and warehousing to a lesser extent). It is useful therefore to look 
further by breaking the data down into percentages for major and then minor 
applications to see if the difference is particularly as a result of one of the types of 
development.
Major applications Minor applications
Type of development HBC Campbell HBC Campbell
Residential 21.2 25.8 6.1 3.5
Retail 14.3 18.9 2.0 1.5
Offices/ light industry 14.3 13.1 5.8 1.3
Industry/ warehousing 5.7 5.6 2.5 0.6
Other 6.8 - 1.6 -
Table 4: Comparative figures for percentage of major and minor applications, 
considered separately, by type of development, with an obligation using my research 
and Campbell et al. (2001).
The large increase in use of obligations in connection with applications for offices and 
light industrial purposes (and industry/ warehousing) is within the minor applications in
48 The comparative figures for Campbell et al. (2001) assume they use ‘offices’ to include light industry 
and ‘industry’ to include warehousing, which is likely as the data was compiled using the DTLR codes 
for returns to Government. It must also be remembered that they use a percentage of permissions, 
whereas my research uses a percentage of valid applications.
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particular and reflects that the percentage o f minor applications with an obligation was 
higher at HBC for each type of minor development. This will need to be explored 
further later when analysis is carried out into the clauses used to see if there are any 
clauses in particular that are increasing these results as this minor category has been 
noticed as higher on several charts and tables now.
We can look at the data across the political six-year timeframes to assess the changing 
trends across time. This breaks down the information contained in Figure 3 into the 
class o f development to give more detail. Figure 5 (below) reasserts that numerically, 
class 6 (minor residential applications) and class 1 (major residential applications) 
attracted the greatest number o f obligations by volume and made up for just over half o f 
all obligations between them. This dominance by residential development is continuing 
to grow under New Labour but other minor development (class 10) and changes o f use 
(class 12) are growing in significance.
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Summary of 18 classes of development:
I Residential; 2 Office; 3 Industry; 4 Retail; 5 Other;
6 Residential; 7 Office; 8 Industry; 9 Retail; 10 Other;
II  M inerals; 12 Change o f  use; 13 H ouseholder; 14 
Adverts; 15&16 listed buildings; 17 Conservation 
Area; 18 Other
(see table 2 in appendix 2 for detailed list).
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Figure 5: Number of obligations by class and party
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Therefore, the vast majority o f obligations are attached to residential planning 
permissions but as there ire so many residential permissions, this is not surprising. 
However, even as a percentage o f applications within each class o f development, 
residential applications attacted more obligations, although the percentage within the 
minor offices/ light industry class was only just behind the minor residential class.
Turning now to whether ihere was also an increase in the complexity of obligations 
being negotiated, it was relatively easy to look at the number o f clauses per 
development type for the six-year period of each party. Table 6 (below) shows that 
there was an increase in the number of clauses per obligation for major applications 
under New Labour, but tlere was a corresponding decrease in complexity for minor 
applications. Other applications showed little change.
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Figure 6: Average number of clauses per obligation by type of development and 
party
It was explained earlier (section 6.2) that the Council was seeking a GTC on many 
schemes and that it was often quite a small amount and so a cash alternative was often 
taken. The Council had irtroduced the GTC policy to seek finance from developers to 
cover the impact costs of increasing additional private trips on the transportation 
network. In line with the Government’s desire to promote sustainable development, the
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contributions were to be used to provide more opportunities for those living on, working 
on, or visiting the site to use alternative modes of transport to the private car. The 
contributions were arrived at by using a formula that links floorspace to trip generation 
activity and meant that most new development for several houses or minor commercial 
development was required to pay.
Looking at the percentage of applications with an obligation, but this time excluding 
those with only a GTC, shows a considerable difference (see figure 7 below)49.
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Figure 7: Obligations per year application received, with and without GTC
It is clear there was a spike in the number of obligations with GTC requirements at the 
end of the nineties and the trend line makes clear that obligations increased over time, 
but when the obligations with a GTC were excluded, the trend line is clearly decreasing. 
Considering the data again, but this time controlling for the increase o f applications 
over the research period, and looking at the number o f obligations as a percentage o f 
applications (as in figure 2) but this time excluding GTC, we still see a considerable
49 O nly those obligations that contained a GTC alone were excluded as those w ith a GTC and another 
clause w ould have existed anyway to m eet the aim s o f the other clause.
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decrease in the percentage o f applications with an obligation, other than GTC (see 
figure 8 below).
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Figure 8: Percentage of applications with an obligation, with and without GTC
It was found earlier that over the whole research period, 1.44% of applications 
registered as valid had an obligation attached. Looking further, we find that an average 
o f 1.17% of applications had an obligation during the six years o f the Conservatives, 
while the contrasting figure is 1.65% of applications under New Labour; a clear increase 
in the overall use of obligations under New Labour. The figure remains the same for 
the Conservatives when excluding the GTC obligations (they were not in use then) but 
drops to 0.76% for the New Labour period. The research data clearly supports the 
findings of other researchers that obligations are on the increase but at the case study 
authority this appears to be mainly as a result o f one type o f obligation that has 
significantly skewed the results (further information on the figures is contained in table 
3 of appendix 2). The implications o f this will be considered further later.
Before leaving the preliminary analysis, there are some other points worth noting. If we 
look at the average number of clauses per obligation by class o f development, this will
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show which obligations tend to be the most complex. This has been considered across 
the research period (see figure 9 below) and can be contrasted with figures 4 and 5 
above. It is not surprising to learn that the obligations attached to major planning 
applications have the most clauses per obligation. However, it is interesting, and rather 
surprising on first sight, to note that classes 3 and 4 (major heavy industry/ storage/ 
warehousing and major retail distribution respectively) have many more clauses per 
obligation than major residential and major office development (classes 1 and 2 
respectively).
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Summary of 18 classes of development:
I Residential; 2 Office; 3 Industry; 4 Retail; 5 Other;
6 Residential; 7 Office; 8 Industry; 9 Retail; 10 Other;
II  M inerals; 12 C hange o f  use; 13 H ouseholder; 14 
Adverts; 15&16 listed buildings; 17 Conservation 
Area; 18 Other
(see table 2 in appendix 2 for detailed list).
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Figure 9: Average number of clauses per obligation by class of development
In conclusion to this section, the preliminary findings show that the case study authority 
showed many similarities with previous research in terms o f obligations being used on a 
small percentage o f all planning applications and with a considerable focus on 
residential development. It also reflected that the number o f obligations being used was 
on the increase both quantitatively and as a percentage o f applications.
However, it was surprising to fmd that while the number o f clauses per obligation was
increasing for major applications, it was actually decreasing for minor applications.
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Looking further, it was found that this reflected the fact that there was an increasing 
percentage of obligations being used to collect the GTC which would often be a single 
clause obligation. Nonetheless, it was surprising that the use of obligations, when the 
GTC was excluded, decreased by so much and also that industrial obligations had so 
many clauses. Some answers will be found when the findings are considered in more 
detail.
7.2 Findings -  negative and positive clauses
Attention can now move to examining what obligations have been used for as this will 
allow some analysis to be made regarding whether obligations have been used more, or 
less, to achieve social aims over the research period and therefore what the potential is 
for progressing social issues within the planning system. Obligations can be used for 
restrictive (negative) purposes to try to stop the impact of a development or to seek to 
achieve something in the interests of better development (positive). The research by 
Healey et al. (1993) found that 64% of obligations contained negative clauses, with 
residential schemes by far the main recipient, while slightly fewer obligations contained 
positive clauses (59%), again with the main use for residential schemes but with a 
significant number also relating to office projects. Research by Ennis (1996b) found a 
slightly higher percentage of obligations containing positive obligations at 63%.
At the case study authority, only 48% of obligations contained a negative clause. 
Taking the research period in three-year segments, we find that the figures are 
constantly dropping, as illustrated in the table below.
Party Conservative New Labour
Year 2/5/91 -  1/5/94 2/5/94-1/5/97 2/5/97 -1/5/00 2/5/00-1/5/03
Segment % 84 67 33 31
Party % 77 32
Overall % 48
Table 5: Percentage of obligations with a negative clause overall, by party (six year 
period), and sub-divided by three year segment.
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This shows a very significant fall across the research period and a remarkable difference 
between the two political administrations in charge with much fewer obligations having 
a negative clause under New Labour. However, if we remove all of the obligations 
from the data analysis that are only included because of a GTC alone, then the figures 
look quite different (see table 6).
Party Conservative New Labour
Year 2/5/91 -1/5/94 2/5/94 -  1/5/97 2/5/97 -  1/5/00 2/5/00 -  1/5/03
Segment % 84 67 62 86
Party % 77 74
Overall % 75
Table 6: Percentage of obligations (excluding those only with a GTC) with a negative 
clause overall, by party and sub-divided by time segment.
The difference between the two political parties is not significantly different and so it is 
clear that the introduction of the GTC to achieve a financial contribution towards 
promoting more sustainable forms of transport has significantly affected the statistics. 
This suggests that the statistics will show a significant increase in the use of positive 
obligations over time. The percentage of obligations with a positive clause will not be 
the reverse percentage of those with a negative clause as many obligations will contain 
both positive and negative clauses. However, the percentage of obligations with a 
positive clause is likely to have been growing due to the increase in the use of GTC 
payments.
Party Conservative New Labour
Year 2/5/91 -  1/5/94 2/5/94 -  1/5/97 2/5/97 -1/5/00 2/5/00 -  1/5/03
Segment % 42 47 82 83
Party % 44 83
Overall % 69
Table 7: Percentage of obligations with a positive clause overall, by party (six year 
period) and sub-divided by three year segment
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As expected, the figures show a considerable increase across the research period and 
with a marked increase under New Labour, which is likely to reflect the take up of 
GTC. Looking at the statistics again, but excluding those obligations that were only 
taken to achieve a GTC payment, shows a slightly different picture.
Party Conservative New Labour
Year 2/5/91 -  1/5/94 2/5/94 -1/5/97 2/5/97 -  1/5/00 2/5/00 -1/5/03
Segment % 42 47 66 59
Party % 44 62
Overall % 52
Table 8: Percentage of obligations (excluding those only with a GTC) with a positive 
clause overall, by party and sub-divided by time segment.
Positive obligations are still on the rise under New Labour, although falling off in the 
second three-year period analysed. The use of positive obligations rose significantly 
under New Labour, although to a lesser extent when the GTC is excluded. However, it 
is a noticeable difference between the research authority when compared to the 
benchmark of Healey et al. (1993) who reported 59% of obligations with a positive 
clause on research undertaken almost a decade earlier. Nevertheless, the figure under 
New Labour for the last segment of the research (when their policies would be taking 
most effect) is identical to Healey et al. (1993) if you exclude GTC, which is clearly 
having a considerable effect on the statistics.
Therefore, it is important to try to quantify the impact of GTC at this stage to see what 
importance should be given to the GTC payments, as they are skewing the statistics 
considerably and it is important to know whether the obligation is of substance or is it 
changing the findings with little benefit actually being delivered?
Where GTC is the only requirement to be resolved through a planning obligation, 
applicants have a choice. As was explained previously in this research, they can either 
pay the financial contribution in cash before the decision is issued or they can still sign 
an obligation requiring the money to be paid before development commences. (The 
Council has a pre-prepared template for the applicant to fill in as a unilateral
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undertaking to speed the process up and save the need for fees for a solicitor to draft an 
undertaking each time). The amount is based on a figure generated from a database 
within the Highways Department that links floorspace to trip generation and so if the 
application is in outline, without the siting to be agreed then a formula is used in the 
undertaking as the figure cannot be generated without the floorspace.
Taking the seventy-one obligations that only contain a clause requiring a financial 
contribution towards the GTC, three cannot be considered as they are attached to outline 
permissions where the footprint of development is not known and so they have been 
excluded. Of the remaining sixty-eight GTC obligations, eight were for major 
applications and generated £39,109; giving an average across the eight schemes of 
£4,889 per scheme. For the fifty-one minor application schemes, a total of £82,279 was 
taken towards GTC; giving an average of £1,613 per scheme. The remaining nine 
schemes were for ‘other’ development and required contributions of £11,519; giving an 
average of £1,280 per scheme. The overall average was a contribution of £1,955 per 
GTC scheme, which is significant and comparable to the ‘value’ of other clauses.
However, there is another side that shows that despite the average payment of just less 
than two thousand pounds per GTC payment, only four of the major schemes were for 
residential purposes and when combined they permitted eighty-five residential units, 
giving an average income of just £276 per unit for the Council. The minor residential 
applications were little better with permission granted for one hundred and twenty one 
units, giving an income of £375 per unit. The average figure across major and minor 
applications is a payment towards the GTC of only £334 per residential unit. Within the 
development industry, the value of residential planning permission is very high and so 
this is a comparatively small contribution towards something as fundamental as 
sustainable transport.
The last point to note on the actual obligations is that there were exactly one hundred 
obligations on the database before the first GTC-only obligation was taken. Of that one 
hundred, twenty-two had included some type of positive requirement towards highways 
(either a financial contribution or carrying out some highway works). In comparison, of 
the remaining one hundred and five obligations since the first GTC payment on the 
database, eighty percent had a highways requirement (including GTC), whilst only nine
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percent had a highways requirement, other than GTC. Compared to the twenty-two 
percent before, it is clear that the GTC is ‘catching’ more schemes to achieve 
infrastructure improvements than before, although it is likely there is some overlap.
Finally, while Healey et al. (1995) had 253 obligations with 524 clauses, giving 2.1 
clauses per obligation, the case study authority had 205 obligations with a total of 465 
clauses, giving an average of 2.3 clauses per obligation. We have just looked at the 
percentage of obligations with a positive and negative clause but now we can consider 
the ratio of all clauses to each other. Healey et al. (1995) had a 37:63 ratio in terms of 
negative clauses to every positive clause. The case study authority had a similar ratio of 
39:61.
To conclude this section, we can see that the case study authority has shown a 
considerable decrease in the overall number of obligations with a negative clause in 
comparison to Healey et al. (1995) and that the period under New Labour was 
pronounced. It was shown that this was directly because of the introduction of the GTC 
scheme and there was a corresponding increase in the percentage of obligations with a 
positive clause. While it needs to be recognised that the percentage of obligations with 
a positive clause without the GTC was similar to that found in previous research, the 
percentage for the case study did increase significantly under New Labour in 
comparison to the Conservative Government. It is accepted that the last period does 
show a fell away but the average across the two six year periods is significantly larger 
than under the Conservatives and when including the GTC obligations, the percentage is 
almost double than under the Conservatives and considerably higher than the previous 
research.
7.3 Findings -  class
It is important to place this research in context, which is why the database was designed 
to enable it to be compared to the research carried out by Healey et al. (1995) by using 
the same broad categories. Three charts will be presented with only passing comment 
to allow a fuller consideration to be given at the end using all three charts.
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Full details of the categories are set out in section 6.3 above but for ease of comparison, 
it should be remembered that the categories used by Healey et al (1995) were:
N1 -  Development control administration 
N2 -  Controlling development 
N3 -  Control after development 
N4 -  Modification of an agreement or obligation
PI -  Highways 
P2 -  Sewerage and drainage 
P3 -  Landscaping and open space 
P4 -  Parking
P5 -  Community facilities 
P6 -  Conservation and restoration 
P7 -  Social policy 
P8 -  Other
The first four (denoted by a prefix of ‘N’) are the negative categories and the next eight 
(prefixed with ‘P’) are positive. A simple comparison can be made between the 
research by Healey et al. (1995) and my research to see what aims clauses were 
primarily used to achieve. Obviously there is a difference in the number of clauses 
found between the two sets of data, so it was considered it would be more illustrative to 
present the data as a percentage of all the clauses per category, as shown in figure 10 
below.
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Figure 10: Comparison between percentages of clauses contained within each 
category
The similarity between the data is surprising and shows that overall, there has been little 
change in the use of clauses and what they are being used to achieve with N3 (control 
after development) and PI (highways) clearly dominating the overall use o f clauses 
overall. P3 (landscaping and open space) is quite far behind in third place but 
considerably ahead of the rest of the categories for HBC. Finding that using obligations 
to control new development after it is built and ensuring a scheme has suitable highway 
access is not particularly surprising and is fairly routine within development control. 
Likewise, the provision of landscaping and open space is also generally accepted within 
the development control system as a regular requirement, although the size o f the result 
may be surprising. It is perhaps symptomatic o f planning authorities becoming more 
constructive with the use of obligations with an increasing number o f development 
plans adopting a view that there should be no ‘net loss’ o f environmental assets arising 
from development (Elson et al., 1999).
The main differences between the two sets o f results are that HBC saw an increase in
N l, PI and P7 and a decrease in N2 and P2. The decrease in P2 is a likely result o f the
utilities now being privatised and legislation requiring developers to resolve drainage
and sewerage issues separately and so is not surprising. Considering the focus o f this
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research on the use of obligations for social issues, the slight increase in P5 and the 
larger increase in P7 are interesting and will be investigated further later.
Part o f the importance of the research database that was constructed for this research 
was the ability to be able to scrutinise the results in much more detail than previous 
research and so it is interesting to break the twelve categories used above down into the 
thirty-seven categories that I devised (the category codes are listed in section 6.3 
above). The results are set out in figure 11 below.
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Figure 11: Total number of clauses by category
The obvious points are the dominance of the GTC and the ‘restriction of use’ categories 
within the wider PI (highways) and N3 (control after development) categories. It will 
be interesting to see how the influence has changed under New Labour and so the total 
results o f figure 11 have been broken down by party in figure 12 below.
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Figure 12: Number of clauses by category and party
It is clear that under New Labour, there has been a shift towards a more positive use o f 
clauses, which reflects previous findings in figures 4-7 above. The main areas o f 
increased usage by New Labour are dominated by highways, phasing o f development, 
provision of footpath/cycleway, and ‘others’. The main decrease is restriction o f use, 
which is surprising, as many would consider that New Labour’s focus on high-density 
urban redevelopment might require closer control of use. However, this may be 
reflected by many issues that previously were covered by an obligation now being 
covered by a condition instead. It will be useful to see if this question can be answered 
later during the interviews, along with the other surprising and significant reductions in 
the provision of landscaping and affordable housing contributions. Meanwhile, it is 
important to step back and take stock of the three charts to look at the spread o f clauses 
in comparison to other research.
It is necessary to analyse the figures in both the broader categories and in the more
detailed sub-categories, as some researchers report data broadly, while others use
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headings similar to the sub-categories. The data from HBC shows that over the whole 
research period, the clear three main broader uses were (using the Healey et al, 1995 
categories with the percentage of all clauses in brackets):
1. PI - Highways (29%)
2. N3 - Control after development (27%)
3. P3 -  Landscaping and open space (15%)
When broken down further (using my more detailed categories) the six top priorities 
were (with percentage of all clauses in brackets):
1. GTC (17%)
2. RoU - Restriction of use (16%)
3. HGpr - Highways provision (7%)
4. RoA - Restriction of activity (7%)
5. HG£ - Highways contributions (5%)
6. RET - Retain/ demolish/ cease use of existing building or access (5%)
To place these findings in context, it is worth considering what previous research had 
found. Grimley J.R. Eve et al. (1992) carried out some of the earliest research into the 
use of clauses within obligations and they found that the main use was for control of 
development (26% of obligations had a provision relating to this category), limitations 
on use (21%), financial contributions and payments (16%) and highway improvements 
(10%). The research reported by Ennis (1996b) found the main use of positive 
obligations was for physical infrastructure provision such as highways, sewerage, 
drainage and parking with 58% of all obligations covering these issues. Environmental 
benefits were next with 27% of obligations focusing on landscaping and open space as 
the main aim, but also covering riverside walks, conservation and restoration. 
Community infrastructure only made up 8% of positive obligations including the 
provision of community buildings, halls, play areas and equipment, and playing fields.
More recent research (Campbell et al., 2001) has shown that the use of obligations was 
still increasing in quantity and in scope by the end of the 1990s and into the new 
millennium. It was found that the most common actions required by developers through
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obligations were for off-site capital works (27%), restriction or requirement of use 
(27%), provision of facilities/services (19%) and provision of on-site capital works 
(15%). However, the salient point found in this piece of research was that for the 
second and third of these categories, the percentage of cases where a financial 
contribution was asked for was greater than the percentage for direct provision. The 
payment of a financial contribution is not new but illustrates that authorities taking 
payments in lieu of provision has grown to a considerable scale.
Research by Walker & Smith (2002) focused on what percentage of authorities ‘always’ 
and ‘nearly always’ sought obligations for. They found that the main use of obligations 
in major planning permissions was found to be securing on-site open space (56% of 
authorities used obligations to always or nearly always secure this), on-site highways 
provision (51%), on-site affordable housing (46%), and off-site highways provision 
(38%). For minor applications, the three most frequently cited obligations used were 
for provision of on-site parking (27%), on-site highways provision (25%), and on-site 
open space provision (12%). However, they did find evidence of the rise in obligations 
for uses other than physical planning with obligations to cover off-site school places 
(21% of authorities) and improved public transport services off-site. They believe that 
there is evidence that County Councils are formulating stronger strategies in their use of 
planning obligations to achieve benefits for educational services, particularly provision 
of new school facilities.
Research by Richards & Bentley (2001) surveyed local authorities and agents and found 
that the most common use of obligations (in terms of percentage of authorities) was to 
secure affordable housing and open space (over 80% of authorities achieved these in the 
past five years). A lesser number of authorities achieved transport infrastructure, road 
access and public access (60-70%) and even less managed to achieve schools, 
community buildings, sewers and land transfer (30-50%). This research showed the rise 
of affordable housing provision using obligations, with most authorities requiring 
provision through obligations, but clearly they still do not make up a high percentage of 
overall obligations, looking at the previous research figures.
Likewise, local authorities were asked to rank the most important use of obligations in 
their own eyes and it was found that delivering physical infrastructure, regulating
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development, and delivering social infrastructure i.e. school places, creches, community 
facilities were the main reasons given (Walker & Smith, 2002). The first two are in 
keeping with the findings of previous research and the research at the case study 
authority, but the third is not particularly prevalent in any of the research reported here 
and so may be more of an aspiration than an achievement.
Going back to look at the findings of the research at the study authority, we can see that 
the focus on highways and restricting the parameters of a planning permission by 
controlling use or activity is therefore similar to the findings of other research. The 
research by Ennis (1996b) where environmental and community facilities were more 
frequent appears to be unusual and my research did not show a significant increase in 
these activities. The interviews will be used to see if there are any reasons why the 
research authority was not more successful in achieving social and community aims.
Picking up on the point noted from the research by Campbell et al. (2001) regarding the 
use of obligations to require provision versus making a financial contribution, the 
findings at the case study authority are interesting. Overall, 52% of the obligations that 
could have offered a choice between provision or a contribution required the provision 
to be made in comparison to 43% that required the contribution and 5% that basically 
gave a choice (payment was required if the provision was not made). However, looking 
in more detail, it is interesting to note that the ratio between provision, contribution and 
choice was 59%, 38% and 3% under the Conservatives but 45%, 48% and 8% under 
New Labour, reflecting a move away from direct provision by the developer under New 
Labour and backing up the previous research.
Walker & Smith (2002) state that they found evidence that major developments receive 
an unequal proportion of obligations while the smaller developments tend to receive 
fewer requirements, if any. This neglects the cumulative impact of developments and is 
unfair as one developer building a scheme for thirty dwellings would have to pay 
considerable costs through an obligation, while another developer building thirty 
dwellings one by one on thirty different sites would not have any such obligation or its 
related costs. The study authority likewise favours the smaller developer as the 
‘triggers’ for requiring provision of services was five or more dwellings for play space, 
ten or more for education, fifteen or more for affordable housing, with many others only
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taking effect beyond this. The only standard requirement without a trigger was GTC 
but as it was only collected if the amount was over £250 (it was not cost-effective below 
this) it usually only took effect on schemes of three or more dwellings. Reasons for this 
can be further explored in the interviews (reported in section 7.5) and a summary sheet 
setting out requirements for developers’ contributions at HBC during the research 
period is attached in appendix 4. It was sent to developers to set out the key ‘heads of 
terms’ expected to be covered by a planning application.
To conclude this section, it can be seen that the research data backs up the findings of 
previous research that the use of obligations and the clauses contained within are 
dominated by seeking to restrict the impact of new development and to ensure the 
necessary highway infrastructure is in place. It had been found in the previous section 
that positive obligations were on the increase and the evidence at HBC is that the sub­
categories relating to negative obligations are still important, but decreasing, while the 
positive sub-categories, particularly those relating to provision of highway 
infrastructure, are on the increase. The research at the case study authority also found 
limited evidence of a growing use of obligations for social purposes compared to 
previous research. Analysis is now needed of the obligations that were used for social 
purposes in the research findings to see if there is an underlying trend and/or reason for 
their use to see if this is linked to a change in approach, brought about by changes under 
New Labour.
7.4 Findings -  social issues
It was discussed earlier (see chapter 2) that social issues are notoriously difficult to 
define and within the planning field there has been little attempt to do this, with the 
result that researchers refer to different aims as being social. It was pointed out that the 
problem is exacerbated by the fact that many aims can be considered to have a social 
aspect as well as an economic or environmental one but that in terms of this research the 
main deciding factor would be to assess the aim of the policymaker. This meant using 
categories P5 and P7 of the Healey et al (1995) categories.
Proceeding with this caveat about what exactly social aims are, we can compare the 
findings to other research. Grimley J.R. Eve et al. (1992) reported that 2.7% of
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obligations contained a clause that either required full provision of, or part contribution 
towards, community facilities and services. Healey et a l (1995) compared their 
research to this previously published research and stated that they had found a higher 
usage of obligations for community facilities, such as community services, sport and 
recreational facilities, as well as an increase in the use to achieve social aims, such as 
child-care, employment training, housing obligations etc. If we add the two categories 
together, (P5 and P7), we find 5.9% of clauses in the research by Healey et al. (1995) 
had a social aim, which is considerably higher.
There is an important point to note at this stage regarding affordable housing provision. 
Healey et al. (1995) appear to split affordable housing clauses across negative (control 
after development) and positive (social policy) categories, while Grimley J.R. Eve et al
(1992) appear to have included all affordable housing clauses under their negative 
‘limitations on use’ clause.
Therefore, the figure of 5.9% for Healey et al (1995) is likely to be a little lower when 
comparing with the figures reported by Grimley J.R. Eve et a l (1992). Care also needs 
to be taken regarding the dates as this does not show an increase over time as although 
Grimley J.R. Eve et al (1992) published their research three years earlier than Healey et 
al (1995), the former analysed data reported over April 1987 to March 1990, while the 
latter looked at obligations negotiated between 1984 and 1991. As the research periods 
were broadly similar, it is likely that the reasons for the different findings lie elsewhere, 
possibly in the choice of case study authorities, and is not reflective of changes over 
time.
Healey et al (1995) were optimistic that their research showed there was a more 
positive side to the use of obligations. They referred to a case in Harlow where the 
authority had argued that a new office development on the edge of town meant that a 
certain number of basic facilities would be required at the site as it would not be easy 
for staff to make use of the town centre. The authority also argued that as many of the 
jobs were office based, under equal opportunities legislation to encourage women back 
to work after childbirth, they should provide a nursery. They were successful in 
securing contributions towards on-site child-care facilities and Healey et al (1995) 
hoped that this was a sign that obligations with a social aim would continue to increase.
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In comparison, the research found that at HBC the percentage of all clauses used for 
social aims was 8.6%, which is considerably larger than the comparative figures from 
previous research. Given that this research is based over a timeframe that is broadly a 
decade later, on the face of it, it is arguably a sign that things are indeed moving 
towards an increase in the use o f obligations to achieve social aims, albeit at only one 
authority. However, as always, further analysis is needed o f these social obligations 
before any claims can be substantiated.
Figure 12 (see previous section) showed that the clauses falling within categories P5 
and P7 (the social aims categories) have considerable variation across the two six-year 
political periods (summarised in table 9 below).
Category Cons NL Total
AH£ 10 1 11
AHpr 5 3 8
CM£ 2 5 7
CMpr 0 6 6
cctv£ 1 4 5
PA£ 0 2 2
BE£ 1 0 1
PApr 0 0 0
CRC£ 0 0 0
Total 19 21 40
Table 9: Total number o f clauses in categories P5 and P7 for HBC and totals under each 
party in Government.
Looking at table 9, it is clear that under the Conservatives, affordable housing 
dominated the use of clauses within obligations for social aims (79% o f clauses) 
compared with under New Labour, where there was a much wider spread o f clauses. At 
first glance, it appears the number of obligations containing a clause requiring the 
provision o f affordable housing is very low with only eight clauses across almost twelve
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years of research. It was considered that this needed to be investigated further and it 
was found that there was a reason.
At the start of the research period, there were some planning applications submitted by 
Hampshire County Council and it appears they were trusted to build the affordable 
housing element of the schemes and so no clauses were inserted into the obligation to 
ensure this happened (there is no evidence it did not). Similarly, around the turn of the 
millennium, some RSLs appear to have changed tack and instead of waiting for the 
private sector to develop schemes that they would then expect to provide the social 
housing element of, they were progressing their own housing portfolios and developing 
themselves. In these instances, instead of the obligation having the usual clauses about 
the number of units to be provided, requiring the Council to be informed of who the 
RSL was, and when the units were to be transferred to them, it simply stated that the 
required number of affordable units had to be provided and retained for such purposes. 
The database constructed by the student had classified these as negative restrictions of 
use, rather than a positive provision of affordable housing (as noted above, Healey et 
al., 1995 had split affordable housing in a similar way). It is worth noting that if the 
applications where the County Council and RSL were the applicants are included as 
positive clauses, then the new table would be as below (AHpr has now moved to the 
top).
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Category Cons NL Total
AHpr 1 6 13
AH£ 10 1 11
CM£ 2 5 7
CMpr 0 6 6
cctv£ 1 4 5
PA£ 0 2 2
BE£ 1 0 1
PApr 0 0 0
CRC£ 0 0 0
Total 21 24 45
Table 10: Total number o f clauses in categories P5 and P7 for HBC and totals under 
each party in Government (amended for affordable housing as positive clauses).
It is clear that within the social infrastructure provision, HBC has focused primarily on 
delivering affordable housing (whether by direct provision or financial contribution) 
with over half o f the clauses relating to this requirement. The second area o f focus was 
on the provision of community, sport and/or recreational facilities (either directly or by 
a contribution), and the third area was the taking of contributions towards CCTV. 
These three areas covered over 93% of social infrastructure.
The provision o f financial contributions in lieu o f community facilities is interesting 
when comparing the two political eras as only two schemes came forward under the 
Conservatives and they achieved an average o f £6,470. Under New Labour, there were 
five schemes, but they averaged £80,625 by way of financial contribution. However, 
upon further analysis, it has to be accepted that this was probably a sign o f the more 
prosperous times as the four largest schemes under New Labour included new 
extensions to the retail parks in the two main town centres plus a large scheme 
involving the local football club. These were all proposals that had been discussed for 
years but only when improving economic conditions came along did they progress.
It could also be argued that the actual provision o f community facilities was because o f 
improving economic circumstances. The six clauses under New Labour only related to
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three schemes, which were two large retail schemes and a large urban redevelopment of 
100 dwellings. However, whatever the reasons, they achieved new public toilets, a new 
household waste recycling centre, a new community centre, basketball court, play area 
and changing facilities between them, which cannot be dismissed.
The transfer of land for leisure purposes is straightforward and was usually at the 
developer’s expense to set the land aside. The contributions towards CCTV have a 
public safety aspect, while the two public art contributions were for £10,000 from a 
major retail scheme and £1,500 from the football club development. The single 
financial contribution towards business enterprise training was an impressive £150,000 
and arose from a new commercial development. Unfortunately, there were no examples 
of direct provision of public art or a contribution towards creche facilities. The lack of 
creche facilities is disappointing, given the hope that Healey et al. (1995) had raised, 
although they had noted it was unusual compared to the research by Grimley J.R. Eve et 
al. (1992), suggesting it was a more innovative case study authority rather than a trend. 
By using the article published by Ennis (1996b), which reports on the same research, we 
can cross-reference and see that three of the four child-care cases were in the London 
Borough of Wandsworth. This supports the view that it was more likely to be an 
innovative authority as many London authorities have more radical social policies due 
to having higher land values and social needs which can be combined to deliver more.
It is clear that several large applications produced a significant percentage of the clauses 
for social aims and that most of these were within the time when New Labour was in 
power and when economic conditions were improving. It is likely that if economic 
conditions had not improved and resulted in these few large applications then the social 
achievements may have been similar to those under the Conservatives, but this cannot 
be proven. It is disappointing to see that if the affordable housing requirements are 
momentarily ignored, the number of applications with an obligation that contains a 
social aim shows that only 10 of the 205 applications fall within this category. That is 
4.9% of applications with a social aim, other than affordable housing. If affordable 
housing is included as a social aim the figure rises to 23 applications which is 11.2% of 
applications with an obligation containing a social clause. With 21 clauses within the 
social aims categories, (excluding affordable housing), and 40 clauses (including
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affordable housing as a social aim) the figures are 4.5% and 8.6% respectively for 
percentage of clauses with a social aim.
In comparison, Grimley J.R. Eve et al (1992) reported a figure of 2.7% of obligations 
contained a social aim, contrasted with the HBC figure of 4.9% (considering the 
affordable housing clauses as negative clauses), so there is evidence that the case study 
authority found more evidence of social aims. To compare HBC with Healey et al. 
(1995), who reported a figure of 5.9% of clauses were for social purposes, is more 
difficult and all that can be said is that the HBC comparison lies between the 4.5% and 
8.6% as it is not clear exactly how many clauses Healey et al logged as negative 
compared to positive, although by cross-referencing Ennis (1996b) it is likely to be 
closer to the 4.5% figure as there were only 2 affordable housing obligations included in 
the positive category.50 Therefore, it follows that HBC found evidence of an increase in 
social clauses compared to Grimley J.R. Eve et al (1992) but did not find a significant 
increase compared to Healey et a l (1995).
Case study results regarding social purposes
This research is primarily interested in whether New Labour brought in any significant 
change in the amount of provision of social infrastructure through obligations and so it 
is essential to try to investigate the comparison between the six years under the 
Conservatives and the six years under New Labour. Considering that in the research 
authority, there were 73 obligations with 171 clauses under the Conservatives and 132 
obligations with 294 clauses under New Labour, the first question is how many of these 
were for social purposes as a percentage. Not only did more obligations contain a social 
clause under the Conservatives as a percentage of all clauses (19.2% as opposed to 6.8% 
under New Labour) but considering there were nearly twice as many obligations under 
New Labour, there were still more obligations with a social clause numerically under 
the Conservatives (14 compared to 9 under New Labour).
If we consider the percentage of clauses contained within the obligations now we find 
that the figures are 11.1% of clauses under the Conservatives were for a social purpose,
50 There is no way of working out how many affordable housing clauses were included in the negative 
clauses as Ennis (1996b), who gives more detail of the clauses, only reports the positive clauses in his 
article.
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compared to only 7.1% under New Labour. If we look at the figures again but exclude 
the GTC obligations, as they were found to have a significant impact on the statistics 
earlier, the figure for New Labour only increases to 9.4%.51 Lastly, if we amend the 
figures, considering the affordable housing clauses as positive clauses rather than being 
negative clauses, the percentages change to 12.3% and 8.2% respectively. Numerically 
speaking, even though there were significantly more obligations and clauses overall 
under New Labour, each of the numerical figures used for the above percentages was 
numerically little higher under New Labour for social purposes (19:21; 19:21 and 21:24 
Conservative clauses to New Labour clauses numerically for the percentages just 
quoted).
Therefore, the extremely surprising conclusion is that under New Labour there was a 
significant decrease in the percentage of obligations that contained any social 
requirements and a significant decrease in the percentage of all clauses being used that 
were for social purposes at HBC. There was a considerable increase in the overall 
number of obligations and clauses under New Labour and so looking as a percentage 
got behind the numerical increase to show there was a decrease in the percentage of 
obligations with a social purpose and an insignificant numerical increase in clauses with 
social requirements. It sounds peculiar and cannot be proven, but if the improved 
economic fortunes that followed in the late nineties and early part of the millennium had 
continued under the Conservatives, would more have been gained than under New 
Labour, socially speaking? Instead, all that can be done is to carry out interviews with 
representatives of the case study authority to see if reasons can be found for why things 
did not improve socially under New Labour when negotiating obligations.
7.5 Interviews with key officers
The interviews broadly focused around three areas; general issues around the purpose of 
the planning system, more direct questions about the purposes of obligations and 
planning gain in general, and then more focused questions on how all of these topics 
specifically applied to HBC.
51 The Conservative figure remains 11.1% as the GTC only took effect during the New Labour period
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A key point of the research was to establish whether New Labour had improved social 
aims within the planning system so that economic, social, and environmental issues 
were all given equal weight. Therefore, it was important to be clear whether the case 
study authority had any particular local issues that could affect the balance of these 
issues, or was it a fair choice for analysis. When asked this question, all interviewees 
generally felt that HBC reflected Government aims with only one commenting that 
there was perhaps greater local pressure to promote social aims as a result of the 
deprivation in the large housing estate of Leigh Park. If anything, this could indicate 
that there should be slightly stronger signs of social aims in the results but as this was 
not evident in the findings, it appears the choice of case study authority was appropriate.
Turning to the purpose of the planning system, all six of those interviewed stated to 
some extent that the original aim of the planning system was to control bad 
development that led to public health problems and un-neighbourly development. 
Therefore, planning was seen to have a strong public interest role and all thought that 
was still an appropriate aim for the modem planning system.
When asked about the Conservative’s aim for the planning system when they had been 
in power, all six commented that economic issues were paramount and encouraging 
development was a central message with the planning system seen as holding that back. 
One commented,
“Planning was not there to stand in the way of economic development; it 
was an obstacle that had to be solved. The planning system didn’t have a lot 
of respect in those days, in the sense that planners were clearly told that they 
shouldn’t influence design of development, other people knew better, we 
shouldn’t challenge the economics of the development, we shouldn’t 
challenge anything, the developer knew best and it was more a system that 
needed to be got round rather than facilitating development.”
They were then asked what immediate changes they noted when New Labour first came 
to power and how the planning system had developed since then. The answers were 
split with three saying there was no immediate change and the other three were further 
split between whether New Labour had introduced a greater focus on regional planning, 
enabling development and putting planning back on the agenda, or being more 
restrictive about where development goes with the whole brownfield debate. As a
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result, it is fair to conclude there was no clear change of direction noted when New 
Labour came to power but all agreed that things had changed since they had been in 
power but there was a mixture as to whether the focus was now on regeneration, better 
design, or housing delivery. However, three also commented that the planning system 
was now more complicated.
When asked how the New Labour modernisation agenda had affected the planning 
system, it was noted that the use of money to encourage the LPA, rather than just 
criticising it, was a positive approach from the Government. However, it was pointed 
out that all authorities ‘play games’ to meet the targets and this did result in ‘tension’ 
with applicants and agents as a result and the pressure to hit targets “runs a risk of 
undermining well considered decision making” with the pressure to make a decision 
within the target date leading to the process being less in-depth. It was also pointed out 
that the process had ‘front-loaded’ the system so there is more pre-application 
discussion but with the drawback that these discussions do not involve the public. The 
problem was summed up by one interviewee as,
“It just becomes obsessive. I think you’re losing quality over quantity. I 
think everything from dealing with applications so strictly within certain 
targets and rejecting applications, on sometimes grounds that are quite 
weak, in my view, where it would have been better to carry on and 
negotiate. OK, you’ve missed your target date by a couple of weeks but in 
the end of the day, what’s going to be around to make more of an influence, 
a development you helped to create or if you missed a couple of weeks on 
your deadline?”
When asked where the pressure for change to the planning system on New Labour had 
come from, five commented they were responding to public pressure and the sixth 
thought changes to environmental issues had been due to Europe, while economic 
changes had been due to central Government pressure itself. One of the key questions 
was whether when the Government says the planning system balances economic, 
environmental, and social issues, does this actually happen in practice. Only one felt 
they were balanced, one commented that the “tools are in place to do that” but went on 
to say that “social and economic are being driven most strongly” and explained this by 
saying the push for housing in the south east was to the detriment of the environment. 
The other four were split between the order of importance being environmental, social
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and economic; environmental, economic and social; economic, social and 
environmental; and economic, environmental and social.
When asked what social issues within the planning system were, all were very vague 
about what exactly the planning system could deliver with five stating affordable 
housing was the key one. It was commented that “.. .it’s difficult to grasp because you 
understand the social issues in terms of a community but how you actually manifest that 
into planning is quite difficult” and they went on to state high crime, unemployment, 
and teenage pregnancies could all be examples but creating planning policies to tackle 
them is very difficult.
This complete lack of clarity about the purpose of the planning system under New 
Labour with a plethora of views on what the main aim was and little understanding 
about how social aims could be integrated into the planning system is illuminating. All 
were clear that the Conservatives had a simple message (whether they agreed with it or 
not) but under New Labour there appears to be a sense that policy is constantly 
changing focus and led by public pressure.
The use of obligations at HBC
The two managers stated that obligations were significant factors in the decision making 
process but all four practitioners were very clear that the absence of a signed obligation 
was a reason for refusing an application but their provision was nothing more than 
‘ticking the box’ and the development has to be acceptable in principle with the 
obligation only one of the means of making it so. None of those interviewed were 
aware of any attempt by developers to ‘buy planning permission’ but four of the six still 
thought that obligations were not a transparent part of the planning system to the public 
with deals done confidentially and only ‘heads of terms’ reported to committee 
meetings, rather than the details.
All interviewees agreed that over time there had been more obligations and the amounts 
collected had increased. The reasons for this were mixed with some identifying ‘best 
practice’ as authorities copied each other, while others felt there was an increasing 
expectation that developers should pay for the impact of their development.
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“The public are just so much more aware now and you know there is 
pressure for why isn’t that development paying for extra school places, or 
health facilities, or community facilities. Just increased pressure for 
development to pay for itself really.”
Four of those interviewed commented that obligations should be used to ensure 
developments paid their way and to overcome problems with a site before permission 
could be granted. There was general agreement that HBC is “a relatively cautious 
authority” and that most development control officers would only stick to what 
requirements were needed by the local plan and there was not a culture of “get what you 
can” from developers. However, one of the managers accepted that other local
authorities had been “very inventive” in finding solutions to ensure obligations
delivered more than practice allowed.
“If you have a willing applicant and a willing local authority, all that you 
then need is a good lawyer.”
The interviewees were asked about the three rationales put forward by Healey et al
(1993) (see section 4.5) for when obligations could be used and all were comfortable 
with their use to remove obstacles that could otherwise hinder the implementation of 
development. However, when asked about the use to mitigate the impact of 
development over a wider area there was a split in opinion with two rejecting this 
approach and the other four only comfortable as long as the new facilities were well 
related to the development and as close as possible. There was little support for a
betterment tax, with the only positive point made that such a tax “would force local
authorities to address what they are looking to gain out of new development” and it 
would make things more transparent and simplify the process.
In terms of whether they would be comfortable in negotiating an obligation to achieve a 
list of different suggested ideas, there was unanimous support for achieving recreational 
facilities, sports facilities, affordable housing, and for community services/ centres (two 
clarified only for capital infrastructure but not for revenue costs). Five of the six 
supported their use for provision of health facilities, educational facilities, and child­
care/ creche (again, several clarified only if related in scale and for the physical 
building, not on-going service costs). Three supported the use of obligations for 
employment training, two were not sure and one said it was not a proper use of
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obligations. Only one person supported the use of obligations to cover the costs of 
social services (Citizens’ Advice Bureau, meals on wheels etc.) and all rejected any 
attempt to contribute towards income support via obligations.
All interviewees supported the principle that small developers should contribute pro­
rata payments in the same way that larger developers did and that having thresholds was 
wrong in principle but two did caveat this with it was impossible to do it in practice due 
to the additional work this would cause which would affect performance figures. All 
felt there was pressure from other departments to try to use obligations to fund new 
ideas and most felt this was putting them under undue pressure to use obligations for 
something they were not designed for.
There was a clear feeling that policy on obligations at HBC had not been developed 
coherently over the years with the GTC policy the first attempt to create a policy and 
that this had only come about due to traffic problems at one of the Borough’s key 
employment areas. One officer admitted to being embarrassed in the early days of 
seeking obligations as the larger developers wanted to see approved documents, 
formulas, and costing for schemes that the contributions were paying towards but there 
was little information to pass on. The open space policy apparently followed on from 
the GTC policy due to concerns that the Council was adopting lots of small pieces of 
land left over by developers that had very high maintenance implications for the 
Council and so the policy was adopted to only seek significant pieces of land and to 
receive an accompanying maintenance payment. Therefore, obligations were developed 
in a reactionary way to resolve problems, rather than in a coherent and positive way. It 
was also considered by interviewees that once obligations were signed, they were not 
properly monitored to check the clauses were actioned (especially contributions paid), 
money spent when it was received, or that it was spent on the relevant scheme.
All agreed that planning officers in the LPA did not have a good enough understanding 
of commercial property markets to be able to negotiate successfully, although two of the 
practitioners commented that the amount of actual negotiation was limited as the 
Council relied on contributions that were set out in the local plan and had a formula. 
All were definite that obligations led to delays with issuing planning permission and 
that the source of this delay was primarily with the solicitors, although there seemed to
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be acceptance that this was on both the LPA and developers’ sides and that planning 
officers could also lead to delays. It was also noted though that ‘clever’ developers 
would play the system in pushing to get the resolution to grant planning permission by 
the committee but once they had it they would purposely slow down progressing the 
obligation to delay issuing of the planning permission as that would start the clock 
running when they had to implement the permission within three years. All agreed that 
delays with obligations were a problem in the target culture promoted by New Labour. 
Lastly, it was considered that Members were not particularly involved with obligations, 
did not really understand them, but that they should not get involved as obligations are a 
technical matter.
We can see that the officers at HBC are quite risk-adverse and seem comfortable in 
using obligations only when they have been clearly identified and justified up-front, 
preferably in the local plan. Although there appears to be an understanding that other 
authorities are using obligations more innovatively, there does not appear to be much 
support for this approach at HBC, with comfort derived from clear linkages between 
development and obligations and little support for wider betterment ideals. This is 
manifested in the support for physical and related infrastructure but little desire for 
revenue payments or support services and clear concern that other departments are 
applying pressure to use obligations in a way that officers are not comfortable with. It 
would appear there is a clear correlation between the reluctance to use obligations more 
‘creatively’ and the fact that the research has not found much evidence of obligations 
used for social issues. Officers are clearly restricting the use of obligations to a ‘safe’ 
and structured approach, which is not a criticism, simply an observation at this stage.
The purpose of obligations at HBC
Turning to the purpose of obligations under the Conservatives and New Labour, the 
officers were first asked why they thought highways and restrictions of use and activity 
had dominated the use of obligations under the Conservatives. There was a mixed 
response with one of the managers commenting that
“.. .it’s been one of the most significant impediments to getting development 
on the ground that we experience in Havant, because the system is over­
complicated, over-bureaucratic, difficult to understand and to rationalise, 
both technically and politically, and by the community and as a result we
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have had major development that the Borough actually needs in ... and ... 
held back by significant periods of time because of the attitude of the 
County Council and the Highway Authority” (name of two areas deleted 
due to sensitivity).
However, the other five saw the use of highway clauses as simply a practical factor that 
applicants need to address to unlock their sites for development. In terms of the 
restriction of use and activity clauses, this was considered to be a result of occupancy 
conditions that used to be routinely controlled by obligations but was now covered by 
conditions. This was because the borough had a high number of applications for old 
people’s homes, granny annexes and seasonal caravan use due to the coastal location.
To contrast the purpose of obligations under New Labour, the officers were then asked 
about the shift towards more positive clauses under New Labour. One of the managers 
stated that
“...this probably comes back to the 2000 Local Government Act, where this 
concept of wellbeing came about, in other words, local authorities were 
being asked to respond positively to wellbeing powers, that is social, 
economic and environmental wellbeing and ever since that period in time, 
there has been an approach by government to flex up and free up the powers 
of local authorities to be more proactive and I think that the use of 106 
obligations goes in tandem with that higher level view or strategic view that 
local government should be more proactive and less defined by regulatory 
stringencies.”
While this is almost a textbook answer New Labour would be proud of, it is interesting 
to note that the other manager also talked about the change in emphasis of planning 
from being a restrictive process to taking on an enabling role but the practitioners were 
less clear. One thought it was the result of a shift towards a wider acceptance of 
obligations generally, one thought it was connected to the growing regeneration agenda, 
one did not profess to know and the other thought it was coincidence. So the managers 
felt it was a direct correlation but the practitioners were perhaps more cynical.
When asked if any changes were needed to give social aims more weight in planning, 
only one was keen on the idea, with three generally supportive but unclear about how 
this could be done (one worried we were at risk of social engineering), while the other 
two were not overly concerned. Four interviewees were in support of changing the
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current obligation system, which was seen as complicated by three interviewees, but 
only one actively supported the proposed CIL.
It would appear that there is some support for improving social aims within the planning 
system but little understanding about what exactly social issues are that it can interact 
with or how this would take place. Obligations appear to have significant limitations in 
the eyes of those interviewed but none were clear about how to replace it.
Conclusions
The research at the case study authority found many similarities with previous research 
results, including residential applications still dominating the use of obligations and that 
the percentage of applications with an obligation was increasing over time. However, 
there were many other results that were different and it was found that the use of the 
GTC meant there were more applications within the office & light industrial class with 
an obligation at HBC (especially within the minor application category). The 
percentage of applications with an obligation was higher under New Labour than the 
Conservatives but significantly lower when the GTC was excluded. While there is no 
reason to dismiss the GTC, there is a concern that it is an example of a more routine 
contribution that is taken and there was evidence at HBC that this was at the expense of 
other obligations, including those with a social aim. There was a clear increase in the 
use of obligations for ‘positive’ purposes over time and the GTC was significant in this 
regard but there was also an increase in the use of financial contributions under New 
Labour generally, compared to direct provision of facilities. This reflects the focus 
from the modernisation agenda to speed up the process but the concern was expressed 
that this could be at the expense of better quality planning. The modernisation agenda 
appears to have led to simple formulas to generate financial contributions instead of 
negotiations around how to design out impacts or consider other ways of resolving 
them. The aim has been on quickly generating a figure and inserting it into a template 
to speed up the process but this has removed the focus from discussing other clauses, 
including social ones.
This research is primarily interested in the provision of social issues through obligations
and it was pointed out in section 6.1 that the Community Strategy for Havant (HBC,
2001) had an ambitious set of social aspirations that the planning system could have
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helped to deliver through the use of obligations. However, although the research found 
evidence of an increase in the use of obligations for social purposes overall (compared 
to previous research), it was found that there had been a clear backward step under New 
Labour. There was almost three times the percentage of obligations containing a social 
clause under the Conservatives compared to New Labour. This is a devastating finding 
to the claims of New Labour that they had ushered in a progressive era, albeit at only 
one authority.
Therefore, at HBC there was only limited success in achieving the social aims within 
the CS with some additional CCTV, community centres, and developing facilities for 
sporting and cultural purposes. There was little or no evidence of provision of 
playcourts, teenage shelters, funding for education in schools around drugs and health, 
improving training for local employees, increasing the quality and range of community 
based learning opportunities, Leigh Park Education Action Zone and Sure Start funding 
or funding needed to tackle deprivation and social exclusion. It appears that the more 
corporate push for developing social aims for the benefit of the local community was 
not being facilitated through the planning system due to a conventional approach to the 
use of obligations. Planning officers were concerned that obligations are not the correct 
delivery vehicle for bringing about change. The officers negotiating obligations 
believed that while the Conservatives had supported economic issues, New Labour had 
no clear message about what the planning system was trying to achieve. There was also 
confusion around what social issues were within the planning system and while officers 
supported the social principles of planning, the lack of support for achieving this in 
practice from the Government meant that officers were only happy negotiating 
obligations with a clear link to the development proposed. While they also accepted 
that the public expected developers to pay more towards infrastructure there appeared to 
be more comfort in using obligations to overcome the more physical aspects of 
development, such as highways issues and restricting the use of development. 
Affordable housing provision has been a long accepted requirement of new residential 
development and so it was no surprise that it dominated social obligations.
Officers were generally supportive of the current obligation system being reformed as it 
was seen as complicated but there was no clear suggestion on how to improve it and 
little support for CIL. While New Labour was seen as more positive about the role of
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planning overall, they were also said to have complicated the system. This leaves the 
conclusion from the case study authority that New Labour did not progress social issues 
and a key reason for this was a lack of clarity around the purpose of the planning system 
and that obligations could have a social purpose in particular. Given the deficiency of 
support for using obligations more creatively, planning officers have adopted a strict 
legal interpretation, which although understandable, has not delivered much in terms of 
social progress. The last chapter will look at this in more detail.
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8 CONCLUSIONS
It has been stated that we should not always try to end with big conclusions and a 
dramatic climax as this usually leads to attempts to bridge the gap between the 
descriptive and the prescriptive by imposing considerable personal opinion, which often 
is not based on the research and ends up detracting from it (Wolcott, 2001). Instead, it 
is suggested that we should simply state what has been attempted, what has been 
learned, and what new questions have been raised with minimum personal opinion. 
This is considered good advice and therefore, this chapter will start with a section 
summarising what the research set out to investigate and what the results found. The 
second section will try to clarify, primarily through the qualitative research, what has 
been learned about the likely reasons for the results and the lack of progress on social 
issues under New Labour. The third section will then set out some suggested areas for 
future research and some suggestions on whether the current direction of travel under 
New Labour is likely to be successful, given the findings from this research. The last 
section will conclude with a little more personal opinion as to whether, considering 
everything that has proceeded in the research, a paradigm shift is ever likely to take 
place and if so, what is needed to make it happen. This should keep the personal 
opinion to a minimum and it will be clearly identified as opinion, rather than evidence.
It is recognised, but needs to be clearly stated again, that there are difficulties in taking 
evidence from only one case study and trying to extrapolate these findings into 
overarching statements and findings. However, research often starts with a small field 
of research that others then build upon and so as long as it is clear what the findings are 
based on, then it is still reasonable to draw out some results that others can further 
investigate.
8.1 Has New Labour brought in a paradigm shift?
It was stated (in section 1.4) that a ‘paradigm shift’ is “a fundamental change in 
approach or underlying assumptions.” While the research found some changes in 
approach to the use of social issues at the case study authority with regard to the use of 
planning obligations, there was certainly nothing that was a clear and fundamental 
change. The literature review had shown there was a change in some assumptions in
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what was said but it is perhaps the reference to underlying assumptions that best 
explains why there was not a deep-seated change when New Labour came to power. 
The research at HBC found evidence of an increase in the overall number of clauses 
contained within obligations that were used for social purposes compared to previous 
research. However, when broken down by political party, it was found that under New 
Labour, there was actually a significant decrease in the percentage of obligations, and to 
a lesser degree clauses, containing any social requirements compared to the 
Conservative Government. This was very surprising and an interesting conclusion to 
the research.
While the evidence from this research is only from one case study, it is considered that 
the results have shown that the authority did appear to have been a good case study to 
use and does not appear to have any local circumstances that would skew results 
significantly away from finding social aims. If anything, it was more likely to reflect a 
higher use of obligations for social purposes due to it being located in a prosperous part 
of the country but having pockets of relatively high social deprivation. Therefore, while 
the results are unlikely to be repeated at every authority, there appears to be some 
evidence from the research findings that New Labour has struggled to bring about a 
paradigm shift in progressing social aims within the planning system during their first 
six years in Government.
Looking at the wider research results, it was shown that the preliminary findings at 
HBC were similar to much of the previous research, with obligations only used on a 
small percentage of all planning applications and with a considerable focus on 
residential development. It also reflected that the number of obligations being used was 
on the increase both quantitatively and as a percentage of applications but it was 
surprising to find that while the number of clauses per obligation was increasing for 
major applications, it was actually decreasing for minor applications. Analysis found 
that this was due to an increasing percentage of obligations being used to collect the 
standardised GTC which would often be a single clause obligation. Nonetheless, it is 
very surprising that the use of obligations, when excluding the GTC obligations, was 
decreasing.
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The case study authority illustrated a considerable decrease in the overall number of 
obligations with a negative clause in comparison to Healey et al (1995) and that the 
period under New Labour was pronounced. This was attributable to the introduction of 
the GTC scheme and there was a corresponding increase in the percentage of 
obligations with a positive clause. While it needs to be recognised that the percentage 
of obligations with a positive clause, excluding the GTC, was similar to that found in 
previous research, the percentage for the case study authority did increase significantly 
under New Labour in comparison to the six years under the last Conservative 
Government. It is also accepted that the last period does show a falling away but the 
average across the two six year periods is significantly larger under New Labour and 
when including the GTC obligations, the percentage is almost double than under the 
Conservatives and considerably higher than previous research. Therefore, it must be 
concluded that while New Labour was in power, there was a shift towards a more 
positive use of obligations at HBC.
The research also backs up the findings of previous research that the use of obligations 
and the clauses contained within them are dominated by seeking to restrict the impact of 
new development and to ensure the necessary highway infrastructure is in place. 
Positive obligations were on the increase with particular emphasis on those relating to 
provision of highway infrastructure but the sub-categories relating to negative 
obligations are still important, even though they are decreasing.
The percentage of applications with an obligation was increasing in the majority of 
major and minor categories, while almost two thirds (64%) of obligations were attached 
to residential applications, which was similar to that found in other research. This is 
partly because residential applications are numerically greater but it was also found that 
residential applications also had the highest percentage of applications with an 
obligation by class of development (8.1%). The prominence of obligations connected to 
residential applications was found to be increasing under New Labour and this is 
important as it was explained that residential applications are much more likely to 
attract social infrastructure for communities than other types of applications. However, 
it was also noted that HBC had evidence of almost twice as many applications with an 
obligation within the offices/light industry category, compared to previous research; this 
was found to be due to the GTC. Major applications were found to have more clauses
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per obligation under New Labour compared to under the Conservatives, but minor 
applications had less (‘others’ changed little).
It was interesting to see that the percentage of applications with an obligation was 
higher under New Labour than under the Conservatives (1.65% and 1.17% respectively) 
but that when GTC was excluded from the New Labour figure, it dropped significantly 
below the Conservative figure (to 0.76%). The dominance of GTC is a concern as it 
only achieves £334 on average per residential dwelling which is not substantial within 
the context of obligations. With reference to this research and the progress of social 
issues, the reason for this concern is that under New Labour, the case study authority 
was moving towards a more routine collection of obligations for highway issues to the 
exclusion of other issues. This was particularly within the minor category and it 
appears this reduced the amount of social issues being progressed.
There was an overall increase in requirements for social and community facilities 
compared to other research (with 11.2% of applications having an obligation that 
contained a social requirement; reduced to 4.9% if affordable housing was excluded). 
The percentage of clauses used for social purposes compared to all clauses was 8.6% 
(and 4.5% if affordable housing was excluded). A key finding from the research was 
that at the case study authority, a higher percentage of obligations contained a social 
clause under the Conservatives than under New Labour (19.2% and 6.8% respectively) 
and a higher percentage of all clauses were for social purposes under the Conservatives 
compared to New Labour (11.1% and 7.1% respectively). The unequivocal conclusion 
is that at the case study authority, the change from a Conservative to New Labour 
Government actually resulted in less being achieved for social aims through the 
obligations system.
The interviews sought to explore the reasons for the findings and found that the 
procedures for obligations was process driven. For example, there was no evidence that 
planning permission was granted because of the obligations on offer and instead 
decisions were taken solely on the principle of development and whether the scheme 
was acceptable. The obligation was seen as a ‘tick box’ exercise as to whether the 
developer had agreed to provide what was required or to pay the required amount in lieu 
of direct provision. However, it was not clear that this approach to obligations did not
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simply lead to developers ‘buying off the impact of their development, rather than 
being forced to think about a more sustainable or low impact solution. This is a really 
important issue, especially with the increase in interest in using formulas to work out a 
roof tax approach, which means developers do not have to think about those issues as 
they simply pay the money instead. This could have a particular impact on the 
provision of social infrastructure as many social issues are more complicated to 
coordinate and to ensure provision takes place if money is taken and then a third party is 
responsible for delivering it. Social infrastructure is less tangible than highway 
infrastructure for example and does not have agencies involved with the same degree of 
awareness or understanding of planning obligations to ensure their needs are 
progressed. This approach of ‘buying off development impact and using formulas to 
the benefit of aims other than social ones, are areas that would benefit from further 
research by others.
It was found that the case study authority was relatively cautious when it came to 
seeking benefits through obligations and only those requirements set out in the local 
plan tended to have been asked for. However, all interviewees believed the 
Government had been opportunistic in using obligations to try to plug the gap in local 
authority finance and some interviewees felt that other departments within the Council 
were also putting pressure on them to use obligations for something they were not 
designed for.
In terms of practical issues, it was accepted that obligations should seek revenue 
payments towards ongoing maintenance costs, that all development should contribute 
on a pro-rata basis, but that monitoring of contributions once agreed was poor (although 
this was addressed in 2008 at HBC with the appointment of a Planning Obligations 
Monitoring Officer). There was also concern that planning officers lacked the skills 
needed to actually negotiate effectively with developers about commercial issues when 
the need arose (it is not often needed when a flat rate formulaic approach is used). This 
point has been underlined recently with growing concern that there is a lack of good 
independent professionals that are able to accurately work out viability assessments for 
urban extensions and how much the related infrastructure will cost (Ashworth & 
Demetrius, 2008). Lastly, it was agreed unanimously that obligations led to delays 
within the planning system, mainly due to the involvement of solicitors on both sides.
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At HBC, New Labour clearly did not bring in any paradigm shift in improving the 
fortune of social issues within the planning obligation system and the focus on the 
formula approach (especially GTC) has arguably reduced the opportunities further as 
obligations have become more of a ‘tick box’ exercise with less interest in negotiating 
individual requirements. At HBC, social aims (beyond affordable housing and 
education) were not on the obligation checklist and so were likely to be ‘out of scope’ 
and not even considered by many officers who saw obligations as a clear cut 
requirement (it was either on the list of requirements or not). This lost the art of 
negotiating social benefits for the community and is very concerning as many 
authorities are turning more and more to using formulas and there is little evidence that 
social issues are included in those formulas. This is an area that would benefit from 
future research.
It is important before explaining in more detail why New Labour has failed to bring 
about a fundamental change in approach, to accept that they have brought in many 
positives that should not be dismissed. The interviews at HBC found that the use of 
money through PDG was a positive incentive and there can be little doubt that this has 
allowed many LPAs to invest in new computer systems and staff to provide a better 
service.
Secondly, Regeneration & Renewal magazine published a special report into the impact 
of the credit crisis on the regeneration industry in June 2008 (Ross, 2008) and it is 
interesting to note that the developers spoke of the importance of providing social 
infrastructure to make successful communities (even if they felt it was the role of the 
public sector rather than themselves to achieve this). This shows that the idea of social 
infrastructure has sunk into developers’ consciousness as an important part of making 
balanced communities. Although this may be largely due to public pressure, the 
Government must take some of the credit as their rhetoric has given weight to the public 
voice so that developers take social infrastructure seriously, which did not happen under 
the Conservatives. While the evidence is that not much has been achieved in social 
terms, at least it is a legitimate topic for discussion, and progressing from rhetoric to 
reality is the next step.
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Thirdly, the whole focus on requiring the LSP to produce a CS that must promote 
economic, social, and environmental issues and be connected to the development plan is 
a very significant step forward in allowing the planning system to take the initiative to 
push social issues. Although New Labour may not have pushed social issues onto the 
planning agenda, they have created the conditions where the public can push for them to 
be taken seriously and progressive LPAs can achieve them.
Fourthly, the introduction in the Local Government Act 2000 for each local authority to 
be required to have a code of conduct for elected Members means complaints are now 
referred to the Standards Board for England for independent investigation. This has 
helped to remove claims of corruption, with research carried out into complaints made 
to the Ombudsman about planning issues finding a lack of evidence of corruption 
(Allmendinger et al., 2003b). This has helped to ‘clean up’ the image of planning to 
some degree, although as with many issues under New Labour, the message has 
probably not got through to the public to the full extent.
Lastly, the introduction of the CIL is a considerable achievement in principle and while 
it is arguable that the proof will only be when it is found how many authorities actually 
introduce CIL, it cannot be dismissed. New Labour may have taken a long time to get 
round to actually introducing something that sought to capture some of the land value 
and ironically it may have been unveiled just as land values have plummeted. However, 
they have stuck doggedly to the task of making sure something was introduced and 
were not put off by the construction industry prevaricating. Social issues and 
betterment are now discussed seriously and not dismissed the way they were under the 
Conservatives and while it can be argued the public has pushed the agenda, some 
recognition must be given to the Government embracing the principles, at least in 
theory and policy if not fully in practice. It could almost be argued that New Labour 
achieved a paradigm shift in some of their theoretical assumptions about social issues 
but these never pervaded across all areas and certainly did not translate into practice at 
the case study authority during the research period.
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8.2 Reasons for the lack of progress
There are probably many reasons for the failure of New Labour to develop a coherent 
and meaningful progressive agenda but this research found three areas that were 
fundamental to the problems they faced. The first was a lack of ability to present a clear 
narrative to communities to explain what they were trying to do as they had no clear 
ideological position and the Third Way rationale they used lacked any depth. Secondly, 
their desire to control from the centre meant they did not trust local government to work 
efficiently and instead they got distracted into arguments about outsourcing public 
services, whether a public sector ethos existed, and if the planning system was to blame 
for the lack of national productivity. Lastly, they were so focused on trying to convince 
big business they were electable that they ended up embracing the neo-conservative 
agenda that was prevalent in business circles at the time, forgetting their own social 
roots.
These three problem areas were ubiquitous throughout the research as it became 
impossible to pin down any sensible strategy that New Labour was developing where 
obligations and social aims could be combined to deliver a step-change in achieving 
social aims. While I was aware of the constant denigration of local government by New 
Labour (as someone working in it), I was surprised through the research to see the scale 
and depth of attempts to bypass local government and the constant threats and lack of 
trust from the centre. It was probably only on reflection of these findings that I realised 
that so much of what local government was trying to do was centred on hitting targets to 
the exclusion of other policies. The interviews bore this out as officers felt there was no 
clarity about the purpose of the planning system since New Labour came to power with 
those negotiating obligations unclear as to whether it was legitimate to seek social aims 
beyond affordable housing.
It was shown that New Labour had come to adopt policies that focused very much on 
economic issues and so local government ended up chasing the demands of the centre 
which were more focused on economic issues and processes than social concerns.
“What damaged the public domain was the remorseless attack on 
professional autonomy and the equally remorseless marketisation that 
accompanied it. Both continue under Labour... We have to devise new 
forms of accountability -  qualitative rather than quantitative, localist rather
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than centralist, bottom-up rather than top-down and involving stakeholders 
along with professionals in a process of social learning. This is an 
extraordinarily difficult task, but we haven’t a hope unless we abandon the 
bossy, centralist mindset that New Labour shares with Old Thatcherism” 
(Marquand, 2004: 26).
Create a narrative and work with communities and local government
The interviews showed that New Labour never managed to develop a clear narrative for 
what they were trying to achieve amongst officers at HBC and this was backed up by 
the literature review that found the focus on the Third Way was probably to blame. 
Blair had personally wanted to develop a new exciting political system for the new 
challenges that globalisation was producing but he was never able to articulate what it 
stood for, instead focusing on what it was not. Such was New Labour’s desire to keep 
winning elections, whenever the Conservatives came up with a good idea, the 
Government simply moved to the Right and stole it, much as Clinton had done in 
America (Cohen, 2003). This approach had left the Party devoid of meaning or 
direction and when the tough times came, the support crumbled away and those who 
were left were caught up in the in-fighting between Blair and Brown.
Reform of the public sector through the modernisation process was one area that 
managed to keep the focus of Blair but he appeared undecided whether the public sector 
could genuinely be reformed or whether it needed to be replaced by the third sector or 
the private sector. This led to the damaging arguments over the value of the public 
sector which resulted in attempts to try to bypass local government backfiring and to be 
replaced with an attempt to privatise public services and then to use the private sector to 
‘improve’ the public services. The catalogue of embarrassing and very costly mistakes 
by the private sector meant this approach was also sure to fail but left considerable 
tension between the public services and central government.
The Government’s own research shortly after they had come to power found that much
of the successful local joint working is a result of local initiative, not central direction,
and that external imposition of solutions does not work and instead personal initiative
and creativity must be fostered (DETR, 2000). The interviews at HBC found that
officers were concerned that they were under pressure to make a decision and that
applications would benefit from further scrutiny if time allowed. There was also
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genuine concern that the public were not properly involved in the planning system and 
that by the time planning applications were submitted, much of the detail had already 
been agreed between the developer and LPA. When applications were received, the 
focus was all on making a quick decision, due to the modernisation programme, but it 
only focused on speed, not the quality of decision or how it was reached (Carmona, 
2007). The focus on speed led to an increase in pre-application discussions with the 
LPA to resolve problems before the application was submitted, but this excluded the 
public even more. This led to a process at HBC known as Development Consultation 
Forums to ensure the community and Members have an opportunity to influence 
planning applications before they are submitted where a public meeting is held at pre­
application stage to discuss the proposals while they are still being formulated. This 
illustrates how local government has been innovative in involving their communities to 
counter central Government pressure for speed alone.
Public participation per se was considered out of scope for this research but some points 
were noted in passing that are of interest and one of these areas was that five o f the six 
interviewees thought the pressure for change within the planning system was a result of 
public pressure. It would be useful if further research was able to consider this point in 
more detail to see if it is possible to track back changes in policy to see if public 
pressure is responsible for many of the progressive changes, rather than Government 
thinking. In fact, the whole area around public participation needs more research and 
debate about how to effectively involve the public (Jones, 2003).
It is accepted that there have been positive messages from the Government with efforts 
to join up thinking and get the LSP more involved with spatial planning so the 
Sustainable Community Strategy and LDF have shared aims and are aligned with the 
Local Area Agreements (DCLG, 2007a). This would give planners an additional source 
of finding out what local partners believe the issues are that need to be tackled and to 
have a co-ordinated approach that involves social infrastructure at the heart. There is 
potential for the planning system to help achieve and/or fund some of these 
requirements.
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It is not just about the economy and big business
It is accepted that in modem society any new Government will need to have a positive 
relationship with the City and big business. However, the extent to which New Labour 
practically sold their principles to be elected and then adopted a right-of-centre agenda 
that at times appeared more authoritarian than the Conservatives was a shock to most. 
Even at the start of his second term when the jitters should have subsided, Blair (2001c) 
simply could not bring himself to criticise big business for the massive boardroom 
payouts that were enraging the public and simply dismissed it as not an issue for 
Government. Blair personally became seen to be untrustworthy and a liability to New 
Labour and while he spoke highly of social issues, the literature review found more 
focus on economic issues. The evidence from the research is that social aims did not 
progress under New Labour and so it was empty rhetoric with those interviewed not 
believing that New Labour was promoting social issues in the planning system. There 
was no clear message as far as they were concerned with pressure for developers to pay 
for their impacts coming from the public instead.
Blair’s association with big business, sleaze, and spin (Enron, Andersen, Mittal, 
Ecclestone affairs, allegations around cash-for-peerages, Weapons of Mass Destmction) 
gave the New Labour government a smell of corruption and incompetence that they 
never really shook. The growing realisation that New Labour was actually a right-of- 
centre Government, focused on winning elections simply by improving the 
administration of the country, while paying lip service to social values meant the public 
grew very weary of Blair in particular. They also showed little stomach for public 
services being privatised and were much more sceptical about the role of big business in 
genuinely being interested in social issues.
The planning system needs a purpose that allows social aims to thrive
Probably one of the most important implications to arise from this research is the clarity 
that the modem planning system lacks a good understanding of social issues. The 
literature review found little had been written about the subject in recent years and the 
interviews discovered that the practitioners at HBC were not clear which social issues 
could, or even should, legitimately be part of the planning system. Part of the problem 
is that the modem planning system was invented to build consensus between many
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disparate interests in the post-War rebuilding programme. Therefore, the aims and 
objectives are very vague and malleable and allow Westminster to make alterations 
without primary legislation and so the system has a ‘mend and make do’ approach with 
little proper thought about its aims and processes (Allmendinger, 2001; Healey & Shaw, 
1994). While planners may have some idea of what they are trying to achieve, the 
public are still cynical and end up blaming the planning system for causing high land 
prices, the housing crisis, clone towns, not boosting economic growth, failing to tackle 
supermarket competition, and not dealing with climate change, amongst others 
(Alexander, 2007).
The interviews at the case study authority found that since New Labour came to power 
there have been mixed messages for the planning system with regeneration, better 
design, and housing delivery seen as the primary focus by different interviewees. There 
was no agreement at all on whether the Government was pushing economic, social, or 
environmental issues the most, although social concerns were not top of the list. The 
Conservatives were considered by the interviewees to have a clear view of the planning 
system (if not one they necessarily endorsed) whereas New Labour appeared to be 
blown about by public opinion and chasing headlines.
Dr Hugh Ellis, a Planning Advisor at Friends of the Earth and a member of the TCP A 
Policy Council, has commented that
“.. .planning reform now seems to be a ‘continuous revolution’ which leaves 
many who are trying to deliver change bewildered. There is a sense that the 
Treasury will go on demanding ‘reform’ of the planning system until it gets 
the ‘right answer’ -  and that the ‘right answer’ is perfect free market 
competition in the use of land. It is becoming more and more evident that 
those who believe in planning as a social movement or that planning has 
intrinsic values which are worth protecting are in a declining minority”
(Ellis, 2007: 18).
This is a damning indictment by a respected commentator of what the planning system
has become as a result of the Government constantly tinkering with the system and
wanting to make it subservient to business interests. A key New Labour mantra was ‘no
rights without responsibilities’ but while the Government has been keen to protect
businesses rights, it is not clear how they have pushed businesses to actually be
responsible in practice. The planning system has some ability to require businesses to
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have some social responsibilities for their local communities. However, it could be 
argued that the planning system is instead being turned into a component of a neo- 
conservative agenda that has little interest in social aims or to uphold the virtuous ideals 
it was founded upon.
The green lobby has successfully encouraged behavioural changes by appealing to 
people’s sense of what is right and there may be mileage in this approach being applied 
to other areas, such as social aims, but for it to work there needs to be a careful 
philosophical foundation (Prowse, 2000). The planning system needs to articulate a 
clear vision of sustainable communities that balances the economic, social, and 
environmental issues communities are facing, within a regulatory framework. The 
Government has made some progress in recent years in articulating a vision for the 
planning system but it must become reality and not just a slogan on the front of 
documents. They also must allow local areas to develop their own solutions and if this 
includes a focus on social issues then they should be supported in practice and not 
‘educated’ into thinking that economic issues must reign supreme.
“The nature of planning will be shaped by those interests which wield 
consistent and widespread influence within British society. Some have 
argued, persuasively, that this has meant that planning has never 
systematically threatened prevailing social and economic inequalities, but 
has, in general, served the purpose of managing land markets and the 
development process...” (Thomas, 1999: 27-28).
There appears to be little acceptance by economists that the planning system should lead 
development and shape society, instead believing it exists to respond to the economy52. 
There is a risk that just as the Government was seduced by big business, and economists 
continue to push for economic issues to stay at the fore, that the planning system could 
be subsumed by business issues and doing what commercial clients want, rather than 
what is in the best interests of the community. Concern has been raised that there is a 
decline within the planning movement of radical voices as it becomes more dominated 
by the private sector.
“Planning is and should remain the most radical form of social and 
environmental regulation ever introduced in the post-War period. It is
52 For a clear example, see the article by the Professor of Environmental Economics at Reading 
University (Evans, 2003).
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strongly interventionist, strongly regulatory. It is positive and visionary, 
participative and democratic. It deals with the complexity of people and 
communities and can offer real hope as a powerful policy tool in the context 
of social and environmental justice. This is not the time to compromise 
with those whose real agenda is the deregulation of the planning process.
We should renew and re-engage with the values that drove planning as a
social movement, however challenging these ideas might be for the 
Treasury” (Ellis, 2007: 19).
The battle for the soul of the planning system should not be underestimated with the 
Government having to admit that the first draft PPS4 showed public bodies were
concerned about the proposed competition between economic, social, and
environmental aims, compared to business respondents who felt it did not go far enough 
in promoting economic issues (Planning, 2008d).
8.3 Should obligations be replaced or reformed?
So far, this chapter has set out what the findings were at the case study authority and 
sought to use the literature review and interviews to consider why New Labour did not 
achieve a paradigm shift in the use of obligations to achieve social aims. This leads to 
questions around what we can learn from the research with reference to obligations 
themselves and if they can actually be used to achieve more for social issues if they 
were used in a different way or are they not a suitable means to achieve social ends?
Considerable changes have already taken place with the new Circular 5/05 which has 
addressed many of the concerns outlined in the literature review but the main view of 
commentators regarding whether obligations are the best way to capture planning gain 
is split. Some have argued that the unsystematic approach of obligations between 
different authorities is unfair to developers and is not suitable for adequately mitigating 
development impacts, with impact fees a better solution (Walker & Smith, 2002). 
Indeed, impact fees and tariff systems of various sorts have received considerable 
support, including the RTPI and the TCP A, amongst others (Brock, 2002; Crow, 2002; 
Healey et al., 1993; Richards & Bentley, 2001; TCP A, 2002b). The RTPI approach is 
to support a tariff that uses the development plan to set out the policy for the tariff, 
which SPD would then detail on an area-by-area basis, setting out requirements for 
physical and social infrastructure, and environmental mitigation etc. (Crow, 2002). The
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policy would set out the cost on a unit or floorspace basis and unspent money would be 
refunded within a given time period, although they did allow for negotiations to take 
place on unusual cases.
The TCPA were more concerned that obligations were less efficient in less affluent 
areas, where investment was needed more, but they rejected nationalising contributions 
due to the loss of local decision-making and the relationship in mitigating the local 
impact (TCPA, 2002b). Therefore, as tariffs would achieve a percentage of 
development value, this was the closest to a betterment tax and so the TCPA preferred 
this approach. Like the RTPI, they supported a unit-cost based approach as acceptable, 
with commercial development worked out on a gross floorspace figure and housing on a 
cost per dwelling basis to ensure smaller developments would not be exempt.
The main alternative view when supporting the reform of obligations to that of a tariff 
based approach was to still seek some type of central taxation, as this would stop 
authorities competing with each other by raising or lowering their tariff, depending on 
whether they wanted to attract or stop development (Edwards & Martin, 2002). There 
is evidence that local authority development agencies in California ran into problems of 
offering incentives to attract companies to new projects only to have them leave within 
a short timeframe as another relocation offer came up at a new centre (Kotin & Peiser, 
1997). Authorities in areas needing regeneration in Britain could similarly end up 
reducing the planning gain required in an attempt to attract in development and then 
seek to undercut each other, all the while reducing the money available for 
communities. Removing the option from local authorities would stop this. The risk is if 
the level is set too high, some less affluent areas will struggle to attract development as 
land values are not high enough to make schemes viable.
On a more positive theme, research by Campbell et al. (2001) demonstrated that while 
the cost to construct off-site infrastructure, facilities, and services are higher in the 
South East than in the Midlands and the North, it is to a lesser extent than the difference 
in land values and house prices. As a result, planning obligations will make up an 
average of 14% of the cost of a house in the South East compared to 18% in the North. 
By contrast, a betterment tax of 40% of the initial land value will be 19% of the house
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price in the South East and only 13% in the North, meaning betterment is much better at 
dealing with depressed land values than obligations.
However, the biggest concern over betterment is that it loses the link between a 
development and the impact it has caused that needs to be mitigated against. The 
Commission on Taxation and Citizenship of 2000 found that people feel disconnected 
from the taxes they pay and the public services that the taxes are used on, as people are 
not clear where their money goes or that it is spent wisely (Regan, 2003). Any change 
from an obligation system to betterment taxation would further break this link and 
would be a retrograde step (Evans & Bate, 2000). There is also concern that any 
taxation approach would reduce flexibility and result in a loss of revenue for 
environmental and community benefits from development (Campbell et al., 1999a).
The TCPA argued that the term ‘tariff should be replaced by ‘community benefit 
contribution’ to remove the idea that it is a penalty on development and argued that any 
payment would have to be identified in advance (preferably through the local plan) to 
ensure it comes out of the land value. This would still allow development to be 
profitable but if landowners sought to keep back land due to the reduced profit then 
compulsory purchase powers could be used (TCPA, 2002b).
It is perhaps surprising, given the often vitriolic attacks made on the obligation system 
along with the allegations made, that so many people prefer to stick with the current 
system, rather than opt for reform. In one survey of local authorities, they were almost 
evenly split on whether obligations should be retained or replaced with other financial 
instruments, although impact fees were generally rejected along with other more radical 
approaches (Walker & Smith, 2002). Another survey of local authorities had found the 
majority of respondents wanted a negotiated system based on obligations (just over 
half) compared to less than a quarter that wanted a more formalised tariff-based system 
with standard charges, betterment or impact fees (Campbell et al, 1999b). The reason 
for this was said to be the flexibility of the system so each site can be assessed on its 
merits, developers can provide the works themselves more easily, and there is a clear 
link between the gain sought and the development site. It is important to realise that 
tariff systems and impact fees normally use obligations as the means to collecting the 
payment. However, this is not the same as a negotiated obligation system which assess
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impact on a site-by-site basis rather than by using a previously worked out charge or 
fee.
Other bodies that have carried out research into the topic have also concluded that a 
more creative use of obligations is probably the best way forward, including the 
Countryside Agency (Elson, 1999) and the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (MacFarlane, 
2000). Evans & Bate (2000) saw no alternative to obligations and felt the system 
should continue with some fairly minor changes and while Healey et al (1993) had 
previously supported the principle of impact fees, they did not rule out the continued 
use of obligations but also with some amendments.
Evans & Bate (2000) report that many industry representatives interviewed in their 
research supported the current system as they value the fact it is levied locally and 
responds directly to the development. They also state that the RICS have commented 
that although the planning obligation system is flawed it is still the most practical way 
of ensuring developers pay to remedy the impact of their development. Others have 
stated that there is little consensus to change the system as most developers prefer to 
take their chances negotiating than being stuck in a rigid system (Campbell et al, 2001; 
Ennis, 1994; Punter, 1999). Lastly, third party groups and Members apparently have 
found obligations a positive and creative way of securing tangible wider benefits 
(Campbell et al, 2001).
Many local authorities had called for a more regularised obligations system that was a 
hybrid between obligations and impact fees (Walker & Smith, 2002). This would allow 
obligations to deal with the direct on-site mitigation while some impact fee or tariff 
approach would allow the betterment issue to be dealt with separately. This is basically 
what CIL has done by dealing with the broader infrastructural requirements that are 
more akin to a betterment tax, while the on-site issues will still be dealt with by 
obligations. It appears the Government has listened to the concerns raised and adopted 
an approach that appears to be supported by many. The real answer will be whether 
local authorities progress and actually make use of CIL or whether they simply do not 
bother and stick with using obligations on a site-by-site basis or as part of a tariff 
system. However, whatever approach is taken, a key issue is that social aims need to be 
clarified and this was pointed out as a problem over a decade ago.
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“Planning obligations... are but a vehicle for achieving social goals. But the 
legislation is procedural, not substantive. Hence, identification of the social 
goals to be achieved by them remains opaque” (Grant, 1999).
Considering the research at HBC it is clear that the important point is that for social 
aims to be progressed, there needs to be clarity on what social issues the planning 
system should be expected to achieve and how they then should be delivered. Whether 
authorities use CIL or stick with obligations, the research from HBC has shown that 
planning officers are not comfortable with using obligations on an ad hoc basis to 
achieve social aims as they do not believe that is what they exist for. If obligations are 
to remain then the Government needs to clarify further that social issues are an 
acceptable aim for obligations.
Social obligations
In August 2006, the Audit Commission produced a series of four documents to try to 
improve the performance of obligations and one of the issues they looked at was how 
Councils decide which community benefits to secure through s. 106. However, it is 
interesting to note the list under ‘examples of community benefits’ included flood 
defence, recycling, crime and disorder prevention, archaeology and conservation, 
libraries, healthcare, fire and rescue, town centre improvements, and local 
environmental improvements (Audit Commission, 2006a). While there may be some 
benefit in money being available for a wide variety of causes, there is a fear that there is 
a finite amount of money to go round and so other causes benefiting could be at the 
expense of social aims.
“The sum is bound to be larger than at present, but if a significant 
proportion of it is devoted to affordable housing the amount available for 
other purposes, including infrastructure and social capital for areas of rapid 
growth, may not be much more than at present” (TCPA, 2002b: 107).
It is clear that there is growing interest in using planning gain to achieve social aims 
with even the right-of-centre Policy Exchange think-tank proposing a ‘social cost tariff 
to compensate communities affected by development and proposing a one-off payment 
of half a million pounds per hectare for greenfield housing sites (Early, 2006a). While 
the CPRE may have dismissed it as an attempt to ‘buy-off opposition to development, 
the fact a right-wing think-tank is even suggesting a social tariff illustrates how
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mainstream social issues have become within planning gain circles. Similarly, the 
Thames Gateway has introduced the concept of social infrastructure frameworks that 
will coordinate the provision of schools, health centres, gardens and green spaces for 
children (Kochan, 2006b).
The London Borough of Redbridge (LBR) was the first authority in the capital to adopt 
its Core Strategy after the Planning Inspectorate had declared it was ‘sound’ (Planning, 
2008c). Therefore, its approach to obligations for social issues is relevant as it shows 
what the Inspector accepted as reasonable. The LBR produced a SPD on Planning 
Obligations (LBR, 2006) that breaks down the social and community facilities it expects 
developers to provide or fund for residential schemes of more than ten units. It worked 
out at £151 per habitable room and covered ‘community care & children and families 
social services’ which included assessment & disability, learning disability, mental 
health, community services, older people, HIV/ substance misuse, management/ 
support, youth offending team, children & family social services. This contribution is 
in addition to those for education, health, employment & training, libraries, sports 
facilities, open space, affordable housing, transport & traffic management, and percent 
for art, archaeology & conservation. This is a genuine opportunity to progress social 
issues through the planning obligation system at last.
From the interviews undertaken at HBC, it is considered that this type of approach 
should be supported as this gives a wide range of social aims that can be considered and 
the amount is not unrealistic. Having the list approved in the development plan means 
that the planning officer negotiating does not have to worry about the legitimacy of 
asking about the money in the same way, as it has already been approved as suitable. 
The fact a figure is also provided means there is little need for routine specialist input or 
complicated negotiations by planning officers. The developer knows what they have to 
pay and the officer simply ensures the figures are agreed as a head of term in the 
obligation before permission is issued. This ensures the link between the new 
development and the social costs so the process becomes clear and simple, and everyone 
is clear what is reasonable to be collected from the outset. The main drawback is that 
the obligations are arguably being used for a taxation purpose but as there is a clear link 
and the evidence from the research authority suggests this approach would actually
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work and cumulatively it could add up to a significant amount of money, it should be 
supported.
Limitations of this research and areas for future study
As with all research, this thesis has limitations and it is accepted that it would have been 
useful if the research could have continued to cover all of Blair’s years in power but the 
fieldwork was carried out years before it was realised his tenure would end while the 
writing up was taking place. The slower pace of studying part-time is also a drawback 
but does allow more to be understood in hindsight and any extension of the research 
database would have delayed the process extensively. It is considered that the first six 
years of the New Labour Government is a good start but it would be valuable if 
someone was to go back in the future and assess the next three year period (or until 
Blair resigned as Prime Minister) for comparative purposes to see if things have 
changed significantly.
It is considered that the research also may have benefited from further interviews by 
tracking down other officers who had worked at the authority during the research period 
to give a broader interview base before drawing conclusions from those interviewed. 
However, the reality is that there were only a few officers who actively negotiated 
obligations routinely during this time that were not interviewed and they either had only 
been at the authority for a short period or were not realistically available for interview. 
Perhaps one area that may have been useful in hindsight would have been to interview 
managers from other departments and Members about their perceptions around planning 
obligations at HBC, although this would have been more of a passing interest than 
fundamental to the research.
One of the key findings of this research was that it appears public opinion has driven 
much of the change in approach by the Government and this is an area that would 
benefit from future research. There are two aspects of this that would be interesting if 
they were investigated further. The first is to assess the extent to which the Government 
has been pushed into making policies that it did not initially want to, due to public 
pressure. The second aspect would be to tackle this point from a different angle and to 
see if it is possible to track back key changes in progressive policies to see what the
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main pressure behind the change was i.e. public pressure, European laws, think-tanks, 
independent research, Government thinking etc.
It was also found that in the interviews, none of the planners seemed particularly sure 
what social policies were in terms of the planning system and the literature review also 
struggled to a surprising degree to find writings that discussed social aims in a planning 
context. There was support by those interviewed that social aims are important to 
varying degrees but quantifying social issues in a spatial planning system is difficult. 
The change in focus of the planning system towards place-making gives a clear 
opportunity for social issues to be driven forward but research needs to be carried out 
into the social aspects of communities that the planning system can genuinely interact 
with. This is an urgent area needing attention by the planning community.
The research mentioned in passing several times that public involvement in the planning 
system is a recurring problem that has raised many questions and problems over the 
years but appears to have progressed little. Questions over who speaks on behalf of the 
community, how to effectively involve these representatives, how they relate to the 
elected Members, etc. need to be resolved if communities are to have an effective voice 
that is involved from the start rather than consulted at the end. It is considered that 
HBC has made good progress on this point by setting up six local Community Boards 
where the Council facilitates the meetings but they are run by the public and elect their 
own chairperson. The Boards are then consulted on issues by the Council (it is a 
Borough Council so there are no Parish Councils) and is a good framework in theory 
but unfortunately they have struggled to capture public interest. Questions also remain 
around local authorities having housing and employment figures imposed on them as 
the public immediately feel disenfranchised. Likewise, the binding decisions of 
Inspectors in making decisions in line with national/regional policy with less interest in 
local concerns is demoralising for any true community view for shaping your own 
society. Alternatives to imposing solutions from above must be found that would 
remove the need for central dictats and arguably the Planning Inspectorate. Again, there 
is relatively little research on these topics.
It was noted that the approach of ‘buying off development impact by simply paying a 
financial contribution risks losing more imagination in the planning process itself and
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could result in worse development than if impacts had been mitigated in the design in 
the first place. This needs to be investigated further to consider whether routinely using 
formulas may result in other aims being prioritised over social ones as economic and 
environmental issues are often more tangible and have more influential lobbying groups 
pressing for them to be included.
Lastly, it would be interesting to consider whether social issues are actually promoted 
more by local communities than by central Government and while there has been some 
research around this issue, it would be good to investigate further to see what issues 
local communities do prioritise when given the choice.
8.4 Is a paradigm shift possible?
This all brings us to the concluding section and the question of if New Labour was 
unable to bring about a paradigm shift in ensuring social aims were given parity with 
economic and environmental aims when decisions were made, was it too much to 
expect? Was the question an impossible dream or could more have been achieved that 
would have been considered a substantial change?
Issues around infrastructure are increasing in prominence with reports that the gap in 
public investment was around sixty-five billion pounds (Falk, 2004) and that was before 
the country entered recession at the end of the noughties. There is a growing demand 
for new housing but with this massive financial gap, social infrastructure runs a risk of 
being forgotten about as the private sector is unlikely to be able to fill this gap alone. 
The public will want to see that infrastructure is provided as there is little support for 
existing communities paying for new communities (even though in reality it is a 
displacement of the existing). If the link between taxes and what they are spent on is 
not clear or considered to be just, then people will be less likely to pay taxes in the first 
place and growing cynicism with government will result, making any more progressive 
use of obligations in the future more difficult (Nye, 2001).
It would appear there are many ways of capturing land value but the benefit of using 
obligations keeps a clear link between the development and the provision of whatever is 
being required. This is considered to be fundamentally important in ensuring that the
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public continue to accept new development and that there is transparency between new 
development and new facilities that the new community will need. There is an obvious 
benefit in setting these charges clearly in advance so the value is taken from the land 
value rather than passed onto the new house buyers if it is raised late in the process. 
However, this is not considered to be as big a concern as it once was as developers are 
now very aware there will be infrastructure required, either to be provided or a financial 
contribution made, and so should be reflecting this in the price they offer for land. It is 
still the case though that the more certainty they have the better and so setting standard 
charges within a document will help. This would be best approved as a Development 
Plan Document, for example as a policy in the Core Strategy in the new LDF system so 
it can be publicly scrutinised and subject to Examination in Public, but this would 
considerably delay approval and will be quickly out of date. Therefore, it is considered 
that a published SPD that has gone through its own public consultation is the best way 
of achieving this. The SPD can more easily be updated as the economic climate 
changes and more importantly, as the needs of the area change i.e. if schools reach 
capacity then new development would need to provide new capacity for the new 
children.
The tools appear to be in place to progress social benefits and it is considered that New 
Labour actually came a lot closer than the practice suggests as they had ideologically 
broken the taboo subject of talking seriously about social issues, put debate about 
planning gain back on the agenda, and even got developers to agree they needed to pay 
for social infrastructure. The problem is that when it came to it, as we have seen, they 
could not bring themselves to follow through in practice, despite having considerable 
public support.
This research suggests that the planning system needs to develop a clear vision that 
gives social and environmental issues a comparable footing to economic concerns in 
practice, to engage properly with the public, and that obligations could easily be used 
for greater community good. Some clarity on the use of obligations and that social 
infrastructure is a legitimate aim would be useful and could be produced without the 
need for legislation, thereby meaning it could be produced quickly. The interviews at 
the case study authority suggest that planning officers relate well to the original social 
goals that the planning system was founded upon and would be willing to develop these
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social concerns in their daily professional duties. The concern at present is more that 
the authority needs to be careful not to stretch the use of obligations as that could be 
found to be illegal but if the Government clarified that obligations could be used to 
collect more social benefits (until CIL is in place) then it would appear that officers 
would be happy with that approach.
Many of the practical concerns raised around the use of obligations appear to have been 
resolved over time as authorities have adopted stricter procedures and the main concern 
about obligations would be resolved if the Government officially widened the role of 
obligations to legitimise much of what is occurring in some authorities. Clear guidance 
could be drawn up and it is recommended that Councils should be required to adopt an 
SPD setting out the tariffs that will be required for new development and justifying how 
the amounts are arrived at.
The CIL could collect whatever is set out in the SPD and the SPD should be developed 
with the local community (not drawn up by the Council and then the community asked 
for views). This should also involve discussions with the LSP to make sure it reflects 
the aims of the CS, but could potentially be broken down further into smaller 
community areas. At HBC, this could use the six area Community Boards and while 
there may be some over-arching priorities common to all that need the economy of 
scale, one Board may wish to prioritise the secondary issues in a different order to 
another, depending on the needs of their community. This would involve the public 
more and they could see what the money was being spent on and see how they could 
influence that and may even increase attendance at the Community Board meetings.
Could a paradigm shift still be achieved?
Like most similar questions, the answer is of course it could happen but the real 
question is whether it will happen and that is not as clear. Some of the barriers to New 
Labour achieving what it set out to were shown as becoming distracted from the task in 
hand by focusing on economic concerns by the pressure they came under from big 
business, driving forward a neo-conservative modernisation agenda that dismissed the 
public sector, refusing to genuinely delegate power, and lacking a narrative.
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Therefore, it is rather depressing to note the Confederation of British Industry is still 
arguing that too many LPAs fail to attach adequate weight to economic considerations 
when taking planning decisions, leading to “unbalanced and unfair outcomes for 
applicants” (Daubney, 2008). The fact they focus entirely on the applicants and do not 
comment on the outcomes for local communities or neighbours of sites is perhaps 
telling in itself but they are still pushing the argument to anyone who will listen that 
economic aims need to be raised in profile. Likewise, the Office of Fair Trading has 
recently raised the ‘old’ criticism that the planning system is acting as a block to land 
supply for house builders (Donatantonio, 2008a). It appears the planning system is still 
suffering from pressure to promote the economic interests and to ‘free up’ developers to 
develop as they please. Despite the evidence they are aware of, the Government has not 
moved to quash these points before they gather momentum and further distract 
attention. It was shown that the Government itself has investigated this claim and 
rejected it and that there is no evidence of a loss of the public sector ethos 
(Allmendinger et al, 2003b), so it is concerning that the Government is not moving the 
debate forward.
There is some evidence that the Government is starting to slowly develop a narrative 
that contains social issues and to work more constructively with local government (the 
modernisation agenda appears to have been toned down significantly) and with the 
public. The debate around CIL and/or obligations needs to clarify the difference 
between recovering land value and making developers pay for the cost of their 
development and towards new infrastructure. The two issues should not be confused, 
and the first is not currently being seriously considered, despite CIL muddling the issues 
(Ashworth & Demetrius, 2008). It was shown that the principle of developers paying 
for infrastructure was accepted back in the early 1970s, while social, educational and 
community provision was added in the early 1990s. It is considered that attention now 
needs to move to the next stage by making betterment work and ensuring communities 
benefit equally from new development, rather than the landowner taking the majority of 
the increase in land value. There is a clear argument for betterment of some type to be 
paid for the good of society and it is not considered to be beyond the ability of the 
Government to design such a system, but the big business interests would need to be 
reduced in influence for this to realistically happen. In the meantime, it is considered 
that CIL, topped up with obligations, could deliver a considerable amount of social
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benefit to local communities. If CIL was rejected by any new Government in the 
upcoming 2010 elections it is still believed that a revised obligations system could 
achieve a considerable amount for social aims.
There has been very recent research undertaken on behalf of the Scottish Government 
(McMaster et a l , 2008) which is encouraging, given that land values in Scotland are 
comparably quite low compared to large parts of England. The research found that the 
use of agreements53 had almost doubled between 2003/04 and 2006/07 and recreational 
purposes numerically dominated the reason for the agreements but with increasing use 
for affordable housing, education, and public transport. The research also found that 
authorities with a dedicated officer working on agreements secured almost five times as 
many contributions as those without and for wider purposes. They also found a third of 
authorities had a formula for calculating the contribution and those with it are collecting 
around two million pounds per annum more than those without. It is my personal 
opinion from my experience that if someone was to go back and examine obligations at 
the case study authority since the end of my research period, that there would be some 
evidence of an increasing use of obligations, although limited increase for social aims.
However, there is a feeling that authorities are starting to get to grips with obligations 
and securing significantly more than they used to and this is causing many to be 
cautious about abandoning a system that is starting to deliver so much for a new untried 
system under CIL. Greater Manchester has announced that s. 106 obligations work well 
and that CIL is not needed, leading to the question as to whether CIL will actually 
change much for many authorities (Lee, 2008a). However, whether an amended 
obligations system and/or CIL are used, they are but a means to an end of achieving 
social aims within the planning system. New Labour broke the arguments about social 
aims being an acceptable goal in theory and it is considered that if a more explicit 
statement was made by Government that obligations could be routinely used for 
achieving social aims, then a paradigm shift may well be achieved. It was shown earlier 
that David Cameron has talked of compassionate conservatism and so even if there was 
a change of Government, it is considered there is sufficient political and public support
53 They are called agreements in Scotland and they are primarily secured under either s. 69 of the Local 
Government (Scotland) Act, 1973 or s. 75 of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act, 1997.
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to embolden local authorities to develop social infrastructure costs and charge for them 
through obligations and/or CIL.
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APPENDIX 1 
LIST OF ACRONYMS
BPF British Property Foundation
CDP Community Development Projects
CIL Community Infrastructure Levy
CS Community Strategy
DCLG Department for Communities and Local Government (replaced ODPM on 5th 
May 2006)
EHDC East Hampshire District Council
EP English Partnerships
GTC Green Transport Contribution
HBC Havant Borough Council -  the case study authority
HBF House Builders Federation
HMRC HM Revenue & Customs
LGA Local Government Association
LPA Local Planning Authority
LVT Land Value Tax
MKP Milton Keynes Partnership
ODPM Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
OPC Optional Planning Charge
PAG Property Advisory Group
PD Permitted Development
PFI Private Finance Initiative
P&CA Planning and Compensation Act, 1991 (the 1991 Act)
PGS Planning Gain Supplement
PPP Public Private Partnership
RICS Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors
RSL Registered Social Landlord
RTPI Royal Town Planning Institute
SEU Social Exclusion Unit
TCPA Town & Country Planning Association
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T&CPA Town and Country Planning Act (with the year of the Act to clarify)
UDC Urban Development Corporation
UP Urban Programme
UTF Urban Task Force
Often the Planning Acts are just referred to as the year and the Act i.e. the 1990 Act is 
the 1990 T&CPA. (The Planning Acts are 1932, 1943, 1947, 1954, 1959, 1968, and 
1990).
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APPENDIX 2 
STATISTICS AND CHARTS
Cons N L Cons N L % change
00 App 676 1111
00 Obi 0 0 0 0
00 Clauses 0 0
01 App 101 69
01 Obi 13 23 12.9 33.3 20.4
01 Clauses 40 70
02 App 10 11
02 Obi 1 2 10 18.2 8.2
02 Clauses 1 3
03 App 14 21
03 Obi 0 2 0 9.5 9.5
03 Clauses 0 18
04 App 24 25
04 Obi 3 4 12.5 16 3.5
04 Clauses 12 54
05 App 59 44
05 Obi 4 3 6.8 6.8 0
05 Clauses 20 4
06 App 533 594
06 Obi 19 50 3.6 8.4 4.8
06 Clauses 43 81
07 App 64 92
07 Obi 1 8 1.6 8.7 7.1
07 Clauses 1 8
08 App 109 51
08 Obi 3 1 2.8 2 -0.8
08 Clauses 8 4
09 App 166 141
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09 Obi 2 4 1.2 2.8 1.6
09 Clauses 2 5
10 App 607 765
10 Obi 8 14 1.3 1.8 0.5
10 Clauses 20 18
11 App 0 0
11 Obi 0 0 0 0 0
11 Clauses 0 0
12 App 577 501
12 Obi 9 14 1.6 2.8 1.2
12 Clauses 14 15
13 App 2485 3992
13 Obi 6 4 0.2 0.1 -0.1
13 Clauses 6 4
14 App 376 323
14 Obi 0 0 0 0 0
14 Clauses 0 0
15 App 133 153
15 Obi 0 0 0 0 0
15 Clauses 0 0
16 App 30 15
16 Obi 0 0 0 0 0
16 Clauses 0 0
17 App 67 21
17 Obi 0 0 0 0 0
17 Clauses 0 0
18 App 223 93
18 Obi 4 3 1.8 3.2 1.4
18 Clauses 4 10
Table 1: Number of applications, obligations, and clauses by class o f development for 
the six years of each Government.
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00 Not included on return i.e. Tree Preservation Order applications
01 Major dwellings -  schemes with 10 or more dwellings or where number of 
dwellings not specified but site area exceeds 0.5ha
02 Major offices/R&D/light industry -  proposals within use class A2 and B1 which 
have floorspace of 1,000 sq. m. or more, or a site area over lha
03 Major heavy industry/storage/warehousing -  proposals within use class B2 and 
B8 which have floorspace of 1,000 sq. m. or more, or a site area over lha
04 Major retail distribution and services -  proposals within use class Al and A3 
which have floorspace of 1,000 sq. m. or more, or a site area over lha
05 All other major development -  proposals with floorspace of 1,000 sq. m. or 
more, or a site area over lha, where the proposed use does not fall into use 
classes C3, A2, B l, B2, B8, Al or A3.
06 Minor dwellings -  schemes with 1-9 dwellings or where number of dwellings is 
not specified but site area is equal to or less than 0.5ha
07 Minor offices/R&D/light industry -  as class 02 but less than size criteria
08 Minor heavy industry/storage/warehousing -  as class 03 but less than size 
criteria
09 Minor retail distribution and services -  as class 04 but less than size criteria
10 All other minor developments -  as class 05 but less than size criteria
11 Minerals -  non county matters only -  both major and minor schemes, mineral 
handling installations etc.
12 Change of use -  where no building or engineering operation is taking place or is 
permitted development
13 Householder development -  extensions, garages etc. within the curtilage of a 
residential property
14 Advertisements
15 Listed building consent -  alteration, extension or partial demolition of a listed 
building
16 Listed building consent -  full or substantial demolition of a listed building
17 Conservation area consent -  full or substantial demolition of a non-listed 
building within a Conservation Area
18 Other -  applications not included in any of above i.e. certificate of lawfulness
Table 2: Government codes for class of development (as produced originally by DTLR)
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Year
(A)
App
(B)
Obi
(C)
Obi exc 
GTC 
(D)
% with 
obi 
(E)
% with 
obi exc 
GTC (F)
1991/92 1079 19 19 1.76 1.76
1992/93 944 8 8 0.85 0.85
1993/94 1021 16 16 1.57 1.57
1994/95 1042 12 12 1.15 1.15
1995/96 1065 9 9 0.85 0.85
1996/97 1103 9 9 0.82 0.82
1997/98 1243 9 9 0.72 0.72
1998/99 1222 16 15 1.31 1.23
1999/00 1244 35 8 2.81 0.64
2000/01 1370 23 9 1.68 0.66
2001/02 1417 25 9 1.76 0.64
2002/03 1526 24 11 1.57 0.72
14276 205 134 1.44 0.94
Table 3: Number of applications, obligations per application and percentages per year.
This table shows the number of valid applications (B) received each year (A), the 
number of applications from that year subsequently with an obligation (C) and then by 
excluding those with a GTC payment (D). It then states these figures as percentages o f 
applications, first including those with a GTC payment (E) and then excluding them (F).
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APPENDIX 3
INTERVIEW TEMPLATE
Aim of the planning system
1. What do you see as the aim of the planning system when it was first created?
□ Do you share that view?
2. Do you think the Conservatives had a distinct aim with the planning system 
when they were in power and if so, what was it?
□ Do you think the Labour Government had a distinct aim for the planning 
system when they first came to power, and if so, what was it?
□ Has that changed since they have been in power, and if so, in what way?
3. If there were changes in the aim of planning across both periods, where did the 
pressure for change come from? (Globalisation, Government policy, public 
pressure etc.)
4. The current Government says there is a balance between economic, 
environmental and social aims in the planning system. Do you think 
Government policy actually seeks a balance within the planning system in 
practice?
□ If not, which aim is primary?
□ How is this seen/ can you give examples
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□ Any ideas why this would be?
5. My research is particularly interested in considering social aims in the planning 
system. What do you see as social issues within the planning system?
6. Has the aim of the planning system in HBC reflected Government aims since the 
nineties or has it had other pressures?
□ If so, what was the aim and why?
7. How has the modernisation agenda affected the planning system?
□ What about at HBC?
Obligations
8. What does Government policy allow obligations to be used for?
□ Any difference in practice?
9. Is there any conflict between policy, case law, and ‘get what you can’?
10. Do you think obligations used be used for the following three rationales & why:
□ To directly support the implementation of planned development by removing 
obstacles i.e. highway contribution to upgrade a junction
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□ Mitigating the impact of development over a wider area i.e. replacing lost 
facilities elsewhere in the borough
□ Betterment i.e. tax on developer
Do you think obligations should be used to provide (or take a financial 
contribution towards):
□ Health facilities
□ Education facilities
□ Sport facilities
□ Recreational -  countryside access etc.
□ Income support
□ Affordable housing
□ Social services -  CAB, meals on wheels etc.
□ Community services/ centres
□ Child-care/ creche
□ Employment training
□ Any others
12. Do you think that small developers should pay the same pro-rata contributions 
as larger developers to cover the cumulative impact of small developments, and 
why?
13. Do you think obligations have increased or decreased in volume and size of 
contributions over the past decade? If so, why?
□ It has been said that the Government has opportunistically used obligations 
to partly plug a reduction in local government finance -  do you think that’s 
true, and if so, to what extent?
□ Do you think Councils are now trying to use obligations to achieve funding 
for ‘new’ ideas? If so, which areas in particular?
□ Does this place you under pressure to try to use obligations for something 
they weren’t primarily planned for?
Specific HBC questions
14. How has HBC policy on obligations developed over the years and in what way?
15. Where has the pressure for any change come?
16. What was driver for open space and GTC obligations policy?
□ Could these have been developed sooner?
□ Could these have been better developed or are they suitable?
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17. Have any other obligations been considered?
□ Should they have been?
18. Highways and restriction of use and activity dominate clauses within obligations 
at HBC over the research period -  any comment on why?
19. My research found a shift towards more positive use of clauses under New 
Labour government -  any reason why this would be?
20. What weight does the Council give to obligations when granting permission?
21. Are you aware of any attempt by developer to ‘buy planning permission’?
22. Any issues over transparency with public and deals being done behind closed 
doors so by the time the obligation is public it’s too late?
23 Are contributions well monitored to check money received, spent and linked to
correct scheme?
24. Is there sufficient knowledge within the Council to negotiate with developers? 
Any issues?
25. Do obligations lead to delays with planning permission?
□ If so, who by?
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□ Is there any conflict with the target culture?
26. Is there much consideration given to obligations simply buying off the impact of 
development rather than seeking a lower impact development?
27. Does the Council seek revenue payments for maintenance? 
□ If so, is it successful
28. Do Members get involved with discussions on obligations?
□ Should they?
□ Do they understand the context of obligations?
Other questions
29. What system should the Government introduce for obligations or leave as it is?
30. Any changes needed to give social aims in planning more weight?
31. Anything else you would like to add?
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APPENDIX 4
SUMMARY GUIDE TO DEVELOPERS CONTRIBUTIONS IN HAVANT
BOROUGH
Summary Guide to Developers Contributions in Havant Borough
1.0 Introduction
1.1 The principle of developers making financial contributions to provide additional 
infrastructure because of their developments is well established. The Council 
needs to ensure that all new development doesn’t increase the pressure on 
existing services and this could require a financial contribution to cover the 
additional costs. Council officers will therefore negotiate with developers to 
seek the required contribution to cover the costs so that both the new and 
existing community will not be disadvantaged. It is important to discuss the 
likely level of contributions with Council officers at an early stage in the 
development process so the costs can be built into developers' and landowners' 
financial appraisals before property transactions are completed. With all 
developer contributions the Council will negotiate the level of contribution in 
order to balance the needs of the community with the viability of the 
development.
1.2 In order to seek contributions from developers there must be a clear planning 
policy justification. The Havant Borough District Wide Local Plan (HBDWLP) 
sets out the policy background for the Council to seek developer’s contributions 
for the following:
2.0 Provision and Improvement of Playing Space (Policy R17 of HBDWLP)
2.1 Supplementary Planning Guidance (SPG) was adopted by the Council on the
26th October, 2004 and seeks to implement the requirements of Policy R17 of
the HBDWLP. The principle of the policy is that most residential development
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isn’t large enough to enable viable on-site provision of playspace. Therefore 
contributions will be collected in area based financial ‘pots’ that will be spent on 
either creating new facilities or improving existing facilities when sufficient 
funds have been accumulated.
2.2 In general, contributions will be sought towards equipped children’s playspace, 
casual children’s playspace and playing fields, pitches and courts on all new 
permanent residential developments of more than 5 dwellings, excluding 
supported housing and care/nursing homes. The playspace calculation is 
undertaken on the net number of dwellings being proposed in a development. 
This means that if 10 new dwellings are proposed on a site where 5 dwellings 
will be demolished to make way for the new ones, then the net development is 
only 5 and the policy does not apply.
2.3 On sites that fall within the threshold for applying the policy, the amount of 
money that will be sought will be calculated on the number of bedrooms being 
proposed in the overall development. The sum that will be sought per bedroom 
is currently £543.50, which includes a sum for maintenance over a 20-year 
period.
2.4 Where there is sufficient land to allow the playing space to be provided on-site, 
then the Council will normally expect the land to be transferred to its ownership 
along with a financial contribution to cover maintenance for 20 years (based on 
the calculation in paragraphs 2.2-2.3 above).
3.0 Green Transport Contributions (Policy T i l  of HBDWLP)
3.1 Contributions will be sought in respect of all development in the Borough where 
additional private trips will be generated on the transportation network. In these 
cases a contribution will be required to make a proposal acceptable in terms of 
providing greater opportunities for those living, working on or visiting the site to 
use alternative modes of transport to the private car. The basis for assessing 
contributions is a formula that links floorspace to trip generation activity. The 
formula is relatively complex and officers can provide further advice. There is
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also SPG available.
4.0 Affordable Housing (Policy H8 of HBDWLP)
4.1 Affordable Housing is housing that is available for people who cannot afford to 
buy or rent from the open market in Havant. It includes social rented and shared 
ownership housing, intermediate housing, key workers’ housing and low cost 
market housing.
4.2 The site size threshold that the Council applies through Policy H8 of the 
HBDWLP is that affordable housing will be sought on development proposals of 
15 or more dwellings or on sites of 0.5 hectares or more. The Council will apply 
a gross calculation method to assessing the number of dwellings being 
proposed. This means that if 15 dwellings are proposed on a site where 4 
dwellings are to be demolished the net increase is only 11, the gross figures is 
15, therefore the proposal would fall within the site size threshold. On schemes 
that fell within the site size threshold the Council will seek a 30% proportion of 
the dwellings proposed as affordable. Affordable housing is usually required to 
be provided on-site but exceptionally financial contributions may be accepted to 
be spent on other sites within the Borough. It is intended to produce a more 
detailed Supplementary Planning Document in the near future.
5.0 Broadmarsh Transportation Strategy (Policy EMP2 of HBDWLP)
5.1 The Broadmarsh Transportation strategy seeks transport contributions to largely 
meet highway deficiencies arising from development proposals in the 
Broadmarsh area. Officers will advise you when this contribution will be 
required.
6.0 Nature Conservation (Policies NC2, NC3, NC4 & NC5 of HBDWLP)
6.1 In exceptional circumstances development may be permitted which would 
adversely affect interests of nature conservation as identified in Policies NC2 -  
NC5 of the HBDWLP. In such cases the Council will seek mitigation and
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compensatory measures which may involve financial contributions as well as 
works on site. On such proposals the developer must take full and detailed 
account of its critical environmental importance.
7.0 Percent for Art (Policy D3 of HBDWLP)
7.1 Public art aims to enhance the quality of the environment and make places better 
through providing identity, character and sense of place through community 
engagement and responses to specific sites. Policy D3 requires a contribution of 
1 per cent of the capital cost of the development for all major development 
proposals. Further guidance will be produced on this policy.
8.0 A3 Bus Priority Route (Policies T10 & IMP1 of HBDWLP)
8.1 This infrastructure initiative is currently being implemented from Portsmouth to 
Clanfield. Hampshire County Council (HCC) is seeking to secure funding for 
the works through developers contributions. No specific details are available 
from HCC in respect of the level of contributions that will be sought and 
applications will have to be judged individually on their merits. All developers 
whose schemes have a direct link to the A3 need to contact Hampshire County 
Council for further details.
9.0 Education (Policy IMP1 of HBDWLP)
9.1 HCC is the education authority and contributions may be needed to meet any 
capacity deficits in number of places available or sufficiency deficits in 
facilities that would be needed due to a development. HCC will be consulted 
on all residential development of 10 dwellings or more.
10.0 Collecting Contributions
10.1 Developer contributions are normally secured under the provisions of Section 
106 of the Planning Act. This means that a legal agreement must be signed. Due 
to the increasing pressure to meet planning application deadlines the Council
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will encourage the use of fastrack unilateral legal agreements and/or the payment 
of any financial sums prior to the granting of planning permission. If applicants 
have not resolved the financial contributions by the time the application reaches 
the deadline then it is likely that the application will be refused. On more 
complex applications a bilateral legal agreement is more usual. In order to meet 
application targets it is essential that applicants are fully aware of their 
obligations and have sorted them out prior to formal submission. For further 
information please contact the Development Control team.
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APPENDIX 5
OTHER WAYS OF CAPTURING LAND VALUE
The TCP A (1999, 2002b) have long argued that any reform of the planning system must 
involve a better way of ‘capturing betterment’ for the benefit of the whole community 
and this principle underlined setting up the Garden City ideal and was accepted in the 
New Towns Act of 1946.
“The point is one of profound philosophy: the demand for development 
arises from the activities of society at large and not from the activities of the 
landowner, and since the nationalisation of development rights under the 
Town and Country Planning Act 1947 the opportunity for individual 
landowners to profit from consent to develop is at the discretion of 
governments” (TCPA, 2002b: 105).
While previous attempts at betterment may have failed, the current understanding of 
direct and indirect impact from development on the environment and on communities is 
better understood and profits from development have increased. There is growing 
confidence that some form of betterment is actually possible, which in itself is a major 
achievement as it would have been inconceivable to think such a discussion was 
possible a decade ago. Mainstream journals are now even suggesting that Councils 
decide the housing numbers for their area, buy the land needed, grant permission and 
then sell the land at the inflated value so the community benefits from the increase in 
land value (Leunig, 2004). However, the TCPA (1999, 2002b) recognise that the ‘devil 
is in the detail’ and betterment will only work once the development impacts have been 
fully assessed, if it is flexible enough to not stifle building, and is disbursed according to 
agreed principles.
One of the key issues in support of betterment is that it purposely split tax collection 
and planning whereas using obligations to achieve fiscal objectives is not what the 
planning system was designed for (Crow, 2002). There has also been considerable 
debate in recent years around the fear that any increase in obligations would simply be 
passed on to house buyers in the form of higher prices, thereby making housing less 
affordable (Butt, 2003). The betterment system would yield a substantial amount of
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revenue but was much more likely to take the contribution from the landowner’s profit 
than the developer, who just passes it on to the house buyer.
The TCPA (1999) accepts that betterment has been difficult to implement in the past, 
but point out that five other options exist and that they could operate jointly at national, 
regional or local levels. The five options are:
• A general land development tax
• A hypothecated land tax to be used for affordable housing or infrastructure 
investment
• Waiving charges or using charges to cross-subsidise on development that is 
agreed as sustainable i.e. environmentally beneficial or priority housing
• A charge collected by partnership trusts for regeneration or conservation
• A charge collected by local authorities and placed in community chests to be 
used for projects generated by the local community.
Consideration of reintroducing a betterment system has also raised concern that any 
taxation would be national which would make local betterment more difficult through 
instruments such as planning obligations and this loss of connection between the tax and 
the benefit would be retrograde for local communities who want to see new 
development contributing something (Butt, 2003). There is also the risk that the 
Treasury sees it as a national tax that did not have to be used for mitigation of 
development impact and so the money would not even be spent on integrating new 
development to old. The main problem though remains the political opposition which 
has hindered previous attempts as cross-party support remains highly unlikely (Butt,
2003).
There are a host of other suggestions that go beyond the simple betterment versus 
obligations debate and some of these are outlined here.
Auctions/ VAT/ stamp duty/ business rate
In the pre-1990s Netherlands, the municipalities themselves carried out most greenfield 
housing schemes by acquiring the land to be developed by buying it from the existing
284
landowners, putting in the primary services and then disposing of the building plots. 
The price retained a contribution towards the secondary services and the plan making 
process. Thus, the development gain was taken from the initial landowner as the gain 
was worked into the purchase price from the original owner. The local authority could 
ensure that all gains required were therefore calculated and reflected in the site 
(Verhage & Needham, 1997). This is probably the best way of ensuring the cost goes 
into the start of the development process rather than added onto the end but is highly 
unlikely to be supported by any political party currently in existence in England.
Another option that has been considered is to alter VAT rates. The UTF and the Empty 
Homes Agency have both advocated harmonisation of VAT rates for new dwellings, 
conversion of existing buildings to residential use along with repairs and maintenance 
(new build and conversion to residential is currently zero rated while refurbishment is 
now 15%). While the Task Force had hoped for zero rating, they accepted that the 
Empty Homes Agency’s proposition of 5% was more practical. However, 
harmonisation at zero rate is against EU law and so will not happen (Evans & Bate, 
2000).
Evans & Bate (2000) also supported the introduction of VAT on greenfield housing as 
this would raise over £1 billion annually. They recognised that in areas of low land 
value the VAT could be reduced (or forsaken) and that similar arrangements could be 
made for housing associations and charities.
Another option has proposed to increase brownfield development by taxing greenfield 
development at 17.5% (now 15%) which KPMG have suggested would work, although 
they held it to be politically unacceptable. Evans & Bate (2000) believe it has some 
potential as France, Austria, Finland, and Sweden all charge tax on new houses at over 
20% and it could be introduced after a time lag to allow existing sites with permission 
to be built that would not have had the cost built into the purchase price.
Adjusting stamp duty has been rejected by the RICS as unacceptable due to the fact that 
it would lead to a more volatile and unstable macro-economy due to the impact upon 
capital values (Evans & Bate, 2000). KPMG have suggested tax holidays for
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brownfield sites and three-year windows before Capital Gains Tax rates are raised 
(Evans & Bate, 2000).
The Pre-Budget Report 2002: Steering a steady course: Delivering stability, enterprise 
and fairness in an uncertain world was published by HM Treasury (November 2002) 
and sets out the Government’s intention to allow local authorities more financial 
freedom. The primary legislation was then set out in the Local Government Bill in 
February 2003 and was to become operational following the next business rate 
revaluation on 1 April 2005. The Treasury then produced a consultation paper Local 
Authority Business Growth Incentives -  A Consultation Paper in July 2003 (ODPM, 
2003a) and stated that the Government was seeking to address the mismatch between 
the costs of economic development (congestion on transport, impact on environment, 
housing, education and community safety etc.) which occur on local authorities and the 
benefits of economic growth which are reaped nationally through more jobs and those 
of better quality which are collected through national taxes. Currently, all business rate 
revenue is collected by local authorities and passed into a central pool but this proposal 
is to allow local authorities to retain some of the business rate revenues associated with 
growing the business rate tax base as a local level.
Other legislation
Historically there has been a plethora of other powers that exist to collect payments or 
have works done, with section 33 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act, 1982; section 111 of the Local Government Act, 1972; section 278 of the 
Highways Act (now amended by the New Roads and Street Works Act, 1991) the ones 
mostly used (Healey et al., 1993). The RTPI (2000) underlines the use of section 278 
agreements as substantial in number and scope and also points out that in addition to 
these powers many local authorities also have local acts which they can rely upon, 
although many of these ceased to have power by the end of 1984. The Government also 
continues to constantly tinker with the local government funding process, with the Local 
Authority Business Growth Incentive the latest idea at potentially giving local 
authorities a little more of the central funding pot (Falk, 2005).
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Section 33 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1982 provided for 
positive undertakings to carry out works and was a main provision before the 1990 Act. 
However, the 1991 Act removed the ability of section 33 to be used in conjunction with 
the granting of planning permission and so is no longer of importance.
Section 111 of the Local Government Act, 1972 allows a local authority to enter into 
any contract that facilitates them discharging any of their functions and so can be very 
wide ranging in scope. As public authorities, they are open to scrutiny of public law as 
well as the private law of contract. This means that the courts will consider judicial 
values of fairness, human rights and the public interest and not just consider their 
efficiency and morality. It is important to realise that this section of the Act means 
powers can be very wide ranging and although there is a perceived legal check over 
their use, the simple fact is that if the agreements go beyond the scope of legal powers it 
is not always relevant.
“...it is important to realize that even where there may be doubts over the 
legal validity of an agreement or a grant of permission, there is normally no 
incentive for the immediate parties to test the matter in the courts. Most 
challenges in the courts have been mounted by aggrieved third parties such 
as rival developers” (Healey et al., 1995: 72).
Any judicial review of a decision to grant planning permission has to be made to the 
High Court and within six weeks of the decision date. The consideration in the High 
Court means very few individuals will be able to challenge a decision for financial 
reasons and for time consumption reasons. The six-week cut off means that unless 
another developer (the only likely source with sufficient finance to challenge the 
decision) is actively monitoring the site and ongoing application, by the time they find 
out the development is going ahead (usually when work starts on site) it is too late to 
challenge the decision.
The other main provision for agreements that was noted above was under the Highways
Act, 1980 where the developer seeks to ensure the roads for the development are
adopted for maintenance by the highway authority. Section 38 of the Highways Act,
1980 (as modified by the New Roads and Street Works Act, 1991) is used when the
developers construct the road themselves and then seeks the highway authority to adopt
it. Section 278 of the Highways Act, 1980 is used where the highway authority carries
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out the work and the developer pays for the works. The developer can also be charged 
for the later maintenance of the scheme. The former (s.3 8) is normally used for on-site 
works and the latter (s.278) for off-site works (Healey et al., 1995).
One of the problems with different options being available to statutory bodies to achieve 
the same aims is that it can be very difficult for developers as they not only face 
different scales and types of demands for the ‘regular’ obligations under section 106, 
but they also face different powers and interpretations of them. Developers are always 
keen to know in advance the likely costs of the proposed development and timescales 
for implementation but this is made more difficult where they are not familiar with the 
processes used. Different legal powers require their solicitors to investigate legislation 
they would not be as familiar with and can cause further delays.
Authorities also use obligations in very different ways and seek very different returns 
for their communities as will be considered later. However, the use of different 
legislation and variation in the use of obligations is not restricted to Britain. Tomalty & 
Skaburskis (1997) report different uses of legislation to collect planning gain across 
authorities in the same city of Ontario in Canada with some authorities collecting 
development charges through by-laws while others negotiate on a site-by-site basis.
SYR/ CGT/ Sales Tax/ TIF/ Crossrail
There has also been consideration given to site value rating (SVR) which is an annual 
tax on the assessed value of all land rather than one-off taxation (Butt, 2003; Hall,
2004). It gives an incentive to land owners to maximise the use of their land as sites are 
taxed on the basis of their potential value rather than on current-use value. It is meant to 
be a replacement of uniform business rate (UBR) and council tax and would apply to all 
land including residential. However, administration would be very difficult due to the 
lack of a satisfactory land database and the UK planning system is not predictable on 
potential uses as it is not based on zoning. In addition, the memory of the Poll Tax riots 
will probably stop changes to the rating system for many years.
Butt (2003) considers capital gains tax (CGT), which the TCPA proposed in 1997 that a 
higher level of CGT should be levied on profits from land as an alternative to
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betterment tax. They have backed away from this position somewhat as it appears it 
would be very difficult to implement and runs the danger of withholding land if the tax 
is too high and CGT is a national tax so it is unlikely it would be linked to the 
development that generated it.
Another option is illustrated by Kotin & Peiser (1997). In California, the city authority 
is allowed to retain 1% of all sale taxes from retail; this is an increasingly important 
revenue stream as government funding has been cut back. However, while it seems a 
relatively simple solution it has strong drawbacks for planning as the redevelopment 
agencies in the USA have aggressively sought to attract large volume retailers for the 
revenue stream that will follow. This can seriously alter land-use patterns as retail 
becomes more attractive and important to cash strapped authorities.
Redevelopment schemes in the USA are often negotiated on a partnership basis where a 
scheme will be considered over a certain life span. The public revenue from the scheme 
is then paid back into the partnership with the first part (say ten years of a thirty five 
year scheme) seeing forty percent of revenue paying for public infrastructure, thirty five 
percent going to the city, twenty percent to the developer and five percent to the retailer. 
Then, during years eleven to thirty five, the developer receives around forty five 
percent, the city forty, the retailer two percent, and public infrastructure thirteen percent. 
The methodology considers the percentage of benefits to be received by each party 
starting from the city’s ‘eligible revenues’ (total revenues minus total expenditure and 
any exclusion). The formula is complicated and the city expenditure includes street 
maintenance, ambulance services, fire protection, traffic enforcement, law enforcement 
and administration (Kotin & Peiser, 1997).
The use of Tax Incremental Financing (TIF) in USA is another possibility. It empowers 
Councils to raise finance to invest in the local infrastructure and then the Council repays 
the debt from contributions raised from developers attracted by the improvements and 
future increases in property tax revenue (Adair et al., 2003; Hall, 2004; Lambert, 2000). 
However, this is a very risky process as the authority could be left with infrastructure 
that has been built but any downturn in the economic climate would mean the 
developers do not come forward. Nevertheless, it has been considered for London and
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has received some support (Butt, 2003) but is unlikely to be a viable option for many of 
the smaller authorities.
A levy of two pence in the pound is to be supplemented onto business rates in London 
for major companies to help fund Crossrail (see Walker, 2007a). The proposal required 
primary legislation54 and will provide £5 billion in addition to the Government 
contributing £5 billion, a further £5 billion will be borrowed by the state against future 
fares, and £1 billion from the cities top firms. The levy will apply to firms with a 
rateable value over £50,000 and will stop once the £5 billion has been repaid. 
However, as it required a hybrid bill, due to the public and private elements, it took a 
considerable time to implement and so is only realistic for major schemes.
Land value taxation
A land value taxation approach involves the local authority increasing and decreasing 
the amount sought according to their opinion of how much of a contribution can be 
achieved which comes from the expected profitability of the site. A problem with the 
user fee approach is that while the hypothecation towards an impact is intended, the 
local authority usually has to pool money to provide the services and so a general 
taxation fee is more useful (Grant, 1999).
The benefits of the planning gain system over a national taxation system include that it 
is outside the control of the Treasury, raises local revenue or provides specific public 
goods, is flexible and can be tied into land policy objectives. In operational terms it is 
beyond the courts who have washed their hands of it and is not in the hands of officials 
with little understanding of land markets, as happens with the taxation system (Grant, 
1999).
User charge
A user charge is opposite to a general tax and is appropriate for the situation where only 
one person (or organisation) benefits from an action by a public body. It is a market
54 Crossrail Act, 2008 which received Royal Assent on 22nd July 2008
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transaction and should be assessed thus. An example would be when a highway 
authority constructs a road to link a private building site to a public highway. It is not a 
tax and is not mandatory - the developer can take it or leave it. However, the problem 
comes from the fact that few services are provided to a single user and usually 
neighbouring landowners also benefit from the service i.e. landowners that adjoin a new 
road will also benefit from the new infrastructure. This is usually more about 
recovering costs and is apportioned via some formula to reflect who gains the most, 
rather than about establishing a fund to meet future liabilities. User charges need to be 
able to demonstrate that the money received is put towards the purpose for which it was 
required in a way that broader economic instruments do not require (Grant, 1999).
Bailey (1994) states that in America, substantial user-charge revenues are generated 
from utility-type, non-discretionary services such as water and sewerage and the growth 
of separate capital property-related charges, such as infrastructure, has also been 
substantial. It needs to be remembered that in contrast to the USA, the UK local 
government does not provide electricity, gas, hospital, higher education, water or 
sewerage services and these accounted for half of user-charge revenue in USA during 
the 1980s and were the areas of most growth. Bailey (1994) shows research results that 
place the UK only 7th (out of 10) for increase in user-charge revenues during 1980 to 
1989 with Australia 1st and Norway 2nd. However, planning gain is not strictly a user- 
charge in many cases as it is levied at the construction stage rather than at the point of 
use.
It has been concluded that the international experience of developed countries is that 
user-charges are not being used as part of a fiscal substitution strategy to replace 
intergovernmental grants (Bailey, 1994). However, in the UK, user-charges are still 
widespread and numerous with the highest cost-recovery rates in property-related 
services, including planning which is in part through the increase in planning gain, but 
were still relatively small compared with people-based services such as education.
Social infrastructure framework
The Thames Gateway has introduced the concept of social infrastructure frameworks 
that will coordinate the provision of schools, health centres, gardens and green spaces
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for children (Kochan, 2006b). Early (2006a) reports that the right-of-centre Policy 
Exchange think-tank proposed a ‘social cost tariff to compensate communities affected 
by development and would be a one off payment of £500,000 per hectare for greenfield 
housing sites and would replace obligations. The CPRE said it was an attempt to ‘buy- 
off opposition to development by local communities. However, the Conservatives 
were said to be interested in it as they did not want to be seen to support the PGS.
Tariffs
The use of formulas is supported by feedback from participants reported by Evans and 
Bate (2000) and also by Healey et al. (1993). The RTPI (2000) also supports the 
development of a tariff or scale based approach where a balanced and well-planned 
development can be organised by contributions to infrastructure. The support is 
generally found in quarters where local authorities are seen as ‘chancing their arm’ in 
trying to extract inflated amounts of money from developers rather than what can be 
justified.
The fact that Campbell et al (2001) are surprised that a fifth of SPG on obligations was 
in the form of informal scales of charges suggests that the use of formula approaches is 
not widely known and has possibly increased in use recently. They report that the most 
usual approach is a standard charge per dwelling (usually towards open space, 
educational facilities, or car parking charges). Windsor & Maidenhead go so far as to 
advise that 28 primary school places are required per 100 dwellings.
Perhaps the most successful scheme of differential land taxation is that of Singapore 
under the Planning Act 1998 which specifically seeks to apply betterment. The base 
point is the entitlement for the plot under the 1958 Master Plan and the charge is 
payable on the difference between the entitlement then and the permission sought. The 
charge is calculated on two multipliers. The first is the use where the cost is calculated 
in accordance with a schedule based on the volume of development according to the 
change of use from the 1958 Master Plan. The second charge is based on any increase 
in density. There is a rarely exercised right of appeal, which allows a valuation 
approach instead of 50% of the increase in value attributable to the planning permission 
but there is rarely much difference between the two. The process works like an impact
292
fee but the objective remains taxing a convenient source of revenues and not to offset 
development impacts. There is no hypothecation of revenues. One of the reasons it 
remains successful is the political stability that underlies it, that it is reviewed annually 
and adjusted to take account of the national economy (Grant, 1999).
It is considered that the current system of using obligations has many drawbacks but in 
principle is preferable to any national taxation system that has the likelihood of being 
controlled by the Treasury, as that would undoubtedly end up in money being siphoned 
off to other causes and break the link with development contributing towards dealing 
with the impact it causes. However, there is a variation on obligations that also needs to 
be considered as it has probably gained ground in recent years as the most likely viable 
alternative and is known as impact fees (Walker & Smith, 2002).
Impact fees
Five different types of impact fee are possible, although subdivision is also possible 
(Goodchild et al, 1996):
• A flat-rate charge, varied by land use type and fixed throughout the area
• A site-specific charge levied in accordance with general principles
• A site-specific charge levied case-by-case
• A project-based charge levied on a fixed basis within a programmed 
development area
• A project-based charge levied on a negotiated basis across a coordinated 
development area
The first has historically been used the most in Britain, the second is characterised by 
the American rational nexus test, and the third includes some of the s. 106 charging in 
Britain, while the last two are derived mostly from France (Goodchild et al., 1996). 
Things have certainly moved on since the framework was developed but it is a good 
starting point.
There can be a considerable problem when it is claimed that new development causes 
damage that is used to justify the collection of a fee but then the local authority does not
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spend the money mitigating the impact but instead spends it on something else entirely. 
This lack of transparency is not so much of a problem in the USA with the required 
‘rational nexus’ test set out in the second option where it must be demonstrated that 
there is a need for the new public facility, the money provided is proportionate to that 
need, and it is used for that aim. The impact fee is worked out in stages by projecting 
needs based on a service area and a level of service i.e. for open space it is 5 acres per 
1,000 residents in the USA so a projected increase of 10,000 residents would require 50 
acres. Then an assessment is made of existing capacity and the difference is the ‘capital 
improvement programme.’ Revenues then have to be assessed with contributions from 
the federal government, state government and local taxes with the shortfall the basis for 
assessing development impact fees.
Impact fees have gone through four stages with the first stage focusing on essential 
ingredients, such as water and waste. The second generation broadened to include 
roads, parks, fire facilities, police facilities, libraries, schools etc. while the third 
generation was more tenuous with publicly-assisted housing, day care centres, public 
art, employment training centres etc. The fourth generation added revenue costs to the 
capital projects and included operation and maintenance costs. The fee per dwelling for 
water and waste are usually between $1,000 and $20,000, drainage and roads $600 - 
$25,000, fire and police services $100-$2,000, libraries and school $550 - $6,000, 
leaving an overall bill of between $1,000 - $60,000 (Grant, 1999).
The UTF (1999) recommended two types of impact fee. The first was a standardised 
impact fee that should be required for small urban development schemes to contribute 
towards local environmental improvements and community facilities that reflect the 
priorities of local people. The second was for larger schemes where environmental 
impact fees were to recompense for the negative net environmental impact. However, 
they were criticised for failing to spell out how the fees would be calculated, how the 
scheme would work, and because they advocated the majority of money collected 
should go to the RDA for regional regeneration rather than to off-set local impacts 
(Grant, 1999).
The rational nexus test is similar to tests three and four of Circular 1/97 (ensuring a link 
between the requirement and the development) but they are considered to be more
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prescriptive, certain in application, transparent in how costs are calculated and 
apportioned, and more accountable as all information is published and updated annually 
in published plans (Walker & Smith, 2002). Impact fees would overcome many of the 
criticisms of obligations as a result and have found favour in many quarters with the 
added transparency of being able to publish the predicted cost of new development in 
the local plan (meaning a developer can quickly work out the cost in advance and reflect 
this in the purchase negotiation) a key selling point (Evans & Bate, 2000; Healey et al, 
1996). Similar systems operate in Greece, Portugal, Sweden and France (Crow, 1998) 
and charging for individual items of infrastructure is not unprecedented in Britain.55
Impact fees have the advantage of being able to be levied at the same flat rate regionally 
or even nationally which would be easy to collect, open, predictable, consistent and 
would cover all developments (not just the large ones) as they can be worked out on a 
unit or floorspace basis. The disadvantage is that it would not reflect the actual cost of 
the impact as costs would be averaged, and it could stifle development where it is most 
needed but land prices are lower.
Healey et al. (1995) suggest that impact fees should be developed through the local plan 
process with policies setting out the impacts of development that would be required to 
be alleviated and the costs associated with doing so. An impact-driven approach to 
development obligations that is grounded in the development plan is considered to 
combine the value of systematic argumentation about impacts with the flexibility to 
recognise the specifics of individual projects and places. The local plan can be used to 
justify the relationships between projects, their impacts, their mitigations, what is a 
sufficient relationship, and material considerations. In Ontario, Canada, the planners 
provide the forecasts and models for predicting future growth in the municipality but the 
finance department work out the cost of providing for the new people and co-ordinate 
the administration and implementation of the by-law through the negotiations (Tomalty 
& Skaburskis, 1997). Separating the payment clarifies that the contribution is to cover 
the costs related to growth rather than an attempt to influence development patterns. 
There may be some mileage in the separation of the functions in terms of transparency, 
but it is hard to see many local authority finance officials being up to negotiations with
55 The Public Health Act, 1875, the Private Street Works Act, 1892, and more recently the Water Act, 
1989 and the Water Industries Act, 1991 all allow for payment for infrastructure
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developers, statutory bodies and the public. Evidence has also found that this approach 
has led to an increase in staff, as negotiations are extensive and developers tend to 
prefer the use of site-specific schemes so they can track where their contribution has 
gone, rather than it going into a large non-specific pot (Tomalty & Skaburskis, 1997).
Impact fees have other problems, not least how to assess the actual cost of the impact, 
how to decide when and if any fees should be waived, and how to account for regional 
or local variations. Perhaps one of the biggest problems is the danger that authorities 
wanting to stifle development could deliberately set targets too high and effectively 
make development unprofitable. Having a policy in the local plan would mean it was 
subject to the Inspector reviewing the evidence base but it would be impractical to set 
out the costs in the local plan due to the time lag from production to it being adopted. 
Therefore it is more likely the costs would be set out in a separate Supplementary 
Planning Document and any appeal against refusal for not paying the charges would 
invite and Inspector to comment on the suitability of the levels proposed.
It is considered that the bigger problem with using impact fees is the philosophical 
argument that we should not give into the idea that it is acceptable to cause 
environmental damage as this damage can be ‘bought’ and paid off. It simply is not 
possible to keep on allowing pollution as eventually the cumulative impact will lead to 
irreversible events that cannot be paid off. Additionally, other development impacts 
cannot be bought i.e. you cannot pay for the loss of open space, bat roosts, historic 
buildings etc. as their loss is more than financial (Evans & Bate, 2000).
Lastly, the other problem of the impact fee approach is that a formula makes general 
assumptions and requires the same amount to be paid for each impact but this is an 
overly simplistic view of the development process. Sites have individual characteristics 
and costs associated with them which a formula will not take account off, such as 
existing buildings to be demolished, listed building to be restored as part of the scheme, 
contaminated land, etc. If no allowance is made for the costs already involved with 
developing a site the proposal could rapidly become financially unviable. Crow (1998: 
369) criticised impact fees for not relating well to the real cost that new housing places 
on infrastructure, although he felt they could be adapted and used with imagination.
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The use of formulas is supported by feedback from many participants (Crow, 1998; 
Evans & Bate (2000; Healey et al., 1993; RTPI, 2000).
“Where the situation permits it, it is manifest that only through some sort of 
formula approach can that arbitrariness which is often raised as a criticism 
of current practice be avoided. It is also the case that the sooner in the 
development process that a charge on a development is known the better” 
(Crow, 1998: 367).
Perhaps the most successful scheme of differential land taxation is that of Singapore 
which specifically seeks to apply betterment (see Grant, 1999). The base point is the 
entitlement for the plot under the 1958 Master Plan and the charge is payable on the 
difference between the entitlement then and the permission sought and is calculated 
using two multipliers. The first is the use where the cost is calculated in accordance 
with a schedule based on the volume of development according to the change of use 
from the 1958 Master Plan. The second charge is based on any increase in density. 
There is a rarely exercised right of appeal, which allows a valuation approach instead of 
half of the increase in value attributable to the planning permission but there is rarely 
much difference between the two. The process works like an impact fee but the 
objective remains taxing a convenient source of revenues and not to offset development 
impacts. There is no hypothecation of revenues. One of the reasons it remains 
successful is the political stability that underlies it and it is reviewed annually and 
adjusted to take account of the national economy.
Impact fees have now been developed into a roof tax, with Milton Keynes the largest
and best know example. However, the Milton Keynes Partnership (undated) explains
how the set up is very specific as it is forward funded by the Partnership, through
English Partnerships (EP) and with HM Treasury approval, so money can be provided
in advance for the infrastructure. The tariff contributions of £18,500 per dwelling and
£260,000 per hectare of employment space will then be used to pay back EP in the
future and is expected to achieve approximately twice the ‘standard’ s. 106 contribution
secured by Milton Keynes Council. Despite this, the contributions will only cover three
quarters of the local infrastructure costs and other funding sources are required to make
up the rest. Paying the contribution itself is not straightforward with, for residential
units for example, ten percent of the contribution paid upon gaining an implementable
consent, a further fifteen percent before work starts on site, and the balance on a
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quarterly basis after the first completion is sold or rented. There are also ‘longstop’ 
dates of ten or fifteen years for any outstanding payments if development is not 
completed within the timeframe.
Walker (2007c) explains that the Milton Keynes roof tax approach required public 
services to plan in the long term but that many do not do this without considerable high 
level pressure. The example is given of the Housing Corporation that took three years 
to develop a system that allowed them to plan for longer-term strategic allocations. He 
also points out that Milton Keynes was relatively straight forward as the land involved 
was fairly uniform in character and potential value and advises that other authorities 
may need multiple tariff levels where land/site conditions vary. The ability of EP to act 
as ‘banker’ to cover the cash flow gap between investment in infrastructure and income 
from the tariffs is unlikely to be repeated elsewhere. Gwilliam (2007) also agrees that 
the Milton Keynes ‘roof tax’ approach is only workable in that location due to the 
‘special circumstances that apply in that area’ and doesn’t think it can be rolled out as a 
model.
The Ashford growth area was another massive Government led regeneration project and 
so was able to use the Milton Keynes roof tax model with an estimated infrastructure 
funding gap of £14,000 per residential unit required (industrial and commercial 
development is exempt to encourage such uses and brownfield development will be 
discounted) and EP is acting as the banker again (Hayman, 2007). This cash flow that 
EP is acting to resolve is a major problem for other Councils to copy but Nigel Smith, 
chair of the RICS, has been reported (see Hayman, 2007) that the answer could be 
through council bonds.
Other smaller schemes have operated, such as that by Reigate & Banstead Borough 
Council, who developed a tariff approach to address the infrastructure needs for two 
major urban extensions around Horley and this worked out at a cost of £13,000 per 
dwelling (no charge for affordable housing) and is updated through a SPD (Ashworth & 
Demetrius, 2008).
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